tss

Chupacabra wrote: Considering that 5 81mm mortars comprises almost all of a batallion's organic artillery support, I think it would be extremely unusual for batallion to commit that much support to one company Extremely unusual, but possible. On 21 June 1944 near Vyborg, roughly 9 artillery batallions (~100) guns boosted the defence of approximately one Finnish infantry batallion (the defenders were a mixture of several units and I don't know its exact strength). That's 3 artillery batallions or 9 CM FOs per company. I would certainly be surprised if my CM opponent had that ratio artillery/infantry. Similarily, at the focal point of Soviet attack at Ihantala there were 21 artillery batallions and one infantry regiment (12th) on defence. IIRC, the regiment had two batallions manning the front line and one batallion reserve, and the front line batallions had two companies in front and one in reserve. The companies were very depleted, having 30-60 men each. So, there were actually more artillery pieces (~250) than front line defenders (~200). (Soviets had ~500 guns there if I'm not mistaken, so there were 2 guns per each defender). Of course, that example is very poor because Ihantala was probably the most artillery heavy battle of the whole war, all fronts counted. And it definitely was not a meeting engagement. - Tommi [This message has been edited by tss (edited 01-05-2001).]

retarded_keydet wrote: LOL! No offense but that sounded like a communist propaganda broadcast to me Actually, real communist propaganda can be quite entertaining to read. In particular, Ilya Ehrenburg was a true artist. The articles where he praises Soviet Union are quite boring, but those aimed against Germany and minor Axis countries contain several masterpieces. I don't know whether any of his wartime articles have been translated to English. In late seventies a collection of his early-war articles was published in Finnish ("Venäjä sodassa"). That particular edition has an added benefit of having a foreword written by a hard-core Finnish communist. I giggled for about 15 minutes after reading it. Too bad that collection doesn't have the article with the famous quote: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The Germans are coming to Moscow to steal silk and velvet to their girlfriends. What do you say, Ivan? Do we give any silk to them? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I would have liked to see whether the quote is as funny when taken in context as it is out of context. I wonder how many of his facts are really true. He used lots of quotes allegedly from captured German letters and diaries, and it would be nice to know how many of the quotes are authentic. - Tommi

von Schalburg wrote: The MG 42 has a firing rate of 1200 bullets a minute Cyclic firing rate. Like you mentioned, you have to change barrel after firing 200-250 rounds and with continuous fire it will be closer to 200 than 250. Supposing that a barrel change takes 5 seconds, you can get out 200 rounds in 15 seconds (if you don't spend too much time doing some extra niceties as aiming), and the highest practical rof is 800 rounds/minute. However, you need three spare barrels to be able to do that. Also, the barrels will not cool fast enough (at least without abundant supply of cold water) so you can't maintain that rate of fire for many minutes. I don't know for certain, but I'd guess that even with MG42 the maximum rof in combat would be somewhere along 400 rounds/minute. - Tommi

Also, Hotchkiss had a pretty large driver hatch that opened to front, so it might be that the driver is doing the looking. - Tommi

Here's data taken from the 1936 edition of "Upseerin käsikirja" ("Officer's Handbook", the actual printing date is 1940) about MG fire: B. MG FIRE BARRAGE These figures suppose that the visible surface area of enemy soldiers is 0.5 m^2 (= standing man) and the advance speed is 3 m/s [= jogging speed]. The necessary fire densities for a 100 m front line expressed in rounds per minute are: 1. Frontal fire: Range [m] 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 ========================================= 30% losses 600 1000 1700 3200 6000 9500 50% losses 1000 1800 3200 6000 11000 18000 2. Flanking fire Range [m] 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 =================================== 30% losses 600 1200 2000 4000 7500 50% losses 1250 2300 3900 7500 14000 Note! 50% losses usually mean that the enemy attack is completely stopped. [i find it strange that flanking fire has higher ammo requirements. Can somebody tell why it is so?] C. PRACTICAL RATES OF FIRE The practical rates of fire for a machine gun [the MG in question is for Maxim/09, I don't know whether the values are with Finnish rof-accelerator or not] are: normal: 200 rounds/min, max ~1/2 hours higher: 300 rounds/min, max 10-15 min high: 400 rounds/min, max 5 min highest: 500 rounds/min, max 1-2 min [The corresponding Finnish terms are "normaali", "kohotettu", "kiivas", "suurin", so there is no danger of confusion] These figures can be used to calculate the necessary amount of MGs for achieving the desired results in a given time. --- end quote --- The figures are probably based on German WWI experiences on the West Front, but I'm not certain about that. Using those figures, it would take 12 Maxims, a full MG company, firing with rof of 400 rounds/min at 1000m range to completely stop a WWI-style attack over 500 meters front. Of course, this is not an absolute figure and in practice the firing range was much smaller. Also, MGs with higher rof can put more lead in the air. Extrapolating from the table (always a dangerous thing to do), it would seem that for 500 m range the figures for frontal fire should be about 350 and 600 rounds for 30% and 50% casualties, respectively. This would mean that about one MG is necessary for each 100 m of the front line, if we add several infantry squad LMGs to the fire density. I would guess that lowering the range from 500 m doesn't lower the density requirements any more since there's less time to fire and the enemy can suppress the MGs easier. - Tommi

