Keith

While I agree with your assesment that the American armored division was light on infantry, which limited a division's "staying power", the primary cause for the reverse was more to due to the corps commander's (Eddy) failure to support 4th Armored Division's advantage with adequate follow on forces. Eddy's decision to consolidate XII Corp's foothold acrross the Moselle rather than pressing on to Germany was a gift to the Germans that allowed them to concentrate reserves. Also Eddy chose to send armored elements back to support the infantry rather than to support the continuation of 4th Armored's advance. Like you said it was customary to attach infantry battalions to the armored division for support. However in this battle Eddy actually DETACHED infantry and tanks from 4th armor to help his infantry fighting in the Moselle bridgeheads. Eddy is to blame, not 4th armored.

With regard to the Eastern Front, the fact of the matter is until recently the Western historians only had access to German sources, which tended to emphasize the early German victories from 1941-1942 and gloss over later war defeats. Also the memoirs of the General officers where revisionist, placing all of the blame for failures on Hitler. In addition these memoirs tended to portray the Russian Army as faceless untrained masses, heavily outnumbering the German Army in all situations. It wasn't until historians John Erikson and David Glantz published their works that a more balanced view has come out. For example, in the Russian winter counter offensive of 1941 the Russians only outnumber the Germans 2:1 in infantry at a few critical points and lesser superiorites in artillery. The Germans maintained armored superiority. Moreover, German intelligence estimated that Stalin had no more reserves so the shock of the Soviet counterattacks was therefore greater. And certainly no one can argue that fighting quality of the Russian army in 1944 was far different from the Russian army in 1941. But many of the older historical accounts do not cover the years 1943-1944 in nearly as much detail as from 1941-1942. Practically 3/4 of Albert Seaton's book on the EF covers 1941-1942. [ 05-12-2001: Message edited by: Keith ]

I think the biggest trick in making a scenario enjoyable against an AI oppenent is knowing how to place the victory flags. The flags are the primary decision factor used by the AI. If you want to have the AI defender hold defensible positons and not get wasted in fruitless counter attacks you have to place the flags in sufficient depth behind the main line of resistance. When designing a scenario for the AI as the attacker the most important thing is learning how to synchronize the timing of forces and reinforcements such that the AI can pull off coordinated attacks. This is really a black art and requires lots of patience tweaking scenario parameters. Having a good road net to the objectives with non-constricting terrain is essential making the AI look smart. Also placing the objectives in a coherent fashion, not willy nilly all over the map, will help the AI. Think of the AI as a rat in a maze and you have to place the cheese (flags) at the appropriate places along the way to help him out. The bottom line is the AI is very respectible and I think carefull scenario design can make the AI fight quite well. Of course the AI will always be better defending than attacking, so keep this in mind.

I am sorry but I must take issue with those that the "AI sucks". I rank the AI, particularly the tactical AI, to be one of the best in the industry. Often funny behavior can be attributed to the inexperience of the scenario designer. For instance, if you capture an enemy objective flag the AI will try to counter attack. The scenario designer should put the flag on the far side of the bridge if the designer did not want the defenders to cross the bridge and get mowed down counter attacking. In the end you will ALWAYS need to find a human opponent if you want a real challenge! Saying things like "It Sucks" is really not to productive and is intended to tick the software developers off. Quite juvenile. [ 05-09-2001: Message edited by: Keith ]

Just go to the following web site of a CM gamer who was a platoon leader in real life: http://www.geocities.com/fpd131/index.html Go to the archives area and he has some great stuff on deployments of infantry on the attack.

My source for my information is the book "Seven Days in January", which was written by a battalion XO of the 6th SS Mountain Division. The author has several pages discussing the long range patrols performed by German squads - sometimes with Finnish scouts. I am sure there were also many Finish only patrols. The author also makes it clear that the Finnish and German offensive in 1941 had sufficient momentum to cut the railway, but the Finns did not want to. The author says this is partially due to high Finnish casualties but also because the Finns did not want to piss of the Western Allies. The author describes how the Germans typically destroyed bridges as the best way to break the rail line. However the Russians had specific labor battalions tasked with keeping the rail line running and stockpilled timber for this purpose. [ 05-04-2001: Message edited by: Keith ]

The Strumkompanie was part of a larger battalion formation specifically tasked for assaults. In Normandy/Cherbourg there was a distinct Sturm battalion that counter attacked the paratroopers in St. Mere Eglise. It was definitely not an ad hoc unit. They were issued a high percentage of automatic weapons. The U.S. first used the recoiless rifle in the airdrop over the Rhine in 45. In fact I think Wild Bill made a scenario about it.

