How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

That's what I was looking for. Wonder where I can get a copy of that book...

Michael

Ebay, 2nd hand bookstores... Not being published at the moment.</font>

[Andreas]

Michael, I would consider that, except that I do not actually own it or have access to it. I have just got a couple of pages scanned.

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by tero:

Any data of the topology of the terrain for this operation ?

That is always the hard part....

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by tero:

Any data of the topology of the terrain for this operation ?

That is always the hard part....</font>

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Great post by Andreas.

Just to reinforce a point already made above by a number of people. It is worth bearing in mind that by September 43 Soviet losses per 100 frontline riflemen, per combat day, had fallen to the same level as those of US frontline riflemen. Life was tough in all frontline units, but Soviet units did not suffer the mass slaughter in 43 that many German accounts report/assume. This in part will have been because, by 43, the Soviets were largely using the same tactics as everyone else. Even in Soviet “lessons learnt” documents from late 41 you see the same comments one gets in US “lessons learnt” documents from Normandy. To give a specific example, in late 41 the Soviets were commenting on the need for attacking infantry to concentrate on engaging targets as they advance.

(In the above calculation it was assumed that each Soviet infantry battalion had only 300 men, each US infantry battalion 500 men. That is Soviet casualties were spread between less “lots” of 100 men than was the case for US casualties. This reflects the reality that Soviet infantry battalions were generally maintained at the lower level of manpower than US infantry battalions. Yet their losses per 100 frontline men, per combat day, were still the same.)

All the best,

Kip.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Paths had to be made through thick underbrush, which severely restricted the mobility of Soviet troops.

It did ?

Lakes and swampy areas led to a splitting up of formations.

German or Soviet ?

In some areas trenches had to be created by piling up earth, and tanks supported by logs.

How were they disguised (if at all) ?

The "auftauchen" bit made me think the Soviet troops managed to burrow in and dig trenches all the way up to and inside the German defensive perimeters.

The network of country lanes, alleys, and particularly the rail network was poor; there were few villages inside the bridgehead. The majority of settlements was on the rivers, in gorges and valleys.'

Sounds like the German defences were poorly designed, given the terrain and the restrictions it presented. Trenches constructed so they were clearly visible.

Or the Soviet had all the positions mapped and pinned down. No doubt they had rehearsed in exact replica mock ups in comparable terrain too.

[PzKpfw 1]

From 1944 - 1945 an Soviet Rifle Divisions frontage on an attack, was 2500m, a Rifle Bns frontage was 700m, on an attack, a Rifle Co's frontage on the attack, dropped from 350m in early 1944 to 100m by late 1944. Because of decreased manpower levels in the Rifle Div.

The Soviets provided them with very lavish supt, Ie, each Rifle Co had 2-3 artillery pieces & 3-4 tanks or SU's provideing direct fire suport for the attack. Soviet Rifle Divs were low priority on replacements.

By 1945 attrition in Soviet Rifle Divs had taken it's toll Ie, the 262nd Rifle Divs, 950th Regt was down to 2 Bns & miscellaneous units for a total of 631 effectives.

The 91st Guards Rifle Regt was down to 1 Rifle Bn with an 161 men. Add in the Regts AT, Mortar, & an SMG co etc & the 91st had about 400 men out of its authorized 774 men. The whole Div was down over 2000 effectives that could not be replaced due to manpower shortages. 5th Army in the Baltic reported 11 of its Rifle Divs had an average strenght of only 2,625 effectives, in March 1945, this was down from an average of 3000 - 3200 in Febuary 1945 and this was in an 'quiet' sector.

The Shtat for an Soviet Rifle Co in 1945 was reduced to 53 effectives, An Rifle Co consisted of 2 Platoons of 23 men each. During the Berlin fighting the average Rifle Div Strength was was under 3000 effectives in 12 Rifle Co's. The Rifle Co strengh had been reduced by attrition to 20 - 30 men each Company.

The reason for the strength decrease was not because the Soviets could not replace the losses. The Soviets chose to create new tank & Artillery formations instead of replaceing Rifle losses.

Regards, John Waters

[Geier]

Thanks Andreas. Great thread.