This is my second post on translated extracts from the Finnish 1936 Field Artillery regulations. This section is about firing against different target types. The text in square brackets is my comments and annotations. F. FIRE MISSIONS 1. UNPROTECTED SOFT TARGETS 286. Depending on the tactical situation and available resources, artillery tries to destroy or supress the enemy manpower or at least to stop its advance. The artillery effect on manpower depends on the formation of the target. Soft targets are the most vulnerable when they are in a closed formation. Soft targets, in particular those not affected by friendly small arms fire, can usually quickly move outside the artillery target area. Therefore, the element of surprise is the first necessary condition for a succesful fire mission. Soft targets may be destroyed only by using a whole batallion strikes. Soft targets may be supressed, in favorable conditions, by fire of single battery. When using artillery barrages, the objective is to temporarily stop enemy movement. 287. The most effective rounds against unprotected soft targets are HE shells [in Finnish "sirpalekranaatti", a shell that produces lot of shrapnells] with quick or timed fuzes. Shrapnell fire is effective only when surprise is achieved against moving targets. Sometimes it may be useful to mix few gas shells (combined gas-HE shells) among the HE rounds. [i think that suggestion of using gas rounds is pretty peculiar for a 1936 vintage regulation book] 288. If enemy infantry is moving in open, it should be stopped using artillery strikes or barrages. The average speed of an infantry formation that is not under small arms fire is about 2 km/h (~30 m/min). Since this figure includes numerous stops and other delays, the true advance speed is greater being approximately 50 m/min. The main difficulty is to plot the fire so that the moving unit is hit. The following two methods can be used: a) As many target points as possible are registered on the advance route of the enemy. The forward observer has to know the operational speed of the batallion (battery) and flight times of the shells. He then has to observe the enemy movement and determine the right moment to call fire. If it is not possible to pre-register targets, it is not usually possible to use target coordinates since then it would take many minutes before first shells arrive and it is not possible to plot the enemy movement that far in future. In these cases enough spotting rounds should be fired that an unchecked bracket ["tarkistamaton haarukka", a 100 m bracket that is correct with 50% probability] is obtained. Then the batallion should fire strike or barrage to the end of the bracket that is on the direction of enemy movement. If some fire missions have been fired near the target point before, a target adjustment is faster to do than bracketing. 289. An infantry formation that is under small arms fire moves irregularly and the average speed is much slower than in the previous case. The methods that were presented above must be used. Correct observation of the target movement is necesessary for accurate fire missions. 290. Infantry units that are manning positions should be destroyed or supressed with strikes that are fired using the parallel pattern [that is, all guns fire with identical settings]. Since defending infantry usually may not leave its positions, it is possible to do accurate fire preparation and fire calibration rounds [that is, firing few groups of shells on a different but nearby target to see where they land]. 291. An unprotected machine gun position may be destroyed or at least supressed with a strike of one battery if its location is known and accurate fire preparation is possible. The strike should be fired with the concentrated pattern [that is, all guns aim at the same point] and without spotting rounds. It is not usually possible to destroy machine guns using destruction fire because they can easily change their positions and avoid the fire. 292. Attacking enemy infantry tries to cross the no-man's land as quickly as possible. It can be stopped only by using pre-registered artillery barrages that should land at most several dozens of seconds after calling. 293. Infantry that is currently deploying (for example, in preparation for attack) is very vulnerable. Usually it is not necessary to use the highest fire concentration. Thus, the fire of a single battery to a 100x100 m target may be enough to stop the enemy attack before it commences. A batallion may fire counter-preparation fire against a front of ~300 m. 294. Infantry reserves are also very vulnerable. Because infantry that is outside friendly small arms fire zones can quickly avoid fire, the element of surprise is necessary. 295. Infantry march columns are vulnerable but they may quickly avoid fire. A march column advances ~100m/min. For achieving a surprise, accurate fire preparation (or bracketing) has to be done at a target point that is along the advance route of the column. The target point has to be selected so that the preparations are completed before the column enters the target area. If it is not possible to do an accurate preparation, bracketing should be done so that it will not alert the enemy. If the bracketing is done against the column itself, the only result is that the column leaves the road. A single battery strike is enough against columns so the fire of the whole batallion may be spread on 300 m front. If the column advances towards the guns a single battery may fire take a 200 m target. The mission should use the parallel pattern. 296. Counter-battery missions should be fired using strikes with intensive fire. Heavy guns are best for this because their shrapnells will penetrate gun shields. Surprise is again important since the gun crews will take cover during bracketing. By using acidic gases, the target battery may be forced to leave its firing positions. [Again, mention of gas warfare. Acidic gases include the mustard gas]. 297. Artillery march columns must stay on roads because vechicles can't move offroads easily even though the manpower may escape. Artillery columns are fired using the same principles as infantry columns. 298. Command, observation, and forward observation posts are either destroyed using strikes or blinded with smoke. One battery strike is enough. Surprise is important. If the objective is simply to make enemy abandon the position, this can be achieved with relatively dense harassment fire or with acidic gases. 299. Mounted cavalry formations may be caught in a strike only if they are not moving. A cavalry formation may move so quickly that it is difficult to hit them even using pre-registered targets. In these cases a 400 m bracket should be created using shrapnell rounds or a fire adjustment is done from a prior target. During the fire for effect the fire values should be adjusted continuously. As shrapnell rounds have large depth effect [a shrapnell ball is lethal up to 300 m, though most balls hit ground at 60 m], they are the best to use in these situations. 300. Fire against supply columns is conducted in the same way as fire against artillery columns. 2. SOFT TARGETS INSIDE FIELD FORTIFICATIONS 301. Infantry targets inside field fortifications may not be completely destroyed with artillery fire. For this reason, artillery should try to have as great moral effect as possible so that the enemy is incapable of resistance in the crucial moments of an attack. This can be achieved by accurate strikes using intensive fire. Often many strikes should be fired at the same target with irregular intervals. Heavy artillery is the most effective in this role. 302. The best round is HE with a timed fuze and the second best is quick fuze. If the trenches are covered, the fuzes have to be slow. If the trenches have numerous closets [that is, there are small one-man dugouts dug in the trench walls] the enemy seeks cover from them. In those cases it is advantageous to start fire with a short timed fuze strike, then change to slow fuzes. Alternatively, the first shells should have a quick fuze and the rest a slow one. 303. Artillery- and bomb-proof dugouts give good cover from artillery fire. Artillery strikes may be used to force the enemy to take cover from them. This lowers its combat efficiency remarkably. Large caliberes with delayed fuzes have a good moral effect on men that are in dugouts. 