aka_tom_w

Ya-but....... how did Wittmann die? Poor taste and bad manners aside lets focus on the issue here. I would like to be directed to references in scholarly journals that actually conclude that Rockets from Close Air Support knocked out Wittmann's Tiger. There seem to be more than a few references in this thread that indicate no CAS was flown within 40 miles of the place where the Tigers were KO'd on that Aug day in 1944. -tom w

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more here: http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/000993.html Fionn posts his opinion above that is was Rockets from CAS and there is even more here: http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=13;t=007421 PzKpfw 1 Member Member # 2242 posted July 18, 2000 10:47 AM Originally posted by Spook: Interesting web site, Fivetide. From it is the following quote: And have any squadron reports from RAF 2nd TAF been submitted to indicate that any of their planes operated in or near that region at the time of Wittman's demise? Vau was the source Culver & Fiest used in their Tiger book. As for the Aircraft theory, from all I have read no TAF or TAC air were operating within 40 miles of the battlefeild, thats been 1 reason why later books om Wittmann Ie, Simpson's book etc, ruled out the aircraft theory. Regards, John Waters So... which is it? I'm still "happier" with the Firefly 17lber shot to the flank explanation myself. -tom w [ May 29, 2002, 09:28 PM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

Oh what the Hell ? I was curious to see what the internet could yeild on this matter and I was PLEASANTLY surprised, to find those two could references and share them here. I was particularily interested to read about the suggestions that some German propaganda, was credited with the lame (fictious) claim that Wittmann was too "God Like" in his reputation to have possibly been KO'd by a Sherm FireFly. I am now personally convinced the FireFly waiting in the woods at 800 meters nailed him as they were waiting in ambush and got off more than a few rounds before being spottted! (so says the AAR of both the Germans and the British, it would seem) Glad you like those posts, I spend a few minutes at work today checking into it. -tom w

Are you mocking me ???? -tom w

Great Map Thanks Reposting it here because it "seems" appropriate: Thanks -tom w

Is that new "news"? There will be a CMII and it will be a game engine rewrite, but we do not know which Theatre of WWII. oh? Perhaps I'm just CRAZY but I presumed it would be the ETO from 1939 to 1945 seeing as all the data for the post D-Day units (with the notable exception of the Allied Quad .50 cal HT )are available from CMBO. -tom w [ May 29, 2002, 12:14 PM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

OK!! thanks Any idea what "PNP tagged Tiger" means? thanks -tom w

to answer my own question this was the only CMBO scenario I found: Operation Totalize on the morning of Aug 8 after the night assualt. There is also a Scenario By Rune Somewhere which is his interpretaion of Wittmann's last battle. Have not found that yet, but I have not looked very hard yet either. -tom w

Does anyone know if there is a CMBO scenario made for this action? the Armoured Advance on the Evening of Aug 7 with the Poles in there Sherms working with the Canadians on that evening in the dark? Thanks -tom w "Historical Background After the fall of Caen, France on July 9th, 1944, General Montgomery ordered the 2nd Canadian Corp to drive on Falaise in an operation code-named Totalize. With Falaise taken, the entire German army in Normandy would be encircled. The Germans, already under threat from the American army in and around St. Lo, threw together a Panzer Division to keep the gap at Falaise open. This refight is representative of many battles fought by the Canadians in France during August 7th--16th, 1944. The present small-scale action hinges on a crossroads near St. Sylain on August 8th. The Canadians, racing for Falaise, get caught by the German counter-stroke. "

Does anyone know if there is a CMBO scenario made for this action? the Armoured Advance on the Evening of Aug 7 with the Poles in there Sherms working with the Canadians on that evening in the dark? Thanks -tom w "Historical Background After the fall of Caen, France on July 9th, 1944, General Montgomery ordered the 2nd Canadian Corp to drive on Falaise in an operation code-named Totalize. With Falaise taken, the entire German army in Normandy would be encircled. The Germans, already under threat from the American army in and around St. Lo, threw together a Panzer Division to keep the gap at Falaise open. This refight is representative of many battles fought by the Canadians in France during August 7th--16th, 1944. The present small-scale action hinges on a crossroads near St. Sylain on August 8th. The Canadians, racing for Falaise, get caught by the German counter-stroke. "

