Andreas

Michael, I will review it on Amazon.com later. Jeff - why buy it? Because it is the best regimental history of a Commonwealth unit that I have seen. It is one of these rare books that make you happy to have parted with the money. Gon, treat yourself to it Steel Inferno is a funny one - it was a starter into the field for me, and I thought it was quite decent then. Now I think differently - I would only recommend it with some health warning. That tour must have been something interesting. Ardennes were nice, BTW. Ideal weather, and we found the foxholes overlooking Foy. Still all there, you can even make out what looks like a company CP.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Vader's Jester: 49th Recce is hard. I just played it for the first time ever as the Britts and got my ass kicked! I had to request a cease-fire. German AI made out with a tactical victory. :mad: <hr></blockquote> Hehe - who said the AI can not be a challenge? -------- Andreas - giving the AI a break since August 2000

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Goanna: A setup for the byte battle will do nicely Mr. Moriarty so that I may exact some satisfaction from your fly ridden corpse.<hr></blockquote> Except that since I decided that the only reason how you sad lot from the Peng thread can justify your existence is that you playtest the brilliant events that are my scenarios. Which Moriartyand Mr. Peng did with Claustrophobia.

I need two of you tossers for a top-secret Byte Battle™ project. Have to be able to TCP each other. Email me NOW. Pronto. Get on with it. Only bolded ones need apply.

Link in my sig. Enjoy.

I picked up 'Go to it' in a shop in Hastings last year for £7. I think it is really quite good, despite the slightly cheesy cover. Seems to be out of print now. Up the Ox & Bucks, and all that...

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Brian: I'm surprised, Andreas. I thought you'd have been rather critical of it... <hr></blockquote> And I even read through most of it. I agree that the paras could benefit from more detailed modeling - especially after just reading Middlebrook's 'Arnhem - the airborne battle'. Well, CM II should solve that. I agree that it would be nice to have the sources - I presume that you used 'Go to it'? If so, you missed in the list of non-modeled vehicles the Cromwell IV, which 6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance did get a few of those towards the end of their stint in Normandy.

An abandoned gun is deemed out of service for the remainder of a battle. In operations, it can be remanned between battles. When abandoning guns, crews were trained to make them unservicable, by e.g. removing the breech block, or firing pin or whatever there is that you can do to a gun to make it no longer go 'boom'. This was expressly done to prevent the enemy from using the gun. Since this was SOP, it can be assumed that this is one reason why you can not recrew guns with Heinie, the wily Kraut (in the case of an Allied gun), or the Man on the Clapham Omnibus (in the case of a German gun).

Nice site Brian.

Where's my turn?

Okay, I tried to post, but somehow or other Netscape hates me. Do a search for AFV Database in Google. All will be revealed. [ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: Andreas ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: That is actually an idea you put into my head with your stories of mismanagent and poor relations between the Allied commanders at the most critical time when the Allies could have removed the last serious obstacle between themselves and the Rhine. The performance of the German formations along the lenght of the campaign is irrelevant and had nothing to do with it, the Allies shot themselves in the foot. Right ? <hr></blockquote> Yes pretty much, except it is not the campaign, it is the operation to close the gap that counted, and 1st Canadian Army messed it up. Of course if the Germans had just adopted the 'tickle my belly, aren't I a cute puppy' position instead of continuing to fight or flee this would have been irrelevant. But it does not mean that the Germans 'outperformed' the Allies here. They were just incredibly lucky. Read the passage on the battle in 'The South Albertas' - the sense of frustration that must have raged with the lower ranks is palpable. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: That is like saying "we won at half time, never mind the opponents scored a few more goals than we did during the second half". And this is exactly the kind of douple standard I abhor. Is it OK to disregard the less than excellent performance for the Allies but not OK to include better than average to poor performance for the Germans.<hr></blockquote> It is not a double standard. The important thing about Totalize was to get through Bourgeubus Ridge. This they did. From there the next good defensive position was the high ground overlooking Falaise, and the south bank of the Laize River, IIRC. Breaking through to Falaise was the order, but they did not manage. It would be great to have taken that ground too, but the main thing was to get through the defense in depth that Rommel had set up. In the tactical engagements fought on the day, the Germans lost. In those on the next day, they did better. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: I'll look up some places where the Germans faired a bit better than in your selection. Or can you cite some off the top of your head ?<hr></blockquote> Hürtgenwald, Arnhem (clearly the Germans in Arnhem outgeneralled the command of 1st Airborne and XXX Corps/2nd Army), Meijel, initial Ardennes, Herrlisheim (where what amounted to two men and a dog captured the better part of a green US tank battalion).

