tss

This thing happened just in my PBEM game with Jarmo. His Sherman was annoyingly hiding behind a heavy building that I then blew off. This happened about half-way through the turn. My Panthers didn't get a los to the Sherman that turn. They finally saw the Sherman two seconds into the next turn. - Tommi

Francesco wrote: StuGs with a grat concrete frontal protection were used by Finns (in 43/44) they were SuG IV Ausf.G mid/late prod. Yes, they were (that is, concrete was used, but the Stugs were IIIG s, not IV). However, I haven't been able to establish how much concrete was added. I guess that the added protection was quite insignificant. Also, during June '44 nearly all Finnish Stug crews added logs to sides of the vehicles. Here again, the effect was neglible. (At least on Stug, alik. Rastas's 531-5, was knocked out by a T-34-85 side hit while having added logs). The ironic thing is that Finns removed the original armor skirts that would have helped against anti-tank rifle rounds (at least two Stugs were damaged by ATRs aimed at the track-wheels). The skirts were found to be too cumbersome while driving in a forest. - Tommi [This message has been edited by tss (edited 01-12-2001).]

That T-34 is in a pretty bad shape. It looks like it has been on open for several years and there's no sign of tracks at all. I think that most probable explanation is that it was an AT training vehicle. Something in the picture reminds me of a knocked-out T-26m37 that is currently at Parola Armor Museum. Two pictures of it are at http://www.pp.htv.fi/jveijala/tankit/tank3.html . - Tommi

illo wrote: Im not sure of this but i think i havent seen geman tanks with tungsten ammo in CM. Didnt germans first use tungsten? That one is easy to answer. If you want to use tungsten, you have to have tungsten. Germany didn't have. I've read accounts that 39mm Paks at france were supplied with tungsten ammo at 1940. Germans developed tungsten ammo for most AT capable gun types they had. However, there simply wasn't enough tungsten available for widespread use, especially after the war had lasted for few years. Though, I think that an occasional Pz-IV or Stug should have one or two tungsten rounds, but that's about the limit. AFAIK, the only time that Stugs in Finnish use used tungsten rounds was at Kuuterselkä. Then, at least the vehicles of the II platoon of the 1st company each had few tungsten rounds. - Tommi

tero wrote: I was referring to the Hyppy Heikki model with... what is the word for "kiinteä lavettinen" anyway ? Paulaharju uses "gun without a recoil system". Quite cumbersome, so I think there's probably some shorter expression somewhere. And the official Finnish term is "jäykkälavettinen". Technically "kiinteälavettinen" may mean a gun that has an old-type naval swivel mount. However, I'm not completely sure whether that is the official term or not since my sources are at home. There was no single "Hyppy-Heikki" ("Jumping-Henry") model, but gunners tended to call just about all pre-1900 guns with that name, both Russian and French models. Some batteries used "Hyppy-Jaakko" as the name. I think that the models around 100 mm had longest jumps. The 152 mm guns were so heavy (120 "puuta"s is about 2000 kg and 190 is a little over 3000 kg) that the recoil force was not enough to send them back much. The lighter guns had smaller propellant charges so they didn't have that much recoil. Note that if the guns had been used as designed, the recoil effects wouldn't have been as bad as they were. Many batteries had no recoil-absorbing equipment such as anti-recoil wedges, wheel chains, and like. But since the situation was what it was, the running joke about the guns was that they needed two observers. One to see where the round lands and one to see where the gun goes. - Tommi

Gotta start nitpicking... tero wrote: The Finns used artillery pieces left over from the 1870 war during Winter War for crying out loud ! Actually, oldest Russian field guns in Finnish use were of the 1877 gun family: 87 mm cannon (87K77), 107 mm battery cannon (107K77-ptrik) (battery cannon essentially means that it was designed to be a field gun), 107 mm siege cannon (107K77-piirk), two different models of 152 mm heavy cannon (152K77-120p and 152K77-190p, the XXXp is the weight of the barrel in old Russian units, "puuta" in Finnish), and two heavy coast mortar models (229M77) and (279M77). Of those models, 107K77-piirk, 152K77-120p, 152K77-190, 229M77, and 279M77 were used also in the Continuation War. - Tommi