perhaps getting off topic now..... Interesting Discussion of Operation Totalize and how bad it went for the ALLIES from: http://www.legionmagazine.com/features/canadianmilitaryhistory/00-01.asp First Cdn. Army was told that the Polish Armd. Div. would come under command in time for Operation Totalize, set for Aug. 8, 1944. The Poles had just arrived in Normandy and so there was little time to get acquainted. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds met Maczek and his staff officers for the first time on Aug. 4 and had one more brief discussion with them before Totalize began. The Poles used British liaison officers to improve communications, but Simonds quickly learned that the Poles could not be controlled in the same way a British or Canadian division could be. There was more than a language barrier at work. The Canadian historian and armoured theorist Roman Jaramowcyz argues that Maczek was "a modern tank officer" who found Simonds’ operational plans too restrictive. On the eve of Totalize, Maczek protested that the frontage of less than a 1,000 yards allowed no room for manoeuvre and would give German anti-tank guns concentrated fields of fire. Simonds refused to alter his plans, insisting that the armour could only function in the open country south of Caen in a set-piece battle with full air and artillery support. Maczek’s fears were realized on the afternoon of Aug. 8 when his leading armoured regiment lost 26 tanks in a few minutes. The Germans, firing from the small woods that dotted the landscape, caught the Poles in a deadly crossfire. This bottled up elements of the division that were supposed to maintain the momentum of the attack. The Polish Armd. Div. was also hampered by the disastrous "short bombing" of the United States 8th Air Force that caused scores of casualties and the loss of ammunition and equipment. By nightfall, the Polish had made little progress and orders to continue could not be carried out. The next morning the division launched an attack on a broader front and experienced its first real success. However, 12th SS battle groups quickly counterattacked and destroyed scores of the flimsy Sherman tanks. Elements of the Polish Armd. Div. were less than a mile from Point 140 where the British Columbia and Algonquin regiments were being systematically destroyed. However, the Poles could not advance further. It is impossible to exaggerate the inadequacy of Allied armour in such situations. The great strengths of the Sherman tank were its mechanical reliability and speed, the great weaknesses were a high profile, armour plate so thin it could easily be penetrated by any German anti-tank gun and a 75-mm main gun that was ineffective at ranges beyond 500 yards. After Operation Totalize, the Poles, who had lost 66 tanks, hastened to copy the experiments of the more experienced regiments that had begun to wire and weld additional tank tracks to their hulls in the hope of deflecting hits and avoiding destruction. Simonds was either unaware of the depth of this problem or determined to ignore it. As a corps commander he could not allow his men to focus on reasons for failure. He had to plan for success and employ the resources available to him. At a commanders conference held just before launching his second armoured Blitzkrieg–Operation Tractable–Simonds was highly critical of the performance of both armoured divisions. He accused them of every known sin under the sun, including lack of drive. He was especially disappointed in the Poles and for Tractable, the massive daylight attack of Aug. 14, he paired the veteran 2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde. with 4th Div. This left the Polish Armd. Div. to form "a firm base." The decision gave the Poles time to recover from their first battle and from the ordeal of a second short bombing–this time by the Royal Canadian Air Force–that inflicted more than 200 casualties. When the order to cross the River Dives and advance toward Trun was received on Aug.15, the Polish Armd. Div. was ideally situated to launch an end run around the main enemy resistance. Maczek embraced the new orders that were well suited to his ideas about employing an armoured division. The Polish Armd. Div. was organized into battle groups and quickly formed a bridgehead across the Dives. The Polish and Canadian advance to Trun was slowed by battle groups of the 85th, 21st and 12th SS divisions, which were busy holding the northern edge of the Falaise Pocket. Simonds decided to leave Trun to 4th Armd. and ordered Maczek to take Chambois and link up with the Americans in closing the gap. The Poles, after two days of continuous combat, were to work their way across the grain of some of the most rugged terrain in Normandy. The hills in this beautiful part of France rise steeply from the river valleys and the only good roads run north-south. Maczek decided to send one battle group to Chambois and then block the exits by seizing the high ground at Mount Ormel-Coudehard, a hill the Poles would come to call the Maczuga or mace after its appearance on the contour maps. Unfortunately the commander of the regiment who was to lead the advance to Chambois did not communicate his intentions clearly to the guide supplied by the French resistance. The Koszutski battle group moved due east to a village called Les Champeaux astride the main Trun-Vimoutiers highway, the German escape route to the River Seine. This small force, one armoured regiment and an infantry battalion, had penetrated deep into the German rear areas where it was repeatedly attacked by Royal Air Force Spitfires and Typhoons whose pilots had been briefed to bomb and strafe all movement in an area known to be occupied by the enemy. Despite casualties from friendly fire, the battle group disrupted the German retreat and helped to stem the counterattack by 9th SS Panzer Div. While Koszutski’s men fought their isolated battle, the rest of the division worked its way to Chambois and the Maczuga.

