Will Allied Strategic Bombing Have Any Effect On The Game?

[Retributar]

Preface:

--This topic may end up having no actual effect on the game itself...never-the-less...this area of operations did have a marked impact on the German War-Machine...and if for no other reason, i posted this to show what 'Strategic Bombing' accomplished and, as well, to show that if it had been better managed...that it could have accomplished much more...by bringing the war to a speedier conclusion!.

Possible German Fix To Allied Bombing Campaign:

After September, German aircraft production declined gradually until December, when 3,155 planes were accepted, and in January 1945, because of the shortage of gasoline, production of all except jet types was virtually discontinued. The jet planes, especially the ME-262, were the most modern planes which any belligerent had in general operation at the end of the war. According to manufacturers and other competent observers, their production was delayed because of the failure of the Luftwaffe to recognize in time the advantages of the type. It was also delayed because Hitler intervened in 1944 with an ill-timed order to convert the ME-262 to a fighter-bomber. Virtually every manufacturer, production official, and air force general interrogated by the Survey, including Goering himself, claimed to have been appalled by this order. By May 1945, 1,400 jets had been produced. Had these planes been available six months earlier with good quality pilots, though they might not have altered the course of the war, they would have sharply increased the losses of the attacking forces... ...This would have prevented the collapse of the German war-industry and would allowed the war to continue on into 1945.

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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Summary Report

(European War)

September 30, 1945

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#tgsp

Air power in the European phase of this war reached a stage marked by rapid development in planes, armament, equipment, tactics and concepts of strategic employment, and by an extraordinary increase in the effort allocated to it by all the major contestants. England devoted 40 to 50 percent of her war production to her air forces, Germany 40 percent, and the United States 35 percent.

By September 1941 Hitler was so confident that he had succeeded in Russia that he ordered large scale cut-backs in war production.

Because the German economy through most of the war was substantially undermobilized, it was resilient under air attack. Civilian consumption was high during the early years of the war and inventories both in trade channels and consumers' possession were also high. These helped cushion the people of the German cities from the effects of bombing. Plant and machinery were plentiful and incompletely used. Thus it was comparatively easy to substitute unused or partly used machinery for that which was destroyed. While there was constant pressure throughout for German manpower for the Wehrmacht, the industrial labor supply, as augmented by foreign labor, was sufficient to permit the diversion of large numbers to the repair of bomb damage or the clearance of debris with relatively small sacrifice of essential production.

Early Air Operations -- City Area Raids :

On three nights in late July and early August 1943 it struck Hamburg in perhaps the most devastating single city attack of the war -- about one third of the houses of the city were destroyed and German estimates show 60,000 to 100,000 people killed. No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from interrogation of high officials that Hitler himself thought that further attacks of similar weight might force Germany out of the war.

The Attack on Oil :

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun.

Further Dividends From the Oil Attack :

The attack on the synthetic oil plants was also found to have cost Germany its synthetic nitrogen and methanol supply and a considerable part of its rubber supply.

Nitrogen for munitions was maintained by reducing the allocation to agriculture, but by the end of 1944 this cushion had been substantially exhausted. The supply of explosives then declined with the reduction in supply of nitrogen. It became necessary to fill shells with a mixture of explosives and non-explosive rock salt extender. There was a general shortage of ammunition on all fronts at the end of the war. There was an equally serious shortage of flak ammunition; units manning flak guns were instructed not to fire on planes unless they were attacking the installations which the guns were specifically designated to protect and unless "they were sure of hitting the planes!"

Steel :

Germany began the war with approximately 23,000,000 metric tons per year of steel capacity, about 69 percent of which was in the Ruhr. The 1940 victories added another 17,000,000 tons principally in Lorraine, Belgium and Luxembourg. However, official records and those of the industry for the war years, supplemented by interrogation, show that the 40,000,000 tons theoretical capacity was never reached. Production in the occupied countries was always troublesome and deficient. In spite of the considerable efforts to develop low-grade ores in Germany proper and medium grade ores in Austria, Germany throughout the war continued to be. primarily dependent on Swedish, Norwegian and French ores.

During the last half of 1944 both the cities and the transportation system of the Ruhr were the targets of extremely heavy attack, primarily by the RAF. Production of steel in the Ruhr was reduced by 80 percent between June and the end of the year. Loss of production of high-grade steel in the Ruhr was greater than the loss of Bessemer steel and high-grade steel became a bottleneck by the middle of 1944. German steel production for all the Reich and occupied countries declined from 2,570,000 metric tons in July to 1,000,000 metric tons in December. Of this loss about 490,000 tons was the result of loss of territory.