Private Pike wrote: Actually Von Mellenthin (Panzer battles, 1956)seems to agree that the invasion of Sicily by the Allied 15th Army Group under Alexander caused Hilter to halt Citadel Well, in that case it should be said that the Allied invansion saved whatever was left of the attacking forces. Had the attack continued, it would probably have ended in another encirclement like Stalingrad. The Soviets had simply too deep defence and too much reserves in the area. The German plan was doomed from the start. - Tommi

I just found an online picture showing a gun with definitely too long barrel. It's the Queen's Pocket Pistol, from 16th century. Some enterprising king or queen (can't remember right now who, and my sources are at home) tried to shoot over the English Channel with it. Well, the shot landed several hundreds of meters from the muzzle. The same range could have been achieved with 1/3 barrel length. Oh, and the actual link: http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/shrapnel/qepp/qepp1.htm - Tommi [This message has been edited by tss (edited 01-10-2001).]

The physical effect of rocket weapons is often exaggerated. They could certainly inflict horrible casualties on unprepared or moving infantry, but they were relatively inefficient (at least the smaller caliberes) against fortifications. The reason for this is that they had large explosive charges but produced very little shrapnells. I think that they also used almost exclusively quick fuzes so they exploded immediately on contact and didn't penetrate deep enough to cause serious damage to fortifications. An exploding rocket would make a really loud "boom", but it couldn't harm a man in a foxhole without an almost direct hit. I have read a story about a Finnish motorcycle messenger that had been continuously on duty for several days. He then got a chance to sleep in a road ditch for several hours. After waking up, he saw lots of rocket tail fins around him; the area had received one Katjusha barrage, but the man had been so tired that he hadn't even waken up. - Tommi

pktaske wrote: From a totally ignorant point of view, I can't seem to figure how the length or specific construction of the tube has much of an impact aside from accuracy. And back to answer the original question. When the propellant charge explodes, the resulting expanding gasses push the shot along the tube, accelerating it. Initially the gasses can go only in the barrel but when the shot leaves the muzzle, the gasses spread to all directions. At that point they don't give any more energy to the shot. So, making the barrel longer lenghtens the time that the gasses accelerate the shot. However, if the barrel is too long, the drag of the shot overcomes the propelling forces at some point, and it starts to loose velocity even before leaving the barrel. So increasing the barrel length beyond a certain cutoff point is a waste of resources. - Tommi

Maximus wrote: No, but I know the episode you're talking about. The one you speak of is Chapter 9: Demons of Deception. OK. It has been several years (actually, at least 5) since the series was shown here and I watched it only now and then. That particular episode is the only one that left a lasting mark on my mind. - Tommi

iggi wrote: Does anybody know why a human brain can do multitasks at the same time while a cpu has to quickly switch from one task to another? A brain is a big network of connected cells. Each nervous cell two kinds of connections, incoming and outgoing. There may be lots and lots of connections coming to and going from one cell. If enough incoming connections are activated (that is, some other cells are sending a signal to the cell), the cell "fires" and sends a signal to all outgoing connections. There's no central controller that dictates when a cell may send or receive signals but they all operate independently. So, in practice the "multitasking" only means that there's activity on several separate locations of the brain. The examples of walking and lifting both arms are actually poor examples since the processing of sensory input takes much more effort and needs much more parallelism. There are also fancy names for each part of the cells but since my relevant books are at home, I can't give them. - Tommi

Maximus wrote: 2) Trenches of Hell - Chapter 8 in the Young Indiana Jones series detailing young Indy as a Corporal in the Belgian Army down in the trenches. Isn't that the episode where Indy rides a Transformer motorcycle that changes model between each scene? And is attacked by a (1916-vintage, IIRC) biplane with seemingly infinite bomb supply? I was also pretty impressed of the recoilless 75 mm guns. (No, not recoilless in the usual sense but otherwise ordinary fixed-mount guns that just don't have any recoil.) - Tommi

