WWII Speculations Thread

[SeaMonkey]

I'm with you JJ, it seems unlikely US would've come to UKs's aid, militarily, upon a German invasion. SC models Sealion pretty accurately as I have pulled the maneuver off frequently, but its not so much the seaborne invasion part as it is the airborne operation that allows the scenario to succeed.

Anyone thinking US had visions of rescuing UK needs to remember that the overwhelming sentiment in the US population and government was that Great Britain was an imperial power, same with the French to a certain extent. The New World didn't look favorably on the old European territorial viewpoint, somewhat hypocritical I must present IMO, so actually the SC mechanism is whether the UK player will allow a prepped Axis player to initiate the campaign, USA is of no consequence.

Again, IMO, this is the road that ultimately leads to the Axis victory, sans keeping the west out in an immediate invasion of the USSR.

[xwormwood]

Germany might have brought down the RAF in southern England, but it still would have had to cross the channel, for every grenade, barrel of oil etc.

And the Royal Navy was far away from beeing in danger of the Luftwaffe, as the struggle with the RAF has taken its toll on the Luftwaffe.

A german invasion would never have been a D-Day like operation, it would have been more a gesture.

The german Navy asked that before an invasion first the RAF had to be put aside, because the Admirals new that this alone would stall the whole operation so long that they never would have to do the invasion.

They knew they wouldn't be able to protect the invasion fleet.

In my opinion the Germans would have been maybe able to large a little invasion, maybe getting some coastal towns, than they would have stalled for a longer period just to stock the supplies they would have needed to go on.

This would have given the Brtions time enough to build up some kind of defence line, and i'm pretty sure that FDR would have given Churchill ALL of his tank reserves, plane and ammo, just to give him a chance to hold long enough until the USA would have been convinced to enter the war.

[SeaMonkey]

And so it is as it is in SC, you have to establish air superiority over the invasion lodgment to ensure a successful culmination of events. Once that has been done, the #1 priority, the issue still remains in doubt, but to pull this off its one step at a time.

Eventually the Luftwaffe should be able neutralize the RN, ie airpower eclipses naval power, and the captured runways would serve to bring in additional troops and supplies until a harbor is cleared for sea transport to begin.

Its like most things, simplier said than done, but I have no doubt if the Germans had pursued a well thoughtout plan from the beginning(Fall Weiss), after the Allied DoW, they could have pulled it off.

And before you say "not possible", remember everyone thought the French and BEF would put up a much greater fight than they actually did.

[Snowstorm]

XWormwood,

But then the USA would have needed time just to get those tanks, guns, etc. to England, and most likely the time would not have been enough. Look how long it took Operation Torch to get launched, Nov. of 1942, 11 months after declaring war. In the case of helping England, they probably would have had no more than 3-4 months before winter would begin to set in, so if Germany were to take England by the end of the year (of course assuming the Germans were to succeed, which is also a very big if), I would think the USA would not have been able to make that much difference in that short period of time.

[Snowstorm]

I quite agree with you, Sea Monkey.

[xwormwood]

The USA already did supply the UK with weapons, planes and ships long before her own war entry. The deliverird wouldn't have been landed as an invasion, but as mere convoys, so this wouldn't have been such an impossible problem.

France and the BEF, well, yes, of course.

On the other hand the attack through the Ardennes was a risky gamble which could easily had backfired against Germany. One or two recon planes sighting the long line of tanks and supply vehicles and all could have been over.

A quick withrawal of the forces from Belgium, and Hitler would have face a closed line full of Char Bs, Mathildas and "not shocked and retreating" allied forces.

Some well placed attack on the narrow ardennes roads and the streets would have been blocked, stopping the german advance,

[arado234]

Xwormwood even if the Amis.somehow did strt to really ramp up supplies to England,if the B.E.F.