[Aacooper]

I don't have the foggiest notion on a larger map where this battle took place, but if it happened in present-day Ukraine, or the parts of Russia to the east, then http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/EART/soviet_maps.html might have a 1:100,000 map of the area.

[Michael Emrys]

John,

Did the soviets ever disband any of their understrength units to flesh out the rest or to provide experienced cadres for the new formations they were raising?

Michael

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

John,

Did the soviets ever disband any of their understrength units to flesh out the rest or to provide experienced cadres for the new formations they were raising?

Michael

Yes & no, Michael in 1941 they did disband Divs that were to depleted to rebuild but this seems to have been an exception as they generaly tended to try & rotate an Regt, Bn, or Co when it was heavily depleted to te rear to try & keep an experienced cadre. They prefered to rebuild an Div then disband it because an disbanded unit had to be replaced wheras, it was easier just to rebuild an Div. Generaly what they did later in the war was take the returning wounded that in most cases, were not allowed to return to their original units but were instead sent to other RDs who needed experienced cadre.

Ie, we can look at Soviet Rifle Div officer replacement Regts which at their peak in 1943, had between 200 - 4,000 officer replacments, some had 7,000, but by 1944 the average # had decreased to only 500 - 1000 officers in the replacement Regts.

By November 1943 the Soviets had to disband their Rifle Brigades to provide Rifle Div replacements Ie, the 4th & 125th Rifle Brigades were disbanded to rebuild the 212th Rifle Div alone.

Other measures were taken as well Ie, in September 1943 the RDs reduced their gun crews from 9 to 6 men & sent the surplus to the Rifle Cos as replacements. By December 1943 the RDs were conbing out their rear service personell for replacements Ie, the 336th RD had to use 40% of its rear services personell, to replace its Rifle losses.

In June 1944 2nd Guards Army combed out its rear service personell, of all men from 40 - 45 years of age, just to get each Rifle Div up to an strength of 400 men. They also resorted to combing out hospitals etc.

Below is an example of the average Soviet Rifle Division Company strength from Sept 1944:

32nd Rifle Div - 40 men.

43rd Rifle Div - 60 men.

70th Rifle Div - 50-70 men.

77th Rifle Div - 50 men.

119th Rifle Div - 35 men.

145th Rifle Div - 35 men.

179th Rifle Div - 40-75 men.

204th Rifle Div - 77 men.

268th Rifle Div - 60 men.

306th Rifle Div - 60 men.

379th Rifle Div - 30-40 men.

The Rifle Bns were reduced to just 2 Rifle Co's & an SMG Co in most cases.

Regards, John Waters

[ July 22, 2002, 01:26 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks, John. From your figures it sounds like by late '44 many rifle divisions had about the equivalent of two battalions for their entire infantry complement. Taken together with whatever effects on artillery effectiveness may have ensued from reducing gun crews, these were divisions in name only, probably being somewhat less effective than an American RCT, one should think.

Michael

[Andreas]

John, I would be interested to see if you have data on 37th and 27th Army in 3rd Ukrainian Front, because it does not look as bad as the data you have. The strength data I have is as follows:

27th Army

104th Rifle Corps

</font>

• 206th RD 7077 men</font>
• 4th Guards Airborne 9277 men
  </font>

35th Guards Rifle Corps

</font>

• 3rd Guards Airborne 7257 men</font>
• 180th RD 7359 men
  </font>

Unfortunately Mazulenko gives no data for 66th Rifle Corps. Judging from the relative homogeneity of these strength returns, I would assume the three divisions of that Corps to be roughly on that level too.

Could the difference be because of the fact that this is before a big offensive, while e.g. your September figures are post a big offensive?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Andreas:

Lakes and swampy areas led to a splitting up of formations.

German or Soviet ?

In some areas trenches had to be created by piling up earth, and tanks supported by logs.

How were they disguised (if at all) ?

The "auftauchen" bit made me think the Soviet troops managed to burrow in and dig trenches all the way up to and inside the German defensive perimeters.

The network of country lanes, alleys, and particularly the rail network was poor; there were few villages inside the bridgehead. The majority of settlements was on the rivers, in gorges and valleys.'