The fact that Britian declared war on Finland in 1941 and the U.S. severed diplomatic ties with the Finns did have an indirect impact on the war in the far North. Finland was very concious to of this and decided not to attempt cutting the Murmansk rail line in Russian territory, which was bringing vital lend lease equipment to Russia. Instead they said the Germans could try it alone if they wish. The Germans only succeeded in doing so intermittently through ski patrols equipped with demolitions. [ 05-04-2001: Message edited by: Keith ] [ 05-04-2001: Message edited by: Keith ]

The tank formation mentioned in the above post was refered to as the panzer wedge. Unfortunately for the Germans it was a complete failure at the battle of Kursk - as described by Guedarian and Melenthen. Basically the lighter tanks fell victim to AT assets once the heavy tanks rolled through. In addition, having the heavy tanks up front negated the advantage of superior long range guns and made them more vulnerable to AT fire. The exact opposite of the panzer wedge should have been used. Also there was poor infantry-tank coordination in Kursk. With regard to the push to the super heavy German AFVs - this came from Hitler's obsession with technology and the belief that if Germany could produce certain quantity of technically superior vehicles/planes/rockets then the Germans could win the war. In reality these super heavy tanks consumed a tremendous amount of fuel - which the Germans were desperately short of - and cost a rediculous amount of scarce resources (labor, material, enginnering) to make in comparsion to the earlier tank models. Not to mention the additional complexity of spare parts required. Interesting point - in the battle of the Bulge offensive the German panzer divisions were so short on fuel that they started siphoning fuel from the fuel inefficient Panther tanks and transfering the fuel to the MKIV battalions and the recon battalions just to remain at least partially mobile. Germany should have concentrated on churning out the MKIV, StugIIG, Marder/Hetzer, and the MKV tanks.

U.S. Army in European Theatre of Operations: 1st Infantry Division 4th Infantry Division 36th Infantry Division (Audie Murphy & fought in Africa, Italy, France, and Germany) 4th Armored U.K: All ANZAC troops Finland: First class army Germany, Western Front 1944-45: Panzer Lehr 9th SS Mountain Division (formerly in Finland) 1st SS Panzer 10th SS Panzer 12th SS until the end of Normandy at which point it was basically destroyed and rebuilt - a shadow of its former self

Will CM2 allow for Rumanian, Hungarian, and Finnish troops to fight against German units in late 1944-45? Also, I hope there will be German mountain units equipped with skis during winter battles.

I recently played a scenario where my .50 cal achieved plunging fire into the rear of Marder at around 700 meters. Perhaps I got a hit on the engine deck or sprayed the open top crew compartment, forcing the vehicle to be abandoned. [ 04-27-2001: Message edited by: Keith ]

The Russian tank crews performed poorly in 1941 due to outdated theories on armored warfare and because of the lack of radios (which of course caused a lack of coordination). They used tanks in much the same fashion as the defeated Western powers did - in unsupported packets. There is a certain mythology surrounding the fighting qualties of the Russian army during WWII that were propogated by over reliance on primary German sources. These sources tended to be revisionist in nature and nearly always attributed Russian successes to vastly overwhelming numbers rather than any battle finess. The mythology is that the Russian soldier was primative, tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, and subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities. Here is a article written by David Glantz for the US armies foreign studies institute that can give some perspective on these mythologies: http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/e-front.htm

There is a good book titled "Patton's Ghost Corps" which deals with the battles in the Mossele Triangle in the Siegfried line. The 90th was part of this corps. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0891416463/qid=987542963/sr=1-3/ref=sc_b_4/103-4155745-7584609 The 90th was an interesting unit. When it landed in Normandy it was considered the worst unit in the ETO because of inept leadership and poor morale, but by fall 1944 it was one of the best. If you plan on making a Normandy scenario I would recommend you model the unit as being mostly Green with poorish quality leaders.

The only 'tanks' the 17th SS had were a battalion of StugIIIgs. With regard to Ambrose, although he has done a commendable job interviewing hundreds of American WWII veterans, he is a poor historian. Ambrose does a very poor job correlating sources and makes very little effort presenting the 'other side of the hill' perspective. His books are also loaded with technical errors. I look at Ambrose's books as a collection of interviews rather than a work of historical fact. Ambrose also has a screwy theory that the American democratic 'citizen soldier' was superior to the soldiers produced by the facist regimes. [ 04-14-2001: Message edited by: Keith ]

Good novels of some the German principles involved include Guederian, Manstein, and Melenthen. But these tend to be somewhat revisionist and blame Hitler for everything and gloss over German defeats. Also the authors tend to portray the Russians as faceless, primative masses and over inflate Russian numerical superiority. Paul Carrel makes for a good read and at least makes an effort to look at Russian sources. John Erikson was the first Western author to present the EF from the perspective of the Russians using previously classified Russian source material from post-Stalinist Russia. Most authors prior to Erikson (Clarke, Seaton) pretty much relied exclusively on German war accounts and as such presented a very one side view. For example 4/5th of Seaton's book is devoted to 1941-1942, the years of German victorys. David Glantz is definitely the best objective Russian military author who builds on Erikson's work and tries to corroborate it with German sources. [This message has been edited by Keith (edited 04-05-2001).]

