Future War in the 1970-'80s

[souldierz]

It is hard to know how effective a current air campaign would be since so much depends on who is on the other side.

There is a RAND study which discusses various assumptions about how effective a 2020 air campaign could be.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf

It deals mostly with the air-to-air aspect, but makes interesting observations about air power since ww2.

I saw a documentary about a massive air war simulation/compitition that Military organizations from all over the world participated in.In it was a very big variety of planes and some if not most of the enemy were using SU's against the NATO type planes.It was the most Impressive air show I have ever seen and it simulated Air to Air combat and Air to ground combat in real time.There were Many, many, many planes of all kinds including all that are being used today.They even had the big AWACS and refuel planes and they were all airborn about the same time.I think it was to simulate a huge air invasion deep into enemy lands.The plan was for the NATO planes to clear the skies from SU's so the fighter bombers can hit the land targets and all was under the command of the AWACS who saw all and knew all.

Seeing those A-10s do strafing runs and bomb runs as a group and then flying away while deploying mass amounts of flares was spectacular to say the least.Very beautiful to watch,but also very violently deadly and my jaw was on the ground the hole time at this incredible display of air power.

The Air to Air combat was no disappointment either.It was basically everyone against the Su's.Modern air combat is one hell of a sight to see.Flares were taking up most of the space in the sky and at times it almost seemed like every one was flying around in a grid of gold dust or shinning stars.It was like a huge spider web of flares was formed and the planes fought amongst each other like a pack of wolves staying close to their lead in the web of smoke and flares,squads of planes were zig zagging in every way. It Looked so disorganized and chaotic as it was unfolding, but oddly enough it also looked so thorough and well executed when those planes were lopping around and attacking in formations.It was like well managed chaos or an well organized mess to phrase it differently.

This was all done on a grand scale and at the end of the day the NATO type planes won over the SU's and bombed their targets. I'm fairly positive it was designed to be a lop sided battle anyway.At the end some pilots were chewed up a bit by superiors due to them breaking a distance barrier between them and another plane and they were also chatting about the new SU's handling.I think this was like an All star game where all the top ACE pilots from all over the world were invited, so it was probably one time only for some pilots.

That was the only time I ever seen what it would look like if there was an all out Air battle between super powers.Just Amazing to watch, especially when the sky was filled with flares.It really gave it a futuristic feel and is definitely in a category of it's own.To sum it all up it was like a big battle in a snow globe and all the snow was flares.I can imaging how confusing it would be for a missile trying to hit it's target.

[jjhouston]

jjhouston,

Personnel, hardware, or both?

I recall reading that during Operation Nickel Grass, the U.S. 'loaned' a number of ECM capable F-4's for use against Egyptian ADA. It seems that under the conditions, we'd want to test our really best stuff and that it'd be our pilots testing it. That conflict is often cited as an exemplar of ATGM vs Tank combat, but it also seems that it was a good dress rehearsal for Layered ADA vs Air-to-Ground anti-radar weapons.

[Vark]

I guess it was only fair, given the number of Soviet 'advisors' on the otherside of the canal.

Given the tempo of a war between Nato and Warpac forces would have precluded any but the smallest of field modifications, the force whose equipment was fit for purpose would have won. Your weapons not performing as predicted, tough! By the time you analyse the problem and come up with a working solution the war is over. There would not be the luxury of having time to rectify your mistakes as in previous conflicts.

[John Kettler]

hcrof and souldierz,

A lot depends on both timeframe and underlying assumptions. In the early days of my military aerospace career, NATO fixed AD consisted of belts of HAWK LOMADS and NIKE HERCULES HIMADS, both with severe engagement limitations in that only one target could be engaged per firing unit at a time. The Air Operation posed the very real specter of missile exhaustion, and we worried about the use of trainee pilots and obsolete aircraft as the first wave for just such an outcome, leaving the good stuff a free pass through corridors in the NATO SAM belts. IHAWK, I think, doubled the number of simultaneous engagements, but the huge leap came with Patriot, which was so advanced as to be almost magical when compared to what preceded it. NATO used to have the missile edge and pilot quality edge, but the former changed dramatically with the revolutionary off boresight AA-11 ARCHER, MiG-29 FULCRUM and Su-27 FLANKER, shortly followed by AIM-120 equivalent missiles. Do you want to posit antiAWACS air-to-air and surface-to-air threats in the sky and Spetsnaz and/or TBM attacks on Geilenkirchen, the main AWACS base? We had plenty of evidence to support those concerns. What about ARM attacks on the major fixed radars? Again, yes, as demonstrated by AS-5 KELT attacks on Israeli TPS-43 in the Yom Kippur War. And so much depended on the SOCs and ATOC, all meticulously characterized by the Russians. We expected incredibly dense jamming, as seen in Czechoslovakia in 1968 where we literally couldn't see into that country by radar.