Big Time Software: I think I can answer your question at least The 75mm gun you were talking about was mounted in a StuG III, correct? Possibly. Either that or the 75 Pak 40. The text didn't mention which one was tested. The 75mm StuK40 L/48 used on the StuGIII has, as far as we can tell (we had to dig for this info) a muzzle velocity of 770 m/s. That would explain it. The Germans did, however, claim that the tested gun had 790 m/s muzzle velocity, but it wouldn't be the first time when some mixup like that happens. (For example, the performance specifications of Italian Fiat G.50 were seriously exaggerated, or at least could be achieved only on some strange conditions that had no relation to actual battle conditions. Yes, I know that the same thing applies to all aircraft to some extent, but Fiat's figures were way off.) - Tommi

tero wrote: The story is true to life. With very liberal values of "true". I've posted a more-depth analysis earlier, a couple of times, in fact. Right now I don't have time to search for the threads, but in short: Yes, in the early July 1941 two platoons were sent to go round Lake Lieksajärvi (just below the 64th latitude line and about 30 km from Finnish border) in command of vänr. Perttuli. Several scenes in the movie are taken from events that happened during this mission, but most scenes are fictional. In CM terms the use of bicycles is a no-no and sending troops far behind enemy lines in that fashion is deemed gamey recon. There's a little difference there. In the real life, they sent almost 70 men on the mission. A lot of them were armed with SMGs so they had enough firepower to defend themselves given that they didn't walk straight into an ambush in open terrain. (To tell the truth, they cycled straight into an ambush but poor accuracy of Soviet troops saved them, the unit had only one casualty during the whole mission). - Tommi

Big Time Software wrote: Ok this is interesting. I'll muddle the pool and give third figure. According to the Kantakoski's book that I've been quoting a lot today, the Finns measured that the 75 mm L/48 had a muzzle velocity of 770 m/s. He adds, that this was different from German value of 790 m/s. He doesn't give figures for L/43. The two other 75 mm guns listed are L/24 (385 m/s) and L/70 (935 m/s) (both from German sources as neither was used by Finns). - Tommi

Slapdragon wrote: Did you fail to jack the Maxim twice I've been reading old soldier's manuals lately and I was pretty surprised when I came to this particular instruction. I can comfortably say that if I had tried to get a Maxim into working condition in a hurry, I would have miserably failed. (Note, if you jack it only once, you will get only single shot). In other words, the idea that WW2 era troops could take apart, fire, load, and service enemy weapons is a stretch. Except those cases where both sides used similar weapons, but I wont digress into that this time. See my postings on older threads of this subject. However, there were several battles where weapon scrounging was more or less the norm. I mean the trench war battles of Summa and Taipale during the Winter War. The defenders stockpiled lots of hand grenades, demolition charges, and Molotov coctails in small caches that were dug in the trench wall. During the day, Soviet artillery collapsed the trenches, and during nights they were dug again, maybe in a slightly different position. As a result, the terrain got littered with explosives, and a man in need had relatively good chances of finding one by digging around. Vänrikki (2nd Lt.) Alpo Reinikainen mentions in his memoirs that he once (on February 18) noticed that three Soviet T-28s were advancing towards his position. He then started digging around and in a few minutes he found several demolition charges that he prepared for use. However, when he raised himself to look whether the first tank was in range, he was incapacited by MG fire. I don't think that there's any reason for including this kind of scrounging in CM. Actually, Soviet major offensives in the Winter War are pretty much impossible to recreate in CM. I can say with confidence that no human player would be bone-headed enough to lose as the Red Army. On that particular day (18 February) that I mentioned, Reinikainen's "Stronghold IV" repulsed all attacks against it, even though in the end there were less than 10 unwounded defenders left. One reason why this happened was that Soviets simply couldn't find the stronghold! The whole terrain was so badly mauled by artillery fire that all identifiable landmarks had been destroyed long ago. So ten men, firing only whenever Soviets got too close managed to hold their positions for the whole day (however, it was the only stronghold that wasn't lost that day). Now with the CM engine the Soviet _player_ would know the approximate location of the defenders from the minute that they first begin firing, even with relational spotting. He could then gather several dozens of squads and a couple of tanks and overrun the stronghold without any serious resistance. (Note that the Winter War map ( http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~tssyrjan/kirvesmaki.zip ) that I made several months ago is of this sector) - Tommi

Lorak wrote: I wonder how much of the German's ability to cross bad terrain was due to the experience of the drivers though? During the aftermath of Portinhoikka counter attack on 26 June 1944 Finns found three intact T-34-85s that had bogged in wet terrain (I think it was a swampy field or something like that). The tanks were abandoned and could be started. Several tank drivers were sent there but they couldn't get the T-34s move at all. They tried for some time, maybe an hour or so, before they decided that they needed some heavy towing equipment. Just when they were sending for artillery tractors, sergeant Lauri Heino's T-34 drove to the scene. Heino jumped out of the tank, jumped in the first bogged T-34, and drove it out of the bog. With his first try. Then he got the rest two tanks out, both with one try. That's what experience does. (He had been driving a T-34 since October 1941 when he had fixed an immobilized one near the Svir power plant.) - Tommi

