How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944

[Grisha]

Now that I have a brand spanking new scanner, would anyone be interested in seeing some intelligence maps of the Yassy-Kishinev operation? Specifically, a German intelligence assessment map and a Soviet disposition map, both from Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. These maps were derived by Glantz after going over a number of different maps from both German and Soviet archival sources.

[Andreas]

Grisha, yes please.

[Grisha]

Will do, Andreas. Please give it 6 hours from now when I will be home from work. Sorry for the delay.

[Zitadelle]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Now that I have a brand spanking new scanner, would anyone be interested in seeing some intelligence maps of the Yassy-Kishinev operation? Specifically, a German intelligence assessment map and a Soviet disposition map, both from Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. These maps were derived by Glantz after going over a number of different maps from both German and Soviet archival sources.

Hey Grisha, add me to that list for the maps if you please....

[Michael Emrys]

Actually, if there is any way for them to be put up on a website and a link posted here, I'm sure many of us would appreciate it.

Michael

[Soddball]

Any data on how the flamethrower units made it to the front of the attack? Mine are usually about 4 miles back and reach the battle on turn 99 of a 100 turn scrap

[Grisha]

Sure, Michael, I can do that.

[Michael Emrys]

Cool! Thanks, Greg.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Soddball:

Any data on how the flamethrower units made it to the front of the attack? Mine are usually about 4 miles back and reach the battle on turn 99 of a 100 turn scrap

Just hazarding a guess, maybe they started with the initial attack waves? In which case, they must have been much better protected by their accompanying inf than is the case in CMBO.

Michael

[Grisha]

Okay, I just finished the website for the Yassy-Kishinev deception maps. I've made a shameless plug for the book I obtained these from, but Col. Glantz is a truly amazing historian and deserves more credit than he receives. Btw, the site is at my friend's own private server, so while a little slow there is none of the hassle of ISP bandwidth, etc. I've also linked a Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception to the site - and don't worry the link is to my own site not a .mil site, so the Brits can have a crack at it too

[Click here]

[Grisha]

Jeez, Michael, you're in Port Townsend? I'm in Seattle, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland

[Commissar]

Wow, thanks Comrade. More material that'll make the lives of the Wehrmacht cultists very unbearable. I can already hear the claims that, "This game bites because the Russians don't suck enough" already.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Just hazarding a guess, maybe they started with the initial attack waves? In which case, they must have been much better protected by their accompanying inf than is the case in CMBO.

This brings up also the question about their battlefield mobility (along with other "heavy" assets like HMG's). Are the heavy infantry assets too slow relative to the regular infantry movement speeds ?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Jeez, Michael, you're in Port Townsend? I'm in Seattle, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland

Small world, eh?

I think there are a bunch of guys in the Seattle area. I got an e-mail from somebody a year or so ago (I lost the mail in a computer crash and don't recall who it came from) who was getting some people together to play h2h. I don't travel so well anymore, so I had to bow out, but left open an invitation to get together if anybody ever came this way. I never heard anything further, so I don't know what happened. I leave the same invitation open to anybody coming to P.T. Send me an e-mail and we'll arrange to meet somewhere for a beer or three.

BTW, thanks for the maps. I printed them all out and will study them tomorrow when I get some time. Also downloaded the article and will give it a look. This is an area I don't know much about, so the information is appreciated.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tero:

This brings up also the question about their battlefield mobility (along with other "heavy" assets like HMG's). Are the heavy infantry assets too slow relative to the regular infantry movement speeds ?

If you mean in CM, I don't generally think so.

It will be interesting to see which speed class they place the Soviet Maxim HMG, the one on wheels.

Michael

[Andreas]

Grisha, great stuff. Much clearer on this than the maps in Mazulenko. I guess I will at some point have to read this article.

The maps show very well the massing in the breakthrough sectors, and how it was achieved. Very interesting to see them alongside the Mazulenko account.

[Grisha]

Like I said before, glad to be of service Anything that furthers knowledge of the Soviet-German War is well worth the time and effort spent.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The maps show very well the massing in the breakthrough sectors...

During a casual perusal of the maps last night one thing really jumped out at me, and that was that German Intelligence had misplaced the 53rd. Army over a hundred kilometers east and across a major river from its true location. It must have come as a shock when they met it in battle. Other mistakes may have been more important to the conduct of the battle, but that one really caught my eye.

Michael

[Andreas]

tero, I have found the gun information. I wanted to post some more about the fight at Leontina anyway, so it is contained in that.

Leontina was a very strong strongpoint at the junction of XXX. and XXIX. AK. If it fell, the defense of the MLR opposite 6th Guards Rifle Corps (the other corps in 37th Army) would collapse. It was defended by one company of 580. IR, and a battalion of 549.IR, both of 306.ID. Translating the following directly: Also in support of the fascists were one detachment (Abteilung = 3 batteries) 10,5cm and three mortar batteries (no calibre, expect 81mm or 120mm) which were situated one to two kilometres south of Leontina.

Translating again: The Soviet attack was supported by three divisional artillery detachments, connected by radio. [...] The initial barrage knocked out most of the fire support of the enemy strongpoint as well as the aritllery and mortar batteries south of Leontina.

30th GAR was supported by one battalion of 19th GAR. When the strongpoint was cut off at 1400, a battalion from 4th Rom. Mountain Division was sent in to relieve them, but it was destroyed when attacking the outer ring of the encirclement in 19th GAR sector.

