DPICM?

[Treadhead Martin]

Back in the early 90's I was an Artillery officer, and even then DPICM was the round of choice. The vast majority of what we fired in Desert Storm were this type of round. Will DPICM show up in the game? Currently, when I do a call for fire, I always feel like I'm using a Viet Nam era asset on a 21st Century battlefield. While these will be of limited use with heavy armor (probably delivering damage optics and the occasional mobility kill), they should be great a chewing up APCs and dismounted infantry.

[YankeeDog]

I'm not at all an expert, but from what I've read, DPICM has somewhat fallen out of favor due to the dud problem. This is particuarly true for fires in close proximity to friendly troops, or onto ground that friendly troops might need to use for maneuver -- DPICM rounds basically create a low-density minefield wherever they are targeted.

So I don't know for sure, but I suspect it's use at the CM scale would be pretty limited. This doesn't necessarily contradict your recollection of firing a high proportion of DPICM rounds in Desert Storm; the kind of close support fire that is represented in CM is actually a relatively small proportion of Artillery missions, and for deeper fires, DPICM it might still be heavily used.

Cheers,

YD

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[Dragon67]

We need DPICM'S mounted on M113s.

[YankeeDog]

Originally posted by Adam1:

DPICM may be out of favour with the political figures but it is not out of favour with the military and is an extremely important part of modern warfare. It's exclusion in CMSF marks a major omission, and has nothing to do with politics and everything to do with coding. American military doctrine is tactical defense relying on indirect fires, particularly ICM, to kill the enemy.

While there are certainly political groups that would like to see DPICM banned, my post was about military/tactical drawbacks to DPICM, not the political issues.

If BFC is going to model DPICM use in a realistic manner, then it need to model the fact that DPICM has a 2-4% dud rate, meaning any movement over which DPICM rounds have been recently detonated carries some risk.

Like I said, my understanding is that, for this reasons, it tends to be used more for deeper fires away from friendlies or terrain friendlies might need use for maneuver, and not so much for the close support stuff you see in CMSF.

Personally, I think MRSI and Arty-delivered smoke higher priority additions to CM:SF than DPICM.

Cheers,

YD

[Clavicula_Nox]

Originally posted by Dragon67:

We need DPICM'S mounted on M113s.

Crewed by troopers armed with Bren LMGs with tripods, and driving funnies by remote.

[Dragon67]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Adam1:

DPICM may be out of favour with the political figures but it is not out of favour with the military and is an extremely important part of modern warfare. It's exclusion in CMSF marks a major omission, and has nothing to do with politics and everything to do with coding. American military doctrine is tactical defense relying on indirect fires, particularly ICM, to kill the enemy.

While there are certainly political groups that would like to see DPICM banned, my post was about military/tactical drawbacks to DPICM, not the political issues.

If BFC is going to model DPICM use in a realistic manner, then it need to model the fact that DPICM has a 2-4% dud rate, meaning any movement over which DPICM rounds have been recently detonated carries some risk.

Like I said, my understanding is that, for this reasons, it tends to be used more for deeper fires away from friendlies or terrain friendlies might need use for maneuver, and not so much for the close support stuff you see in CMSF.

Personally, I think MRSI and Arty-delivered smoke higher priority additions to CM:SF than DPICM.

Cheers,

YD </font>

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[YankeeDog]

@ Dragon

DPICM duds would be more important to model because (a) they're relatively common, and ( they create a significant battlefield effect. We're basically talking about 2-5 landmines laid per 155mm shell detonation.

@ Adam1

As for DPICM use in 2003: Once again, I agree that DPICM currently an important part of US doctrine. I'm less convinced that DPICM is doctrinal within 1-2km of friendly forces. All of the uses I have read of in GWII were relatively deep interdiction or destructive fires against large formations of enemy, not close support fires.

In fact, IIRC there was one significant incident in 2003 were a US unit had to deviate from its planned route of advance, because DPICM had been fired over it recently and the commander was concerned about the time it would take to render the route safe (or the potential damage of just charging ahead, I guess). I'll try to find a reference.

But like I said, I certainly don't have any real world experience or training on the matter. Anyone who does, and can point to doctrine or verified use of DPICM in close proximity to friendlies, I'd love to be proven wrong.