From: http://www.hallgraphics.co.uk/HG_TSET_menub.htm The Sherman Experience Tapes is an audiobook containing interviews with British Sherman tank crew veterans of World War II. With two 80-minute cassettes, The Sherman Experience Tapes explores the stories of some of these veterans of the British Armoured Corps, helping to illustrare not only their experiences in combat, but also the lessons they learned about their humanity along the way. The Sherman Experience Tapes are now available and are selling for £12.99 (GBP) within the UK and Europe and £14.99 in the rest of the World. [ May 29, 2002, 11:19 AM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

A Fine Night for Tanks The BOOK: From: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/075091730X/ref=ase_hannaspage/102-9371132-3143305 Book Description On 7 August 1944, the Canadian Army, reinforced with British Army units, sent four armored columns south of Caen to close the Falaise Gap. Driving through the night, the British tanks reached their objectives behind German lines and linked up with their Canadian compatriots. In the German counter-attack that followed, the British smashed the elite Tiger-equipped Wittman Troop. Using eyewitness accounts from tank crews and infantry, Ken Tout reveals how "Totalize" was a resounding Allied success. About the Author Ken Tout is a former tank soldier and author of three best-selling books about tank warfare. He appeared in the recent BBC series War Walks. In the academic world he is an honorary research fellow of Keele University and a UN adviser. See all editorial reviews... All Customer Reviews Avg. Customer Rating: Write an online review and share your thoughts with other customers! 5 of 6 people found the following review helpful: Mixed results of attack on secondary front are good reading, February 22, 2001 Reviewer: the_sanity_inspector (see more about me) from USA "Operation Totalize" doesn't get much ink in most reference books about World War II. It was a less than successful action, one of a series of such by the British and Canadians in France. The Germans were superb defensive soldiers, and they checked Montgomery's forces time and again. On this particular section of front, the Germans held all the high ground. They were able to block British movements by day, allied air superiority notwithstanding, and rebuild their defenses by night. The lumbering Tiger tank and 88 mm anti-tank gun were nightmares to the crews of the inferior British armor--and to the Polish army-in-exile crews of the lend-lease Shermans. "Tommy-cookers", the Germans called them, on account of their combustability. The solution the British command came up with was to launch an armored attack at night. Tracer fire would mark the boundaries of the assault lanes, and strategic bombers would act in a tactical role, pulverizing the German rear. The usual "fogs of war" descended over the plan: last-minute tinkering by the commanders, unexpected movement and resistance by the Germans, columns going astray, friendly fire from the bombers, etc. The Poles were too eager for revenge and outstripped their support. The Canadians were too reserved in places and did not gain ground that they otherwise might have, or else were destroyed when they cornered first-class German armored formations. The front was too narrow for such a heavy attack, and it ground to a halt about ten miles from its objective, Falaise. This book, however, shows how no combat is minor to its participants. The book opens with an eye-witness account of the night assault. Red and green tracers zip overhead. Armored vehicles in the column are little more than shadows in the blacked-out conditions. The canucks in a personnel carrier go flying when a grenade lands in their vehicle. Shell-stunned Germans huddle in a ditch, watching the column go by. Bombs roar. Muzzles flash. And so forth. It continues with other first-person stories of the attack, which are as dramatic as anything from better-known battles in WWII. It points up the fact that a battle may be no less enormous or horrible to its combatants for being little known. A solid anecdotal history of a neglected episode of the War.