The Secondary Campaigns :

In November of 1944, the Allied air forces returned to an attack on the submarine building yards. In the months that had elapsed since the spring of 1943, the Germans had put into production the new Types 21 and 23 designed to operate for long periods without surfacing and so escape radar equipped aircraft patrols as well as surface attack. And an ambitious effort had been made to prefabricate submarine hulls and turn the slipways into mere points of final assembly. The program was not working smoothly. Though nearly two hundred had been produced, difficulties with the new type, together with the time required for training crews, had prevented all but eight from becoming operational. These delays cannot be attributed to the air attack.

The attacks during the late winter and early spring of 1945 did close, or all but close, five of the major yards, including the great Blohm and Voss plant at Hamburg. Had the war continued, these attacks, coupled with the attack on transportation, would have removed the threat of further production of the new submarine.

The Attack on the Railways and Waterways :

The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of the German army.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production.

CONCLUSION :

Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea, its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy's greatest naval threat -- the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority made possible the success of the invasion. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces.

Some Signposts:

1. The German experience suggests that even a first class military power -- rugged and resilient as Germany was -- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting -- any effective fighting -- within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.

2. The significance of full domination of the air over the enemy -- both over its armed forces and over its sustaining economy -- must be emphasized. That domination of the air was essential. Without it, attacks on the basic economy of the enemy could not have been delivered in sufficient force and with sufficient freedom to bring effective and lasting results.

3. As the air offensive gained in tempo, the Germans were unable to prevent the decline and eventual collapse of their economy. Nevertheless, the recuperative and defensive powers of Germany were immense; the speed and ingenuity with which they rebuilt and maintained essential war industries in operation clearly surpassed Allied expectations. Germany resorted to almost every means an ingenious people could devise to avoid the attacks upon her economy and to minimize their effects. Camouflage, smoke screens, shadow plants, dispersal, underground factories, were all employed. In some measure all were helpful, but without control of the air, none was really effective. Dispersal brought a measure of immediate relief, but eventually served only to add to the many problems caused by the attacks on the transportation system. Underground installations prevented direct damage, but they, too, were often victims of disrupted transportation and other services. In any case, Germany never succeeded in placing any substantial portion of her war production underground--the effort was largely limited to certain types of aircraft, their components, and the V weapons. The practicability of going underground as the escape from full and free exploitation of the air is highly questionable; it was so considered by the Germans themselves. Such passive defenses may be worth while and important, but it may be doubted if there is any escape from air domination by an enemy.

6. The German experience showed that, whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack Persistent re-attack was necessary.

8. Among the most significant of the other factors which contributed to the success of the air effort was the extraordinary progress during the war of Allied research, development, and production. As a result of this progress, the air forces eventually brought to the attack superiority in both numbers and quality of crews, aircraft, and equipment. Constant and unending effort was required, however, to overcome the initial advantages of the enemy and later to keep pace with his research and technology. It was fortunate that the leaders of the German Air Force relied too heavily on their initial advantage. For this reason they failed to develop, in time, weapons, such as their jet-propelled planes, that might have substantially improved their position. There was hazard, on the other hand, in the fact that the Allies were behind the Germans in the development of jet propelled aircraft. The German development of the V weapons, especially the V-2, is also noteworthy.

[ July 07, 2004, 11:47 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Liam]

Retributar, all this is very valid. UK/USA/USSR Production was massive, the Germans needed to meet the Allies Numbers to win. The Strategic bombing did effect them, but I have to argue, what would these percentages converted into Amphibious Landing Craft/Troops/Tanks/trucks/Artillery/etc... for a 2nd front of been like? The Brits attempted an early landing but got cold feet so it seems to me that the Air War in Europe as far as strategic terms was still somewhat experimental and the land war was what finally won. It was Stalin who took Berlin and combined might of the Western Allies who liberated Western Europe.

Despite losses, how early would a real D-Day have been possible? If you play SC you notice that any decent player usually doesn't delay beyond '42 or '43 and spends most of his resources on that area because in a real competitive game Russia needs relief. In Real Life Russia was winning by '43 and that was obvious to the West and Stalin believed he didn't need them really. I definitely believe Churchill and FDR feared the losses and didn't really care if Russia took the brunt of them. So D-Day 44 was definitely going to do what the AHC intended, Free what territories they felt were of high 'value'... It was a Race so to speak...