304. Field fortifications in an artillery position increase its durability only by giving the gun crews better cover from strikes. Sudden and concentrated strikes may still cause heavy casualties on gun crews. Delayed fuzes and 152 mm shells may destroy accomodation and ammo dugouts. 3. FIELD FORTIFICATIONS 305. Field fortifications are destroyed by using the destruction fire. This usually demands much time and ammo. The estimated ammo requirements are presented in the following paragraphs. BARBED WIRE 306. Mortars are the most effective artillery pieces against barbed wire. Artillery (light) is used only if other methods have failed. The quick fuze is the best to use against a wire obstacle. If there are many different HE rounds available, the one with the largest explosive charge should be chosen. Wire zones are usually composed from numerous thin obstacle lines. A zone that is at most 2 r_x [r_x = the expected round dispersion distance on the firing axis] is treated as a single obstacle. If the zone is 2-4 r_x wide, it is treated as a single obstacle but 50% more ammo is fired. A zone that is wider than 4 r_x is divided into two or more targets. The expected ammo usage against fixed wire on level ground may be read from the following table. The table supposes that the mean impact point stays at the midpoint of the obstacle during the whole fire mission. The table gives shots per meter of width of the breach. Range 76K 122H 152H 2000m --- 12 8 3000m 30 12 8 4000m 35 14 9 5000m 40 16 10 6000m 45 18 12 The depth of the breach is then approximately 2 r_x. If only slow fuze is available, the figures should be doubled. The ammo usage on targets on slopes is obtained by multiplying the figures with the slope factor [that is defined elsewhere, downhill needs most]. If the wire is not fixed ("spanish mounts", etc.), 50% more ammo is necessary. The fire should be fired as serial fire [that is, one round at a time] so that the range to each gun is checked separately. Depending on the width of the breach the fire is allocated either by gun or by 2 gun section to different targets that are separated by 4 r_y [r_y = the expected dispersion distance perpendicular to flight direction]. If the breach is narrow (< 4 r_y), the fire isconducted by using the concentrated pattern. In that case the ammo usage should still be calculated using the width of 4 r_y. If accurate observation is not possible, the ammo requirements are doubled. Sometimes there is not enough time for preparations and the fire has to be conducted using strikes of multiple batteries. In those cases calibration rounds should still be fired and the ammo usage doubled. Since ammo requirements increase with the range, batteries as close to the frontline as possible should be used. However, quick fuzes don't work reliable with very small impact angles (< 10 degrees) so too short ranges may not be used with cannons. The firing charge should be smallest possible. TRENCHES 307. It is not economical to destroy trenches by artillery fire because it demands an excessive amount of ammo. However, sometimes it is necessary to destroy intersections of trenches or machine gun nests. A trench intersection can be destroyed from medium range using - 122H -- 100 rounds - 152H -- 60-80 rounds The best effect is achieved with slow fuzes. If the distance between two target intersections is less than 30 meters, the connecting trench will also be severely damaged from the fire. MG NESTS, CLOSETS, AND DUGOUTS 308. Shrapnell-proof MG nests, closets, and dugouts can be destroyed with 2 direct 76 mm hits or by a single larger shell. If the dimension of the target is know, the expected ammo usage can be calculated using the method presented in Appendix I when the following effective radiuses are taken in accord: - 76 mm -- 0.9 m - 107 mm -- 1.2 m - 122 mm -- 1.6 m - 152 mm -- 2.0 m It is best to use the delayed fuze. Otherwise, slow fuzes have to be used but then the ammo usage is about 10% larger. The impact angle should always be at least 20 degrees so ricochets are avoided. The following figures give ammo usage estimates on destroying a 2.7 m x 1.6 m machine gun post: - 76 mm -- 4500 m -- 120 rounds - 122 mm -- 2800 m -- 40 rounds - 152 mm -- 2800 m -- 30 rounds If some area has a number of dugouts whose positions cannot be accurately established, a certain percentage of them will be destroyed by area fire. The following table has estimates on ammo usage per 100 m x 100 m area so that 30%, 50%, or 100% dugouts on the area will be dest oyed, supposing that a dugout has 15 m^2 surface area. Calibere 30% 50% 100% 76 mm 270 400 800 122 mm 120 180 360 152 mm 100 150 300 Artillery-proof dugouts may not be destroyed using smaller caliberes than 152 mm. The expected ammo expenditure for the 152 mm howitzer can be obtained by multiplying the figure in the above table by three. Bomb-proof dugouts may not be destroyed by field artillery fire. ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND GUNS 309. The guns of an artillery battery may be certainly destroyed only if the fire can be aimed at each individual gun separately. If only area fire can be used, an enemy battery may be partially destroyed or at least silenced for a long time using the following amounts of ammunition: Distance 76 mm 107 mm 122 mm 152 mm 3000 m 500 -- 250 180 4000 m 600 -- 300 220 5000 m 900 -- 450 320 6000 m -- 600 -- 350 7000 m -- 800 -- 500 The best fuze against artillery equipment is the slow one. If the firing positions have artillery-proof dugouts, 152 mm or larger caliberes are necessary. 4. VILLAGES AND OTHER INHABITED PLACES 310. Villages are best destroyed by fires that are ignited with incendiary rounds. If they are not available, shrapnel rounds may be used by setting the fuze so that they will burst after hitting the ground. Setting fires is not usually desirable since they are impossible to control. Buildings, stone buildings in particular, are very difficult to completely destroy with artillery fire and a large number of rounds has to be used. However, few direct hits are usually enough to rout the enemy from the building. 5. ARMORED VEHICLES [these regulations were already quite dated when the war broke out] 311. Armored vehicles are shot using either direct or indirect fire. When using direct fire, only one gun, that is taken to a suitable position, is used against a single target. If more guns are available, they all fire separately. If the fire range estimate is not correct, a 100 m unchecked barrage is created and the fire is aimed at the endpoint that is in the direction of enemy movement. The target movement is compensated by firing in the front of the target using the table on page 224. [i omit the table because it gives the adjustment using direct figures for azimuth control of different gun models.] The largest available charge and slow fuze should always be used. When indirect fire is used, strikes are fired against pre-registered targets and the forward observer should take into consideration the flight time and the target speed. The fire against heavy and medium tanks should use slow fuzes, against light (tankettes) quick fuzes, and against open topped vehicles timed fuzes. - Tommi