Jeff Duquette wrote: Do you have access to schematics or photo through the T26 or T34 primary gunsight. I have a drawn schematics. They are from the book "Punaiset panssarit" ("Red Armor") by Pekka Kantakoski. He commanded the Finnish Armored Batallion in 1974-5 and before that he was an instructor (1949-60), teaching conscripts to use T-26, Vickers 6 ton, T-34-76, T-34-85, Stug-IIIG, Pz-IVJ, T-54, BTR-50, and PT-76. A little addition about the T-26 sight, the 2 mil scale for MG use. There is no mention about magnification on gunsights. However, nearly all early-war Soviet tanks had one or two observation periscopes that had a fixed 2.5 magnification. This caused more problems than it solved, since it narrowed the field of vision and range estimation was very difficult. In T-34-85 and IS tanks the tank commander had also a adjustable unmagnified mirror that could be used to look out of the hatch. It was a copy of British mirror system that was used in lend-lease tanks. Kantakoski also mentions that the Soviet observation cupola was much worse than German because its slits were narrower. I may go to the scanner and get some pictures of them. Though I think I wait until tomorrow and bring also the field artillery regulations manual and get its pictures, too. - Tommi

Big Time Software wrote: I know of a few examples where the armor simply turned around and left, leaving the infantry to fend for themselves. And sometimes the armor had good reasons to leave, but the infantry didn't know about them and bitterly lamented the "cowardice" of the tankers. For example, the German 303rd Assault Gun Brigade got an undeserved poor reputation among the infantry that they supported. The stugs were used as a fire brigade in counter attacks and their job was to return to the deployment area immediately after a Soviet break-in had been sealed. The infantrymen didn't know about this and were excepting that the guns would stay in the front for direct support. Also, they didn't know how much ammo a stug could have and thought that stugs returning for ammo replacement were running away from battle. - Tommi

Terence wrote: I'm sure that you are correct. The Soviet progaganda machine was well advanced and spread all kinds of amazing (and untrue) stories around. Last spring I managed to find the booklet "Their name was Legion". It was a collection of translations of Soviet hero stories. Very entertaining to read, I must say. It would be very interesting to find out how much truth it contains. The booklet was printed in 1944, IIRC. But that doesn't change the fact that there were some Soviet snipers, and they were used on the battlefield -- mostly in urban situations. Here are two (true) stories of Soviet snipers. Both are from Finnish sources. 1. During Winter War at Kollaa, one Soviet sniper managed to kill three Finnish officers in two days. He was then hunted down by Finnish sniper, Simo Häyhä. I've posted details of this story earlier somewhere. 2. During the advance to River Svir in September 1941, one Finnish attack to a forested hill was repulsed a couple of times. The attackers had ~15 KIA, most killed with head shots. Because the tank batallion was nearby, a platoon of T-26 tanks was send in to help. The tanks started to shoot HE rounds to the hill. When one fir came down, the tankers saw that it had a platform on it and two men jumped up. The tankers were pretty amazed and stopped firing, but a nearby infantry platoon leader quickly shouted to them that they should continue firing and kill the snipers. The snipers were then cut down by MG fire. Those two snipers had caused at least 10 casualties on the attackers, maybe more. - Tommi