For a very long time, NATO was brittle, weak and highly vulnerable to air and missile attack on its air defenses. Our shelters could be smashed; theirs couldn't. The U.S. had no proper runway buster munitions and had to get Durandal from the French, whereas the Russians had the BETAB family of rocket boosted dibber bombs. Had war come, once in inventory, it would've been the British with the JP-233 and the Germans with the Streuwaffen at treetop height carrying most of the runway interdiction role using laydown attacks, with the associated attrition. NATO rapid runway repair was disastrously bad for a long time. I should know, for I spent months researching rapid runway repair. NATO planes required smooth, clean runways, where lots of Russian planes had rough field capability and operated from airfields with modular runway elements. I think it's worth noting that the first version of Hackett's book had NATO losing. He had to change a whole stack of things for NATO to barely survive, that after the Queen got involved! I think the destruction would've been enormous, after which all kinds of "emery dust" would've started eating up both sides: pilot fatigue, losses, aircraft availability (a real issue for MiG-21 vintage aircraft, thanks to short engine lives), spare part availability, commo breakdowns, etc.

Sgt Joch,

Something else to read!

jjhouston and Vark,

The Wiki says we sent 36 F-4s, all under IAF pilotage but, some in full U.S. camouflage but IAF markings because of time constraints.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Nickel_Grass

"Airlifted supplies were not all that was delivered under Nickel Grass. In the opening days of the war, Arab forces destroyed significant numbers[citation needed] of Israeli Air Force aircraft, surprising the Israelis with aggressive use of the new Soviet SA-6 Gainful Surface-to-air missile. Consequently, 36 F-4 Phantom jet fighters were sent to Israel under Nickel Grass. They were flown to Lod, where American pilots were swapped for their Israeli counterparts. After the replacement of USAF insignia with IAF insignia if needed, the planes were refueled and ordered to the front, often taking to the air within hours of having arrived. Interestingly, some aircraft came directly from the USAFE fleet and operated in USAF camouflage,[7] but with Israeli insignia."

Av Week articles of the time talked about crash resupply of ground munitions (expended at a huge rate), tail assemblies for Skyhawks with SA-7 damaged rear fuselages, Phantom replacements, special jammers for the SA-6 CW radar, etc., tanks, TOW and Maverick, some of which are covered here.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/airchronicles/apj/apj89/spr89/krisinger.html

Some idea of potential European attrition may be gained from this.

http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:QlDKRtloMOIJ:handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA366257+sa-6+jamming+pods+yom+kippur+war&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a (page 15 in original report)

"The IAF lost 50 aircraft in the first 3 days of the war with total losses rising to 102 by the

end of the war, representing nearly 37 percent of Israel's pre-war assets.84 Two events finally

turned the tide of the air war in favor of Israel: massive resupply by the US to include new self-

protection pods and retuned radar warning receivers with the capability to display SA-6

indications85; and a successful Israeli ground counterattack which overran and destroyed SAM

sites. In contrast to the 1967 war, a commission reviewed the conduct of the 1973 war and made

major recommendations for change.86"

And here's the decline of the SA-2 from the deadliness of the early days to its virtual ineffectiveness when we got tactics, hardware, jamming and SEAD sorted out.