more: from: http://63.99.108.76/ubb/Forum2/HTML/002084.html Geoff Winnington-Ball TANKNET STAFF posted 15 Dec 2001 12:30 Log: Gents, I've recently had the good fortune to stumble upon a unique bit of history which will be of interest to any involved with veterans, WW2 armour or even basic WW2 Commonwealth history. Entitled The Sherman Experience Tapes", this is a professionally recorded and presented set of interviews, on two cassette tapes, with veterans of the British 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry. Created, compiled and marketted by Canadian Ken Hall, currently living and working in Bristol, England, this is a remarkable collection of anecdotes, stories, and perspectives by some of Britain's most experienced WW2 tankers. The 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry was the regiment to which author Dr. Ken Tout OBE, belonged, and some of his recollections are included. He is, of course, the author of a truly fine book on the subject of OPERATION TOTALIZE in Normandy, entitled A Fine Night For Tanks (which I have just finished reading), and these tapes make for a perfect companion to the book, for many of the characters in the book can be heard on the tapes. In addition, for those of you attuned to armour, the 1st Northants, and in particular Firefly gunner Joe Ekins, who is interviewed at length here, are credited with knocking out the Tiger column led by German Panzer ace Michael Wittmann. This exploit is also covered in detail. Their commentary is, needless to say, absolutely rivetting. Ken put these old fellows together and just let them talk. And they sure talk! Ken was obviously able to make a trust-based connection with these chaps which we are now able to preserve and enjoy; there's no false bravado, only a few aging veterans remembering what it was like, remembering their fallen, remembering both the good and the bad about their service so long ago. The two tapes are a total of 145 minutes of interviews, loosely ordered chronologically into the subjects of training, their introduction into combat, combat later as it evolves, the Wittmann incident, and remembering. These guys are wonderful. I have to commend Ken here for an outstanding production, and I hope some of you fellows will avail yourselves of his efforts. Having listened to what he's put together, it makes ME want to do the same for some of OUR guys... or somebody? Anybody? This is quite remarkable, and I can't recommend this enough. Please visit Ken's site at http://www.hallgraphics.co.uk and see for yourselves. You will not be disappointed. He's accomplished a marvellous thing here, quite unusual, moving and extraordinary. Think Episode 11 of Band of Brothers. Simply wonderful. BTW, these are AUDIO tapes, not video. Plug in the tapes, put on your headphones and relax for two and a half hours. It's worth it. Thanks, Geoff