Sounds like the German defences were poorly designed, given the terrain and the restrictions it presented. Trenches constructed so they were clearly visible.

Or the Soviet had all the positions mapped and pinned down. No doubt they had rehearsed in exact replica mock ups in comparable terrain too.

tero - the information here is from Mazulenko, and concerns the Soviet side. The Soviets had the MLR completely mapped, but unlike e.g. in the offensives in AG Central sector, did not send long-range scouts behind the enemy lines.

The trenches would have been a problem for both sides, probably more so for the Soviets, since the Germans had the advantage of the terrain.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

the information here is from Mazulenko, and concerns the Soviet side.

OK.

The Soviets had the MLR completely mapped, but unlike e.g. in the offensives in AG Central sector, did not send long-range scouts behind the enemy lines.

There was no partisan activity in the area ?

BTW: almost no Axis arty survived the preparatory barrage. How far behind the line were they ?

The trenches would have been a problem for both sides, probably more so for the Soviets, since the Germans had the advantage of the terrain.

I still wonder the use of the term auftauchen. It translates "rise to the surface", right ? I know for a fact the Red Army dug trenches so they could get closer to the enemy positions in preparation of assaults like this. In comparable wet/marshy terrain too. Is there anything mentioned about the Red Army preparations for the assault ?

[Andreas]

tero - in this sense it means "appear/suddenly appear".

I do not know the distance to the MLR from artillery positions.

Mazulenko specifically talks about long range scouts. Maybe they were seen as more reliable than partisans.

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Andreas:

John, I would be interested to see if you have data on 37th and 27th Army in 3rd Ukrainian Front, because it does not look as bad as the data you have. The strength data I have is as follows:

Andreas, I will see if I have anything. It would be interesting to see, how many of those effectives, were in the Rifle Co's, vs how many were suport personel. The Data for September was an sample of the average strength of Rifle Div, Rifle Regts, Rifle Companys; only it does not state it was post offensive etc.

Some Soviet formations were favored Ie, they recieved priority in replacements as well. Also I would add these levels were not considered bad this was an choice the Soviets made to build new Mechanized & Arty formations out of the replacement pool that would have refurbished the RDs .

One thing to remeber is the data in my 1st post, look at the frontage, & paticularly the fronage an Rifle Co attacked on 100m, then look at the suport, the Co was given in tank/SU & DF artillery pieces. This was more suport then any Allied Inf Co, German Inf Co etc, recieved. And was the start of the Soviets switch to giveing their riflemen maximum support Ie, quality over quantity, in late 44-45 with large ammounts of tank/SU & Artillery supt available.

Regards, John Waters

[ July 22, 2002, 11:06 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Grisha]

John & Andreas,

Posting good data here, many thanks. Regarding replacements and TO&E, two things should be kept in mind as well. 1) As John stated, better units ('better' meaning better combat performance) were kept at official Shtat levels, whereas poor units were sometimes reorganized drastically to 2/3s of Shtat TO&E. This brings me to the second point, 2) that Front commanders were given control of actual TO&E for their rifle divisions. In other words, the Front commander could reorg his rifle divisions as he saw fit.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:

This brings me to the second point, 2) that Front commanders were given control of actual TO&E for their rifle divisions. In other words, the Front commander could reorg his rifle divisions as he saw fit.

It looks to me as if this was what happened, and 3rd Ukrainian Front brought the assault divisions near Shtat (is that the right term to use?).

Interestingly, 66th Rifle Corps drops off the narrative after 2 days of the operation after an action at Kauschany Wek. A map of the encirclement has them at the outer Eastern edge, indicating they had a fairly 'easy' job. This could indicate that they were hit by the breakthrough operation to such a degree that they needed a bit of R&R. In that case, they would lose the attachments, and these would scuttle off doing what they do best elsewhere.

I have scanned a map that shows German defenses in the strongpoint of Leontina, and should answer some questions about positioning of guns etc. This is the sector that was attacked by the other Rifle Corps of 37th Army, 6th Guards. Unfortunately the division is not given, and neither is any info on statistics relating to the unit. The attack itself was carried out by 30th Guards Airborne Regiment on 20th August 1944.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

This could indicate that they were hit by the breakthrough operation to such a degree that they needed a bit of R&R.