(Page 13 in original)

"During the course of the air war over North Vietnam there had been a steady drop in the

effectiveness of the SA-2 missile, as various countermeasures took effect. When it was

first used on a large scale, in 1965, the SA-2 destroyed about ten fighter-bombers for an

estimated 150 Guidelines launched: an average of one kill for every fifteen missiles. By

November 1968 one aircraft was shot down for every 48 missiles fired. During Linebacker

II [1972] one aircraft was destroyed for roughly every 50 Guidelines fired."74

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 demonstrated once again that air operations cannot

be conducted in an environment where an integrated air defense network has full use of its

communications, surveillance, and fire control systems. Israel's inability to counter Egyptian and

Syrian air defenses and achieve spectrum superiority resulted in unacceptable losses during the

initial stages of the war.75 Israel's high losses clearly demonstrated the lethality of the modern IADS."

Remember, 37% of the IAF's frontline combat force was lost in 20 days, with most of that in the first week before the IAF stopped flying CAS.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sgt Joch]

Actually I don't see the number of planes shot down as a good indicator of how effective an air defence system is, the real indicator is whether enemy airplanes were able to carry out their objectives or not.

Kosovo 1999 is a very good example of a successful air defence. If enemy air strikes are obliged to jettison their ordnance or miss their targets, the air defense system has done its job. From the article John linked above:

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ICK/is_2_16/ai_90529723/?tag=content;col1

Evidently, the Serbs launched only a few SAMs against attacking NATO aircraft the first night. The second night, the enemy fired fewer than 10 SA-6s, none of them scoring a hit. Later during Allied Force, the Serbs frequently fired SAMs in large numbers, with dozens launched in salvo fashion on some nights but only a few launched on others. Although these ballistic launches constituted more a harassment factor than any serious challenge to NATO operations, in numerous instances allied pilots had to jettison their fuel tanks, dispense chaff, and maneuver violently to evade enemy SAMs that were guiding.

Indeed, the SAM threat to NATO's aircrews proved far more pronounced and harrowing than media coverage typically depicted, and aggressive jinking and countermaneuvering against airborne SAMs frequently became necessary whenever the Serbs sought to engage NATO aircraft. Ten or more pilots operating in a target area might report a SAM shot as ballistic while the one pilot on whose helmet the missile was figuratively guiding would be actively reacting to it. Shortly thereafter, 10 pilots would recover to widely dispersed home bases and report nonthreatening ballistic launches, while only one would return with the evidence of a guided shot. Such episodes drove an initial impression among Allied Force leaders that "most" of the observed SAM shots were ballistic. Fusion of all the pertinent information and elimination of duplicate reporting, however, indicated that a substantial number of SAM launches, perhaps as many as a third, were guided.

Indeed, Gen Wesley Clark, US Army, supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), later reported numerous instances of near-misses involving enemy SAM launches against NATO aircraft. General Jumper added that a simple look at cockpit-display videotapes would show that "those duels were not trivial." (14) From the very start of NATO's air attacks, Serb air defenders also sought to sucker NATO aircrews down to lower altitudes to bring them within the lethal envelopes of widely proliferated man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and AAA emplacements. A common Serb tactic involved firing on the last aircraft in a departing strike formation, perhaps on the presumption that those aircraft would be unprotected by other fighters; flown by less experienced pilots; and low on fuel, which would limit their freedom to countermaneuver.

and on the results of the air campaign:

In all, more than 800 SAMs reportedly fired at NATO aircraft, both manned and unmanned, over the course of the 78-day air war, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed man-portable infrared missiles. (33) A majority of the fixed SAMs were fired without any radar guidance. Despite that expenditure of assets, enemy fire downed only two NATO aircraft--the F-117 mentioned above and, later, an F-16--although another F-117 sustained light damage from a nearby SA-3 detonation and two A-10s were hit by enemy AAA fire but not downed. (34) Also, in two reported cases short-range, infrared-guided missiles hit A-10s, one of the missiles apparently striking the bottom of the aircraft, defusing itself, and bouncing off harmlessly. (35) US and NATO aircraft fired at least 743 HARMs against radars supporting these enemy SAMs. (36) Yet, enough of the Serb IADS remained intact--mainly the persistent AAA and MANPADS threat--to require NATO fighters to operate above a 15,000-foot floor throughout most of the air effort. Although al lied pilots could effectively counter the older SA-7 with flares if they saw it in time, the SA-9/13, SA-14, SA-16, and SA-18 presented a more formidable threat.