[arado234]

Xwormwood even if the Amis. did start to really ramp up supplies to England it wouldnt do much good if the B.E.F.was captured.All the Brits could do was arm the civilan pop.Not much chance against Paras. and whatever troops the Germans brought in by air.The Royal navy wouldnt be able to do anything about it.Germany probably wouldnt need any tanks.England may verywell have surrenderd.Thank goodness we never had to find out.

[SeaMonkey]

Sorry xwood...not buying... I mean come on, with the US 1st Army sitting astride the Ardennes in 1944 and having material superiority they were barely able to stop a well worn Wehrmacht from getting to the Meuse and this was after thoroughly practicing to stop the Blitzkrieg.

You really think the BEF and French could've stop those panzers no matter what, just because they spotted the maneuver? I think not! The Allies didn't have a clue how to use combined arms at this time and the commanders in charge were very slow reacting. It happened, I have history to prove it. Sure Seelowe is just conjecture(because the Germans didn't really try it, it didn't fail), so all we have is a simulation to test it...its called SC and it can happen in SC, doesn't prove reality, but you really think the uboats would be just sitting around letting those US arms flow into an invaded UK?

[carverrt]

I think the USA would have committed “volunteers” to a fight in the British Islands. Maybe a Division or two of troops, most defiantly Air Squadrons (ala Flying Tigers), and the USN would have taken over convoy duties freeing up RN units to close down Germen occupied channel ports.

I think eventually an undersupplied and under reinforced German Army would have overextended itself trying to push north (Scotland) and west (Wales) out of England. Eventually enough well supplied Commonwealth and other land units would have recaptured England.

[JerseyJohn]

Torch didn't occur until November 42, which was still a lot earlier then a lot of the upper echelon of the Army was comfortable with. Rick Atkinson's excellent book "An Army at Dawn" paints a pretty grim picture of the readiness of the U.S. Army to tackle the Wehrmacht.

Thank you, ebitt, this just reinforces the point being made about how unprepared for war the United States was even at so late a date. Which, I believe is what you're saying as well. :cool:

So many great points being made the past page or two about Germany's chances if in Britain if they'd actually managed, presumably through paratroop drops, in seizing some of the channel ports in Autumn 1940. It's hard to cite who said what at this point but, generally, I find myself agreeing with SeaMonkey and Snowstorm in that there would have been a gradual buildup and then a fanning out; past a critical point if the UK troops hadn't succeeded in stopping the expansion they'd have lost, probably by early summer 41.

1) carverrt's point about volunteer units going to fight in Britain has substance but I believe they'd have been too little and too late. If the Germany army reached the point cited, that of pushing into Scotland and Wales, the war would already have been lost for the UK because London would have fallen and, at that point, strong Luftwaffe units would have been based in Southern England. Germany would have had full control of the English Channel and there would have been nothing to stop them from ferrying as many troops and supplies across as they wanted to bring over. End of story; look at what Germany was able to raise against Russia at this time. Britain, fighting on the German's terms in their own country would not have beaten them. Historically, in Russia that summer, Germany did the equivalent of defeating the UK six or seven times over. By July or August German troops would have taken Wales, done some sight seeing on Hadrian's Wall before moving through the rest of Scotland to take Scapa flow.

Regarding the Royal Navy interdicting German vessels darting across the channel, sorry, I don't buy it. Not with the Luftwaffe sitting on both coast lines, not to mention torpedo craft and U-boats. Look at the Royal Navy's losses off Norway 1940 against air attacks, Crete 1941, and the Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk entirely by air attacks off the Malasian coast a few months later. Operations in the English Channel under the circumstances described would have been to the British what Leyte Gulf was for the Japanese, only without any chance at all of success, only a glorious watery grave.

BrotherX, If the air battles were to be fought over the channel, with some German fighter squadrons stationed in southern England -- concrete runways and good road access! -- with the expanding German bridgehead depriving the British of their civilian air defense spotters and disrupting entire sections of Britain's radar network, then I can't help but feel the balance would have shifted in a hurry in Germany's favor. With the ME 109's not having to worry about flying time (they'd have been fighting right over their own air strips!) and the Spitfires and Hurricane's having to be the ones watching their fuel guages, it would have been the reverse of what happened over London. Further, downed British and Allied fighter pilots would have been killed or captured while surviving German pilots would have simply returned to their squadrons; again the reverse of the historical Battle of Britain situation. A very simple German arrangement: fighters mainly in Southern England, Stukas and other surface attack squadrons along the French coast, and after the first massive losses the Royal Navy would have had to forget any idea of cutting the German lifeline. Or, be sunk.

