Panzer Group West and Ultra

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Aco4bn187inf:

Here's a general question- once the Allies were on the ground in Normandy, was there any conceivable strategy by which the Germans could have succeeded? What do you all think would have been the best response? (Go ahead and use the benefit of hindsight in your answers.) Of course the issue is speculative but I sometimes get the impression that the Germans were doomed no matter how they reacted.

A separate question- I once saw an interesting history book of the 2nd SS Panzer division in France. Is anyone familiar with such a book, as I can't remember the title?

Steel Inferno is the title of a book on I SS Panzer Corps...and Sons of the Reich is the story of II SS Panzer Corps....

[JonS]

Max Hastings has a book on 2nd SS Pz Div called, oddly enough, Das Reich. From memory it mainly covers the march up through Oradour-sur-Glane, rather than any involvement in Normandy.

[Wisbech_lad]

"Here's a general question- once the Allies were on the ground in Normandy, was there any conceivable strategy by which the Germans could have succeeded? What do you all think would have been the best response? "

Yes, if Stalin agreed an immediate and binding cease fire, and the Germans transferred enough stuff from Eastern Front, maybe.

The best response, in my opinion, would have been for the Germans to do the sensible thing and all go home. Preferably lynching Hitler at the same time. Sort of like the sensible Italian reaction once Allies where on the ground in Italy.

[JasonC]

The Germans could readily have held in Normandy indefinitely, if they remained on the tactical defensive and if they had a replacement stream of at least 500 tanks and 100,000 trained infantry per month.

The infantry replacement rate was readily within German capabilities, not actually achieved because of institutional and decisional hold ups not any absolute scarcity.

The armor replacement rate required was harder. The Germans could achieve it but only by starving the eastern front, which they could not afford. AFV production was not really high enough to send the majority against the Russians and still send adequate numbers of new vehicles to the west.

Instead they sent a "one-off" stock to the west, not a continued flow. That was inadequate and the western allies readily attrited their way through the AFV supply. Although the actual breakthrough in the US sector depended on infantry imbalances created by attrition, not on the AFV imbalance.

The success of the breakout once it occurred did depend on low remaining German armor and its serious misuse (for reckless counterattacks etc).

Germany's main problem was failure to think through these campaigns in sustained attrition terms, looking for razzle dazzle solutions to fundamentally economic-logistical problems.

The usual excuse is that they were lost logistically, but it does not hold up under rational scrutiny. They had tactical skill advantages to boost the effects of numbers. They made recurrent unforced errors (e.g. insufficient infantry replacements sent to Normandy) largely out of fear of attrition thinking, when their actual defensive successes turned on high achieved exchange ratios wearing their enemies out, locally. In other words they were better at the actual attrition fighting than they thought they were, and worse at the command and direction of attrition operations because of their distrust of them.

They could have lasted a lot longer in Normandy if the front only gave way after running out of armor, not infantry. And they would have run out of armor a lot later if they used it more defensively and husbanded it more carefully for "linebacker" defense roles. (The initial force was more than what was needed to hold. But the replacement stream was pitiful).

Given Russian successes in the summer of 1944, they still would not have had enough new armor production to meet all of their needs, and probably would have eventually lost in Normandy because of it. But they could have done a lot better than they did.

[ July 14, 2005, 06:05 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

...the Germans would have pulled back behind the Orne initially, and more than likely behind the Seine within a month.

What, give up a short front in near-ideal defensive terrain to retreat across open ground where they would be harassed by Allied airpower and pursued by Allied armor, to get to a front almost three times as long in poorer defensive terrain? Hitler hung on to the lines in Normandy as long as there were forces there to do it. Why would he change his mind because one counterattack failed?

Michael </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Germans could readily have held in Normandy indefinitely, if they remained on the tactical defensive and if they had a replacement stream of at least 500 tanks and 100,000 trained infantry per month.

The infantry replacement rate was readily within German capabilities, not actually achieved because of institutional and decisional hold ups not any absolute scarcity.

Dependent of course on the replacement rates of their enemies - which were not good. Casualty reporting rates in the British and Canadian armies were based on desert expeierience - and in Normandy were so inadequate to the task, the new category of 'Double Intense' had to be created. The Canadians were becoming acutely undermanned in their infantry units by the end of the Normandy campaign (the Scheldt in October 1944 would bring about the decision to send conscripts to NW Europe), and Britain had already disbanded an entire infantry division (59th Staffordshire) to make up reinforcements for other units.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Yes, but that's cherry picking the most optimistic—from the British point of view—of all the possible outcomes.

Of course, that is the luxury of playing "What if".

And the Germans would have still been worse off on the Seine than in Normandy for the reasons I gave.

I don't disagree with you on the tactical benefits of defending in Normandy vs the Seine, but if the front gave way then arguing over which area is best to defend is a moot point. They would be forced to fall back to the Seine anyway since it is the next defensive line, albeit temporarily.