In the end, as noted above, enemy SAM fire brought down only two aircraft (both American), thanks to allied reliance on electronic jamming, towed decoys, and counter-tactics to negate enemy surface-to-air defenses. (37) However, NATO never fully succeeded in neutralizing the Serb IADS, and NATO aircraft operating over Serbia and Kosovo were always within the engagement envelopes of enemy SA-3 and SA-6 missiles--envelopes that extended as high as 50,000 feet. Because of that persistent threat, mission planners had to place such high-value surveillance-and-reconnaissance platforms as the U-2 and JSTARS in less-than-ideal orbits to keep them outside the lethal reach of enemy SAMs. Even during the operation's final week, NATO spokesmen conceded that they could confirm the destruction of only three of Serbia's approximately 25 known mobile SA-6 batteries.

In all events, by remaining dispersed and mobile, and by activating their radars only selectively, the Serb IADS operators yielded the short-term tactical initiative in order to present a longer-term operational and strategic challenge to allied combat sorties. The downside of that inactivity for NATO was that opportunities to employ the classic Wild Weasel tactic of attacking enemy SAM radars with HARMs while SAMs guided on airborne targets were "few and far between." (39) Lt Gen Michael Short, the Allied Force air commander, later indicated that his aircrews were ready for a wall-to-wall SAM threat like the one encountered over Iraq during Desert Storm but that "it just never materialized. And then it began to dawn on us that...they were going to try to survive as opposed to being willing to die to shoot down an airplane."

40.) Interview with Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF, PBS Frontline, "War in Europe," 22 February 2000. Serb IADS operators may have been able to trade short-term effectiveness for longerterm survivability because allied aircraft typically could not find and successfully attack fielded Serbian forces and other mobile ground targets. Had they been able to do so and kill enemy troops in large numbers, Use Serb army's leadership would have insisted on a more aggressive air defense effort. That would have enabled NATO to kill more SAMs but at the probable cost of losing additional friendly aircraft.

yes, the Serbs only shot down 2 aircraft for 800 missiles fired, but NATO was never able to shut down the Serb's air defences. Because of that NATO was not able to strike effectively at Serb military targets.

[John Kettler]

Sgt Joch,

The question was asked earlier how things might go had war broken out in Europe, and it was to that I responded. Elsewhere, though, I clearly indicated an entire continuum of air defense system impacts. In my aerospace days, situations in which the air defense forced the bombers to salvo ordnance and leave without actually attacking was called virtual attrition, and believe me, we deemed it important. If we apply your criterion to the early stages of the Yom Kippur War, then the Egyptian air defense won a smashing victory over the IAF, a victory that didn't last because the Egyptians moved out from under their fixed SAM envelope, allowing the replenished, now higher tech IAF a more benign operating environment on the one hand, but made resounding on the other when the IDF crossed the Suez Canal and simply smashed whole swaths of SAM and AAA defenses. That was what enabled the gutting of the deeper Egyptian positions by IAF strikes into Egypt. Coming back to the NATO air losses to the Serbs list, I've seen numbers that suggest the NATO air loss figures aren't to be trusted and are deliberately understated. See particularly page 10 of the thread.

http://www.steelbeasts.com/sbforums/archive/index.php/t-4572.html

Don't know about this, but it sure is interesting.

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=95042.0;wap2

Publicly reported Yugoslavian claims amount to 114 aircraft, helicopters and UAVs.

http://yumodelclub.tripod.com/war_over_yugoslav/s_e_c_t_i_o_n_s.htm

Russian MOD comparison of wildly conflicting claims. Interestingly, it confirms the Prisonplanet piece on offensive Yugoslavian air ops against NATO helicopters in Albania. I think it's most interesting that the international security think tank ISSA doesn't buy the NATO claims either.

(fair use)

http://www.vor.ru/Kosovo/commentaries_395.html

"The NATO reports during and after the war have been called in question. A delegation of the international Association of Strategic Studies led by an American Senator Jim Sakston visited Yugoslavia and made a conclusion that the loss in man power and equipment of NATO and the United States were much more higher than that was publicly reported."