Once southern England was secure Germany could have made any build up it wanted -- 75 -100 divisions? -- an still been able to shift at least as many east to keep an eye on the USSR. I honestly don't see any of the Britain holds out scenarios being realistic. I doubt the British would have either.

Churchill out, a moderate in, and a peace treaty leaving England south of the Thames in German control and Great Britain left otherwise in tact to continue controling its empire.

As always, my hat is off to Arado for making so many good points in all of this.

-- In the above scenario, with Britain out of the war, I wonder if Germany would have chosen to send troops to gain control of the Belgian and Dutch colonies. The Belgian Congo's huge resources, including uranium. The Dutch East Indies for oil, rubber and a host of other resources. With Germany selling oil and other resources from Indonesia to Japan I have to wonder how the situation would have changed? Would Germany even have invaded Russia? The Middle Eastern governments alligned by force to the UK might well have demanded complete autonomy, and the opening to Germany, rather than Britain, of their oil. Gobally the Union Jack goes down a couple of notches while Germany's influence expands and rises. It's pretty much what Steven Ambrose described in his alternatives to Barbarossa, what he called, "The beginning of a modern Dark Age" with, as he also speculated, the USSR lined up with Germany and Japan.

Except, of course, we'd still need to factor in that clinically insane German corporal, an Austiran trying very hard to prove he was the greatest German who'd ever lived. I can't help but think he'd have turned east regardless of how successful he was anywhere else. But in this scenario there's no second front, and the United States, finally preparing for a war that might well come to it, is still neutral, and not likely to be drawn in on Russia's behalf.

[SeaMonkey]

Hard to refute your line of reasoning JJ, so I won't!

This is exactly the scenario I've been laying out for years as the best chance for an equitable situation East vs West. No doubt the Axis will have to do some extreme maneuvering, both militarily and diplomatically, but none the less a viable alternative to the historical occurrence of WW2.

I do believe that the UK would carry on from Canada with the rest of the Commonwealth falling in line and led by the economic might of the USA. The USSR is kind of a wild card, China also, and there are in roads to the East, like the MidEast and India, think about Australia, S. Africa as bases of operations.

This would make a great game set in the era of WW2 technological achievement and we include the whole globe as a potential battleground, places that were never ventured into in the reality that was WW2. Now what about those WMDs? As we play into the later years of the 40s, might the endeavors of both players at technology yield some weapons of extraordinary destructive consequence?

[AZGungHo]

If you are postulating that Hitler was alive and in power, then there's no doubt that at some point he would have gone east and attacked Russia. Even if he had been smart enough to try and roll up Africa first, or invade England, or whatever. He was obsessed with Russia and Communism and sooner or later would have taken them on, unless he was taken out of power and/or out of this life.

But if you imagine a German Africa and Turkey finally falling into line with Hitler, so that Germany could have invaded Russia from two different directions at the same time. If they could have taken the oil fields away from Russia, who knows what would have happened?

But none of this was possible with Hitler, who would have declared war on the US with Pearl Harbor. Once the US is in the war, eventually it's going to end only one way. Without Hitler declaring war on the US, things get much more dicey for FDR. He clearly, and in my opinion rightly, wanted the US in the war, and Hitler made it easy for him. Without that happening, the US is at war with Japan, but not Germany?

I suppose there's a thousand different scenarios you could draw from all this, and all of them share two things in common: They are fascinating to think about, and impossible to prove!! Which is part of fun of course!