I read the formula again, and add few more comments: rexford wrote: What occurs in the field is not exactly what happens on a nice day in the firing range with carefully kept-up guns and ammo that has been proofed under non-stress and ideal conditions. That is certainly true. I have been posting examples from the Kuuterselkä battle for few days and found one that illustrates battlefield accuracy: At one point, alik. Vartio's stug (-7) was advancing on the point and noticed a T-34-85 on the side of the road, ~20 meters away. The driver quickly turned the vehicle towards the tank and the gunner, korpr. Leppänen fired. The shot either missed or hit a spot where it didn't cause any serious damage. The T-34 then fired back, and it too missed. Leppänen got the next shot, hit, and knocked out the T-34. So here we have one or two misses at 20 meters, which, according to theoretical accuracy models, shouldn't be possible at all. Gross aiming errors like that are pretty difficult to model using any theoretical models. Gross errors sometimes happened also with field artillery using indirect fire. I have read of one occurrence where the gun crew (it was a harassment mission with only one gun) mixed full and half powder charges, and the result was that the rounds fell in the pattern of the British artillery motto. What if Tiger uses range estimation vs. 700m target and average error is 35%. Standard deviation for 35% avg. error is about 28.6%. The range-finding equipment of the day had limited precision. I have some data on range-finders that were used by the Finnish army. First, the gunsight of the 45 mm gun of the T-26 tank had granularity of 4 mils on horizontal axis and 2 mils on the vertical axis. The firing range had to be set on a separate "elevation drum" and it wasn't shown on the lens. This caused many aiming errors. Also, the sight was attached to the gun and it moved up and down so the gunner could end in very uncomfortable positions. The final flaw was that there was only one scale that had to be used both with AP and HE rounds, even though the weight of an AP round was only 2/3 of the weight of a HE round. The 76.2 mm gun of T-34-76 had a better sight but it too was far from optimal. The horizontal granulation was again 4 mils and vertical 2 mils. However, it was possible to get one mil accuracy with it. There were separate scales for AP and HE rounds as well as for the MG. The range was again set using an elevation drum but this time it was shown on the lens, also. The sight of the 85 mm gun was otherwise similar to the one of the 76.2 mm but it didn't have cross-hairs but the vertical hair extended only to the horizontal mil indicator. According to my source ("Punaiset panssarit"), this was almost a direct copy of the Pz-IV's sight. I have also data on field artillery range-finders, but it isn't available just now. - Tommi

rexford wrote: Max trajectory height = 1.336 (Flight time) raised to 1.919 power. This is pretty close to the formula that we were taught in the artillery weather school. We used 1.5 * FT^2 that overestimates the actual ceiling but is close enough for artillery weather report purposes. We used the data to estimate the time when a sounding had to be started. If the gunners wanted to shoot 40 second flight times, the ceiling was ~2000 m, and the sounding would take a little over 10 minutes with the time to fill the balloon counted in. (The balloon will take ~6 minutes to raise to 2 km, IIRC). The more rough formula has the advantage that it can be calculated in head for most flight times. It certainly isn't accurate enough for probabilistic analysis of hits and misses. - Tommi

The battle of Kuuterselkä gives also some insight on accuracy of official kill figures. The above figure of 21 kills is based on post-war compilation of different accounts. The official figure was lower, 18. On 9 July (almost a month after the battle) General Lagus, commander of the division, awarded tank-destroyer's badges to the following gunners: - Olof Lagus, 4 kills (correct, and yes, he was the general's son) - Veikko Haapamäki, 3 kills (correct) - Lauri Leppänen, 3 kills (one too few, however, he was awarded two kills from the Portinhoikka battle instead of correct one, so in the end his total figure of 5 kills was correct) - Toivo Juomoja, 3 kills (completely wrong, he wasn't even a gunner at the time) - Sulo Vuorela, 3 kills (correct) - Oiva Savela, 2 kills (correct) Interestingly, Olavi Taponen didn't get any credits, though he destroyed 5 vehicles in the battle. Three of his kills were credited to Juomoja and two were not credited at all. The main reason for this seems to be that there was no one left to correct the figures when they came. Aulanko was wounded and Koskiniemi killed at Kuuterselkä, Kvikant was killed several days later, and Taponen himself was wounded at Portinhoikka, after destroying three more T-34s. After the Kuuterselkä battle, Taponen was made the tank commander of -6, and Juomoja came as a replacement gunner (though Taponen manned the gunner's bench himself at Portinhoikka). When the battle data was collected, someone probably remembered that Aulanko's -6 destroyed three tanks. As Juomoja was by then its gunner, the credits were awarded to him. There are also some other cases where rewards go to wrong people, by a honest mistake (forged or beautified reports are a different case). For example, the former President of Finland Mauno Koivisto was awarded a VM 2 ("Freedom's Medal, class 2") for his bravery in combat, in particular in the battle of ... Oh dear, I forgot what battle it was. However, he has himself stated that he wasn't in the battle at all. He was on a two-day, three-man contact patrol. He was usually a (self-appointed) LMG gunner but had taken a SMG with him to the patrol because it was lighter. It seems that the unknown guy who fought with the LMG performed well in combat but the usual gunner got the reward. That particular LMG is now in the Finnish War Museum. It was found several years ago from a hidden weapon cache in a forest. The company commander (Lauri Törni, later Larry Thorne) and one of his platoon leaders had hidden several automatic weapons and ammo because they feared that Soviets would try to occupy the country. The LMG could be identified to be Koivisto's weapon because his red handkerchief was still in the stock. This particular LMG was probably chosen because it wasn't in official books since Koivisto had taken it from a dead Russian, IIRC. - Tommi