However I honestly feel that France could've been liberated by '43 and German down by '44 if Allies had spent a few million lives..and I think most Historians and fellow History Lovers agree

The Figures you spoke of are still interesting but Air will be still be used as a ground killer in SC2 more than a strategic Weapon... I assure you that

[ev]

Thanks for all the good info, Retributar.

In support of your post, oil production in Germany dropped from 8.9 million tons in 1943 to 6.4 million tons in 1944. The figure is most impressive when you realize that most of the drop probably took place in the later months of 1944.

I do not have data for 1945.

[Shaka of Carthage]

As Liam pointed out, you are basically repeating what the future US Air Force wanted the politicians to believe. Realize that the people responsible for having the survey written were also trying to establish the US Air Force as a seperate service. The basic belief was that with Strategic Airpower and nuclear weapons, you didn't need a massive Army or Navy. The politicians of the time, ate it up, since no one wanted to think in terms of fighting the Russians man against man.

I'm not saying that the strategic bombing didn't have an effect against Germany. But it wasn't decisive.

Notice that I have very carefully tried to say "strategic" air above. Tactical air superioriy did give the Western Allies a decisive advantage in combat. But it didn't win the battles.

Which gets back to the basic points that have been talked about for over a year here...

Strategic Bombers need to have the ability to reduce the enemies production points. The problem in SC is that as soon as they do, all the enemy has to do is put a ground unit on that production target, and the Bombers can't get to it. The other problem, is no Allied player in SC will put the resources into Strategic Bombers, like the Western Allies did in real life. Its the same reason the Western Allies can invade Europe prior to '44.

Tactical Aircraft provide armed reconnaissance once they have established air superiorty. Operational interdiction is not modelled in SC. Instead, SC has Tactical Aircraft acting as flying Artillery. It wasn't like that.

[Retributar]

Yes Shaka the Strategic Bombing Effort was NOT-DECISIVE...but it could have been if the Oil and Electric/Power Industry had been concentrated on. In any case...it did have a real impact... as stated in my article...i provided a few example's of such.....

-No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from interrogation of high officials that Hitler himself thought that further attacks of similar weight might force Germany out of the war.

- by July 1944 every major plant had been hit.-Oil Production fell drastically-The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic.-

- On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

- Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces.

- By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation.

- In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun. Note: More Bodies against the Russians would have made no-difference here!...Fuel was needed more than bodies!.

-Due to a critical shortage of Oil- There was a general shortage of ammunition on all fronts at the end of the war. There was an equally serious shortage of flak ammunition; units manning flak guns were instructed not to fire on planes unless they were attacking the installations which the guns were specifically designated to protect and unless "they were sure of hitting the planes!"

- Production of steel in the Ruhr was reduced by 80 percent between June and the end of the year.

- The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a-considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

- Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production.

- The German experience suggests that even a first class military power -- rugged and resilient as Germany was -- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting -- any effective fighting -- within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.

Strategic Bombing was a near fatal kick in the Nut's to the Germans but it was not just quite enough to put them completely out of business!. Many German units were on their own...foraging for what fuel and supplies that they could get for themselves...that's why they couldn't come to Berlin to support Hitler...they just didnt have the material resources to do so!.

[Liam]

Retributar,

Noone is saying the bombing wasn't effective, think what D-Day '43 would've done to the German War Machine vs thousand of Lancasters and B-17s? Firebombing and terrorizing German citizens. It would've beat the Germans outright instead of hampering them and slowly cutting suffocating them. Going for the Vipers Neck isntead of cutting of pieces of his Tail bit by bit...

I think personally if my Goal was to conquor you fast and to knock you out of a War it would be with Straight up Battlefield Arms. As Shaka mentioned Tactical Air to ground Missions aimed at destroying the enemies Land Units and freeing up space was vital. There were so many Leaders before the War who spoke of winning Wars without Land units. Germans couldn't do it in BOB, and Americans and British however much they may have crippled German Industry an Production didn't win that way.

Japan was a bit different story. I would likely say the Nukes had a huge morale impact, but weren't much more damaging than a typical Bombing Run on Toyko, I think our conventionals did as much damage in #s at the time.