[SeaMonkey]

Nope AZ, no Hitler, no Stalin, no FDR, no Churchill, only us, the SC clan, and a world full of nationalistic, imperialistic, communistic, etc. ideologies.:eek:

A global map to maneuver on, a diplomatic process, and a way to prosecute full scale mayhem(war) if we don't get our way..........which is to win.

So that's it....our playground......now....will the real global dictators please stand up!

[AZGungHo]

Hey SeaMonkey - I'm trying to stand up, but my knees are knocking!!!

[JerseyJohn]

And, of course, there should be some provision made for War Crimes Trials. :eek:

[jon_j_rambo]

You guys are in Bunta Dreamland in regards to the Nazis taking England.

[SeaMonkey]

Like you got room to talk Rambonehead, I beachslapped you right out of the British Isles and you ran.....tail tucked....all the way back to Canada.

Had to get the good ole USA to help you back to the continent, so don't talk to me about how tough your Limeys are!

[SeaMonkey]

Ohhhh and John, the only war criminals are the losers!

[JerseyJohn]

Ohhhh and John, the only war criminals are the losers!

Well, naturally, SeaMonkey.

[AZGungHo]

You mean we'll have to put the AI on trial for war crimes??? ;-)

[xwormwood]

I don't say that an invasion was impossible, but i doubt that a succesful invasion would have been possible in 1940.

Operation Sea Lion at wikipedia puts it well together:

"...Operation Sea Lion (German: Unternehmen Seelöwe) was Nazi Germany's plan to invade Englang during WW2, beginning in 1940. To have had any chance of success, however, the operation would have required air supremacy over the English Channel. With the German defeat in the Battle fo Britain, Sea Lion was postponed indefinitely on 17 September 1940 and never carried out.

By early November 1939, Adolf Hitler had decided on forcing a decision in the West by invading Belgium, Holland and France. With the prospect of the Channel ports falling under Kriegsmarine (German Navy) control and attempting to anticipate the obvious next step that might entail, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder (head of the Kriegsmarine) instructed his Operations officer, Kapitän Hans Jürgen Reinicke, to draw up a document examining "the possibility of troop landings in England should the future progress of the war make the problem arise." Reinicke spent five days on this study and set forth the following prerequisites for Invasion England:

• Elimination or sealing off of Royal Navy forces from the landing and approach areas.
  
• Elimination of the Royal Air Force (RAF).
  
• Destruction of all Royal Navy units in the coastal zone.
  
• Prevention of British submarin action against the landing fleet.

In December 1939, the German Army issued its own study paper (designated Nordwest) and solicited opinions and input from both the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe (German Air Force). The paper outlined an assault on England's eastern coast between the Wash and Thames rivers by troops crossing the North Sea from Low Country ports. Reichsmarschall Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, responded with a single-page letter in which he stated: "...a combined operation having the objective of landing in England must be rejected. It could only be the final act of an already victorious war against England as otherwise the preconditions for success of a combined operation would not be met." The Kriegsmarine response was rather more restrained but equally focused on pointing out the many difficulties to be surmounted if invading England was to be a viable option.

On 16 July 1940, following Germany's swift and successful occupation of France and the Low Countries and growing impatient with England's indifference towards his recent peace overtures, Hitler issued Directive No. 16, setting in motion preparations for a landing in England. He prefaced the order by stating: "As England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, still shows no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare, and if necessary to carry out, a landing operation against her. The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English Motherland as a base from which the war against Germany can be continued, and, if necessary, to occupy the country completely."

Hitler's directive set four pre-conditions for the invasion to occur:

• The RAF was to be "beaten down in its morale and in fact, that it can no longer display any appreciable aggressive force in opposition to the German crossing".
  
• The English Channel was to be swept of British mines at the crossing points, and the Straits of Dover must be blocked at both ends by German mines.
  
• The coastal zone between occupied France and England must be dominated by heavy artillery.
  
• The Royal Navy must be sufficiently engaged in the North Sea and the Mediterranean so that it could not intervene in the crossing. British home squadrons must be damaged or destroyed by air and torpedo attacks.