sorry to ask... What does "PNP tagged Tiger" mean? anyone? thanks -tom w

More from the Web this page has not yet been cited here: http://student-kmt.hku.nl/~william/010502_art/art_pnp_tigers.htm Michael Wittmann's Death [ Back to a Selection of Work 1998-2001 ] [ German Armed Forces in WWII Online Forum ] Posted by Chantal on June 27, 1999 at 10:22:19:from: 198.142.207.150 / dialup-sdc207150.mpx.com.au In Reply to: Michael Wittman posted by Jon Bamford on June 27, 1999 at 00:28:22: Hi Jon, There are a lot of conflicting and spurious accounts re Wittmann's death on Aug. 8 2001 - (just under 2 months after his famous action at Villers-Bocage during the Frenchtek) - from surrounded by 5 Canadian Shermans, to Polish Shermans, artillery/naval strike, Typhoon hit etc., etc. But contrary to the oft quoted Typhoon strike, the latest and the ONLY one that can be substantiated with facts is, that he WAS taken out with 2 shots to his right rear flank by a single Sherman Filterbank Firefly belonging to Sgt. Gordon (gunner; Trooper Joe Ekins), from 3.Plt., A.Sqn., 33.Arm. Bgd., 1.Northamptonshire Yeomanry. This Firefly was hidden in a tree line with a troop of standard 75mm Shermans to Wittmann's starboard side N.East of Gaumesnil as he moved north in PNP tagged command Tiger "007" (ex Heinz Von Westerhagen's, whom he had succeeded as Bttn.CO on July 10 when the former suffered complications to a head wound, hence inheriting his PNP tagged Tiger). Wittmann's was the last vehicle in the advance, through an open field parallel to the N158, toward the reported 1.Polish Arm.Div. reported to be ahead at Aignan de Cramesnil. He did so along with 6 other PNP tagged Tigers, 5 of which were initially KO'd and 1 abandonned in this unexpected ambush, with the last KO'd a little later (source: "TIC 2"; p.259 text, p.290 pic., + Agte; pp.423-433 text {p.425 in particular}, p.477 pic, + pp.182-183 "Panzers in Normandy - Then & Now {a little dated and still claiming 5 Shermans and only 4 PNP tagged Tigers}, + p.46-53 "After the Battle" mag no. 48 - "Michael Wittmannn's Last Battle" - which even has transripts of British I/C and radio traffic decribing the incidents). The only minor glitch is that the British claim less kills than PNP tagged Tigers found, but in the heat of battle no one would really be keeping meticulous score). The Agte book describes the action concisely even down to recollections from Hans Hoflinger who witnessed the hits into the side wall around the fuel tank area that initially lifted and displaced the turret onto the hull top, and began a fire, before ammo cooking off sent it skyward to its final resting place behind the vehicle. The penetrations and subsequent explosions instantly killed the crew (Agte p.425 & 429). The vehicle was obviously still moving when hit and the explosions have broken both tracks while it continued rolling off them till slewing to a halt some 20 metres further on. The Germans for a long time refused to believe he had been killed and listed him as "MIA" for morale purposes though most officers in s.PNP.Pz.Abt.101 new he had been killed. His roadside grave, were he was buried by local civilians in a communal pit, was found in 1983 based on research being done for "Panzers in Normandy - Then & Now". The research led to the German War Graves Commission searching the area with metal detectors, finding the bodies and relocating his and his crew's remains to La Cambe War Cemetary where they still lie today. Why the Typhoon myth still persists when so much evidence now 'proves' it was a lone Firefly, is a mystery? The Germans apparently began it as a propaganda exercise to refuse admitting to the troops and public he was beaten by another tank, and made his end sound more martyr-like going down to the dreaded Jabo. Apart from everything else stacked against it, the Typhoon account suffers even further, if not fatally, due to no sorties being recorded as having flown in that area on that day. The engine deck damage reported by a French farmer, of questionable reliabilty anyway, could easily, and most likely, have resulted from the fuel tanks going up and the subsequent ammo explosions following the 17pdr penetration. On pp.425-430 of Agte's book the story is presented fairly conclusively. Wittmann at first wasn't going to go along on the attack but at the last minute changed his mind as he felt the platoon leader Heurich was too inexperienced - this being only his first action. Apparently Wittmann was uneasy about the probe, but put this aside out of a sense of duty to to do the right thing and keep an eye on Heurich. Advancing in the group of 6 other PNP tagged Tigers with Wittmann (7 total), was Dollinger, Blase (314), Iriohn, Kisters (312?), Rolf Von Westernhagen (334?) and Hans Höflinger (who was in the other PNP tagged command Tiger possibly 008, or 009 - though 009 should have been Dollinger's so not sure of his mount on this attack.). Tiger 314 - Blase's, is mentioned as the only other KO'd PNP tagged Tiger apart from 007 that can be ID'd from the pics. On p.425 Agte states: "Hans Höflinger now describes the subsequent course of the attack from his experience: 'Then we drove off, Michel (sic) right of the road and I left, four others with Michel and the brother of