[Blashy]

By doing the bombings it helped the russians.

No bombing could have gone the other way Liam, that of no being short of supplies in Russia and letting them push forward or simply a standstill.

Which would have given them a much better eastern front.

Bottom line is we had hundreds of the best military minds of that era, I think they had a clue what they were doing.

The only one who had no clue militarly was Hitler.

[pzgndr]

Strategic Bombers need to have the ability to reduce the enemies production points. The problem in SC is that as soon as they do, all the enemy has to do is put a ground unit on that production target, and the Bombers can't get to it. The other problem, is no Allied player in SC will put the resources into Strategic Bombers, like the Western Allies did in real life.

The second problem is directly related to the first, which is being fixed in SC2. SBs will now cause damage to resources even if a ground unit is positioned there. There will probably be a few other adjustments to strategic attack values, strike ranges, and such to help make SBs a little bit more effective.

While not decisive, 3 or 4 L/R Allied bombers with decent escort support can put a serious dent in Germany's production in the current SC game if you try an Allied air strategy. Get SBs into Greece within range of Romanian oil fields and Germany starts to suffer from loss of MPPs. It takes some real effort for the Allies to hurt Germany with the loss of 100+ MPPs per turn (assuming total loss of 2 oil and 2 mines) but it's possible. In SC2 bombing should be a bit more effective overall, but shouldn't be TOO much more powerful or else that creates a new problem.

[Retributar]

Liam Offhand im not sure that the Americans had enough resources to attempt a major invasion of Europe in 1943...for example i dont think that they had enough landing craft...and they still needed to construct their Mulbary Harbours and so on!. However it should be included in a what if...if nothing else.

Another Thing...i think that the Americans didn't at that time have the same tolerance for massive casualties as the Russians and Germans did...you see it so much more pronounced today...Americans do not stomach taking casualties very well.

If they had the capacity to invade Europe...and took heavy casualties to storm ashore...it may have caused the government to collapse (Even on June 5-6th with all the preparation that they had done Eisenhower thought that the invasion could fail...so much so that he had made up a letter for broadcast taking FULL-RESPONSIBILITY for its failure...should it infact happen!) ...especially if the invasion had turned into another Dunkirk and it could have happened...America would be forced out of the war!.

So this Hypothetical situation could be included in the game ...take your chances and see if you can succeed.

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Battle Of Britain:

Yes...German-Airpower didn't succeed there!. Check on the internet for the reason...you should find that if the Germans had concentrated for 2 or 3 weeks longer bombing the British Airfields...that the RAF would have ceased to be a military concern.

At this point...German Airpower would have dominated the Channel...which means that the British Navy would have been as Suseptible as the Bismark was to being sunk by bombers. Operation Seelow could have begun at this juncture!.

Again...the major reason for failure was the misapplication of Air-Resources!.

[Edwin P.]

Originally posted by pzgndr:

While not decisive, 3 or 4 L/R Allied bombers with decent escort support can put a serious dent in Germany's production in the current SC game if you try an Allied air strategy.

Any chance of the Allied AI occassionaly trying an "Allied Air Strategy"? and will it know how to effectively use bombers?

In SC1 I found them most effective when Axis Air Resources were deployed elsewhere.

Example, unlike the AI, I bombed Bergan in Norway to build my experience without the fear of being intercepted.

[ July 09, 2004, 11:52 AM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[Retributar]

pzgndr: I agree with you that Strategic Air Bombing should not be too powerful...it would ruin the game. However...there should be an adjustment so that one can experiment with a more powerful air campaign.

The main reason why the Strategic Air Effort was not as effective as it could have been is because the Allies didnt concentrate their efforts on knocking out Electric Power plants and Oil facilities.

Think of it if there is no Oil or Electricity...all of the factories will be out of business...and the armed forces will be paralyzed!.

But instead the Allies made the same mistakes as the Germans did...by bombing Cities and other targets which could recover quite well...and needed to be hit again and again and again to reduce their effectiveness. They squandered their air resources by wasting their effort on those lesser value targets.

To counter the Allied Strategic Bombing effort...the Germans would need to continue full-throttle in Anti-Air research as well as Jet-Aircraft research...then produce as much anti-aircraft units as they can afford and make sure to keep the Airforce in top-form. If Jet's are researched and constructed early enough...even

the Hitler Directive to make most of them as Fighter-Bombers would not totally eliminate the effect that the ME-262 Fighter-Jets could have had.