They will be better off to the extent that the forces in northern France and the Low Countries will not have been previously drawn down, but then they weren't drawn down much historically either, so not a big change there.

Here I disagree. The Germans were able to bring a sizeable force down into Normandy after the 10th of June, and these included the better part of their armor reserves.

[JasonC]

If you want to fantasize about possible counterattacks, the 10th is way too early. The Germans did have a fleeting window when they might have launched a counterattack on a sufficient scale, early enough in the build up, but after forces had time to arrive.

The window is right around June 20th. The obvious sector for it is the junction between the US and British sectors, the sector historically screened by the arriving 2nd Panzer division at this time. This was before Epsom, so there were actually quite a few Panthers available in theater.

Also, some units that wasted time getting to the front could have been used. 116 Panzer was sitting it out in reserve, 2SS was wasting time killing civilians in the south. Lehr could have gone direct to the US sector instead of to the Brit sector first. Several Panther battalions were wasting time in training that should have been done months before.

If they had been a lot more serious about it, they could readily have formed a full panzer corps for such a counterattack. The US was focused on Cherbourg and logistically limited (they lost their mulberry around this time e.g.). Weather was bad, making allied air not a problem. The other fronts were not critical anymore. The target would have been the Bayeux area.

The US force in the area at the time was the 1st infantry division, with some attached armor and TDs. Not a pushover but not a match for 3-4 PDs either. Logistical support for so many vehicles in that particular part of the front might have been a challenge, but less so than e.g. the Ardennes was.

Five days earlier and not enough armor has reached the theater yet. Five days later and they have to stop Epsom and to throw in most of their available armor to do so. But right around the 20th, they would have been able to do something serious. Probably they still would have been stopped, at the latest once they got within easy naval gunfire range of the coast, but it was their best shot offensively speaking.

Personally I think 100,000 infantry a month and an attritionist defense was more promising, but if one wants armor counterattack schemes that is the one that had the best chance.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Lehr could have gone direct to the US sector instead of to the Brit sector first.

But who would have taken over Lehr's spot in the front? Historically it wasn't relieved off the line until sometime in July.

[roqf77]

jason c this is true. but it would also require more suppplies. like fuel and ammunition. where would this come from?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

Lehr could have gone direct to the US sector instead of to the Brit sector first.

But who would have taken over Lehr's spot in the front? Historically it wasn't relieved off the line until sometime in July. </font>

[Aco4bn187inf]

Thanks Michael Dorosh and Jon S,

It must have been the Max Hastings book. I have Steel Inferno, which impressed me a lot.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

Lehr could have gone direct to the US sector instead of to the Brit sector first.

But who would have taken over Lehr's spot in the front? Historically it wasn't relieved off the line until sometime in July. </font>

[JonS]

leaving aside losses and missing eqpt, no two Pz Divs in Normandy were organised or equipped the same, as far as I can tell. Lehr was one of the stronger ones, and certainly more tactically mobile with it's full complement of SPWs.

[JasonC]

The Germans had 12SS and 21st Panzer for the British front, along with 101 SS Tigers, and had just set the Brits on their heels at Villars-Bocage. 9th and 10th SS (with more Tigers) were set to arrive at the end of the month, in time to form an operational reserve. 1SS would also arrive around the same time. That is plenty of insurance.

On the US front, the US were focused on Cherbourg and supply limited ashore, unable to support 2 corps in heavy operations simultaneously given the state of their over the beach supply, the effects of storms, etc. 17SS, 6th FJ Regiment, with some StuG etc, were in the US sector and outside of the penisula. 3rd FJ division was arriving at St Lo also with some StuG.

503 Tiger was slow coming from Germany but there is no reason it could not have made the battle, in time to act as the Tiger battalion for a Heer panzer corps attack. 116th Panzer was playing musical chairs with Panther battalions - their own was in training so they had another, it was sent east and they got a third and trained it. They could easily have switched that "move order" if an attack were on in the west for the 20th, so it would have had basically a full compliment. The same is true of 2 Panzer, one of the best in the Heer and unengaged to that point.

Lehr had some fighting earlier in June but as Villars showed that wasn't exactly required of it. There was already quite a bit of armor in the Brit sector. It made sense to send it there if the idea was an early counterattack out of Caen, but that is exactly what we have agreed was far too early. Lehr should have gone to the left side of the Brit sector, between Villars and the later 2 Panzer sector - and not wasted its tanks early.

Even without 2 SS, therefore, they could have assembled a full panzer corps with ~600 AFVs, half of them high powered types. 2SS could have been there as the exploitation force, or if Lehr has to disentangle from a premature commitment farther east, could have relied Lehr in a timely fashion.

Either way, you get a Heer panzer corps for the attack, plus an SS panzer corps arriving a week or so after it jumps off as your insurance force. With plenty holding the wings (mostly infantry in the US sector it is true, but that was perfectly sufficient historically, in that terrain).