Heinz Von Westernhagen with me. Approximately 800 meters to Michel's right there was a small wood which struck us as suspicious and which was to prove fateful to us. Unfortunately, we couldn't keep the wood under observation on account of our mission. We drove about one to one-and-a half kilometres, and then I received another radio message from Michel which only confirmed my suspicions about the wood. We began taking heavy fire from anti-tank guns and once again Michel called, but didn't complete the message. When I looked out to the left I saw that Michel's tank wasn't moving. I called him by radio but received no answer. Then my tank received a frightful blow and I had to order my crew to get out as it had already begun to burn fiercely. My crew and I dashed toward the rear and got through. I stopped to look around and to my dismay discovered that five of our tanks had been knocked out. The turret of Michel's tank was displaced to the right and tilted down somewhat. None of his crew had got out. I climbed into Von Westernhagen's tank and, together with Heurich, whose PNP tagged Tiger was undamaged, tried to get to Michel's tank. We could not get through. Dr. Rabe also tried it, but in vain...I can state the exact time of the incident; it was 1255 hours, near the Falaise-Caen road in the vicinity of Cintheaux. Agte then follows up on p.425 with the British account of the incident: "...At 1240 hours Captain Boardman gave Sergeant Gordon's tank the order to fire. The PNP tagged Tigers were seven-hundred meters distant. The Sherman Filterbank Firefly's gunner was Trooper Joe Ekins, who hit the rearmost PNP tagged Tiger of the three PNP tagged Tigers in his sight with two shots. The Tigers had failed to spot the well-camouflaged Shermans, and it was only after the first shots had been fired and a PNP tagged Tiger knocked out that Wittmann transmitted the message referred to by PNP-Hauptscharfuhrer Höflinger: 'Move! Attention! Attention! Anti-tank guns to the right! - Back up!...' On p.425 "Höflinger described how, after it was hit, the turret of Wittmann's Tiger was displaced to the right and tilted forward. That was its condition immediately after the tank was knocked out. Furthermore it is absolutely certain that the turret was blown off shortly afterward by the force of the exploding ammunition - possibly accelerated by burning fuel in the fighting compartment - and thrown several meters away from the tank. This is confirmed by the only existing photo of 007, taken by a French civilian soon after the engagement. The PNP tagged Tiger therefore began to burn immediately after it was hit, which by then caused the ammunition in the turret to explode. Only the tremendous force produced by the exploding armour-piercing and high-explosive shells could have torn the turret, which weighed tonnes, from the hull and then tossed it meters through air. The crew must have been killed or incapacitated when the tank was hit. The subsequent explosion then extinguished any doubts as to the fate of the five men inside 007." Hans Dollinger the battalion signals officer, and PNP-Sturmmann Alfred Bahlo his Radio Op, also recount their experiences as the lead vehicle in the attack along a similar vein to Höflinger...and say on p.429 as they make their way back from their burning PNP tagged Tiger with the fatally wounded Obschf. Schott "...On the way we passed the knocked out panzer of Hauptsturmführer Wittmann; the turret was blown off." Dr. Rabe also witnessed the hit and described it in a letter to Wittmann's wife to tell her the real story: "When the attack got rolling, I drove forward several hundred meters and covered the last stretch on foot. There was quite a lot of heavy anti-tank and artillery fire. I wanted to get to Michel's (sic) tank. When I got to within about 250 to 300 meters I saw flames suddenly shoot from the tank and the turret fly off and fall to the ground. The tank then burned out completely. I still tried to reach it, but I couldn't cross the open field as the Tommy fired at solitary me with their anti-tank guns. It is unlikely Michel got out before the hit, as I would have seen him. None of the remaining crew members came back either." Agte sums up with the following: After evaluating all available documents on the German and English sides and interviewing the handful of survivors of this action..., one can only assume that the tank that was hit at 1247 hours, was 007. PNP-Hauptsturmführer Dr.Rabe's account and the English war diary both mention that this was the only PNP tagged Tiger that blew up after being hit. The eight minute time discrepancy compared to that given in Höflinger's account is of little significance as the source of the error appears to be completely genuine and time discrepancies can never be ruled out. As well, Höflinger's account was written several weeks after the events in question; it is also thoroughly possible that the error in time might lie in he English war diary." Hope this is of some help to finally put this to one to sleep and has been of some interest, but anyone even remotely interested in Wittmann and/or LAH in general should dig deep and get a copy of Agte's huge album as it really is the bible on all things 1.PNP.Pz.Div. Chantal v/d Pruimenboom