There's now a big debate on bailed out crews in the gamey tactics thread. I just went through one particularly well documented battle, Finnish counter-attack at Kuuterselkä 14.6.1944, to see what did the assault gun crews do after they had to bail out. Approximately one third of the attacking Stug-IIIGs were either knocked out or immobilized, and practically all of the rest were either damaged or had some severe malfunction that hindered their operational use. The following is the list of stugs with problems, approximately ordered by their damage times: 531-3 Ylik. Hyytiäinen (2 x T-34-85) Gun hit by a T-34-85, retreated for repairs. 531-19 Ltn. Sartio (4 x T-34-85) The semi-automatic gun loader malfunctioned, retreated for repairs. 531-4 Kers. Nertamo The clutch-break steering malfunctioned, retreated for repairs 531-6 Ltn. Aulanko (1 x ISU-152, 2 x T-34-85) A T-34-85 hit penetrated right upper front armor killing the loader (Paavo Havu). The commander and gunner (Aulanko and korp. Taponen) dismounted and followed the counter attack by foot. The vehicle was sent back to retrieve more ammo and a new loader. It returned back to battle later and the crew remanned it (meanwhile Taponen had destroyed 2 tanks in other stugs). This stug was the last one to retreat from the battle field. Ltn. Aulanko did three trips to front line while footed, trying to find out reliable information. In the final phase of the battle Aulanko once more dismounted and tried to get in contact with the company HQ (the radio had malfunctioned, probably a result of the hit). On this trip he was wounded by artillery fire. 531-5 Alik. Koskiniemi (2 x T-34-85) Koskiniemi's gunner panicked, jumped out of his hatch, and routed. Koskiniemi spotted Taponen walking along the road and asked him to man the gun. Taponen destroyed one T-34 but then the vehicle fell into a pit and the gun elevation control was jammed. The driver (alik. Pirttinen) managed to get the vehicle out of the pit and retreat out of fire. Koskiniemi then joined Aulanko on his first foot trip to front line but was killed by an artillery barrage. The loader had also come out of the stug and was wounded in eye by a shrapnell. Later, kapt. Kvikant took the vehicle (with damaged gun) after 531-29 was destroyed, and Taponen got one more T-34. The gun was repaired and the stug continued to fight until the end of the battle. 531-7 Alik. Vartio (1 x IS-II, 1 x ISU-152, 2 x T-34-85) A camouflaged T-34-85 hit the vehicle on top right front corner. The hit didn't penetrate but it destroyed the MG and "some equipment" [i don't know what in particular]. Also, the engine stalled and the driver (psm. Leiponen) couldn't restart it so the crew bailed out. The loader (psm. Solismaa) and the tank commander were wounded by small arms fire while bailing. Both the driver (psm. Leiponen) and the gunner (korpr. Leppänen) were unwounded and retreated from the battle. Later, korpr. Vuorenmaa, the temporary loader of 531-6 managed to start the vehicle again (under enemy fire) and drive it to safety. 539-29 Kapt. Kvikant (1 x ISU-152, 2 x T-34-85) A direct hit knocked this vehicle out. My sources don't have the exact details. It is possible that it was empty at the time, since no crew member was wounded. Kapt. Kvikant stayed on the area since he was the company commander, the rest of his crew retreated from battlefield. The gunner, alik. Haapamäki was later asked to be the gunner of 531-6 when it returned to front, but korpr. Taponen took the job in the end. Before -29 was destroyed, Taponen manned the gun (his 3rd assault gun in one battle!) for a while and destroyed an ammo truck that had wandered to the battle area. 531-27 Ltn. Myllymaa An AT gun hit to the top left superstructure, killing the tank commander. The driver (korpr. Tuusa) managed to drive the vehicle away before the gun fired again. The vehicle then retreated. 521-24 Alik. Halonen (1 x IS-II, 2 x T-34-85) An AT gun hit to right superstructure, wounding the loader (psm. Poskiparta). The tank commander then took the loader's position, observing the situation from loader's hatch. The vehicle didn't receive the order to retreat and it advanced alone several hundreds of meters, destroying three tanks. It was immobilized on a pile of rocks and the crew blew it up with a hand grenade. After doing that, they realised that they had left all weapons in the vehicle and were now unarmed. The driver (psm. Jaakkola) was wounded by a SMG burst and retreated. The tank commander didn't want to leave the battle ground but went to an infantry Major asking for something to do. He took the gunner (psm. Vuorela) with him while Vuorela thought that they had done enough for one battle. The Major sent them to destroy one assault gun (-23) that had been left intact in the no-man's land, but they failed. They then retreated from the battle. 