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: What has brought up the Allied casualtie ratio is the huge numbers of captured Germans who are not combat casualties technically speaking.<hr></blockquote> Cough cough - excuse me. I believe that this would be news to German staff officers who had to replace these guys. At the time, I am sure they were listed MIA, as everyone else. Situation: a fortified hamlet has been by-passed by an Commonwealth force in the night. Come dawn, the Commonwealth force (say 250 men altogether) attacks the hamlet, which is held by infantry (say 250 men), with a combined arms attack. Tanks shoot the place up, artillery rains down on it, the infantry closes in. For the sake of the argument, let's assume that KIA/WIA are roughly similar (50 each). After an hour or so, 200 Germans surrender. Are these men combat casualties or not? Discuss Mind you, the Allied wounded will return to battle (except for the seriously wounded and maimed) within, say, one day to six months. The German wounded won't, no matter how lightly WIA they are. Also, the 200 still combat capable Allies move on to the next objective. Allied attrition: short-term: 50 medium-term: 30 long term: 15 German attrition: 250 Which force would you rather be commanding?

You posted while I wrote. tero - I am not interested in Anglo-American history writing and how they try to make the facts fit the bill. Yes there are cases where they failed abysmally, operationally and tactically and I am the first to acknowledge that (again, dig up that post by me regarding Meijel). Alternatively taking Caen on D-Day or first battle for Cristot anyone? That was not your point though, if I may remind you. You asked specifically for 'one' example where the Germans were forced out of a position they intended to hold. I gave you several. Discuss Regarding the failure of the Allied time-table - as Moltke said, no plan survives contact with the enemy. The Germans achieved the delay by feeding in the reinforcements that they could instead have used to conduct a fighting withdrawal across France (something they later did very successfully in the Netherlands). Since these forces were only available once, that meant that once they were put into the grinder, and failed to achieve success, the way would be wide open. One could argue that Montgomery's failure in planning was to assume that sane military thinking (trading space for time/forces) would prevail over 'hold at all costs'. It did not, and the consequence was a brutal slog and a battle of attrition lasting two months, followed by an astonishing collapse lasting two weeks.

End of the operation, even. tero, you seem to be concluding that the Germans outperformed the Allies in Normandy because of Allied squabbling. That is an interesting jump in logic. You initially asked for a single example of the Allies outfighting the Germans on the tactical level to a degree that they had to give up ground they did not want to give up. Instead of broadening the subject out as you do, thereby obscuring it, why don't we concentrate on four: 1. Totalize Phase I 2. Woensdrecht 3. Buron (as mentioned by Michael) 4. Walcheren 1. The Germans had no intention of giving up Bourgeubus Ridge. Simonds' idea of a night attack using tracked APCs instead of a frontal asault forced them out of this perfect defensive line. Never mind that Phase II did not go as well. 2. The Germans had no intention to give up Woensdrecht, because it was the lifeline into the Breskens pocket and to the South Beveland peninsula and Walcheren Island. They put von der Heydte and his paras in place there to keep it. The Canadians forced them out. 3. Buron - what Michael said. 4. The Germans had no intention of giving up Walcheren, but the combination of flooding the island (Simonds again), and a two-pronged attack across the channel to South Beveland and across the Scheldt forced their surrender. This one is a bit unfair in terms of tactical fighting, since the Germans really only folded because of the flooding. You may elect to drop this example. Please note that the spectre of Bagration and/or the moustachioed one himself was not invoked in the making of this post. I look forward to your comments.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: [qb]The operational goal was the annihilation of the German army in the West, righ ?<hr></blockquote> I doubt that. AFAIK this only became the goal when the opportunity presented itself with the Mortain counter-offensive, i.e. relatively late in the war. The sudden collapse during the two weeks of August and September came as a total surprise, as can be seen by the airlanding operations that were planned and then cancelled because the ground forces had seized the dropzones. I think the operational goal was far more limited - establish a sustainable bridgehead on the continent, capture a large harbour, and undertake operations against Germany as are possible. Happy to be corrected on this though.