This ultimately placed responsibility for Sealion's success squarely on the shoulders of Raeder and Göring, neither of whom had the slightest enthusiasm for the venture and, in fact, did little to hide their opposition to it. Nor did Directive 16 provide for a combined operational headquarters under which all three service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) could work together under a single umbrella organization to plan, coordinate and execute such a complex undertaking (similar to the Allies' creation of SHAEF for the later Normandy landings).

Upon hearing of Hitler's intentions, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, through his Foreign Minister Count Ciano, quickly offered up to ten divisions and thirty squadrons of Italian aircraft for the proposed invasion.Hitler initially declined any such aid but eventually allowed a small contingent of Italian fighters and bombers, the Italian Air Corps (CAI), to assist in the Luftwaffe's aerial campaign over Britain in October/November 1940.

Beginning in August 1940, the German Luftwaffe began a series of concentrated aerial attacks (designated Unternehmen Adlerangriff or Operation Eagle Attack) on targets throughout the British Isles in an attempt to destroy the RAF (Royal Air Force) and establish air supperiority over Great Britain. The campaign later became known as the Battle of Britain. However, the change in emphasis of the bombing from RAF bases to bombing London turned Adler into a strategic bombing operation. This switch afforded the RAF, reeling from Luftwaffe attacks on its bases, time to pull back and regroup.

The most daunting problem for Germany in protecting an invasion fleet was the small size of its navy. The Kriegsmarine, already numerically far inferior to Britain's Royal Navy, had lost a sizable portion of its large modern surface units in April 1940 during the Norwegian Campaign, either as complete losses or due to battle damage. In particular, the loss of two light cruisers and ten destroyers was crippling as these were the very boats most suited to operating in the Channel Narrows where the invasion would likely take place. The U-boats, the most powerful arm of the Kriegsmarine, were simply not suitable for operations in the relatively shallow and restricted waters of the English Channel.

Although the Royal Navy could not bring to bear the whole of its naval superiority (most of the fleet was engaged in the Atlantic and Mediterranean), the British Home Fleet still had a very large advantage in numbers. British ships were still vulnerable to enemy air attack, as demonstrated during the Dunkirk evacuation and by the later Japanese sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse. However, the 22 miles (35 km) width of the English Channel and the overall disparity between the opposing naval forces made the amphibious invasion plan risky, regardless of the outcome in the air. In addition, the Kriegsmarine had allocated its few remaining larger and modern ships to diversionary operations in the North Sea.

The French fleet, one of the most powerful and modern in the world, might have tipped the balance against Britain. However, the preemptive destruction of the French fleet by the British by an attack on Mers-el-Kébirscuttling of the French fleet in Toulon two years later ensured that this could not happen.

Even if the Royal Navy had been neutralised, the chances of a successful amphibious invasion across the channel were remote. The Germans had no specialised landing craft, and had to rely primarily on river barges. This would have limited the quantity of artillery and tanks that could be transported and restricted operations to times of good weather. The barges were not designed for use in open sea and even in almost perfect conditions, they would have been slow and vulnerable to attack. There were also not enough barges to transport the first invasion wave nor the following waves with their equipment. The Germans would have needed to immediately capture a port, an unlikely circumstance considering the strength of the British coastal defences around the south-eastern harbours at that time. The British also had several contingency plans, including the use of poison gas.

One of the more glaring deficiencies in the German Navy for mounting large-scale amphibious assaults was an almost complete lack of purpose-built landing craft. The Navy had already taken some small steps in remedying this situation with construction of the and the Pionierlandungsboot 39(MFP) but these too were unavailable in time for a landing on English soil in 1940, the first of them not being commissioned until April 1941.

So how would the Navy assemble a large sea-going invasion fleet in the short time allotted? The obvious solution was to convert inland river barges to the task. Towards that end, the Kriegsmarine collected approximately 2,400 barges from throughout Europe (860 from Germany, 1,200 from the Netherlands and Belgium and 350 from France). Of these, only about 800 were powered (some insufficiently). The rest required towing by tugs.

