British light btln equipment quality request

[c3k]

Check the latest from the USMC. They're going to use HK416's to replace their SAWs. Interesting development. It doesn't make sense (to me) to replace a suppressive firepower weapon with 100+ round, full-auto, with a selective fire 30 round magazine weapon. (Imagine the WWII Wehrmacht swapping squad MG-42's for Brens?) BUT, if it's the camel's nose under the tent, attempting to swap ALL M-16's out for the HK416, then it makes sense. Shrug.

[akd]

BTW, the now cancelled XM-8 small arms program was largely based on the same underlying logic as the British SA-80 family of weapons. I'm not sure if that factored into killing the program (plenty of other reasons to kill it), but I think it should be. The range of effective uses of the L85A2 is not wide enough.

Reading about the differences in the nature of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq is really interesting. The average engagement ranges, and available support, are night and day different. The fact that short barreled 5.56 weapons are viewed so unfavorably in parts of Afghanistan is no surprise. But there are other weapons that have largely been deemed "useless" in some parts. Mortars and even larger artillery are not very effective in some circumstances because of the fighters being dug into the sides of hills. And that's when they are available at all, which is often not the case due to the vast distances being covered by so few troops. Etc. etc.

Iraq, on the other hand, is mostly about fighting in built up areas. And when the enemy is out in the open, it's more likely flat terrain broken up by ditches, fields, or other terrain. There are few opportunities for extreme long range firefights. And when encountered, the Coalition usually has the firepower handy to clobber the source of the fire. Artillery is almost always available and it is generally able to silence whatever it is fired at (provided it is aimed properly). Not to say that there aren't situations where 7.62 (or longer barreled 5.56) wouldn't do a lot better, it's just that the situations are far fewer than in Afghanistan.

Steve

I think you can safely generalize Iraq as fighting in built up areas, but I don't think you can generalize Afghanistan as the opposite, especially in regards to the British experience. The Brits have spent most of their time in Helmand province, which is characterized by very close "urban-rural" terrain, similar in many respects to Norman bocage. Since the practice of subbing a GPMG for one of the section LMGs seems to have already been happening in Iraq and has carried over to Helmand, I don't think engagement distance is the primary motivating factor behind the practice.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Check the latest from the USMC. They're going to use HK416's to replace their SAWs. Interesting development. It doesn't make sense (to me) to replace a suppressive firepower weapon with 100+ round, full-auto, with a selective fire 30 round magazine weapon. (Imagine the WWII Wehrmacht swapping squad MG-42's for Brens?) BUT, if it's the camel's nose under the tent, attempting to swap ALL M-16's out for the HK416, then it makes sense. Shrug.

Hah! I had the exact same thoughts about that.

AS I understand it for each M249 they plan to replace they will use two M27s while retaining the M249s to be used at discretion. I can predict with a near 100% certainty how that's going to work out. M249s will be alongside the M27 until they wear out.

It all strikes me as the USMC trying to get the HK416 to have a foot in the door for future full replacement. The utility of such weapons as true automatic support weapons is so dubious that it would be hard to believe that they are completely sincere about the M27 being the new SAW.

[Battlefront.com]

Elmar,

Yes, sorry... L86A2, not L85A2! I find the Brit designations quite confusing because they are so similar to each other.

As for the XM-8, the primary reason it was cancelled was the cost was not considered inline with the improvement it would bring. Like so many US military projects, it originally started out as an inexpensive modification of the G-36. Had the project remained within its initial scope, it very well might have been accepted. But there was major mission creep and the cost of the program skyrocketed but the value to the military did not go up proportionally. The US military might be the most lavishly equipped force in the world, but it's massive size means that people notice when a huge bill is presented. Lots and lots of expensive projects have been cancelled recently because the budget simply can't absorb it all.

AKD,

I think you can safely generalize Iraq as fighting in built up areas, but I don't think you can generalize Afghanistan as the opposite, especially in regards to the British experience. The Brits have spent most of their time in Helmand province, which is characterized by very close "urban-rural" terrain, similar in many respects to Norman bocage. Since the practice of subbing a GPMG for one of the section LMGs seems to have already been happening in Iraq and has carried over to Helmand, I don't think engagement distance is the primary motivating factor behind the practice.