Allied timetable: reach the Seine by D+90. Reality: Seine reached by D+66. I would argue the Germans did not handle themselves well on that one. German goal: delay allied advance across France by resistance behind water/terrain obstacles e.g. Somme. Reality: they did not manage to, except in the Vosges. German goal: destroy Allied spearheads (Mortain, Nancy) Reality: both attempts by the Germans ended in utter defeat, and destruction of the German attacking force.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Paul T. Gardner: Well, when I say the burbs, I mean the burbs of the burbs! Brentwood in Essex to be precise. With London ever expanding, it appears attached to the burbs on maps. It's an easy trainride into Liverpool street, and then London's your oyster. Do you work in London? I commute and so am in town during the week. Perhaps we could meet up sometime to talk CM and all things military? Also Kip and Peter_NZer if they're close by. Maybe we could organise something for the new year as Christmas usually screws up timetables a treat. Well it does for me anyway. Have a great time in the Ardenne. Rgds<hr></blockquote> Oh I will - 16th of December in the Ardennes is a traditional family outing for Germans after all. Now if only I had not waylaid that Kingtiger. We actually get together for drinks regularly. Email me in the profile (and anybody else in London interested) and we set something up for the new year.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Why then the version (floated also by Anglo-American sources) where the gap was held open by "gallant" efforts of the German troops at the bottle neck ? <hr></blockquote> Err, because that makes better press than saying 'we had them, but because we were stupid and incapable at commanding our troops, we let them get away'? <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: What do you attribute the subsequent recovery to: Allied resupply problems and inability to continue offensive operations or active German efforts to shore up the troops ?<hr></blockquote> Allied euphoria, and inability to grasp the opportunity presenting them. When the tanks of 11th Armoured were ordered to 'rest and refit' in Antwerp they had enough petrol to go through to Woensdrecht and cut off South Beveland and the retreat of 15th Army. If they had done that, the German forces in Holland would have collapsed (15th Army GHQ was instrumental in organising the forces into resistance), a bridgehead over the Rhine would have been possible, outflanking the Westwall (probably without Market Garden), Antwerp would have been freed for supplies six to eight weeks earlier, and the war would have been over before Christmas. Simplistically said. But yes, worries about supply levels, lack of clear instructions, failure to realise that the Germans are not beaten until they are really beaten, all that conspired in those days in early September.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by The_Capt: I hear ya Slappy, These were the days!! Back when tactics were king. Now it's mod this, Newbie that and "When is CMBB coming out". I do miss talking about war.<hr></blockquote> You can always have a look at the last few pages of the 'Bring out your dead' thread...

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Assuming the attacks were orchestrated and well-executed. You listed the Allied high water marks. What about the low water marks ? There are the operations when the Allied effort was botched up good even before the troops crossed the line of departure. And cases when the Allied effort was not enough to break the deadlock despite their superiority. <hr></blockquote> Which ones were those? The Allies eventually managed to break all the deadlocks. It did not go smoothly or from victory to victory, but win they did. A good example is Woensdrecht, where one day the Canadian Black Watch was annihilated, but a day or two later, the RHLI against the same defenders broke through. Another example is the Leopoldkanal battle where the Canadians managed to secure the bridgehead across the canal but became pinned, and could only make headway when the flank landing on the eastern side of the pocket had taken place. Clearly in that case it needed maneuver (an additional landing) to get on with the job. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Indeed. But which is the predominant trend in a multi-month operation: the drone of the operations that fail or the flashes when the operation succeeds ?<hr></blockquote> The Scheldt battle lasted almost two months. The Rhineland battles lasted about two months. Clearing the Maas/Overloon salient took weeks. There were multiple setbacks in these battles, but at the end of the day each of the campaigns ended with an Allied victory and the destruction of most of the German defenders. In most cases the total destruction was Hitler's fault, but the failure of the defense had taken place beforehand. Especially in the Rhineland, the Germans occupied good and sound defensive positions, and it took hard fighting to root them out. But rooted out they were. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Interestingly enough Hürtgen is one of the "forgotten ones" in the history of WWII. I wonder why..... and if there are others that have been overshadowed by the more illustrious victories and defeats. <hr></blockquote> Well I have not, and I have posted another one here a few days ago, in a thread called 'Clearing the west bank of the Maas'. 47th Panzerkorps against 7th US Armoured at Meijel. I also think that Huertgen has not totally been forgotten - it just does not capture the imagination as the Ardennes do.