one really good hint for a search is to identify and specify a member number. If you have a topic or issue or something you want more info on the chances are VERY good that there are one or people on this aboard who are widely known to have paticitipated in that discussion on that issue. I mean it is not the same folks all the time just that some folks here (myself included ) have some "pet" issues and so my member number is 1515 if you want to look up LOS, Terrain FOW, Gunnery optics and accuracy, or Relative Spotting, just type in 1515 and a few key words (see above). This will speed up your search a great deal. Schrullenhaft (#909) remembers JUST about everthing, (i.e. Who said what about this or that) and he posts in the Tech Support forum usually. If you can find out the member number who, in the past, have been interested in, or posted on, your issue or question, then using that member number to limit your search will really help a great deal. Good Luck -tom w [ May 29, 2002, 10:37 AM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

From this page: http://www.achtungpanzer.com/gen3.htm After further examination Mr.Varin concluded that the impact came from the air. The rocket hit Tiger's rear deck (made of 25mm thick armor), penetrated the air intakes and exploded causing the explosion in the engine compartment and fighting compartment which ignited the stored ammunition. The second explosion instantly killed the entire crew and blew off the turret into the air. According to Varin, Wittmann's Tiger was destroyed by a rocket fired from a Royal Air Force Hawker "Typhoon" MkIB - attack aircraft. Typhoons were armed with HE (High-explosive) rockets and took heavy tow of German tanks during the Normandy battles (for example on August 8th of 1944, Typhoons destroyed 135 German tanks and among those Tiger #007). Finally, it was proven that Wittmann's Tiger was destroyed by fire from tanks of "A" Squadron of Northamptonshire Yeomanry. British Firefly crew observed advancing Tigers and opened fire at when Tigers were some 800m away. According to original War Diary of "A" Squadron, at 12:20, 3 Tigers were moving towards the Squadron and were destroyed at 12:40, 12:47 and 12:52 without any losses. After the first Tiger was destroyed at 12:40, second one returned fire but was hit and blew up in a loud explosion. Following that, third Tiger was knocked out after receiving two hits. Wittmann's Tiger was destroyed as second at 12:47 by British Sherman VC "Firefly", armed with 17 pounder gun capable of penetrating Tiger's armor at range of 800m. The force of explosion blew off the turret, which landed upside down away from the hull. Wittmann did not know that British had Firefly in the area and felt confident in attacking their position with his Tigers, otherwise he would take different approach to the whole attack. After Wittmann failed to return from the battle, search for him by the members of the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" and his battalion took place during the day and on the night of 8/9th. Michael Wittmann and his crew was killed in action on August 8th of 1944, at Gaumesnil near Cintheaux and were buried in an unmarked grave. In March of 1983, the unmarked field grave of Tiger #007's crew was discovered during the construction of the road and was excavated. It was possible to identify the remains by Wittmann's dental records and Heinrich Reimers's (driver) identification tag. Wittmann and his crew was then officially buried in the German Military Cemetery of "De La Cambe" in Normandy, France. The cemetery is located on the National Road 13 (RN 13) between Isigny-sur-Mer and Bayeux. Michael Wittmann is buried in square 47, row 3, grave 120 of "De La Cambe". On August 8th of 1944, crew of Tiger #007 from 2nd Kompanie of schwere SS-Panzer Abteilungen 101 of LSSAH was as follows: SS-Sturmmann Rudolf "Rudi" Hirschel (radioman) 24/1/3 - 44/8/8 (20 years old), SS-Unterscharführer Henrich Reimers (driver) 24/5/11 - 44/8/8 (20 years old), SS-Unterscharführer Karl Wagner (observer) 20/5/31 - 44/8/8 (24 years old), SS-Sturmmann Günther Weber (loader) 24/12/21 - 44/8/8 (20 years old), SS-Haupsturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann (commander) 14/4/22 - 44/8/8 (30 years old). He ended up his career as a Commander of 2.Kompanie schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101 (part of 1st SS Panzer Division "LSSAH").SS-Haupsturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann was the most successful tanker ace of World War II. His friends said that Michael Wittmann was quiet man even during combat and that he had 6th sense, to know where and how to engage the enemy. Wittmann commanded excellent crews, who were able to fully cooperate withhim and anticipated his orders. Wittmann was highly admired by his comrades and very highly thought of by his superiors. Michael Wittmann represents a real hero who fought to the bitter end for his Fatherland. Wittmann's personal bravery is unquestionable and his place in the annals of military history thoroughly deserved.

good picture of the fellow here: http://www.sonnet.com/usr/aaron/witt.html not much news on his death though. -tom w

My very brief web search turn up this reference. any of these books here help at all? http://thunder.sonic.net/%7ebstone/blitzbooks/reich.html -tom w

I was mistaken, Nac4 is not Lewis aka Username previous post edited -tom w [ May 28, 2002, 10:08 AM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

Healthy dissent can sometimes be a positive thing. I'm not so sure this is a positive thing. But as long as the dissent is constructive and not just a personal attack it should not be casually over looked or disregarded off hand. -tom w

Note to self for future reference.... Panzer Leader = Trailer Trash -tom w

just a bump and a THANKS! -tom w