Relative Parity on the Eastern Front in CMBB

[kipanderson]

Keke,

I understand what you are saying, but do not entirely agree. However, even if we put that aside there are other ways of measuring the possible combat effectiveness of the Soviets.

One method that I used was to take a look at the losses of American and Soviet forces in terms of daily losses per 100 front line soldiers in various operations. As I mention in passing above. If you take that route you also find Soviet loss rates tumble during 43. The difference between the start of 43 and the end is huge. Even more, you find that the loss rates correlate very closely with the figures for the change in combat effectiveness over time. If you zoom in even closer and look at operations such as The Destruction of Army Group Centre you can see examples of what is happening. The Germans would send out blocking forces to close off some of the “land bridges” through the famously wet areas of Byelorussia and the blocking forces would be swept aside in a day or two by follow on Soviet infantry. The speed with which large German pockets were destroyed was very different from earlier years.

Another point where I differ from some is in the idea that the tactical and the operational can be totally separated. If you look at the both Stalingrad and Kursk, strategic and operational victories for the Soviets, you will find that the casualty ratios were very unflattering for the Soviets; depending on how you count; 2.5-3.5 to 1, Soviet to German. The reason is that at the tactical level the Soviets were still being out fought, although winning at the operational level. However, when the Soviets start to win battles at the operational level, but at far lower casualty ratios, there is no avoiding the conclusion as to what is happening. The Destruction of Army Group Centre could not have been performed at the speed it was, and at the casualty ratio it was, with Soviet forces at the same relative combat effectiveness as they were in the Stalingrad operation. Soviet casualties would have been very much higher; the pockets would not have collapsed as fast.

An overall casualty ratio of 1.6 to 1, Soviet to German, does mean that in every operation where the Soviets suffer twice the casualties the Germans did; there was also an operation in which the Soviets suffer the same casualties as the Germans. Once again, there is no avoiding the overall conclusion.

Anyway, all good fun,

All the best,

Kip.

[Aacooper]

Kip,

I agree that of course the Soviets vastly improved over the course of the war. Your ratios... are they from DuPuy? I have some doubts about his methodology because I believe a definitive number is impossible to come up with. For example, the Soviet offensive against Army Group Center in 1944 in DuPuy's eyes worked better than the Western Allies vs. the Germans in Normandy. DuPuy's calculations can't take into account things like battlefield size and density - imagine Eisenhower's troops put on a flat, wide open plain with German divisions spread way out and only one panzer division in reserve.

Just thought I'd throw that out there.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Aacooper:

imagine Eisenhower's troops put on a flat, wide open plain with German divisions spread way out and only one panzer division in reserve.

Just thought I'd throw that out there.

Aacooper, the situation you describe above was often the result of Soviet operational art. In 1944, right before the opening of Bagration most of the Panzer divisions were deployed down south opposite 1st Ukrainian Front in anticipation of the offensive starting there. Why was that? Because of Soviet operational art, primarily through the use of deception. The Soviets already knew the Germans expected the offensive to begin there, and did everything they could to keep them believing this. Meanwhile, forces were secretly redeployed along the northern Belorussian area, while fronts in the Baltic(3rd Baltic Front) and south Ukraine(2nd & 3rd Ukrainian Front) regions were kept active and visible to keep German attention focused away from Belorussia. Then the Karelian operation began, further distracting German attention up north. Finally, the Belorussian campaign began along with the Baltic fronts in earnest. A month later, 1st Ukrainian Front started its operations.

One last point I should make is that each time the Germans' attention was drawn away from the Belorussian area German reserves were sent away from the Lvov area(opposite 1st Ukrainian Front) to reinforce an area they thought was soon to be attacked. When the big attack finally did happen, more reserve units from the Lvov area were sent up to the Belorussian area, but arrived too late to stem the tide. And that's when the 1st Ukrainian Front began its Lvov-Sandomir operation, opposite a reduced German force - as planned.

[ May 15, 2002, 12:47 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by kipanderson:

Another point where I differ from some is in the idea that the tactical and the operational can be totally separated.

To separate them would mean that the ratios would get even more unflattering when you take out the POW's off the equation and use only actual battlefield casualties (KIA/WIA). The MIA are marginal as in tactical context at coy/battalion level the number or MIA is usually "manageable" and in direct correlation with the type of battle being fought.

I know, MIA and POW's are "casualties" every as much as KIA/WIA. Been around this block a few times.

But I see what Keke is after. The Finns lost only ~2000 (confirmed POW) to ~4000 (total MIA) between 1941 to 1945 (figures off the top of my head so feel free to shoot them down). That is peanuts compared to the big boys and their MIA/POW figures. Also, the Finnish active periods were limited (summer of 1941 - winter 1942 and the summer of 1944) so it is easier to discern the tactical and the operational data from each other.

With that in mind it is not so hard to envision tactical and operational data being disseminated into separate entities for other participants.

Only, with the POW's out of the picture the overall ratios turn worse at least in the case of the Western Allies. Can't have that now can we ?

The Red Army ratios against the Finns: The Finnish POW exchange rate for the entire 1941-45 era (~2000 Finns vs ~65000 Russians taken by the Finns) is absurdly favourable to the Finns. Soviet sources state the KIA during the summer of 1944 assault numbers ~23 500. The number of Finnish KIA was ~12 000 (again, off the top of my head so feel free to shoot them down). That would translate into approx. 2:1 loss ratio even with Soviet era figures without a pinch of salt at a time when the norm was 1.6:1.

However, when the Soviets start to win battles at the operational level, but at far lower casualty ratios, there is no avoiding the conclusion as to what is happening.

The number of POWs taken is starting to get proportionately bigger compared to the KIA/WIA the Germans are suffering thus bringing the overall ratios down ?

The Destruction of Army Group Centre could not have been performed at the speed it was, and at the casualty ratio it was, with Soviet forces at the same relative combat effectiveness as they were in the Stalingrad operation. Soviet casualties would have been very much higher; the pockets would not have collapsed as fast.

One contributing factor to the speedy collapse of the pockets was the fact the Germans were actively trying to break out. In Stalingrad they dug in. Also the fact Stalingrad was a city and the other pockets were formed in rural areas does factor in. Then there is the Memel pocket which held on for quite a long time. And the "moving pocket" the Grossdeutchland rode on towards the west.

An overall casualty ratio of 1.6 to 1, Soviet to German, does mean that in every operation where the Soviets suffer twice the casualties the Germans did; there was also an operation in which the Soviets suffer the same casualties as the Germans. Once again, there is no avoiding the overall conclusion.

The Red Army got better at its trade. But it was still ever as much willing to take the casualties and it could also afford them. That did not change one bit from 1939 to 1945.