Germanboy wrote: Following speculation on my part: Another possibility would be to use a smoke round (no cratering then). That doesn't work because smoke rounds have different ballistics from HE rounds. I can't remember the actual figures right now, but I think that a smoke shell had 2/3 range of a HE shell that was fired with same charge and elevation (actually, the figure was given for a gas shell). The reason for this is probably much poorer weight/area ratio. - Tommi

Jarmo wrote: I think I remember there were several cases where the crew decided to risk it, and succesfully used whatever AT weapon they had brought along. And there were cases where tank crews dismounted from intact vehicles to attack enemy tanks with close-defence infantry weapons. (e.g., when an immobilized ISU-152, which blocked the advance along Portinhoikka road, was captured on 26 June '44). Another interesting case (~2 July '44) was an unknown Soviet tank commander who got out of his T-34-85 after the first hit and seconds before the next hit blew the tank up (a picture of the tank can be seen at http://www.hkkk.fi/~yrjola/war/finland/ ). The TC run to forest and escaped. This happened behind Finnish front lines since the tank had driven through the defence because the AT gunners had mistakenly identified it as a Finnish vehicle. About 30 minutes after the tank kill the lone TC stumbled onto a Finnish camp. He then decided to attack, run through it and killed one officer with his pistol. He almost escaped to forest again but was shot few meters before reaching cover. Not saying it was common though, and if it was allowed in CM, it would become the norm. So not allowing crew heroics is the right way. Agreed. - Tommi

Kingfish wrote: 3) Shouldn't the area around a TRP be covered with craters? Not necessarily. It may be that the target coordinates are measured without firing either by reading a map (if not much time is available) or by using surveying equipment (very slow). However, coordinates are not enough for accurate fire, but ballistic adjustment (my translation from Finnish "lentoratakorjaus", I don't know the official English term) has to be calculated. Since ballistic adjustment is essentially same for targets in similar range and direction, it can be calculated, for example, by firing calibration rounds in a target that is, say, 500 meters away from the actual target point. This way there will be no craters in the actual target area. Also, air bursts can be used so there will be no craters anywhere. According to Finnish practices, there were five ways of getting the target coordinates: 1) exact map coordinates (or surveying data, if available). This was the best but also the slowest method and it corresponds to CM target reference points. 2) map grid. The terrain was divided into a grid of 100x100m squares and the fire was called to the target square. This was not as good method as exact coordinates since determining the correct square was not always easy and the target may be between midpoints of two squares. 3) intersection from two FO points. Two different FO points both measure the direction of the target and its position is calculated trigonometrically. Very accurate, but slow and both FOs have to see the target. 4) one FO point. The one FO team measures both the direction and range (using a range-finder) to the target. This was inherently inaccurate because of 1-5% accuracy limit of range-finders in use. This method could be used also with the method 2. 5) I can't just now remember what it was. It had only one FO team but the range was determined without range-finders. The methods 1) and 3) allowed, in practice, instant strikes without any spotting rounds. With 2) and 4) few spotting rounds were usually, but not always, necessary. The method 2) was often used during attack when the exact location of the FO team was difficult to determine. The rest methods were more for defence. The method 4) was the only one that could be used against fast moving targets. - Tommi

kipanderson wrote: 3) the use of artillery to reduce minefields. Quoting my earlier answer to the question: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Clearing minefields (and barbed wire) with artillery requires either _a lot_ rounds and a competant FO or a great amount of dumb luck. A 1936-vintage Finnish artillery field manual ("Tykistön taktillinen toiminta") quotes that with 75 mm guns it takes 250-350 rounds to clear a 10x30 meter area of obstacles. (The figure is for wire, but the text implies that it applies to minefields also). With intensive fire, a 75 mm gun can fire 10 rounds in a minute (but only for a short time because the barrel will otherwise be ruined). The guns in CM fire with much slower rof. I've not checked but I think that they fire less than 5 salvos in a minute. So, to clear that small area would take at least 15 CM turns. In practice, obstacle clearing was much slower since intensive fire couldn't be used and the results of each shot had to be observed. The artillery manual gives the figure that a 2-gun section can clear a breach in 3-4 hours, so a battery would need 1.5-2 hours, the effective rof being somewhere around one shell a minute per gun. Also note, that according to an older Finnish manual (early 20's), it is not possible to clear obstacles that are placed in marsh with artillery. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> And another about using larger calibere shells: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Yup. Of course I forgot to check my notes to see what the obstacle clearing figures were for heavier guns, but I seem to remember that 105 guns would need about 1/3 - 1/2 less ammo than 75 mm ones. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I feel it is well within the scope of CM to model a 100-turn game in which the first half is spent breaching a minefield and the second assaulting an enemy position. But even 50 minutes is not enough (using artillery) unless you have heavy artillery and sound firing methods. With a 4-gun 105 mm battery it would take 45-60 minutes to get a single 10 m wide breach to an obstacle. Clearing minefields by hand is even slower and was usually done during the night (or nights) before the attack. Minefields were usually placed in positions where they could be covered by fire. Clearing them during day would lead to severe casualties, even if smoke screens were used. Additionally, the enemy would have a good idea on the approximate attack direction. The fastest way through a minefield is to blast it with demolition charges or bangalore torpedos, and this is already in CM. - Tommi

After writing the above post, I started to wonder about the geography and went to see the map of Vuosalmi area. One morning was quite foggy and the Soviet side of the river was hidden by the fog. Actually, the Soviet tank was in the bridgehead on the Finnish side of the river. The account was little confusing but a mention of a "road at the riverside" identified the place to be on the North side of Vuoksi. - Tommi

I just came upon an interesting account. During the battle of Vuosalmi one Finnish stug (Ps-531-25, "Kyllikki") was positioned near the Vuoksi river. One morning was quite foggy and the Soviet side of the river was hidden by the fog. The stug crew were relaxing when they suddenly noticed a muzzle flash on the other side of the river. Some Soviet direct fire gun was firing blind, they thought. Then they noticed that the location of the flash changed between the shots so it had to be a tank. Apparently the tank crew changed locations between each shot so that Finns couldn't pinpoint it. However, they used only 4-5 different firing locations and in fixed order. The stug crew then aimed their gun at one of the positions and waited for a couple of Soviet shots to see that the gun was aimed correctly. Then, just after they saw the muzzle flash the next time the gunner, private 1st class Vuorela, fired his 75 mm gun. Amazingly, the shot hit and the Finns heard a catasthrophic explosion from the other side of the river. When the fog cleared, they saw that the Soviet tank was approximately 1000 meters away. Vuorela destroyed a total of 7 tanks in summer '44. - Tommi