If you look at single events, you would be right. But since arguably all these discrete events are in reality affected by others, and in turn affect them, you have to look at the strategic level. But even so, in the majority of actions, viewed from a purely tactical perspective, following Normandy, the Germans were resoundingly defeated, either by maneuver, or by attrition. There are a few actions where they won, but they are not many. Regarding the Falaise Gap, I would be interested in sources for your claim that the Germans had an organised defense that could choose to hold or withdraw. Reality was that they had no such thing. The gap was help open because the Canadian 1st Army (in particular 3rd Infantry, 4th Armoured and 1st Polish Armoured) failed to close it, because of inability to control the battle. The Canadian blocking force was too weak in infantry to close the gap. The Germans swamped them with numbers at night, and got a lot of guys out. The only organised attempt was the attack on the Poles sitting on the Mace from outside the gap, but that was about all, and did not achieve its objective. The real action happened at St. Lambert, and if you read the memoirs of von Luck, or even that old storyteller Meier, it will be clear that no organised resistance happened there after probably August 20th, and very little beforehand. If the Canadian command had not failed abjectly, or if Monty and Bradley had been a bit clearer with each other who is responsible for what, the Germans would never have escaped in numbers. Again, they were soundly beaten by the time of the gap, on the tactical and operational level.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Originally posted by Andreas: [qb]Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so? That is not my intention. The widrawals were not by no means voluntary. But were there cases when the widrawal was dictated by other reasons than tactical situation on that particular spot ? Were there cases when the Germans retreated despite still having enough assets to continue holding on to the positions after having done so for some time ?[/QB]<hr></blockquote> This is a circular argument - if the Germans had had the assets they would have stayed. They would have denied the landings, and any further advances. They did not, and in particular situations their assets did not suffice to withstand an orchestrated, well-executed attack, so they had to go. This is where the operational and strategic links into the tactical. They were beaten at these places tactically, and all these tactical losses combined to become operational and strategic loss. They were outmaneuvered during the 'Swan' across northern France (otherwise Antwerp would never have fallen so easily), and they were beaten in very brutal battles of attrition in the Scheldt and the Rhineland, while they in their turn did beat the US in the Huertgenwald.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions.<hr></blockquote> Totalize; Epsom D-Day itself, since I never heard of any plans by Adolf to withdraw from th position. After Normandy: Operations: Veritable; Blockbuster; Market Garden; Plunder; Grenade; Switchback Places: Woensdrecht; Walcheren (Scheldt battles); Aachen; Breskens pocket (Festung Schelde Sued); Vosges Do you want me to go on? Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so?

Michael, I am currently sitting here scratching my head (something my co-workers are used to from me), trying to figure out which Byte Battle Simon is talking about. As for his battle - I think it works well. The recon platoon are now all dead/maimed/POW, which is just dandy. Unfortunately I do not know the pamphlet you are talking about, but would be interested in the read. Regarding the old 'the carrier platoon restored the situation', I usually read that as 'my very mobile reserve platoon dashed there in their carriers, dismounted and restored the situation'. Whitaker in 'Tug of war' has some references to this. I don't think they fought mounted. Regarding recce - I use carriers quite a bit as OPs, and less as transport for teams. If you hide them in scattered trees they are quite difficult to spot. Until the battle from Simon came along I never thought much about using them as a way to get a recce platoon into position quickly, but depending on the map it works quite well. I think using them as back-up to the team is a bit 'gamey', since they have an extra Bren, which historically would not have been there.