Will Syria be able to crack SINCGARS?

[Finnius Mack]

Because Hezbollah is claiming they listened to the IDF communications. Is it propaganda, or is the technology gap closing?

Newsday article here.

[Schrullenhaft]

I saw that article in my local paper. Interestingly the Hezbollah source admitted that they weren't able to listen in "around the clock". There's a suggestion that several units didn't enable their encryption. I'm guessing that the Iranians (or potentially the Syrians, but I'd guess Iranians) have got comm intercept gear that can match/guess the frequency hopping of SINCGARS, but if it is encrypted, they won't be getting real-time info from those intercepts.

The other half of it was Israeli troops using cell phones. Despite orders not to communicate important info over the phones its possible that certain bits of information did go out over the cell traffic and some Hezbollah intelligence units were able to piece together the info they needed to react accordingly (i.e. - potential unit location, unit type such as armor, etc.).

[Battlefront.com]

I am going to guess it has more to do with lapses in IDF communications protocol rather than some sort of encryption decoder.

Steve

[Bil Hardenberger]

I agree Steve, without the encryption key there is no way they could match the freq changing order being used by a SINCGARS radio.

Even if they were recording individually every potential frequency and then combining the intercept into coherent conversations via some advanced computer programming (troublesome that as there would be very many micro pieces of audio, not all of which would be from the same source), then as Schrullenhaft says, the intelligence being tactical, is very perishable and would not be able to be analyzed in real time... as perishable intelligence it would be worthless (tactically) unless the enemy force was very static.

Even when I was in Intelligence we could intercept SINCGARS traffic, but only if the target unit was not using encrytion but was broadcasting in the clear.. which back then was not unusual for tactical units.

Bil

[Finnius Mack]

Originally posted by Bil Hardenberger:

target unit was not using encrytion but was broadcasting in the clear.. which back then was not unusual for tactical units.

I think that is the catch. I'd be shocked if they managed to intercept SINCGARS when used properly. But, it's certainly possible, even probable, that it wasn't used correctly.

The article specifically mentions cell phone traffic being intercepted, I wonder if the IDF uses the "talkabout" style radios as well?

[Battlefront.com]

Finnius Mack,

The article specifically mentions cell phone traffic being intercepted, I wonder if the IDF uses the "talkabout" style radios as well?

Well, the US has been using them in large numbers ever since the war began. There are many reasons for this. The assumption was that the enemy likely wouldn't be listening or able to understand what they heard. The latter is pretty interesting. How many of us native English speakers have problems understanding people within our own countries? Trying to understand a Scottsman or a Cajun gives most fellow countrymen a headache, so I can only imagine what this would do to a half assed English as a third language guy listening in on radio traffic.

Steve

[Bertram]

The Dutch (in Afghanistan) are forbidden to use cell phones. The tell-com used can tell where the cell phones are used (by triangulating from the send-towers used, the police uses this often enough). There is some fear those tell-coms are infiltrated.

It is pretty probable that any cell-phone use in Libanon would be handled by the Libanese tell-com covering the area...