The fight must have been vicious, and quite mercyless. At 1800 hours, Leontina was cleaned of the enemy. On the battlefield, 1,200 dead fascist soldiers and officers were left. 30th GAR brought in 250 (sic!) POWs and 37 guns, amongst them seven assault guns, as trophies.

[sturner]

Reading this brought two images to my mind, the first was that of a Napoleonic Corp attacking.

The second was what I dreaded during my tour in Germany, '79-81. The Russians, if they came across would present such a target rich environment that we would go through our Battalions entire basic load of ammunition within the first hour and a half. It would take my Support Platoon about 4 hours to return to the Ammo Dump, which probably would be under chemical attack or air attack, for resupply. And even then they would only be allowed to draw half of our basic load for the Tank company and two Infantry companies. Within the first day of combat, we would be down to throwing rocks, and my logistics units would be part of the front line... as it moved through us.

[ July 25, 2002, 10:18 PM: Message edited by: sturner ]

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

During a casual perusal of the maps last night one thing really jumped out at me, and that was that German Intelligence had misplaced the 53rd. Army over a hundred kilometers east and across a major river from its true location. It must have come as a shock when they met it in battle. Other mistakes may have been more important to the conduct of the battle, but that one really caught my eye.

You hit on a very important observation, because it wasn't a one-time anomaly, but a result of the development of deception, or maskirovka by the Soviets.

In Glantz' book on the subject he says this within the Introduction:

The growth and development of Soviet military art and science has been evolutionary, and heavily dependent upon experience. The structure and focus of this study reflect the extensive dimensions of Soviet military experiences in general with particular emphasis on surprise and deception. In the Second World War the Soviets conducted nearly 50 major strategic operations and over 140 front (army group) offensive operations. The fronts ranged upward to 500 kilometers with depths to 650 kilometers - each involving between 300,000 and 2.5 million men. In virtually all of these operations the Soviets attempted, with varying degrees of success, to achieve surprise through deception.

The scope of these efforts reflected the magnitude of those military experiences. As early as December 1941 at Moscow, the Soviets were able to mask the offensive employment of three armies totalling over 200,000 men. In November 1943, near Stalingrad, the Soviets secretly redeployed, concentrated, and attacked with major armored forces which encircled elements of two German armies. Just over a year later, in December 1943 west of Kiev, the Soviets secretly employed two tank armies and two combined armies to drive German forces irrevocably west of the Dnepr River. In the summer of 1944, in Belorussia Soviet deception measures concealed from German eyes the redeployment and subsequent offensive employment of two armies, a tank army, and several tank corps numbering over 400,000 men and 1,500 tanks. On the eve of the Vistula-Oder operation (January 1945), German intelligence failed to detect the presence of six Soviet rifle armies and one tank army and only tentatively detected another rifle army and two tank armies, a total force of almost one million men and over 2,000 tanks (about 40 per cent of the Soviet force used in the January offensive).

The ubiquitousness of Soviet deception, and the futility of attempting to understand strategic and operational deception from an examination of a few selected cases, require a comprehensive view of all operations - lest a critical segment of that deception be overlooked. A comprehensive view must also capture failure as well as success, for a review of successes only would belie the fact that successful deception is immensely difficult to achieve.

[Guest Mike]

Russian use of surprise is well documented a long wayback. One of the most decisive battles of WW1 was Brusilov's offensive of 1916. Then the Russians smashed the Austro-Hungarian armies opposite them in a huge surprise attack.

We tend to think of Russians as using crude tactics and strategy, whereas they are as clever as anyone else.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Mike:

We tend to think of Russians as using crude tactics and strategy, whereas they are as clever as anyone else.

What made them so different was their willingness, or better preparedness to take the casualties.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Translating the following directly: Also in support of the fascists were one detachment (Abteilung = 3 batteries) 10,5cm and three mortar batteries (no calibre, expect 81mm or 120mm) which were situated one to two kilometres south of Leontina.

Can you tell why they were situated so close to the front ? And bunched up like that ?

Translating again: The Soviet attack was supported by three divisional artillery detachments, connected by radio. [...]

Indicating they did have the ability to call in unprepared fire missions quickly on targets of opportunity when needed.

The initial barrage knocked out most of the fire support of the enemy strongpoint as well as the aritllery and mortar batteries south of Leontina.... SNIP..... 30th GAR brought in 250 (sic!) POWs and 37 guns, amongst them seven assault guns, as trophies.

Would the term "paralyzed" be better than "knock out" when talking about the arty being dealt with ?

Still, them being KO'd because they were so tightly bunched up and so close to the front does not surprise me. They may even have been fully functional but got overrun by the Soviet infantry, given the ferocious speed they seem to hav swept over the defensive positions.

The fight must have been vicious, and quite mercyless. At 1800 hours, Leontina was cleaned of the enemy. On the battlefield, 1,200 dead fascist soldiers and officers were left. 30th GAR brought in 250 (sic!) POWs and 37 guns, amongst them seven assault guns, as trophies.

Any data on the Soviet casualties in this engagement ?

[Andreas]

tero, no data on the Soviet casualties unfortunately.

I have been thinking about the positioning of the guns, and it may have been a conscious design decision, to ensure that should the front on the flanks of the strongpoint be ruptured, it would still have artillery to control the breakthrough sectors and to defend themselves. Which may not have been the case had the guns been further back. Leontina was prepared for a perimeter defense.