"Steel Beasts had it" doesn't mean jack to me, though. There's lots of stuff in other wargames that I'd really rather CMSF steer well clear of.

Regards,

YD

[ May 15, 2008, 02:03 PM: Message edited by: YankeeDog ]

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[YankeeDog]

Looking for stuff. . .

Globalsecurity.org does have mention that the U.S. Marines had some significant problems with DPICM restricting their own maneuver and causing friendly casualties here:

GS DPICM page

The use of dud-producing munitions such as DPICM during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 incurred a penalty, restricting Marine's maneuver and follow-on operations in areas after their use. Marines were killed or seriously injured after encounters with dud munitions. . .

But I'd like a better source than that. . . I'm trying to find whereever GS got this info. Problem is, searches are pulling up all the Human Rights anti-cluster bomb sites, so I'm having to slog through that to find more reliable info.

No offense, but I like sources as close to primary as possible, not just what some other tactical wargame did.

Gotta go hit happy hour now, though -- far be it for me to miss an opportunity to imbibe frosty beverages! So this is probably all for me for today. I'll try to do some more searching tommorrow.

Cheers,

YD

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[Battlefront.com]

We've had this discussion a couple dozen times before... always the same answer from us... it's not relevant.

The primary purpose is to denny the enemy room to maneuver or to hit their assembly areas. This is akin to massed artillery or air strikes, which have always been considered out of CM's scope.

The other things is that DPICM has fallen out of favor within the military itself, contrary to Adam1's belief. I've talked to guys in Iraq, I've read reports of the couple of times it was used in OIF. The things cause more problems than they solve. The primary problem is two fold:

1. If you are on the attack, the chances are that wherever the enemy is now is where you eventually want to be yourself. Mining your own advance path is not a good idea.

2. If you intend on holding the ground after, then you also have to deal with the aftereffects.

There were only a few uses of DPICM in Iraq, despite the target rich environment. One of the few instances where I saw it mentioned actually demonstrated the two problems I just mentioned. An Iraqi mech unit was headed towards a natural path towards American positions, so they DPICM'd the area (no American forces were anywhere near it). The Iraqi move never got that far, but hours later the Americans did. They were then denied access to the very spot they could have used to exploit the enemy's flank. Not smart. But on top of that this was farm land and the local Iraqis were none too pleased about their fields suddenly being off limits. After the shooting stopped the US had to deal with that. It was a complete waste and the lesson was not lost.

So again, DPICM is not a close support weapon. It is not intended to be that and it isn't used as such. It is also a weapon that has fallen out of favor within the military because of its questionable military value as well as the reality of the problems it causes after the shooting stops. It is not favorable to political elements for the latter reason and the international pressure against mines of all sorts.

What another game does or doesn't do has never influenced what we do or don't do. DPICM doesn't belong in CM:SF, that's all that matters.

Steve

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[Dragon67]

//@ Dragon

DPICM duds would be more important to model because (a) they're relatively common, and ( they create a significant battlefield effect. We're basically talking about 2-5 landmines laid per 155mm shell detonation.//

It is not as relatively common as a rifle jam turning yer shorts into a mobile latrine. To say 5 out of 100 is significant in a real war is one thing, to state it is significant in a two hour or less simulator is not.

[JonS]

A fire-mission in which 50 rounds of DPICM are fired would predictably result in 132 UXBs in an area roughlyy 100mx100m, and those UXBs are going to be equal opportunity employers. On average, you'd have one UX bomblet every 75m^2, or every 8mx8m block of land (heh - 8x8 ... coincidence?). If you don't think a minefield of that density is significant, well ... there are some maneauvre commanders who'd like to have a word with you.

It may not be the purpose of DPICM to restrict maneauvre, but that is the effect. When the scenario is the 3rd Shock Army surging out of the Fulda Gap or the North Koreans surging across the DMZ then duds aren't too much of an issue - and could even be seen as desirable. But the US isn't generally on the strategic or even operational defensive anymore.

[Battlefront.com]

Adam1,

I have no idea what crop damage or politics has to do with CMSF.