If you need a tester I would be happy to give you a hand with your scenario. Just email me at kschur@erols.com

Great website! On the subject of inadequately trained reinforcements, here is a quote from the diary of the Black Watch: "2) The N.C.O. situation in the Bn. is now very serious. We have reached rock bottom as far as creating N.C.Os. from the ranks goes, because casualties have drained the Bn. of trained privates and the reinforcements arriving are not sufficiently trained. There have been only three N.C.Os. included in the reinforcement flow this month (apart from a few returning N.C.Os. of our own), and they had been recently converted to Infantry from other arms. (3) With regard to personnel in the Bn. refer to the results of the questionnaire on training as infantry, of all ranks in the Rifle Companies. This clearly shows the critical situation now existing in the Bn. resulting from the great percentage of our reinforcements being personnel from R.C.A., R.C.E., R.C.O.C., R.C.A.C.C., who with very little training are sent forward as infantry. This is our greatest problem and the solution is not yet in sight as the necessary training time is evidently not available. 2. MORALE The morale of the Bn. at rest is good. However it must be said that "Battle Morale" is definitely not good due to the fact that inadequately trained men are, of necessity, being sent into action ignorant of any idea of their own strength, and after their first mortaring, overwhelmingly convinced of the enemy's. This feeling is no doubt increased by their ignorance of fieldcraft in its most elementary form."

There have been many post on the desire to have a 'Hull Down' command implemented, and this thread really falls into that category. I see a couple of problems: 1) Hull down with respect to what? You might be hull down to one terrain feature but not to another. 2) How would you specify the command in a user-friendly fashion that is not overly complex? 3) In real life a tanker slowly edges his tank up to the crest of the hill to achieve a hull down position. He doesn't simply automagically move into the perfect hull down position. In the current game system you move your tank to just behind the crest and then hunt forward to where you * think * you might achieve a hull down position. This seems pretty realistic to me. [This message has been edited by Keith (edited 04-03-2001).]

Kevin, you should just make the scenario playable from the Allied side or PBEM. As you are finding out there are limits to what the AI can handle. Generally speaking, the AI can only attack successfully if there is good terrain with accessable waypoints (objective flags). In your intro breifing mention that the scenario should be played from one side or PBEM. From what I have read the Germans dug in on the forward and reverse slopes of the canals, sometimes with concrete bunkers. The polders should be modeled as swamp hexes since they were flooded. Also at this time of the war the Canadians replacement system was completely broken down due to political reasons. They were throwing guys in the line who did not even know how to clean their weapons or had seen a PIAT before. A real tragedy.

You need to get your hands on a book called "Tug of War" by Denis Whitaker. It is about the Canadian army's battles to open the port of Antwerp and the Scheldt waterways. The book was just republished in 2000 and is available form Aamazon.com. Of course if you want super detailed maps you need to get a Michelen Road map of the area. These maps have terrain features and vegetation.

This proposal is too much in the way of micro management. The system works fine as is. Somtimes you just have to eyeball things. Maybe you should not move your tanks so aggressively.

Remember that the Germans frequently attached troops to form battle groups for specific purposes. So feel free to mix and match some units like tanks and stuff. But to be historically correct you should keep your infantry as all of one flavor.

The volksgrenadier division was the standard infantry division designation from fall 1944 until the end of the war. So yes, they were very common. Typically they were of rather poor quality, often formed from surplus personell from the air force, navy, etc. with minimal combat infantry training and inexperienced officers. Sometimes there were a sprinkling of veteran troops from destroyed divisions. As far as artillery support is concerned, the TO&E of a volksgrenadier division list a 75mm battalion and 105mm battalions. Typically there was also an assault gun company attached (Hetzers or StugIIIG).

If anybody wants my scenarios "Indian Fighting", "Debut of The Jadgtiger" (Norwind Scen.), "Bloody Causeway", or the new "Dunkirk Again" just email me at kschur@erols.com. Since the Scenario Depot is kaput, I will be sending them to other web sites for posting shortly. -Keith Schur