There are some glitches in the above, but the organization is big time into Balkans policy and made Congressman Jim Saxton the recipient of the Award for Outstanding Contributions to Strategic Progress for 1998. (see ISSA Background & Services below)

Here's ISSA.

http://www.strategicstudies.org/

Item 10 here supports what the Voice of Russia article asserts regarding understatement of NATO losses. (fair use)

http://members.tripod.com/~sarant_2/ks17saxton.html

"10. We attempted to investigate reports that there has already been

considerable loss of life among NATO forces, and we feel that we received

some confirmation that this has been the case. Clearly, the cost to NATO in

human and equipment terms has already been far greater than anything which

has been announced. Just how extensive the NATO aircraft and personnel losses

have been remains to be confirmed. What is clear is that already there has

been a cost to us, apart from the mere monetary cost of equipment and

consumables. This cost can only rise significantly as the conflict proceeds."

Vark,

Had a brain interrupt earlier. SSC-1b should be a SEPAL, not a STYX. Latter's designated SS-N-2.

Nice tutorial on NATO reporting name system.

http://www.ipms-gateway.com/articles/NATOSovietNames.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[Lethaface]

John, the first link of the steel beasts forum is a waste of time, you'd better take a closer look

Didn't look at any of the other sources, but members.tripod.* thingies never seem to arise above the house and kitchen 'conspiracy theories'.

I'm sure the US or any other country could cover up some aircraft losses, although not in such a scale. Furthermore the Serbs surely would have shown every inch of any downed plane remains. For me nothing has been proven about heavy NATO losses.

The Serb Air defence might still have been effective, downing 2+ planes and scaring away a lot of others while surviving.

[Sgt Joch]

John, I see you wanted to make a different point on AC losses. I was responding to this comment:

And here's the decline of the SA-2 from the deadliness of the early days to its virtual ineffectiveness when we got tactics, hardware, jamming and SEAD sorted out.

(Page 13 in original)

"During the course of the air war over North Vietnam there had been a steady drop in the

effectiveness of the SA-2 missile, as various countermeasures took effect. When it was

first used on a large scale, in 1965, the SA-2 destroyed about ten fighter-bombers for an

estimated 150 Guidelines launched: an average of one kill for every fifteen missiles. By

November 1968 one aircraft was shot down for every 48 missiles fired. During Linebacker

II [1972] one aircraft was destroyed for roughly every 50 Guidelines fired."74

I was making a different point about the overall effectiveness of Air Defences.

The effectiveness of SA-2s did decline from 65 to 72, but that only tells part of the story, since the U.S. had to adopt tactics to minimise losses which lessened the effectiveness of the air strikes.

In a typical "Rolling Thunder" strike on Hanoi in 66-68, fighter bombers would approach Hanoi from the NW at about 5,000 feet AGL where their approach would be masked from ground radars by mountains, the famous "Thud Ridge". As they got close, they would pop up to a high altitude, spot their targets and dive down to do their bombing run, after which they would egress back along the same route. This would lessen their exposure to SAMs, but also made it harder to spot and accurately bomb their intended targets.

There was also the issue of flights which jettisoned their ordnance/fuel tanks when maneuvering defensively against SAMs which would then abort back to base.

Yes, the effectiveness of SAMs went down, but so did the effectiveness of the air offensive.

The history of air operations since 1960 shows the dynamic ebb and flow between offence and defence:

-SAMs were overpowering in 65, but U.S. countermeasures/tactics gradually reduced their effectiveness at the cost of decreased offensive power;

-the 73 Suez canal probably saw the strongest relative defence since the IAF was unprepared for the SA-6 which saw its introduction on the battlefield and was much deadlier than the SA-2s;

-Bekaa 82 and Iraq 91 shows a swing back to the offence since the IAF/USAF developped new tactics which allowed them to effectively shut down the Syrian/Iraqi air defences;

-Kosovo 99 shows a swing back to the defence as the Serbs adopt new tactics to prevent a repeat of Iraq 91.

So you see a swing back and forth as each side adopts new technologies/tactics to give it an edge.