As part of a Navy competition, prototypes for a prefabricated "heavy landing bridge" or jetty (similar in function to later Allied Mulberry Harbours) were designed and built by Krupp Stahlbau and Dortmunder Union and successfully overwintered in the North Sea in 1941/42.

Krupp's design won out as it only required one day to install as opposed to twenty-eight days for the Dortmunder Union bridge. The Krupp bridge consisted of a series of 32m-long connecting platforms, each supported on the seabed by four steel columns. The platforms could be raised or lowered by heavy-duty winches in order to accommodate the tide. The German Navy initially ordered eight complete Krupp units composed of six platforms each. This was reduced to six units by the fall of 1941 and eventually cancelled altogether when it became apparent (Engineer Landing Boat 39), a self-propelled shallow-draft vessel which could carry 45 infantrymen, two light vehicles or 20 tons of cargo and land on an open beach (unloading via a pair of clamshell doors at the bow). But by late September 1940, only two prototypes had been delivered. Recognizing the need for an even larger craft capable of landing both tanks and infantry onto a hostile shore, the Navy began development of the 220-ton Marinefährprahm Sealion would never take place.

In mid-1942, both the Krupp and Dortmunder prototypes were shipped to the Channel Islands and installed together off Alderney where they were used for unloading materials needed to fortify the island. Referred to as the "German jetty" by local inhabitants, it remained standing for the next thirty-six years until demolition crews finally removed it in 1978/79, a testament to its durability.

The German Army developed a portable landing bridge of its own nicknamed Seeschlange (Sea Snake). This "floating roadway" was formed from a series of joined modules that could be towed into place to act as a temporary jetty. Moored ships could then unload their cargo either directly onto the roadbed or lower it down onto waiting vehicles via their heavy-duty booms. The Seeschlange was successfully tested by the Army Training Unit at Le Havre in the fall of 1941 and later slated for use in Operation Herkules, the proposed Italo-German invasion of Malta. It was easily transportable by rail.

Specialized vehicles slated for Sealion included the Landwasserschlepper (LWS). Under development since 1935, this amphibious tractor was originally intended for use by Army engineers to assist with river crossings. Three of them were assigned to Tank Detachment 100 as part of the invasion and it was intended to use them for pulling ashore unpowered assault barges and towing vehicles across the beaches. They would also have been used to carry supplies directly ashore during the six hours of falling tide when the barges were grounded. This involved towing a Kässbohrer amphibious trailer (capable of transporting 10-20 tons of freight) behind the LWS.The LWS was demonstrated to General Franz Halder on 2 August 1940 by the Reinhardt Trials Staff on the island of Sylt and, though he was critical of its high silhouette on land, he recognized the overall usefulness of the design. It was proposed to build enough tractors that each invasion barge could be assigned one or two of them but the late date and difficulties in mass-producing the vehicle prevented implementation of that plan.

The German Army High Command (OKH) originally planned an invasion on a vast scale, extending from Dorset to Kent. This was far in excess of what their navy could supply, and final plans were more modest, calling for nine divisions to make an amphibious landing with around 67,000 men in the first echelon and an airborne division to support them.The chosen invasion sites ran from Rottingdean in the west to Hythe in the east.

The battle plan called for German forces to be launched from Cherbourg to Lyme Regis, Le Havre to Ventnor and Brighton, Boulogne and Eastbourne, Calais to Folkestone, and Dunkirk and Ostend to Ramsgate. German paratroopers would land near Brighton and Dover. Once the coast was secured, they would push north, taking Gloucester and encircling London. There is reason to believe that the Germans would not attempt to assault the city but besiege and bombard it.German forces would secure England up to the 52nd parallel (approximately as far north as Northampton), anticipating that the rest of the United Kingdom would then surrender.

On 17 September 1940, Hitler held a meeting with Reichsmarschall Göring and Field Marshal von Rundstedt. Hitler became convinced that the operation was not viable. Control of the skies was lacking, and coordination among three branches of the armed forces was out of the question. Later that day, Hitler ordered the postponement of the operation.