Big Time Software wrote: "40m (took 3 shots)" DOH! That must have REALLY sucked, since it was real As you know Jeff, there isn't a lot of difference between 17m and 40m, so 2 shots missed at 40m is really hard to imagine as well. Though it is not certain whether the first two were misses or did they only fail to penetrate. This is not stated in the book. The destroyed tank was identified as a KV-I, but since it happened on 11 June 1944 it may have been a IS-II, and in that case two non-penetrating hits wouldn't be surprising, at least if the shots hit the front. That 15 m example was certainly a real miss. - Tommi

I have been pretty busy the last few days so I haven't had time to answer to this thread. Doug Beman wrote: Are the italics yours? They are original. Actually, the original used e x t r a s p a c e s between letters, but it doesn't work too well on computer screen. Also, (and this is meant w/o offense) what's the point? Well, I've done teachning work too long now, it is in my blood... Jarmo wrote: Is it just me, or do the STRIKE's fire densities sound godawfully high? They are. Nenonen's opinion was that it is better to hit few targets really hard than to harass many targets without causing any serious damage. One Soviet captain who was captured at Ihantala in July 1944 stated that in his opinion, Ihantala was much worse place to be than Stalingrad because of Finnish artillery. (He had been there, but I don't know during what phase of the battle). In practice, if the forward observer thought that using a whole strike would be serious overkill, he would call a 1/2 or even a 1/4 strike. Additionally, during the Winter War the standard ammunition quota was 7 rounds per gun per day and full strikes were simply not possible. One interesting thing to note is the mention of time-on-target barrages. I haven't found any good reference on US artillery use, but some texts that I've read claim that T-O-T was a purely American speciality and even then only from 1943 (or something like that) onwards. And here we have a 1936 manual that has instructions on doing flight time calculations for T-O-T barrages. I would really like if someone could give a reference to some detailed account of US artillery procedures. Jasper wrote: <>Do they ever talk about ammunition types / ratios in there? There was a full chapter on choosing ammunition and fuze types on different targets. I will write it down someday when I have time. Meanwhile, here is a list of main ammunition types that were used by artillery in WWII: - HE: there were actually two different types of HE rounds in use. I don't know whether there is any official English terminology to distinguish them. The first type was "miinakranaatti" in Finnish (literally: "mine grenade", from the corresponding Russian term). This type of ammo was filled with explosives and had a thin casing. It had mostly concussive effect and only few shrapnels were produced. The other HE type was "sirpalekranaatti" (literally: "shrapnel grenade"). These had little less explosive but the casing was thicker and produced lots of shrapnels. Most field guns had both ammo types. Mine grenades were used against fortifications and earthworks and shrapnel grenades against enemy soldiers. - Shrapnel ("shrapnelli" in Finnish): Shrapnel rounds looked much like giant shotgun shells. They had several dozens of small steel pellets and a charge that was ignited by a timed fuze. The idea was to get the charge to blow about 10 meters above ground so that the pellets would cover the ground below. Shrapnel rounds were very effective against two targets: infantry moving in open or infantry that was unentrenced in woods. However, against any other targets their effect was miniscule. Most armies started to phase them out after WWI. -AP: there were again many different types of AP rounds. Field artillery used usually "panssarikranaatti" (lit. "armor piercing grenade") shots, that is, rounds with hardened piercing tip and an explosive charge. These were normally used against bunkers and other fortifications. -Incendiary ("sytytysammus"): These were filled with some burning material. Generally, they were only rarely used. Most armies used four different fuze types: - quick ("herkkä"): the shell would explode as soon as its tip hit something. - slow ("jäykkä"): the shell would explode when it reached the depth of about 2 shell lengths. - delayed ("hidastettu"): the shell would bury itself even deeper before exploding. - timed ("aika"): the shell would explode when a set time had elapsed. The Western Allies had also proximity fuzes that would explode when the shell was a given distance away from ground. There were also some extra quick fuzes that had a rod attached to them and that would explode when the rod hit the ground. - Tommi

illo: I just read that Finnish AT crews with 75mm Pak40 averaged 2 shots to 1 hit from ranges of 1000-1200 in combat against non moving tanks. Well, if you look at the Appendix 4 of the book, you may notice that all of the Armored Division's Pak40 kills were from much shorter range. The mentioned ranges are: 150m, 150-200m, 250m, 40m (took 3 shots), 150m, 200m, 75m, 450m, 200m, 200m and 200m, the average being about 150 meters. That 450 meter case was pretty interesting, a 50mm Pak gunner fired 41 shells at a T-34-85 before it caught a fire (first hit immobilized it). The ammo usages (when given)for 75 mm guns were: 3, 6, 5, 2, 1, 1, 3, 2, 1, with the average 2.7. Note that neither the range nor the ammo usage was given for all destroyed tanks. Another thing that has to be remembered is that those figures come from engagements where the gun won. There is no data from those fights where the AT gun lost and was destroyed, or fired several shots, missed them all and the target escaped. One of Käkelä's older books (I think it was "Laguksen Miehet") gives one occurrence where Finnish AT men didn't perform so good. One of the Finnish T-26 companies was fighting South of Vyborg (it was either June 18 or 19) when one of them drove to a Finnish AT ambush. The 75 mm AT gun opened fire from point blank (15-20 meters) but missed (the nationality of the tank was clearly marked). The tank commander then shouted to the gun crew and tried to get them to cease fire, but they didn't pay any attention to it and fired again, this time destroying the tank. One crewman was killed. - Tommi