Because we focus, and have always focused, on things which are most relevant to the scale of operations CM simulates. Not everything in the entire possible arsenal that could possibly be used. I mean, why not tactical nukes, cruise missiles, B-52 bombing runs, several battalions of 155s blasting away, etc. It's never been our thing, never will be because it's not relevant to tactical combat. We have to draw the line somewhere, and simulating exotic battlefield experiences, if even that, is over the line. So, yes... it does matter that the real chance of this weapon being used in the Syrian in a way that is relevant to CM is slim.

If you are trying to say that units are unable to call ICM beyond 2km from their positions if targets are available you're just wrong, factually.

Er... no, I'm saying it's not like they call down DPICM within 2k of their current positions that they are currently occupying and engaging in active combat. If you wish to argue against my position, I welcome you to do so. Start by citing a couple dozen examples of this in OIF.

Iraq was not a "target rich environment" at all, targeting information was scarce.

When the bulk of the Republican Guards and mech units were moving from around the north of Baghdad to south... yeah, I'd call that target rich. And when they did...

When they did see heavy mech guess what they did? ICM and air, while Heavies provided overwatch and spotting.

And how close were these strikes to a small tactical combat unit engaged in close combat with the enemy? Massed artillery, B-52 bombing runs, etc. are all outside of CM's scope. Always have been, always will be.

You can argue that CMSF has some special story that makes all this impossible, but the idea that ICM has questionable military value is really far out and just wrong. HE would not have worked, and you can bet they didn't close with enemy heavy mech with tanks or brads.

Right... so you just made my point for me, didn't you?

Also the claim that the primary purpose of ICM is to deny the enemy room to maneuver is wrong.

See JonS's comments. But he's just a former cannon cocker, so what does he know

This is from Global Security:

The use of dud-producing munitions such as DPICM during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 incurred a penalty, restricting Marine'sr maneuver and follow-on operations in areas after their use. Marines were killed or seriously injured after encounters with dud munitions. After combat operations ceased, the duds continued to be a danger during civil-military operations, both to Marines and civilians. The use of dud producing munitions must be carefully considered in light of the penalty that will have to be paid later. The use of DPICM needs to be carefully considered in its employment. A better round needs to be developed that does not have a 2-4% dud rate.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/dpicm.htm

Hey, I could be wrong. But it's not up to me to prove our case any more than I already have. I've said it's not relevant and so far I've yet to see a convincing counter argument. Well, besides the JasonC style "I want it so I'm going to be rude about it until I get my way". Not impressive

Steve

[JasonC]

From the after action reports of 3rd Infantry division artillery on the early, high intensity phase of the current Iraq war -

The artillery missions fired by 3ID Div Arty were impressive: 610 DS missions fired for a total of 13,923 155-mm rounds expended, and 90 counterfire plus 26 reinforcing missions for a total of 794 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets.

Those figures are for a 21 day period at the start of the war, by just the div arty of 3rd ID. Which had 54 SP 155mm howitzer and 9 MLRS. Fighting strength of the SP 155s never dropped below 51 howitzers operational.

They fired a total of 108 "smart" 155 rounds, claiming 48 vehicle kills. (Probably high as claims, incidentally). These were fired 2 to 4 rounds against each target and preferred against stationary vehicles.

Dual-purpose, improved conventional munitions were the munition of choice for killing tanks and personnel in the open.

They destroyed numerous enemy artillery batteries with only six M26 MLRS rockets (all ICM). (That was a standard counterfire mission - 2 rounds per launcher from a single 3-vehicle MLRS battery).

When the division entered the Baghdad area, HE consumption doubled because of the concern over dud-producing munitions.

The danger-close line used for ICM by 155mm during this period was 600 meters. It was farther for MLRS, 1200 meters was the closest it was fired. MLRS was mostly used for counterbattery, some for planned map "prep fires", and fired ICM exclusively.

Col. Dan Allyn, the commander of the 3rd BCT, was fond of saying, "Prep with steel, lead with lead, count the dead." He began every 3rd BCT engagement with cannon artillery preparatory fires and repeatedly used his direct support artillery battalion to shape the battlefield before entering the enemy's direct fire range.

Col. David Perkins, commander of the 2nd BCT, requested an artillery preparation of enemy positions just 15 minutes before his brigade's famed "heavy metal" run into the heart of the Baghdad palace district on April 7. The 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery fired a four-target MLRS prep of 24 rockets, obliterating enemy defensive positions around a key intersection.

