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How were the Normandy Invasion divisions chosen?


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I was wondering how the particular divisions were chosen for the invasion of Normandy. (Not including the Airborne and Ranger units, etc. I understand whey those units were chosen.)

There must have been a lot of self-promotion and campaigning by the various unit commanders to have their divisions picked for the task. And if I was Supreme Commander, I'd want units with some experience and sound training to tackle to objectives.

I don't recall reading much about this aspect of the Overlord/Normandy planning. Anyone know much about it?

Curious about the U.S. units, and the Commonwealth units too. Infantry and Armour. Canadian, British etc.. I can guess why a FRENCH unit was chosen. But why specifically the U.S. 29th and 4th divisions. Or the Brit Northumbrian, or Canadian 3rd division?

Was it just that they were in England, and had the time to train for the specific tasks/objectives of Overlord?

Were the infantry divisions considered "cannon-fodder" divisions? Or were they picked because of a perceived quality or effectiveness?

Cheers,

Gpig

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All of the divisions in England had roles to play, eventually, though not all were to see combat. The American divisions to take part in the initial assault were chosen in part based upon experience (e.g. 1st Infantry Division was an obvious choice) but in the absence of combat experience, divisions were chosen to lead the assault on D-Day based upon the excellence of their leadership and state of amphibious and regular training as evaluated by the SHAEF planners.

What you may not be aware of is that the planning for Overlord actually began two years earlier (at first in a very generalized way) and most of the units in the UK were ramped up there for the specific purpose of invading the continent. It's not like, "OK, let's invade and, by the way what have we got sitting around we can use?" It was much more a matter of tailoring the force to the mission and that involved division selection, equipment and training.

The French divisions were raised and trained mostly in N. Africa and equipped by the Americans. Most of them entered via Marseilles in the south, except for LeClerc's armored division.

Eventually, the UK ran into manpower problems and had to break up a couple of its own divisions in order to provide combat replacements for the others still in action.

By the end of the war, the US had virtually no uncommitted divisions, although one or two saw almost no combat at all, having just arrived in theater or being engaged in securing French ports still occupied by the Germans. IIRC there was not even one combat division left in the entire continental U.S. by the time of V-E day.

All this is off the top of my head so if I mis-remembered something or left important details out, please feel free to jump in.

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to a large extent, it was question of who was available.

The Canadian Army had three infantry divisions, the 1st was in Italy, the 2nd was still rebuilding after Dieppe, that left the 3rd which had never seen combat. However, it had trained extensively for the invasion.

The same was true of the 29th U.S. which had never seen combat, but had also been extensively trained for the invasion.

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Well, you see, first there was a mummy division, and a daddy division. These two divisions loved each other very much, and decided they wanted to have a family vacation, so they could go on a family holiday to France ...

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The Big Red One has a special place in my heart since I served in the division from 1990-1994.

One often overlooked aspect of the 1st ID being chosen for D-Day was the relentless campaigning by it's commanders, especially Terry Allen. Terry was a very aggressive commander and always spoiling for a fight. As a unit, the 1st had a lot of prewar political influence and prestige within the Army which carried over into the war. However, Omar Bradley really did not like Terry and his leadership style. If not for Bradley talking higher commands into allowing him to relieve Terry (and assistant division commander Roosevelt) during the Sicily campaign, it's likely ho could have caused the 1st to stay in the Mediterranean theater and another division (possibly the 9th?) chosen for the first wave landings in Normandy.

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The Big Red One has a special place in my heart since I served in the division from 1990-1994.

One often overlooked aspect of the 1st ID being chosen for D-Day was the relentless campaigning by it's commanders, especially Terry Allen. Terry was a very aggressive commander and always spoiling for a fight. As a unit, the 1st had a lot of prewar political influence and prestige within the Army which carried over into the war. However, Omar Bradley really did not like Terry and his leadership style. If not for Bradley talking higher commands into allowing him to relieve Terry (and assistant division commander Roosevelt) during the Sicily campaign, it's likely ho could have caused the 1st to stay in the Mediterranean theater and another division (possibly the 9th?) chosen for the first wave landings in Normandy.

I feel the same about the 4th ID.I served in the 4th from 89-93.

I just drove by Ft Riley the other day and had to stop in my 18 wheeler on the shoulder of an off ramp to watch a bunch of Chinooks take off from the Tarmac.Cool stuff having the Airtsrip right by the Interstate.Had like 8 Chinooks take off at the same time and head East,then a slow turn North.Made me wish I had stayed in and done my 20.Hell,I would have retired two years ago,what was I thinking when I got out.If you were in from 90-94,you must be what about 38 or 39,same as me.God I feel old.I actually said to some teenage kid at the check out the other day in the Wal Mart"Back in my day Son".I had to stop myself.LOL.

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No question that behind-the-scenes army "politics" at the command level was influencing a lot of the decisions being made in wartime. I've been reading this stuff 50 some years and am still learning new - and appalling - things about how certain members of the US Army's generalship were making decisions based upon very little more than prejudices, preconceived notions, emotion, bias and personal animosity towards some other general and his "entourage" or branch. Once you actually get into that level of history, it breaks down into achingly painful images of flawed humans acting out of some misguided perception of what won/lost the last war. True visionaries and real leaders were rare and even those that existed, had flaws that were sometimes fatal to their own side.

History has taught us that it is a nation's young men that pay the price for older mens' mistakes. But in the past, as often than not, some of those flawed older men would die off in battle, leading their armies into a final charge or last stand. Today, it is rare for that to happen to generals, particularly those in upper echelon administrative positions.

Yep, there is a lot more to war than OOB's, TO&E's, TM's, FM's, Ballistics Charts and Op Orders. The really interesting background stuff has to be rooted out like a truffle, but the morsels are worth the effort. I very much encourage the OP to read up as much as possible about the generals of the day and their deeds/misdeeds. It makes you all the more grateful to those who sacrificed their lives carrying out some of the orders these very imperfect generals made every day.

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Thanks all, for fleshing out some great details.

I've read Eisenhower's biography of WWII, and that was pretty amazing. But it was written fairly shortly after the war so a lot of details were left out. (No mention of ULTRA at all, for example.)

Currently, I'm waiting for the third book in Rick Atkinson's amazing WWII histories. "An Army at Dawn, and "Day of Battle," are full and detailed. (The first details operation Torch, the second Sicily/Italy.) Great stories from the trenches on up to supreme allied commanders and presidents/prime ministers. I highly recommend them to anyone looking for a full and entertaining read on those histories.

Cheers,

Gpig

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James Jay Carafano's book "After D-Day - Operation Cobra and the Normandy breakout" shows a very interesting picture of the capabilities of the U.S. senior commanders.

He gives most of the credit for the success of Cobra, rightly IMO, to the battalion commanders who had perfected their skills during the bocage fighting and who were the ones actually making the critical decisions during the breakout.

Michael

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He gives most of the credit for the success of Cobra, rightly IMO, to the battalion commanders who had perfected their skills during the bocage fighting and who were the ones actually making the critical decisions during the breakout.

Michael

exactly the regimental and battalion commanders. He has also good words ("steady performance") for a few division commanders Manton Eddy (9 ID), Leland Hobbs (30 ID) and Raymond Barton (4 ID).

His credo is, that the focus on the senior leaders neglected the role of the field-grade leaders.

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