[John Kettler]

Lethaface,

Was referring to the last few entries, not the sweeping claims early in the thread, and I know full well about overclaiming, keeping up home front morale, etc. That thread was merely first one up, to get the ball rolling, as it were. At best for NATO, the sum total of what I dug up casts serious doubt on the official loss reporting. At worst, it reveals gross falsification of the records. This isn't that hard to do. The U.S. Air Force, for example, often reclassified crashes by secret plane or craft X as vanilla crash Y. This was done to hide things like "black" testing of Russian/WP aircraft and Stealth prototypes. Likewise, it has a thick book of plausible other explanations, with names like "training accident," "engine failure," "bird strike" and the all time favorite "pilot error" backed by classification authority under "National Security" to keep the cover story intact. "I don't care what you think you saw, lieutenant, here's what really happened. That's an order!" I can cite you examples from a bunch of services and one DOD agency you may not be familiar with, NASA. I can also show you how similar techniques have been used to gag civilians via the threat of substantial fines and jail. The last is called CIRVIS and is explained here.

http://www.cufon.org/cufon/janp146e.htm

Here's the relevant extract from JANAP 146E, taken from The Condon Report, p. 888.

http://www.ncas.org/condon/text/s5chap02.htm

Section 102a defines its scope in these words: "This publication is limited to the reporting of information of vital importance to the security of the United States of America and Canada and their forces, which in the opinion of the observer, requires very urgent defensive and/or investigative action by the U. S. and/or Canadian armed Forces."

Reports made from airborne or land-based sources are called CIRVIS reports; those from waterborne sources, MERINT reports. The relevant section on security for CIRVIS reports is as follows:

208. Military and Civilian. Transmission of CIRVIS reports are subject to the U. S. Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the Canadian Radio Act of 1938, as amended. Any person who violates the provisions of these acts may be liable to prosecution thereunder. These reports contain information affecting the national defense of the United States and Canada. Any person who makes an unauthorized transmission or disclosure of such a report may be liable to prosecution under Title 18 of the US Code, Chapter 37, or the Canadian Official Secrets Act of 1939, as amended. This should not be construed as requiring classification of CIRVIS messages. The purpose is to emphasize the necessity for the handling of such information within official channels only.

Sgt Joch,

I agree with you that the history of air operations is dynamic, as splendidly reflected on The -Ology of War piece earlier. I have been a student of the war in the ether for decades, a process facilitated by a father who was a professional in ECM/ECCM/IRCM and a bunch of other fields, not to mention a charter member of the Association of Old Crows. When I was still in high school, I had the Air Force's best F-4 pilots and WSOs in my living room conducting ECM tutorials. They were there as part of a highly classified Vietnam War program called PAVE FIRE, designed to locate, target and destroy optically directed flak sites, a program on which Dad was lead engineer.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Lethaface]

John,

To be honest I'm not all too trusty with (parts of) governments in the USA, EU and rest of the world

However the one posting about these figures made wild jumps from 120 to 30 losses. The others were just replying with more garbage.

Anyway I would directly believe there were cover ups, but not on such a gross scale (that would need evidence). Without any significant information of the contrary we can only work with what we have, speculation about nonsense will never rise up above the nonsense

Anyway, you don't have to convince me that possibly quite some more aircraft have been downed then officially reported since I think it is a real possibility. What I stated was more in light of the level of discussion in the particular link you posted.

Would be interested in others sources with more value though, think the subject is interesting.

[John Kettler]

Lethaface,

As I said, only parts of that thread seemed credible to me, which is why I specifically mentioned only the last few posts on page 10. OTOH, the info on Yugoslavian offensive air ops is most interesting, particularly in light of the discussion of same by Russia's MOD and the ISSA statements, which I consider credible, after conducting a fact-finding tour. For the record, I always thought the Apache nonuse explanation to be bizarre (too high and cold), given that the U.S. has long developed its weapons for worldwide operability and tests them under all sorts of extreme conditions. Cold air is dense air, feeds the engines efficiently with whatever oxygen is there and allows the rotors to bite. What really degrades a helicopter's performance is high and hot, as the Russians learned the hard way in Afghanistan. Hot air is thin, leaving the engine oxygen starved when it already is working hard because of the heavy heat load. The result is a helicopter really laboring and often forced to drastically reduce payload. Bottom line for me is that NATO (to include the U.S.) has understated its losses in order to not make political waves within the alliance or the individual members. It seeks to present a war on the cheap by hiding its true costs in lives, aircraft and other damages. Someone really interested in this issue might find it worthwhile to Google Earth the sites listed from Yugoslavian TV reporting and see how many smashed paths through treetops show up.