(So they were certainly willing to use ICM in the city, and near terrain they intended to seize and cross).

Lt. Col. Terry Ferrell, commander of the division's cavalry squadron, would not move his squadron unless they were under Q-37 firefinder radar and MLRS coverage. According to him, "Indirect fire was the killing system of choice within the squadron. Fires allowed the troops to destroy the enemy without actually getting into a knife fight." Lt. Col. Ferrell further states, "MLRS in the close fight works. On several occasions, the only system capable of assisting the squadron with the destruction of attacking forces in adverse weather conditions was the rockets. They saved many a trooper's life..."

MLRS is potentially the maneuver commander's silver bullet. In at least one case, one troop of the division cavalry squadron was decisively engaged and in danger of being overrun. Although the range-to-target was 25 kilometers, the risks were calculated and deemed acceptable, and the squadron commander called the MLRS mission within 1,200 meters of the troop's location. The effects on the enemy were devastating and the cavalry troop broke contact and repositioned in good order.

My own assessment - yes there was a preference for straight HE once inside Baghdad, largely for reasons of collateral damage humanity rather than worries that ICM would make areas impassable. Yes there were some concerns over ICM making follow up dangerous. But no, these did not preclude large scale use of ICM in the active phase of the combat.

ICM was used for deep fires, notably counterbattery by MLRS, and for prep fires before engaging at all within direct fire range. But it was also used to distances of 600 meters from friendlies when tube fired, and 1200 meters from friendlies by rocket, when threatened by overrun. Understand that an MLRS strike is going to annihilate a full grid square, so the covered zone stretched to 700 meters away from the friendlies, not counting shorts, and potentially 400 meters from them for the tube shoots.

The higher level maneuver force commanders relied extensively on artillery fires, along with air and attack helos, to destroy enemy heavy elements before maneuver forces engaged, and also to engage on favorable terms while the enemy was recovering from significant artillery fires. In addition, surgical use was made of smart rounds, though in limited numbers, and of direct HE missions. And massive area fires were used to defend units in heavy contact with numerically superior enemies, which did happen on occasion.

The total number of tube missions fired comes to 30 a day for one division, average, with peaks easily several times that and other days lower. The average shoot was fairly small - 18 to 24 rounds - which means they avoided long, sustained fires in favor of many rapid little ones, when targets warranted. MLRS was mostly taking out Iraqi artillery batteries, 1-2 daily for each battery, and firing major support shoots by the whole battalion more like once a day.

[ May 15, 2008, 07:11 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JonS]

Jason, could you overlay that with your interpretation of what it means for CMSF please?

For instance; CB is OoS, so those missions are irrelevant (except in terms of background to scen design). Similarly, reference to 'prep fires before engaging at all within direct fire range' would seem to imply significance for scenario design, rather than in-game use.

Also, for my personal benefit ...

Understand that an MLRS strike is going to annihilate a full grid square

IIMU that the 'annihalate a full gridsquare' chestnut refers to a full 12-rocket strike by a single launcher. Is that what you meant?

Regards

Jon

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[Battlefront.com]

Holy crap! I can't believe I forgot to bring MRLS into this as well! A weapon with a 1200m danger close range is ridiculous to add to a game where that covers more than half the map, if not the entire map. Which is why we didn't include it

JonS,

For instance; CB is OoS, so those missions are irrelevant (except in terms of background to scen design). Similarly, reference to 'prep fires before engaging at all within direct fire range' would seem to imply significance for scenario design, rather than in-game use.

Based on what JasonC wrote himself, I think that's what he's saying too.

Adam1

Bah, you got me on a typo on the 2k figure. I meant within. Like I said though, you can make some excuse in the story line for not having it in the game, but not doctrinal. That was my beef. That, and the idea that unless duds can be modeled there is no use putting ICM in the game.

When I discuss things by default it pertains to CM's scope. So when I say there is a marginal argument, at best, for including them in CM:SF... I'm talking about the CM:SF paradigm. I don't care what happens outside of it. B-52 strikes, psychological warfare, counter intelligence, Special Ops lazing targets, MRLS strikes, etc. are interesting to me as a military historian, but that's not what I'm here to discuss.

