Andreas

That is ridiculous. I asked Amazon to dig it out for me. Took them two to three months, but they got it in the end for £18 + pp. New hardcover, fourth edition from 1998.

Get a grip - edit your post again, and go and get 18 Platoon. Or somefink. I asked my colleague Rob (HLI subaltern and vet of the Gulf War, also international level Rugby Union referee, and Scottish), and he said it is excellent. Was required reading for him at Sandhurst.

Oh yes - Mr Kane, welcome. Your wife has no idea that she has presented you with the equivalent of a long-legged busty blondine mistress Marlow - I hardly think that a comparison of 258 vehicles vs. 130 or so tank kills is fair. I have no idea how many vehicles Wittmann killed, but I would expect it to be quite a few. Also, as I understand, trucks and AT guns were considered prime targets in the east, if not by the tankers, but by the guys understanding logistics. I don't think these comparisons are very meaningful anyway.

Oh yeah Rune, is that so, with your so-called facts? Now what I want to know, how good can a game be that does not include the Spanish Blue Division? And where is it in CMBO I ask you? We all expected the Spanish Blue Division! German artillery delays - before trolling on about them, it would behove one to exhibit a basic understanding of different artillery practices. Whether both sides had radios is only part of the equation after all. Or let's take real life, shall we? According to my grandfather, a German counter battery observer in WW2, the time to get the computations resolved could be anything between 1 to 15 mins. He did that job for about 5 years outside Leningrad and elsewhere. Fact is, the Germans never had an artillery system that could take on either the Royal Artillery or the US artillery in response time and weight on targets, or the Red Army in weight of barrages. They did not have the number of guns, the ammo, the mobility, the flexible command system, and probably not even enough batteries for their radios by 1944. Also, the practice of using their artillery soldiers as Alarmreserve to plug breakthroughs combined with a much better counter battery fire got a good number of them killed in the process, leading to a lower training level than in either the Royal Artillery or the US artillery, where the gunners led reasonably sheltered lives.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Apache: I have something by John Salt (I think) which is aimed at batallion level. Has he done soemthing at company level too? [ 01-29-2002: Message edited by: Apache ]<hr></blockquote> I do believe that the Britorg document which is the basis for the website stuff is broken down to platoon level. Yep - just checked. If you scroll further down here you'll find an equipment table for the 1944 Infantry Battalion. Combine that with the other info, and you are sorted.

John Salt's Stuff

From this site: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The next day, British armor came across and we climbed atop the tanks and moved forward towards Munster.<hr></blockquote> The next day being day two of Varsity. And <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>We had acquired the 57mm recoilless shoulder weapons, replacing the Bazookas. This new weapon had much more firepower and accuracy. Roadblocks and opposition were no match for these new weapons combined with the British Tanks. <hr></blockquote> The guy is a US vet of 17th Airborne, who dropped at Wesel during Varsity. Following Varsity, UK 6th Airborne had 6th Guards Tank Brigade (Churchills) as a permanent attachment for its march through Germany to the Baltic.

President, eh? No wonder you were so sure that the tab from the lunch in Cologne would be accepted as expenses. Congrats.

The US Army infantry board tested Molotov Cocktails, according to the memoir of Colonel Triplet 'A colonel in the armoured divisions' (book review at Der Kessel). He found them useless against tanks (I think they tried them on an M3, but can check next week). The use of language like 'that'll fix him' increases my distrust of the use of training manuals as corroborating evidence for anything. Does anyone know how many Panzer III/IV fell victim to Molotov Cocktails?

My understanding is that these were ordinary Heer formations, in some cases rebuilt units that had been destroyed earlier, e.g. 13. PD having been destroyed in Romania ended up being PD Feldherrnhalle 2, to be finally destroyed in Budapest. The Red Army must have felt like they were in a bad Zombie movie...

Well, there are about half a dozen pictures with gunned Ram IIs in 'The South Albertas' captioned (insert English region here), there are also references to training on them, and a definitive reference that 'shortly after [13th Dec. 43] the regiment received news they would be converting to Shermans' or somefink. I don't know whether we are talking Rams or Ram IIs here, but the latter definitely were in England as MBTs.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Enoch: Note my post above, 84 of the Ram II OP tanks were built. I am kind of surprised that these were ever employed as I thought none of the Ram tanks were ever shipped overseas.<hr></blockquote> I am quite sure that the SAR trained on the RAM II while in the UK. I also recall that the divisional commander 'nicked' a shipment of tanks due to go to the UK when they were in Nova Scotia to train on.