Regards,

John Kettler

[lomir]

John, it's more likely that the fear to loose the AH-64s due to the Serbs deploying the SA-18 Grouse (9K38 Igla) MANPADS is the explanation. The US doesn't want to risk his Apache pilot lives unnecessarily. The A-10 exceptional durability was a better choice to provide CAS at low speeds and altitude. On this days, a "Warthog" landed safely at an air base flying with just one engine after been fired upon with a SA-6.

Also, at many days most of all flights were cancelled because of poor weather conditions and low cloud cover. John, can I ask you: the too high and cold explanation, where did you take it from?

I'm sorry, but I have to say I disagree with you about those forum's information. Sources are Serb/Russian (propaganda) news and forums... I have to say those aren't the best places to look for anything close to real information about NATO operations on that period of time. I quote from Maskirovka in Yugoslav military thinking, by C. J. Dick. Published in 1999, Conflict Studies Research Centre (Surrey):

"Methods used in maskirovka include the following:

[...]

- disseminating false information and rumours;"

The mass media and the population/military morale, both yours and enemy's, is something you have to win in a war as well.

Allied Losses & Incidents during Operation Allied Force (1999)

Two allied planes were directly lost during combat missions due to enemy fire (2/May/99 F-16CG #88-0550/AV of the 31FW/555FS hit by SA-3 and on 27/March/99 F-117A #82-0806 of the 49FW hit by SA-3 or more likely a SA-6). Six Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were shot down.

And the next list from that first forum you give us the link to, seems to be the most accurate:

ALLIED LOSSES & INCIDENTS

Date Loss Country Circumstances

28 May 1 A-10A USA Hit by Serbian SAM.

Aircraft returned safely to its air base

14 May 2 Drones USA Shot down by Serbs

5 May 1 AH-64 USA Crashed near Tirana on a training mission

Both crew members died

2 May 1 F-16CG USA Crashed near Metic after strike mission due to engine

failure;pilot was recovered two hours later

2 May 1 OA-10A USA Emergency landing at Petrovac, near Skopje

1 May 1 AV-8B USA Crashed in Adriatic on return to carrier;

pilot ejected safely

26 Apr 1 AH-64 USA Crashed near Tirana on training mission;

both crew members survived

18 Apr 1 F-16 Denmark Emergency landing in Sarajevo due to engine problems

16 Apr 1 OA-10A USA Emergency landing in Skopje, cause never acknowledged

14 Apr 3 Drones Germany One was shot down by Serbs;

earlier, two other drones were shot down

7 Apr 1 Drone USA Shot down over Yugoslavia

27 Mar 1 F-117 USA Shot down west of Belgrade by Serbian SA-6 missile; pilot recovered hours later by combat SAR unit

26 Mar 1 F-15E USA Emergency landing at Istrana AB

John, I believe there were more incidents and planes returning safely to base with some kind of damage, but not more combat losses than those stated. I'm not an expert at all about how well US Congressional reports and committees work, but I'm sure that here in Old Europe if a government/military tries to falsificate records on the official loss reporting, very soon his balls will be served on a tray.

To end:

"The truth is that the greater the collection capability an opponent has, the greater the opportunity to feed him specifically designed false information." U.S. Army FM 90-2 (October 1988)

[Vark]

The reason I have heard, from the horses mouth so to speak, was a political and military one. Whilst attending a lecture, by the MOD, on future wars and the problems of strategic implementation I talked to a senior British Army Air Corps helicopter commander. As the conflict had shortly ended, and as I found out he had commanded Helicopters in that operation I asked him about the lack of AH-64's. His response could be broken down into four distinct parts

1. The AH-64's ECM/ECCM suite was not deemed suitable, as the peace dividend had affected upgrades. He contrasted this with the British AH-64 with far better systems. This could be the traditional 'our kit is better than yours' but he did hold a senior rank and later on Flight International reported on the delays to upgrades, mentioning the Apache fleet

2. Poor pilot training, caused by cut back in the US meant that the attrition rate, during NAP fling at night in heavily wooded high contour areas was deemed too risky. The US suffered casualties to their AH-64 fleet in night training accidents when they deployed, so their might be some truth in this. The loss of pilots allowed a delay in deployment, casued by an inter-service row. See below.