That would be in line with other reports of similar operations. A spearhead unit would be expended and it would remain behind while other elements go past them to press the attack home.

In that case, they would lose the attachments, and these would scuttle off doing what they do best elsewhere.

Which attachements are these ? The support elements ? I'm not sure they would be transferred outside their assigned infantry battalions/regiments. They might dig in with the spent infantry to form a defensive perimeter around the objective in case the counter attacks were succesfull.

I have scanned a map that shows German defenses in the strongpoint of Leontina, and should answer some questions about positioning of guns etc.

It does. But it also raises a few more concerning the events.

1) What kind of guns were they ? Only 2km's from the front line would indicate their max effective range was not more than 5 km. One explanation could be they were field guns and not howitzers and if there were obstructions (hills etc) that they could not fire over and hit the designated fire zones. Or they were prepared to fire direct fire support as well as regular fire missions.

I think mortars they were not, if I remember my tac markers correctly.

2) Why were they grouped so tight together so close to the front ? 12 guns (3 batteries, approx 50% of the arty in this sector) of them in a 1sqkm box. Was that standard SOP ?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:

Which attachements are these ? The support elements ? I'm not sure they would be transferred outside their assigned infantry battalions/regiments.

2) Why were they grouped so tight together so close to the front ? 12 guns (3 batteries, approx 50% of the arty in this sector) of them in a 1sqkm box. Was that standard SOP ?

A few answers. The support elements would be the plethora of additional tank and artillery that I listed in the first post.

No idea what guns they were. I would suspect they were so close because this was a strongpoint in the frontline. Probably ATGs, IGs, captured Soviet 76.2mm guns etc.pp. I would expect the heavy artillery to be further back.

Some translations I forgot last night:

SB - Rifle Battalion (Soviet)

GLR - Guards Airborne Regiment

Gut - Manor House/Farm

IR - Infantry Regiment (German)

ID - Infantry Division (German)

Geb.Div. (rum) - Romanian Mountain Division

Am Morgen des - on the morning of

Am 20.8. gegen 14 Uhr - 20/8 at about 1400

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tero:

What kind of guns were they?

I'm not perfectly familiar with the tac signs on this map, but based on their placement I would guess that most of them are AT guns. Indirect fire artillery other than mortars is almost certainly located in an area not shown on the map.

Michael

[Runyan99]

It looks to me as if this was what happened, and 3rd Ukrainian Front brought the assault divisions near Shtat (is that the right term to use?).

I believe so. Shtat = Authorized Strength

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The support elements would be the plethora of additional tank and artillery that I listed in the first post.

OK. It was unclear if you meant the organic support elements or the general support elements.

No idea what guns they were. I would suspect they were so close because this was a strongpoint in the frontline. Probably ATGs, IGs, captured Soviet 76.2mm guns etc.pp.

What kind of terrain does the rounded terrain marker stand for ? Height gradient ?

I would expect the heavy artillery to be further back.

That would be reasonable. Still, "most" arty assets being KO'd by the perparatory barrage would suggest the arty got special attention.

BTW: the reason this arty business interests me is the break through attack the Soviet troops made against the Finns in June 1944 saw the loss of most of the artillery of the formation in the focal point of the attack. But they were lost because they could not be moved out of harms way (horses and tractors detailed to farm work too far away), not because they were KO'd by the preparatory barrage. The guns were approx. 5-7 km's behind the front line because like most Finnish arty the max range of the guns was 10km's or less.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

If some of you are looking for the document from which the above tactical and organisational diagrams are taken what you are after is Handbook on USSR Military Forces, TM30-430, November 1945. The chapter on tactics is available from The Nafziger Collection, is part of the same series of books that are available from BTS themselves. The entire Handbook is “very rare” and I am very fortunate to have copy, however, there must be others out there.

Do a search using google.com and you will certainly find the chapter on Soviet tactics is commercially available.

All the best,

Kip.