In my other topic 'Something I Hope WILL HAPPEN in SC2!' ... it shows(Through the Internet Links) that the Germans could have in early 1945 start to field something like 1000 - 1500 Fighter-Jets(NOT ME-262's) per month!...that would have kicked the Hell out of the Strategic Bombing effort!.

Their major problem is that they didn't have enough pilots...why they didn't is something i still don't understand?.

Perhaps if the resources allocated to the Bismark and other Ships which had virtually no-effect on the war were allocated to the Air-force instead ...the Germans would have had the where-with-all to maintain a decent airforce!.

With a strong airforce...the Allied Bombing effort would have to cease operations until they could upgrade their airforce...and perhaps Paulus's army at Stalingrad could have been saved!.

-------

UPDATE:--- The Perfect German Solution---if only they had the Pilots!.

Heinkel He 162A-2 Salamander Volksjäger

http://www.ww2guide.com/jetrock.shtml

The He 162 was a small, single-engine jet fighter developed in less than three months with unskilled labor using mostly wood and other non-strategic materials.

The first prototype flew on December 6, 1944. --- 280 aircraft were completed before the end of the war (and another 800 were found in various stages of completion in the factories), but only a handful actually saw action, in the hands of regular pilots.

However, its range was severely limited; the Volksjäger needed to wait for the bombers to come to it and was at a decided disadvantage if Allied fighters appeared, since it could do little but run because of its limited fuel supply. *** Well...the remedy for a limited fuel supply is to install Drop-Tanks...Then DROP the Drop-Tanks as soon as the enemy was to be engaged!.

It was planned to build 4,000 of these aircraft each month in various versions.

http://www.shockwaveproductions.net/firepower/manual/he162.htm

***For What-IF Situations...we need an option in the game to train enough Manpower from the ManPower Pool to have the opportunity to train enough pilots or whatever so that severe critical shortages do not occur!.

He 162A "Salamander"

THE PICTURES WON'T SEND...GO TO THE WEB-SITE AND TAKE A LOOK!.

[ July 09, 2004, 11:44 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[SeaMonkey]

Retributer, I have the answer. The reason, at least the foremost one, is Germany did not possess enough aviation fuel to train pilots thoroughly. Why? Loss of adequate crude oil supplies and the ability to refine them.

[Retributar]

They would have had all the fuel that they needed if they had an Airforce that could have protected their Oil supplies. If your Oil-Supplies are Bombed to Hell...of course there is no fuel for the Airforce!.

[ev]

I agree with Retributar. Through 1943 Germany was producing plenty of oil (8.9 million tons a year). Germany suffered a huge drop in production in 1944 (6.4 million tons produced).

I don't have quarterly data. But look at the facts: The bombing campaign against oil refineries really picked up in the late spring '44. First quarter producion was probably fairly steady around 2.2 million tons. A bit of guess work, Q3 production may have been around 1.8 and Q3 and Q4 production most have dropped below 1.2 million tons per quarter. That's a 40% drop in production!

A 40% drop in production a monstrous drop. But add to that that the bombing campaign hit first the refineries that made aviation fuel... late '44 there was probably no aviation fuel. But that was the result, not the cause, of the bombing campaign.

In 1942 and 43 Germany had the oil to sustain a larger airforce. I do not know if they had the industrial capacity to make more planes. Perhapps, as far back as 1940 and 41 they should have built more manufacturing plants, so they could build more planes. But they certainly had the oil. They lost the oil, after they lost the air war.

[Retributar]

http://www.freewebs.com/mahross/aerialwarfare.htm

STRATEGIC BOMBING:

Interesting Excerpt: "Militarily the Stategic Bombing Air Campaign was a constant battle to improve tactics and methods as seen with the development of more effective delivery systems.

Also the campaign managed to tie up countless numbers of Germans in defending the Reich. The campaign helped to shape and distort German output.

From 1943 and on, 75% of all 88mm flak/anti-tank guns went to anti-aircraft duties inside the Reich. In terms of manpower, the campaign forced the Nazis to employ between 1 and 2 million personnel in anti bombing duties. These could have been better employed elsewhere, for example, in the Wehrmacht or in the factories.

The bombing also decreased production in other important areas such as lorry production, where in 1944 42% of production was lost due to bombing raids.

Also the campaign led to the virtual destruction of Luftwaffe which gave the Allies complete air supremacy and led to the success of the Operation Overlord and subsequent operations."