Here's a quote from the Finnish 1936 Field Artillery Regulations book about different fire modes. Needless to say, the translation is mine (and again the translation of several technical terms is guessed). 4. FIRE MODES 242. Different fire modes are: - strike - barrage - destruction fire - harassing STRIKE 243. The objective of a strike is to cause casualties for enemy manpower - either enough casualties to destroy the target unit; or - at least suppress the enemy at the decisive moment. Additionally, one must to aim to cause as great moral impact as possible so that even if the physical effect of the fire is insufficient, the enemy's will to fight is broken. These aims can be achieved only if the following conditions are met: a) The fire density has to be great enough. Depending on the objective of the fire mission and the target type the fire density should be 40-120 rounds per 100mx100m area in one minute using light (76mm) artillery. The ammunition usage for other calibers can be calculated using the following conversion factors: 120 x 76 mm rounds fired at soft targets correspond to approximately: - 80 x 107 mm rounds; - 60 x 122 mm rounds; or - 40 x 152 mm rounds. The fire should come as surprise and have maximal impact from the first second. For this, time-on-target is usually assigned. A strike is fired using either the parallel, the narrowed, or the combined firing pattern so that the guns fire rapid fire 10-20 groups (76 mm), 7-14 groups (107 mm and 122 mm), or 3-6 groups (152 mm). 244. Depending on the objective of the fire and the target type, a strike is fired either by the whole batallion, two batteries, or by a single battery. 245. In a strike of the whole batallion, 10 groups are usually fired using the parallel pattern so that the impact pattern covers uniformly the target area and a fire density of 120 rounds in a minute is achieved. The shrapnel density is then so great that in favorable conditions it causes the destruction of unprotected manpower and targets in trenches are completely suppressed. 246. A strike of two batteries is usually fired using the parallel pattern. If equal shrapnel amount is desired, 15 groups have to be fired but then the shrapnel density is lower because of the longer duration of the strike. 247. One battery strike is fired using either the parallel, the narrowed, or the combined firing pattern. A total amount of 10-20 groups is fired. The weakest strike (10 parallel groups) suppresses the target in favorable conditions. Lengthened strike (more than 10 groups) cannot usually be kept uniformly in the target area because promptness of the fire lessens in the firing battery. Also, after it a lengthy cooling period is necessary. By narrowing the pattern by two thirds one can achieve as high fire density as when using a whole battery barrage and the parallel fire pattern. Therefore, one battery strike is usually sufficient for point targets. BARRAGE 248. The objective of a barrage is to prevent enemy from advancing over a given area, called barrage target. Each battery fires separately at a barrage target using 10 groups (76 mm) in rapid fire. The width of a barrage target is 150 meters when the fire comes from front and 300 meters with flanking fire. The fire is spread uniformly over the target area by using the "stepping method". The fire density of a barrage is thus approximately one half of the density of a strike. This is considered to be enough to stop the enemy movement. 249. Each battery has a special main barrage target. A battery has to very carefully prepare fire to its main barrage target and the guns of the battery should be kept aimed at it when there is no firing activity. When firing barrages, it is best to use quick or timed fuses. If those are not available, shrapnel rounds may be used. DESTRUCTION FIRE 250. The objective of destruction fire is to destroy enemy weapons, other equipment, fortifications, transportation routes, accommodation places, etc. At the same time casualties are incurred on the enemy and its operations on the target area are prevented. Destruction fire usually demands direct hits or at least near misses for effect. Destruction fire has to be fired so that after preparations calibrating rounds are fired, usually one gun at a time. The fire has to be continuously observed and adjusted as necessary. Thus, fire for effect cannot be fired using continuous rapid fire but serial fire or short bursts of rapid fire (2x3 groups at a time) has to be used. The best ammunition is HE or sometimes AP grenades (against concrete targets) with slow or delayed fuses. 251. The fire for effect is canceled when the target is destroyed. The estimated ammunition requirements against different targets will be presented later in this book. Destruction fire usually consumes very much ammunition and time and the enemy can easily evacuate the target area. Thus, destruction fire should be used only when absolutely necessary and by an explicit order. HARASSMENT FIRE 252. The objective of harassment fire is to harass the enemy movement, fortification work, quartering, etc. Harassment fire is fired in irregular intervals using short bursts of rapid fire, serial fire, or even single rounds. Both shells and shrapnel rounds may be used. - Tommi

Few examples on this subject from Lauri Leppänen's book (that I quoted a couple of days ago the first time). The last Finnish Stug-IIIG that was lost in the war was hit on front right hull by either an AT gun or a tank during a counter attack at Vuosalmi. Two crew members were wounded, one seriously (he died later because he couldn't be evacuated from the vehicle that was under fire) and one lightly. One of the other crew members (I think he was the loader) panicked and started to run towards the enemy. His comrades shouted to warn him but he continued in the same direction and vanished from sight behind a building. He was never seen again and I think that he is still in the MIA list since his body hasn't been found and he didn't return from captivity, either. Another occurrence happened during the Kuuterselkä counter attack. One stug of the 3rd Company of Assault Gun Batallion had a broken radio and it didn't hear the order to stop the advance so it continued to advance until it had only 2 AP and 3 HE shots left. At that point the infantry elements that were following the gun told that there were at least ten Soviet tanks behind a ridge line. The stug waited until first of them (a KV, or possibly IS-2) crossed the ridge and stopped it with 1 HE and 1 AP shots (the HE was a mistake). Then the crew started really to worry and the gun commander decided to retreat. They went backwards with full speed, but managed to immobilize the vehicle over a pile of big rocks and had to abandon it. They thought about the situation for few minutes before they realised that they had to go and blow up the stug. However, at the same time Soviet tanks started their advance and they didn't have time to activate the self-destruct charge and had to drop a hand grenade from the hatch. After destroying the vehicle they also realised that they had left their personal weapons in it. When they walked back to the start lines they got separated and two walked back trying to find their company (one of them was by that time lightly wounded). However, the gun commander took the gunner with him and he went to ask the local infantry commander whether they could do anything useful. The gunner was not too enthuastic about it. They were sent to destroy an intact stug that had been left before the lines (a 152 mm shell had landed in front of it and the crew had then abandoned it because they thought that they had hit a mine). The assault gun was under Soviet small weapons fire and the gunner then decided that they actually had done enough for one battle (they had destroyed 4 tanks) and decided to go back and report that they couldn't get to the stug. - Tommi