Jeff, excellent and very interesting scans you provide there. I think I should get the book one day. Regarding non-FOOs ordering a shoot, I seem to recall something from 'Tug of war' (about the Sheldt battles) where it was said that the Riley BN OC Whitaker ordered a shoot. My memory is growing hazy though. Major Currie and the SAR were in a very difficult position at St. Lambert, and AFAIK did not have an FOO present. Without the artillery support, they would most likely have been overrun, IIRC. This may have influenced the slightly unconventional procedure. Especially since their commanders could not pull their finger out and get infantry to them. Jon - if Raid across the Rhine bites so much, why don't you review it. Or even better, write an AAR, to illustrate how it was your tactical ineptness, and not my hallowed design skills that were at fault

I had another look at Lexikon der Wehrmacht regarding German FOO establishments. For the 1940 artillery regiment, it seems that each battery of four guns had 2 FOO (VB) teams (mounted on horseback - they initially seem to have had a car too, but that was lost from TO&E later). They also seem to have had 2 backpack sections (I'll check with the guy whether these are the same). Does anybody else think that generous? On top of that, the detachment staff battery had another 4 backpack radio sections, and two medium and one large telephone sections. This to me would indicate a fairly well established signal net for the battery and the detachment. FDC was apparently done on battery level, at least there is a platoon for that. Early war Panzerdivision artillery should be fairly similar, only that they were motorised and on HTs (or in Kuebels), as pointed out above. Early war FAC was also done from HTs. On top of this, TO&E called for a Beobachtungsabteilung (Observation/ranging detachment), but there were never enough to go round, so they ended up being Corps level assets, and it seems were replaced with a battery size unit, at least in 13. Panzer - maybe this was only in armoured divisions due to their higher mobility. From my grandfather's accounts, it seems that the Beobachtungsabteilungen never made it near the frontline during the mobile battles, either in Poland, France, or the Baltic states and Russia. He fought in a number of 'mopping up' operations though.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges: There is an increased chance of withdrawing units panicking or breaking, according to the manual; I'm not sure how great the chance is, although it doesn't seem to affect generally good order squads much. It's probably easier to start a withdrawal than to stop one, so that's probably what the morale penalty simulates.<hr></blockquote> Yep - withdrawal means that the unit goes down one level (i.e. from 'alerted' to 'cautious', or from 'cautious' to 'panicked' or whatever it is called). So there is a real risk if you use the command that you will have trouble stopping the rout. I think that is fairly realistic. I think what DD is asking for is a command sequence where the unit is dispersed, but then reassembled. I think that under battlefield conditions that would be quite unrealistic in the time-frame of a CMBO battle, unless the orders where to assemble are given at the same time as the order to disperse, in which case there should be a time lag. Just my opinion.

Now, after this excursion into Britishness, let's see how the Hun did things. The following is an excerpt from Hoffmann (2001) 'Die Magdeburger Division - zur Geschichte der 13. Infanterie - und Panzer - Division 1935-45', Mittler Verlag The division was ordered to convert from infantry in October 1940. Apologies for the translation (mutilation more like it). <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>In 1941, I. Abteilung [Artillerie-Regiment 13 (mot.)] was still organised like any other light motorised artillery detachment. Every battery of the I. Abteilung did however have one or to light armored observation cars [Panzer-Beobachtungswagen], an open-topped, half-tracked vehicle (Sdkfz.253) to accompany tank attacks. Very mobile FOOs (VB) sometimes however accompanied tank attacks in Kübelwagen, as did the light field howitzers, which often followed the tanks closely with their prime movers.<hr></blockquote> An organisational table states that the Artillerie-Regiment 13 (mot.) contained the observation battery (Beobachtungsbatterie) 323 (Pz.), equipped with two lMG for weapons. A footnote states that this replaced the Beobachtungsabteilung (observation detachment) 13, which was detached from its assignment to the division in 1939. Unfortunately the rebuilding of the division in 1943 according to the Panzer-Division 1943 TO&E is not covered with the same detail.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC: Does that mean people should shut up or sign BTS's praises instead of niggling away trying to get the best there is to be as perfect as possible? Nope, not at all. The community of hard core wargamers is not called "grognards" for nothing. "Grognard" means "grumbler", i.e. one who complains.<hr></blockquote> Jason, by no means did I mean that people should stop raising valid points, or debate the game. CMBO is not the holy writ, and it certainly has its faults. The reason I raised this is that there is IMO a big risk that people start putting things down as engine faults when they really are not. I have my complaints about the game as well, and Steve knows about them, but at the end of the day, I think there is sometimes too much griping and propagation of myths going on here. Jagdratt - there are two types of interior walls, supporting and non-supporting. The former is probably difficult to get through with small arms and grenades. There is however a third type of wall that is lodged between buildings, a fire-break. This is a very solid wall set with the intention to prevent a fire from jumping buildings. To get through these you need a serious engineering effort. The wall is good enough to be the exterior wall for the building - and often was, since along a block plots of land would be developed at different times.