-------------------------------------------------

SOOOO..... it doesn't take a Rocket-Scientist to see that if the Germans had put more into their Airforce...the Allied Strategic Bombing Effort would have been largely neutralized. This would have ensured their Oil-Supplies and would have freed up another 1 to 2,000,000 men for the Wehrmacht.

With one to two extra million soldiers, plentiful fuel stocks and a strong Airforce...perhaps Russia could have been beaten after all!. The king-Pin in all of this again...is that the Germans needed a much stronger Air-Force!.

-----------

I think this would make a good MOD ...Option: Germany Develops and maintains a larger Airforce throughout the war!.

* 1,000,000 more men for the Eastern Front starting sometime in 1943!.

* Much larger Luftwaffe...now capable of dealing with a technologically and numerically enhanced Russian Air-Force!. [However this is done by reducing production points for the USSR or by whatever other method!]

* Enhanced Industrial Output Capacity...Overall Production increases by 25%

[ July 09, 2004, 02:06 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Shaka of Carthage]

How can you state that Germanies production of 8.9 million tons a year was sufficient?

Look at what the other nations were producing at that time.

Then look at what the consumption rates where.

8.9 was far from enough.

[SeaMonkey]

Maybe that's why Hitler directed the 1942 summer offensive should have the Caucasus oil fields as its objective.

[ev]

Originally posted by Shaka of Carthage:

How can you state that Germanies production of 8.9 million tons a year was sufficient?

Look at what the other nations were producing at that time.

Then look at what the consumption rates where.

8.9 was far from enough.

The US produced about 20 times more oil than Germany. However, the US was operating huge fleets in the Pacific and the Atlantic, huge number of transports on both theaters, and large air armadas on both theaters. More important, Germany's economy ran on coal, not gas.

I will try to get the consumption rates, and post them as soon as I have them.

[xwormwood]

Originally posted by Retributar:

This would have prevented the collapse of the German war-industry and would allowed the war to continue on into 1945.

It would have brought Germany the atomic bomb.

So thank God for this stupid usage of the ME-262.

Strategic Bombing:

I wonder what would have happend if those efforts to bomb civilians back to stone age would have directed to fight the german army.

As far as i know the gains out of strategic bombing were very small compared to what was spent on it.

From many german soldiers is known that they fought desperatly because thay knew that at home everyone was dead, everything was in ashes etc.

[Roosevelt45(the 2nd)]

@xwormwood : exactly, that's what I thought too.

the blitz, the bombing of Londen by the Germans, should have thought the allies that bombing cities doesn't bring down the morale, it does the contrary. but still 'bomber' Harris decided to bomb cities like Lübeck and Keulen(The name of this city might be different in english),where industrial capacity was back to normal after a week,while the allies lost a lot of bombers and killed loads of civilians.

Only the bombing of the dams in rheinland-Pfalz had a pretty heavy effect on German industry.

Also the bombing of French infrastructure,before D-day helped a lot but killed a lot of civilians too.De Gaulle,btw, always claimed that the same effect with less casualties could have been reached by using the French resistance to do this.

But Churchill and Leclerc were afraid of German represailles against French citizens.(Von Rundstedt's system of 1000 dead French for one dead German, and 500 for a wounded one)

[xwormwood]

Originally posted by Roosevelt45(the 2nd):

Only the bombing of the dams in rheinland-Pfalz had a pretty heavy effect on German industry.

As far as i know the effect was pretty low.

The industry in the ruhr got their water from some other sources, Krupps or Hoeschs machines didn't even have to stop even a single day. Within 8 weeks the holes were repaired.

Appr. 2000 civilians died, at least 700 of them were ukrainian famale slave-laborers, imprisoned in a camp near by.

Rgarding the losses (half of the bombers didn't made it back) and the proposed target (give the german war industry a decisive blow to end the war) it was only a heroic attack of some brave pilots, but in the end more something like a war crime than a well done attack to shorten the war.

[Roosevelt45(the 2nd)]

Yes,you're right I may have overestimated the effect when I said 'heavy' but I still think that this was by far the most effective air attack during the war.Despite the fact that it was mainly just a morale boost.

An elite unit of the RAF attacked with a new type of bombs called 'bouncing bombs' designed by a man named Barnes Wallis.

Barnes Wallis

RAF history section.

Dambusters