As for supply, there was no overall difficulty. The Germans supplied the whole July force in heavy combat. The only real issue would be the road net to keep getting stuff up to the attack, because that is relatively thin between St. Lo and Villars, toward the coast. You do have a good lateral road behind the front for shifting forces, and could make dumps along its length. The ground is comparatively high providing good artillery observation and cover against the reverse, and the weather was poor.

The only hard bit would be running stuff up from that lateral road, toward the coast (because the roads are so thin in the area, until you get to Bayeux). I'd think many hundreds of SPWs might be able to help with that, though. Ideally, you make ground fast enough to open the highway net from St. Lo and/or Villars to Bayeux, after you've grabbed the bit in between over the "back roads".

It is a perfectly workable plan, better than anything they actually tried. Hindsight helps, obviously. Standing on the defensive might have worked even better. Still, it was the best shot the "counterattack with armor" school could ask for, if they had been patient enough to set it up. The Allies were still pretty weak at that point, only two weeks after coming ashore.

[Kingfish]

You are ignoring one very important point - the infantry divisions which would have freed the panzers for the upcoming attack didn't arrive until much later. The PDs were stuck on the line for weeks past your June 20th deadline, and when they were relieved they were in no shape to conduct offensive operations.

[JasonC]

2nd Panzer was not in the line. It was just arriving, and in this exact sector. 116 Panzer was not in the line. It was in reserve clear until the breakout at the end of July, despite already being in the theater. 2nd SS was not in the line. It was arriving from the south of France. 503 Tiger wasn't in the line, it was in Germany (and arrived in leisurely fashion at the end of the month). 9SS and 10SS, with 102SS Tigers, arrived at the end of the month in time to help stop Epsom, but were not in the line. Same for 1SS, arriving a little later.

12SS was in the line and I leave it there. 21st Panzer was in the line and I leave it there. 101SS Tigers was in the line and I leave it there. All in the British sector, and quite sufficient to give them a bloody nose at Villars a week before my planned attack. 17SS was in the line in the US sector and I leave it there.

The only item I suggest moving is Panzer Lehr. I say you can either make the mistake they actually made, of hoping for a rapid counterattack out of Caen in the first few days (the reason they put 12SS and Lehr in the same sector as 21st Panzer), in which case you relieve it with 2SS - or you plan the later attack from the get-go, defend with 21st and 12SS in the Brit sector, put Lehr in the Brit sector still but on the left (west) end of that sector, in which case you have it around for this offensive - and also have 2SS as it arrives.

I'm accounting for every unit, when they all arrive, all the realistic possible moves, gathering the proper equipment, all the things staff would do to prepare a panzer corps scale offensive. The initial attack force would be 2nd Panzer and 116 Panzer side by side with Lehr was the exploitation force in the mistake-and-relief option. In the better planned from the get-go option, the lead units can be Lehr (already in the line) and 2nd Panzer (just arriving in exactly the same spot it did historically), 116 Panzer as main exploitation, and 2SS also arriving behind it to add weight. 3FJ also can take part, holding the left shoulder. A full SS panzer corps (9SS, 10SS) arrives the week afterward to help or to react to any counters the Allies get off, or to cover any failure.

Flip comments without engaging the details don't remotely cut it. Epsom historically sucked in 2 Panzer's Panther battalion and pretty much all of 9SS and 10SS. After that, you can talk about armor being tied down in the Brit sector. But Epsom did not jump off until 5 days after my proposed start date. The Brits were licking their wounds from Villars Bocage, not attacking.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Flip comments without engaging the details don't remotely cut it.

LOL, isn't that rich. You're moving PDs around like a puck on an air hockey table and you accuse me of not engaging in details. You want to discuss details then lets do it, only at least keep it within historically realistic contents.

Comments like this: "2SS was wasting time killing civilians in the south." certainly does nothing to address the mobility problems this division had to deal with just to get to Normandy. Elements of that unit were still in the south of France as late as the last week in July, and it wasn't because they were having too much fun rounding up entire villages and burning them alive.

The same is true with 116th Pz. There was a reason the German high command kept them out of Normandy for so long. They were only formed in late spring, and part of it came from a badly depleted unit from the Eastern front. It suffered from a lack of mobility (same as 2SS).

Also, please put to rest the the option to move Lehr to the American sector. Again, there was a reason they ended up where they did, and for so long. The German unit assigned to defend the British beaches on D-day was the 716th ID, a unit which ceased to exists after the first day. Thus the PDs were forced to cover this gap, and Lehr was one of those PDs. Could the 12th SS have been stretched to cover this sector? Sure, if they had arrived as one unit. Unfortunately they didn't, and the PL had to be inserted to cover the gap. Otherwise the Brit 7th wouldn't have bothered going around the Lehr's flank for Op Perch.

[Aragorn2002]

Ahhh, good old times.