Topi: I think nowadays the "piiru" used in the Finnish army is 0.06 degrees, so full circle (360 degrees) is 6000 "piiru"s. The 6000 "piiru"s to 360 degrees system was in ues already during the WWII. However, the manual states that a true "piiru" would be a little smaller but that in practice 6000/360 is close enough. Firing with howitzer's cyrillic lettered direct fire sights would be even more fun if the "piiru"s were different.. There were also weapons using different "piiru"s in Finnish army. In particular, the guns without recoil systems that the French donated (87 mm and 150 mm guns) used the French system of 6400/360 (or 6200/360, I can't remember for certain). There was a nice anecdote in the book "Vienan tykit" about the heavy 150 mm French fixed-mount guns. An additional difficulty in aiming those guns was that the gun had to be aimed by turning the whole gun. This also ment that the corrections had to be issued as mirror-image, so that to get the rounds to land to right you actually moved the end of the gun to left. Once the guns of one such battery were directed by a forward observer of a different unit that used the common system. The first rounds were a little off so he issued corrections. When the telephone operator relayed the corrections the battery officer translated the figures in his head (he had a lot of experience doing it by that time, since even their own FOs used the normal system) and shouted them to the firing unit. However, the forward observer also heard the correction and got very angry because he thought that some joker was messing with his orders. Now, I would like to clarify my original post a little: Also, the minimum allowed fire adjustment is given as 4r, where r is the expected standard deviation on the displacement of a single round. A rough guideline would be that in usual firing conditions r=20-25 meters, so no fire adjustments smaller than 80-100 meters were allowed. This was true only for spotting rounds. If the forward observer noted that the barrage was not right on target, he could issue also smaller corrections, in integer factors of r. The rule of thumb was that if 75% rounds fell in front of the target, the aim point was 1r off the target, if 100% were short, the aim was at least 4r off. I can't remember the percentage figures for 2r and 3r adjustments. The interesting point was that with timed fuzes the actual aim point should be 1r behind the target because that way the actual target gets higher concentration of shrapnel. - Tommi

Some time ago I found an old Finnish artillery doctrine manual ("Kenttätykistön ampumaohjesääntö") from an old book's shop. I haven't had time to read it completely, yet, but I've found some interesting tidbits. The doctrine was written in 1935 and the book was printed in 1936. The book has one chapter on changing fire from one target to another. According to it, fire can be transferred to another target without spotting or calibration rounds if two conditions hold: 1) The range to the new target may differ from the range to the current target by at most by 1/3. (Formula given: If D_1 is the current range, targets within range 2/3*D_1 - 4/3*D_1 are allowed). 2) The difference on firing directions may be at most 300 "piiru"s. I don't have slightest idea what is the correct English term for piiru, but 300 of them make an approximately 17.5 degree angle. In practice, the allowed change area is roughly a circle with radius 0.3 of the range (it is actually a band of a sector but a circle is a convenient abstraction here). So, if the guns were 2 km away, the maximum target adjustment would be about 600 meters. Obviously, this formula doesn't function for very long ranges, but the manual doesn't say what is the cutoff point. I recall that another source stated that fire missions without spotting could be fired up to half of the maximum range of the gun so that is a good guess for the upper limit of the formula. For a 76K/02 (the main gun when the manual was written), half range would be about 4000 meters, and for 122H/09 (the main howitzer) 3700 m. Also, the minimum allowed fire adjustment is given as 4r, where r is the expected standard deviation on the displacement of a single round. A rough guideline would be that in usual firing conditions r=20-25 meters, so no fire adjustments smaller than 80-100 meters were allowed. Another book, "Upseerin käsikirja" ("Officer's Handbook"), that was written in the same year gives time estimates for different artillery things. The most interesting are: Deploying a forward observation post: 15 minutes. Registering a new target: 2-3 min. Calling fire without target coordinates: 4-6 min. Calling fire with target coordinates: 5-6 min. Calling fire to a registered target: 1.5-2 min. Calling fire to a pre-aimed, registered target: 0.5-1 min. Adjusting fire: 1.5-2 min. These values are for light artillery and the book simply states that heavy artillery is a little slower. Also, if morse codes have to be used to transmit the fire commands, the calling times increase by 1-1.5 min. The figures above are from pre-war regulations and may or may not correspond to actual reality of war. Also, Finnish artillery accuracy was among the best of the war, at least it was better than German or Soviet (this claim is partly based on opinions of several German artillerymen who fought in Northern Finland). I don't know how it would compare with British or US artillery. Oh, and in case that someone wonders. The difference between spotting and calibration rounds is that with spotting rounds you try to bracket some target by firing alternate long and short shots until you are confident that you have the range correct. With calibration rounds you fire a number of rounds using the same gun settings and then observe where they land. - Tommi

Mark IV wrote: Looks like they dropped those Monty Python 2000 lb. weights directly on each guy. YM 16000 lb, HTH, HAND. - Tommi

Chupacabra wrote: You forgot 5)They're Finns I would guess that something like this probably happened also with the German low-velocity self-propelled guns but I don't have any data how common occurence it would be, and I haven't come across any descriptions of such events. You could tell me that the Finish army used catapult-launched reindeer in an indirect fire role against the Soviets and I'd believe you Oh, no [que for Bruno], no Lapplander would allow such a waste of perfectly good reindeer, they would rather eat all the edible (and most of the inedible) parts and use the bones as raw material for knife handles. The fact that it would a government's reindeer would make it even more appetizing. (Most of the reindeer recipes start with: "First steal a reindeer from your neighbour"). On the other hand, I have seen a photo of a monster slingshot (the kind that would make Wiley. E. Coyote proud) that one enterprising soldier constructed for throwing hand grenades into Soviet trenches that were 150 meters away. The fork of the slingshot was a little over one meter wide. The slingshot probably got its power from torsion of the wooden frame as I would have hard time believing that someone could find a meter-long rubber band in the front lines. - Tommi