3. AH-64's SoP was to operate with both special forces units and artillery units to help prepare targets and rescue downed crew. The higher ups in the USAF wanted to put the AH-64's under Air Force control and refused to allow the support units the AH-64's were used to. They apparently feared that a rescue mission across into Serbia could escalate into a shooting war with US ground troops, in a defacto 'invasion' calling in MLRS and 155's into Serbia, to support the AH-64's. As a result the Army refused to use the AH-64's saying it would put the pilots at too great a risk.

4. Lomir, to back up your point, he said that intel said Serbs were hiding MANPADS teams in the forest edges, of likely ingress routes, to launch second generation IR missiles, like the SA-18's, in counter helicopter ambushes. The plan was to shoot the missiles as the helicopters flew over the dense woods, impossible to avoid in some areas if tank hunting, as the Serb armoured columns had by then dispersed into the thick pine forests. The AH-64's TI systems could not penetrate the heavy foliage cover and the antiquated IR warning and counter measure systems would have given only seconds to react to a rear aspect engagement. The surviving crews were then to be captured for propaganda purposes, as Saddam had done, hopefully undermining the war effort, don't forget the opposition from leftist/socialist countries to the operation in Europe was high and the Democrats were in power. Having said this, the capture of the US army soldiers only seemed to boost the US governments resolve, so perhaps the Serbs had been a victim of their own propaganda, aimed at the US.

[John Kettler]

lomir and Vark,

Good stuff! Some of it's confirmed by this 3-page article on the Apache's woes.

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-07-16/news/9907160085_1_apaches-kosovo-army

As for "high and cold" being the issue, I read that in Av Week. General Wesley Clark's Waging Modern War apparently illustrates multiple pernicious disconnects between the warfighters and the force trainers/controllers, as detailed in Robert D. Steele's review. (Fair use)

http://www.amazon.com/Waging-Modern-War-Bosnia-Kosovo/dp/1586481398

"Services versus Commanders. The military services that under Title 10 are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces--but not for fighting them, something the regional commanders-in-chief must do--have become--and I say this advisedly--the biggest impediment to the successful prosecution of operations. The detailed story of the Army staff resistance to the use of the Apache helicopters is the best case study I have ever seen of how senior staff generals with political access can prevent operational generals with field responsibilities from being fully effective. In combination with the insistence of the services that forces be held back for Korean and Persian Gulf threats that might not be realized, instead of supporting a real war that existed in Europe, simply stated, makes it clear that there is a "seam" between our force-creating generals and our force-fighting generals that has gotten *out of control.* The fog of war is thickest in Washington, and the greatest friction--the obstacles to success in war--are largely of our own making.

Lawyers, Fear, and Micro-Management. Just as we recently witnessed a lawyer overruling the general to avoid killing the commander of the Taliban, General Clark's war was dominated by lawyers, a fear of casualties, and micro-management, from Washington, of his use of every weapons system normally left to the discretion of the field commander. This has gotten completely out of hand. Within NATO it is compounded by multi-national forces whose commanders can refuse orders inconsistent with their own national view of things, but reading this book, one is left with the clear understanding that General Clark was fighting a three-front war at all times: with the real enemy, with the media, and with Washington--his NATO commanders were the least of his problems.

(Snip)

We Don't Do Mountains. No statement in the book hurt me more than one by an Army general telling General Clark that his plans for the ground campaign could not be supported by the U.S. Army because "we don't do mountains" This, in combination with the loser's attitude (no casualties) and the general reluctance of the services to put their high-tech capabilities like the Apache at risk in a real war, sum up the decrepitude of the U.S. military leadership and the Revolution in Military Affairs-Andrew Gordon in Rules of the Game has it exactly right-the post Viet-Nam and post Cold War era has left us with a bunch of high-tech chickens in control of military resources, and we need to find ourselves some rat-catchers able to redirect our military toward a lust for man to man combat in every clime and place-and the low-tech sustainable tools to do the job."

Regards,

John Kettler