So, as I've said, I don't need to "make some excuse"... the use of DPICM within the scope of a CM battle is an outlier event at best. We never have spent time and resources to simulate outlier systems. The one exception to this are weapon systems which may be extremely rare, but their purpose on the battlefield that CM simulates is indeed relevant. For example, the Jagdtiger in CMBO and CMBB. Outlier? You bet. But relevant to tactical warfare at CM's scale? Absolutely. The same case can not be made for DPICM.

Oh, and yes... if we did happen to simulate DPICM we would have to include duds. Just check the quotes above. They were an issue for the troops on the ground and, in at least in the Marines' experience, did cause friendly casualties. We are generally against simulating things in a lopsided way. Not simulating the downside of a weapon (and the dud rate is a very widely known problem) is akin to biasing the game in favor of the side that benefits form it. In this case Blue. Gotta take the good with the bad or the value of putting it in at all diminishes proportional to impact it has on gameplay.

Steve

[ May 15, 2008, 08:53 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Clavicula_Nox:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Dragon67:

We need DPICM'S mounted on M113s.

Crewed by troopers armed with Bren LMGs with tripods, and driving funnies by remote. </font>

[Treadhead Martin]

Can I change my request from DPICM to smoke? It would seem less controversial and quite useful. OpFor seems to use it quite regularly.

[JasonC]

JonS - the blast area of a single MLRS DPICM rocket is a radius of about 100 meters (oval in the direction of flight actually, that is the circle size of similar area). A full battery shoot, which happened in the first gulf war with some regularity, would have 3 launchers all unload completely, on the same square kilometer, which saturates it. That is a full grid square annihilation. Real saturation like that is wanted for armor targets.

But in the present war early phase, the shoots were typically smaller than that. 6 rounds for a counterbattery fire mission, up to 2-4 times that. Those typically would not mean a single launcher unloading half or all, but instead a few rounds per vehicle from a battery or more. The idea being to approximate a "time on target" for maximum target exposure, minimum time to take cover.

More recently, the round of choice for MLRS in Iraq has been the new GPS guided one, plain HE. It is as accurate as other GPS weapons and can usually hit within 10 feet of the aim point. The warhead is 200 lbs, making is smaller than aircraft bombs, and it is actually treated as a finer scalpel than calling the air force. These have been used on individual snipers. The rate used isn't all that high, though, theater-wide. A dozen a month. But that is a low intensity war adaptation.

As for the question what the active war phase says about ICM in CMSF, normally intervention of anything as big as a full battery sized, all unload, gulf war I style MLRS strike would mean the end of the scenario from a maneuver unit perspective.

Small units rely on having such firepower in their hip pocket, to do things that might otherwise seem incredibly reckless, and that might be relevant at the CMSF scale. But it is marginal. Accurate use of single shots of GPS guided MLRS, in the modern style, seems to me to be squarely within the CMSF scope.

DP ICM fired from straight 155s also seems within it. Whenever the enemy has vehicles rather than pure dismounts, and the US has artillery support, it is what they'd reach for. Current low intensity fighting against pure infantry in small groups doesn't show that, but in CMSF, the Red forces typically do have vehicles.

And against vehicles, 155s will use DP ICM. Which is deadly against all the thinner stuff, but marginal vs. full MBTs. MLRS ICM is much more powerful, in an armor penetration sense. MBTs won't like even the 155 stuff, though - some losses and many significantly damaged.

Will they aim it 150 meters beyond friendlies? Certainly not. Depending on the range the scatter of a single round about the aim point can be 100-150 meters. Bombets can be dangerous 100 meters away from the impact point - though the saturated area is much smaller (one 155 shell carries only 72 bomblets, vs. 644 in a single MLRS rocket). In practice, they would use it on targets on the other side of a CMSF map, but they would use it. If CMSF can include Saggers with long minimum ranges, it could include 155mm ICM.

If instead the target is infantry, these days they'd use VT HE, not ICM. If it is buildings or field fortifications, delay fuze plain HE. Or GPS guided MLRS rockets, with a rounds fired number you can count on one hand.

The full throated use of ICM and or MLRS is still there, and would be happening above the CM scale. But those "scalpel" uses of either (but not the "cross", MLRS ICM) you'd see within that scale.

FWIW...