The postponement coincided with a rumour that there had been an attempt to land on British shores at Shingle Street, but it had been repulsed with large German casualties. This was reported in the American press, and in William L. Shirer's Berlin Diary but was officially denied. British papers, declassified in 1993, have suggested this was a successful example of British black propaganda to bolster morale in Britain, America and occupied Europe.

After the London Blitz, Hitler turned his attention to the Soviet Union, and Seelöwe lapsed, never to be resumed. However, not until 13 February 1942, after the invasion of Russia, were forces earmarked for the operation released to other duties.

Military historians are divided on whether Operation Sealion could have succeeded; some such as Michael Burleigh, and Andrew Mollo believe it was possible. Kenneth Macksey asserts it would have only been possible if the Royal Navy had refrained from large scale intervention and the Germans had assaulted in July 1940 (they were unprepared at that time), while others such as Peter Fleming, Derek Robinson and Stephen Bungay believe the operation would have most likely resulted in a disaster for the Germans. Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off.

During the period 19-26 September 1940, sea and wind conditions on and over the Channel where the invasion was set to take place were good overall and a crossing (even using converted river barges) was feasible provided the sea state remained at less than 4 (which, for the most part, it did). Beginning the night of 27 September, strong northerly winds prevailed, making passage more hazardous, but calm conditions returned on 11-12 October and again on 16-20 October. After 20 October, light easterly winds prevailed which would have actually assisted any invasion craft traveling from the Continent towards the invasion beaches. But by the end of October, according to British Air Ministry records, very strong SW winds (force 8) would have prohibited any seagoing craft from risking a Channel crossing.

There were a number of errors in German intelligence, and whilst some of these might not have caused problems, there were others (such as the inclusion of bridges that no longer existedor mis-understanding the usefulness of minor British roads) that would have been detrimental to German operations, and would have only added to the confusion caused by the layout of Britain's cities and the removal of road signs.

In wargames conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974, which assumed the Luftwaffe had not yet won air supremacy, the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in England by using a minefield screen in the English Channel to protect the initial assault. However, the German ground forces were delayed at the "Stop Lines" (e.g. the GHQ Line, a layered series of defensive positions that had been built, each a combination of Home Guard troops and physical barriers. At the same time, the regular troops of the British Army were forming up. After only a few days, the Royal Navy was able to reach the Channel from Scapa Flow, cutting off supplies and blocking further reinforcement. Isolated and facing regular troops with armour and artillery, the invasion force was forced to surrender. ..."

[JerseyJohn]

You mean we'll have to put the AI on trial for war crimes??? ;-)

Hmmm, It would be great if it plays well enough to warrant it.

BrotherX, Thanks for posting that excellent article.

But our discussion has a slightly different starting point. Germany acts much earlier, in July of 1940, dropping paratroops on a very small part of the English coast with the specific aim of gaining one major British port, presumably Dover. Once the bridgehead is established reinforements are flown in to a captured air field, the harbor facilities taken with supplies and further reinforcements brought in by transport, the Luftwaffe and elements of the Kreigsmarine creating a safe path in which the Royal Navy would be unable to operate. The bridgehead expands in Kent and Sussex, moving west till all of Southern England to Bristol is taken, then turning north to the Thames, and London. Our assumption is that Britain negotiates peace before losing London, the result being a Vichy type settlement with Southern England and the Channel Islands becoming a Reich territory. I think this was not only feasible, but could have been completed before the onset of winter!

[jon_j_rambo]

Question: What happenend to the French Army? Why didn't they reform to the West? Despite the Germans taking Paris, couldn't have they skirmmished to Western France, continue to fight?

[JerseyJohn]

By the time Germany took Paris I think the French Army was pretty much destroyed. German troops had actually moved all the way down the Atlantic coast; I don't think the French could have reorganized, unless it had been to the south, where the Germans hadn't sent spearheads, territory that was soon to become Vichy France.