I managed to find another example on the fact that you can find an actual real-word example of just about anything that can happen in a war. This time it was a case of using a SPG to fire indirectly in a CM scale combat without lengthy preparations. This event happened in 20 June 1944 during the battle of Vyborg, and the gun was a BT-42, a Finnish-made assault-gun conversion of Soviet BT-7 tank that had a 114 mm howitzer as the main (and only) weapon. I'm not certain of the engagement range since it wasn't explicitly given and the accounts of that day are pretty confusing and I don't know how far Soviets had advanced by that time. I'd guess that the range was 500-1000 meters. (There was a tank-obstacle line positioned about 500 meters in front of the gun and I'd guess that the Soviets were a short distance behind that.) Any way, here's the direct quote from Lauri Leppänen's brand new "Rynnäkkötykit isänmaamme puolustajina" ("Assault guns protecting our Fatherland"): <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The following description is based on information given by Lt. Yrjö Nieminen: One gun [bT-42], probably Sippel's command vehicle 717, was dug in the Ristimäki graveyard. The driver was sergeant Aarne Virtanen and the loader was private Adiel Sorvisto. As the situation was quite worrying, Lt. Sippel had a conversation with Maj. Bäckman about possible methods of improving it. After this Sippel and Nieminen decided that Nieminen goes into the gun and starts firing the enemy. The main objective was to improve the morale of the supporting infantry. The gun was positioned so that it could fire close support if the enemy attacked but the trees in the graveyard prohibited the direct fire to enemy positions that were some distance away. After this Sippel and Nieminen agreed to fire indirectly so that Sippel would be some distance away from the gun in a place with good visibility to enemy positions and give the corrections with hand signals. They did so but the enemy soon located the gun and started to fire at it, either by an AT gun or by a tank. The first shots missed quite much but the subsequent shots got closer and finally one shot exploded in the rear part of the tank-hole. Dirt and shrapnel entered the vehicle via the open rear-hatch but no-one was hurt. Nieminen ordered Virtanen to drive fast to the secondary position that was on the far side of the graveyard. Nieminen himself jumped out of the gun and stayed in the hole. Sippel and Nieminen then had a conversation and Nieminen found out that Sippel had noticed that the enemy was starting to fire back and had tried to signal that the gun should retreat to the secondary position but Nieminen had misunderstood those signals as fire correction signals. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Few notes on the description of the event: 1) The assault gun men decided to start an ad-hoc indirect fire barrage without doing any preparations that would have been normally necessary for firing indirectly. Also, the main objective was to distrupt the enemy and give a moral boost to own infantry. 2) The fire was directed by a nearby observer and no radio links were used (actually, BT-42s didn't even have radios). 3) The fire didn't happen during the actual Soviet attack but shortly before it. The description doesn't say how much time passed between the shooting and the start of the attack, but it seems that there was at least 30 minute pause before it and the main thrust of the Soviet attack wasn't directed at the graveyard. 4) The account doesn't give details on how long did the preparations for the fire take and what was the rate-of-fire. Later that day Finnish defence collapsed and Soviets captured Vyborg without too much trouble but they couldn't cross the straits on the other side of the town because the bridges were blown. The BT-42 company lost five vehicles out of nine, including Sippel's no. 717, that was hit in the turret by a T-34-85. Sippel and Sorvisto both died but the driver survived. Lauri Leppänen, the author of the book, was a Stug-IIIG gunner in Rynnäkkötykkipataljoona (Assault Gun Batallion) and he was probably the first Finn to destroy a IS-II tank (the official account claims that it was a KV-I, but a picture taken by Lt. Olli Aulanko clearly shows that it was actually a IS-II). For some reason the driver of the IS-II had left his hatch open (possibly to see better in the dusk), and Leppänen (or possibly corporal Haapamäki who also fired at the tank) fired through it destroying the tank that would otherwise have been practically invulnerable from front. (Leppänen destroyed a total of 5 tanks, the rest four being T-34-85s.). - Tommi

Sir Wamers Kahlenberg wrote: I read that a American tank crew that had lost a track was able to repair the track in 10 mins. I have no trouble in believing that some kinds of track damage could be repaired quickly, maybe even in 10 minutes. However, they would need much more time in most cases. A repair time that quick would require that the tank is quite light (so the track is light), there's absolutely no damage in the drive wheels, and the repair conditions are pretty much ideal. Two days ago I read about one event when a Finnish T-26 lost a track while crossing River Tuulosjoki (early September 1941). The driver hit a rock that was hidden in water. According to the book, the crew managed to get the track back on in 30 minutes, in darkness and in cold water. However, I wouldn't trust the time estimate too much. The author, Reino Lehväslaiho, served in that unit for the whole war (the only original man in his platoon to survive unwounded). As a T-34-76 gunner he destroyed 5 T-34-85s during Summer '44. - Tommi

Snake Eyes wrote: Thanks for the info, I stand corrected. Do you have a reference? I would like to look into this more. The problem is that I can't remember what the references were in particular since it has been some time since I read the details. The just about only reference about air war in my bookshelf is Mike Spick's "Luftwaffe Fighter Aces", and it has only two sentences about the matter (re-translated from Finnish translation): <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> One of the legends that have grown on Me 262 is that unless Hitler had decided to use it as a bomber, it would have seen use as a fighter much earlier. In fact, Führer's interference costed only three weeks. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> - Tommi

Snake Eyes wrote: As an example, the Me262 could have been available in late 1943 or early 1944 had Hitler not insisted that it be a bomber. By what I've read from various sources, the bomber thing didn't really affect Me262 development that much. The main problem was engine reliability and that would affect both bomber and fighter variants equally. The true delay for the bomber-fiasco was a couple of weeks. Slapdragon wrote: (Russians were worse, they would actually throw away a tank or halftrack rather than fix it). That would happen only to old tanks, not new. There were still a lot of old T-34-76 models in service in 1944 and not surprisingly the tankers didn't like them. So, when one broke down they would sometimes it with the hope that they get a newer one in exchange. However, they would definitely repair all IS-II tanks that they could. - Tommi