531-17 Kers. Räsänen Got caught in ambush of two AT guns. First hit destroyed the gearbox immobilizing the vehicle and the second one destroyed the gun. The crew bailed out and Räsänen ignited the self-destruct charge. The gunner (korpr. Hyvämaa) managed to take a SMG with him. The crew then retreated from the battle. 531-?? ylik. Liimata The clutch-break steering malfunctioned, retreated for repair. 531-20 Kapt. Kumlin Got hit by 2 AT guns, gun damaged, retreated for repair. 531-?? alik. Hietanen Bogged in sand, got an engine malfunction while unbogging, retreated for repair. 531-?? alik. Tammisalo Gun aiming mechanism malfunctioned, retreated for repair. 531-23 maj. Åkerman Abandoned by crew when a 152 mm artillery round hit in front of it. The crew (except Åkerman who had to command the batallion) retreated from battle. The Soviets captured -23 intact. 531-?? kers. Rastas Damaged by an AT gun. Loader bailed out and was wounded by a rocket barrage. The vehicle was evacuated for repair. 531-1 kapt. von Troil The tank commander and the driver (kers. Haikka) were out discussing with ylik. Brotell about the situation when an artillery barrage hit the area and killed Troil and Haikka. The vehicle was then sent back but a HE near-miss cut a track immobilizing it. It couldn't be recovered and apparently sappers blew it up to prevent Soviets from capturing it. The surviving crew members retreated from battle. Some notes: In CM terms, the assault gun batallion lost three stugs (-29, -17, -7) as knocked out, two were abandoned after immobilization (-24, -1), and one abandoned without a good reason (-23). One of the stugs (-7) could later be recovered. Additionally, six (-3, -6, -27, -24, 20, -??) were damaged by enemy fire. Two of the damaging hits were gun hits. The number of otherwise malfunctioning vehicles is quite surprising. A total of five (-19, -4, -??, -??, -??) assault guns had to retreat because of malfunctions. Two had problems with steering, two with the gun, and one with engine. Additionally, one vehicle (-5) had a self-inflicted gun trouble but it could stay in battle. In the end of the battle, only three stugs out of 18 were still in battlefield and two of them (-5, -6) had been somehow damaged. Only Brotell's vehicle (-10) was completely intact. Of the six knocked-out or abandoned vehicles, five crews left the battle, with the exception that commanding officers (Aulanko, platoon leader, Kvikant, company commander, and Åkerman, batallion commander) stayed in the battle (Åkerman was not even in his vehicle when it was abandoned but was some 100 m away). Also, korpr. Taponen (whose vehicles were not knocked-out at any point) lingered on the battlefield and during the battle served in three different stugs. The one exceptional crew that stayed was alik. Halonen's crew and Halonen was a pretty special case, here's what his gunner Vuorela has later said of their private attack: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> That Halonen, he was a bloody maniac [in Finnish: "sotahullu", literally: "crazed of war"]. He ordered to advance over the ridge and said that there was a good hunting ground on the reverse slope. The driver, Jaakkola, said then that by hell he could drive there but then we wouldn't come back again. I saw a Klim [probably IS-II] crest the ridge and fired. A hit, but with a HE round. The loader had made a mistake. However, few enemy tanks fire back immediately since even a HE will give one hell of a bang. Halonen, who was loading after the real loader was wounded put the last AP round into the barrel, I fired, and it penetrated the Klim Voroshilov. It exploded into fire. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The assault guns knocked out 21 Soviet tanks or assault guns. It is not know how many could be repaired later. The total Soviet armor losses were 40 vehicles that day, according to their casualty report. Some were destroyed by a Ju-88 bombing run and the rest were knocked out with Panzershrecks and -fausts. - Tommi