Engagement distance was mentioned in that report you linked to as a primary reason. I know that the US Army has repeatedly identified this as a problem, but as you say they are in more diverse terrain than the Brits are at the moment. However, note that the problem with spreading out so thinly, with inadequate support in theater to begin with, is a major problem for all forces in Afghanistan. In Iraq if someone gets into a tight spot it is more likely than not that help is not far away. In Afghanistan usually the force running into trouble is on its own (unless it's a major operation). Therefore, assigning more firepower to the Rifle Sections not only makes sense, it's pretty much the only thing that can be practically done at this point.

There is, of course, the issue of stopping power of the 7.62 vs. the 5.56. This has been a hotly debated partisan fight for most of the last century. There is certainly no end to it now, nor will there likely ever be until the basic technology changes rather radically. For example, going with a higher calibre caseless round than what the 5.56 offers.

When did the Brits start moving additional GPMGs into Iraq to sub out for a Section LMG? Remember CM:SF's timeframe is 2007/2008 timeframe.

As for the Marines' adoption of the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR), the modified HK416, that's really a head scratcher to me. The Marines have repeatedly shown that they do not care about weight, they care about firepower. Why they are swapping out the M249s for the M27 is so far not been explained to me. What I do know is that they intend on retaining 3x M249s per Rifle Company (currently they have 6) to use as an optional substitute for the M27, based on battlefield conditions. Which sucks from our standpoint because this sort of thing really f'n complicates things for us

Steve

[akd]

AKD,

Engagement distance was mentioned in that report you linked to as a primary reason. I know that the US Army has repeatedly identified this as a problem, but as you say they are in more diverse terrain than the Brits are at the moment. However, note that the problem with spreading out so thinly, with inadequate support in theater to begin with, is a major problem for all forces in Afghanistan. In Iraq if someone gets into a tight spot it is more likely than not that help is not far away. In Afghanistan usually the force running into trouble is on its own (unless it's a major operation). Therefore, assigning more firepower to the Rifle Sections not only makes sense, it's pretty much the only thing that can be practically done at this point.

I think this latter reason is the primary driving force, but I think it also exists in Iraq as well. Small units being responsible for huge areas seems to just be a reality of modern war (and it mostly offset by. An insurgent cell often has several PK/PKMs at its disposal, so it is not all that unlikely that smaller units can find themselves outgunned (leaving support assets aside). Average engagement distance studies in Afghanistan just don't work for me when you have US Forces in the mountains getting into 800m firefights, while in Helmand you have the Taliban intentionally engaging at 50m or less to nullify coalition air/artillery support and small units being tasked with clearing the "urban-rural" maze of villages and compounds.

When did the Brits start moving additional GPMGs into Iraq to sub out for a Section LMG? Remember CM:SF's timeframe is 2007/2008 timeframe.

Anecdotes from the 2004 timeframe at least for their use at the small unit level, e.g. Sniper One mentioned above.

[Jonny(FGM)]

There is, of course, the issue of stopping power of the 7.62 vs. the 5.56. This has been a hotly debated partisan fight for most of the last century. There is certainly no end to it now, nor will there likely ever be until the basic technology changes rather radically. For example, going with a higher calibre caseless round than what the 5.56 offers.

I never got this debate, unless you're one of those uber special soldiers, you get hit with a bullet in the flesh you're going down, it might not kill you but it'll make the threat you pose be significantly decreased.

[Boche]

I never got this debate, unless you're one of those uber special soldiers, you get hit with a bullet in the flesh you're going down, it might not kill you but it'll make the threat you pose be significantly decreased.

yeah, not to argument against you but its supposed to have something to do with the "stopping power" of the bullet. stating that 5.56 dosnt have the "umpf" of a 7.62.

[Jonny(FGM)]

oh no i get that people say a 7.62mm will do more damage than a 5.56, and i don't doubt that it will, it's simple physics. But to all those people who say that 5.56mm doesn't have enough stopping power id say ok let me shoot you with it then and see how you feel about the lack of "stopping power"