RMC - I agree about the representation. I just don't agree that this failure of representation means that the simulation does not work. I believe it does, and I now know a number of people who agree with me. BTW - courtyards are easily done. I'll send you a map with an explanation to look at if you are interested.

BTW ASL Vet - what are you comparing it to? I am talking computer games here, not board games.

Well ASL Vet, nobody is stopping you from making a different sort of Bocage map, last time I checked I did not have a monopoly on scenario design. FYI - in a trypical European city, you actually have to get out in the street/courtyard/garden to get from one building to the next, since the buildings are divided by very strong fire-walls. So I stand by what I said. They both work, if you squeeze the Bocage together close enough, since that helps quite a bit with the seeking cover problem, I found.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by xerxes: For scenarios, the withdrawal direction should be settable by the senario designer as EITHER a map edge or a single point on the map. If you're surrounded, withdrawing should move you away from the enemy, (which would be towards the center of the map).<hr></blockquote> You do that at the moment by setting a friendly map-edge. This is quite important, since it also determines the direction in which units rout.

Very interesting stuff Jeff. I think in the German case, with the extra backpack radio, there was definitely intent to give the FOO the opportunity to dismount and operate away from the tank very flexibly (i.e. without laying a line). If 'manpack set' refers to a backpack radio, I presume the intention was there for the Commonwealth as well. BTW - While Panzer III OP tank production stopped in 1944, the slack was taken up by the production of almost 100 Panzer IV OP tanks. I guess the idea was to have an OP tank that did not stick out like a sore thumb.

On Lexikon der Wehrmacht are some pictures of Panzer III observation variant. From those pictures, I'd venture the guess that it is a fake gun. Numbers produced are 225 in 1943 and another 43 in 1944. Interestingly, it was equipped with two medium wave radios (30W transceiver Fu 4 and receiver Fu 8), a radio 'F' and a backpack radio set, presumably for dismounted service. The same site in its OOB page for a German artillery regiment of the 1st Wave of divisions, gives 4 backpack radio sections (two on horseback, two on foot), two medium and one large telephone sections, and one artillery signals section (for connection to the supported infantry regiment) per battery. It is a very confusing organisational list, as it also includes to FOO sections (on horseback with radio, one observer, two signallers). Unfortunately the armoured element has not received the same detailed treatment, but I will check my copies of Engelmann, and a history of the 13th PD tonight.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by John D Salt: One particular place where small-arms should certainly be included as crew weapons is for the Vickers MMG in British service. I have never heard of this weapon being issued on any basis other than to MG battalions (one per division, which of shared around evenly gives an MMG coy per brigade, and, fairly obviously, a platoon per battalion). A Vickers MMG platoon consists of four sections, each of 10 men. This section is really just like an ordinary rifle section, except that the Bren is replaced by a Vickers. Most men in the section are armed with rifles. All the best, John.<hr></blockquote> John, assuming that you are the John Salt, author of documents like 'Britorg' etc, I am very glad you found your way here. I used your stuff extensively in creating scenarios for CMBO - really helpful. Hope you finished that PhD successfully. All the best, Andreas

I think sometimes in bickering over the faults that CMBO has, (or even anticipating those that CMBB might have), we tend to forget what an excellent piece of software this game is. Two things that seem to have become accepted folk-wisdom about the failings of the CM engine bother me. 1) CMBO does not handle city battles well - how will it cope with Stalingrad? I think this claim is total and utter tosh. What is correct is that the QB system does not handle city battles - but it does not even try. What is also true is that for a city-battle to work, you have to have a good designer, maybe someone who has been to Europe and understands the layout of a European city. That condition fulfilled, city battles become amongst the most bloody and exciting battles you can fight. I know because I designed a good one, and because I currently playtest a game by Berli which has been excellent. See-saw, close quarters, extremely bloody, no-holds-barred fighting. Does not get any better than this. On the CD, WBW's Nijmegen would fit the bill, if it was not lumbered with the river crossing. So, I think that contrary to these repeated claims, CMBO handles city fighting brilliantly. 2) CMBO does not model Bocage battles well For a time I agreed with that statement. Having looked at this, and designed an express Bocage battle now, I tend to disagree with it completely. If you don't insist to have your Bocage fields rectangular 300x400m fields, but instead have it twist and turn on very small fields (as is realistic in the western region of Normandy, I have been told), it appears to work well. 3) The AI is crap on the attack While it is only as good as a semi-competent human player at its very best, I found that it can be surprisingly tough and I think that the 'Ai-style' will lend itself very well to early GPW fighting. During the weekend I tested this, and it did quite well. After playing CMBO for more than two years, since the Beta, and designing scenarios for over 18 months, I am still discovering new angles, and it never is boring, or even close to becoming stale. I think Steve and Charles have done an excellent job, and with all the complaining about really minor, tedious nitpicking that is sometimes going on here, this is forgotten all too often. Enough ranting - please excuse me while I get off my soap box.