The German Army in the Soviet Union 1941-45 - Effective or not?

[von Lucke]

Reader's Digest version of the last 5 pages:

Luck will only get you so far. But like all degenerate gamblers, the OKH kept on rolling the dice and doubling their bet. Well, they finally threw snake-eyes in August 1941. Then the leg-breakers started to move in to collect on the 3 years of debt the Germans had built up...

A better strategy would have been to conduct peace negotiations with the British ("Hey, I kicked France's arse --- that whole Versailles thing is avenged --- let's be friends!"), sit back and build up, and wait for the Soviets to attack Germany. Then use the "wronged party" clause to take the Ukraine, Byelorus, and the Baltics (assuming they could force them away from a prepared USSR), and be happy with that.

[Michael Dorosh]

Peace with the British? I thought Hess tried that!

[Gaylord Focker]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Reader's Digest version of the last 5 pages:

Luck will only get you so far. But like all degenerate gamblers, the OKH kept on rolling the dice and doubling their bet. Well, they finally threw snake-eyes in August 1941. Then the leg-breakers started to move in to collect on the 3 years of debt the Germans had built up...

A better strategy would have been to conduct peace negotiations with the British ("Hey, I kicked France's arse --- that whole Versailles thing is avenged --- let's be friends!"), sit back and build up, and wait for the Soviets to attack Germany. Then use the "wronged party" clause to take the Ukraine, Byelorus, and the Baltics (assuming they could force them away from a prepared USSR), and be happy with that.

Thats why the Allies allowed Germany to build up a little during the 30's to begin with.

Once Germany invaded Poland that was the final straw it became clear to the world what the intentions of Hitler were and it was agreed he had to be stopped. (besides Italy and Turkey who had a hard time making up thier minds)

[Rat]

To get back to the subject, the East war was lost due several reasons which more or less all sprout out of the fact that Hitler was way to sure of his self and tend to start to develop hearing problems when it came to save plannings from generals. The reason or at least the main reason of the defeat in the east is that they desperatly wanted to reach Stalingrad and take control over the Wolga and the oilfields. Now, that is good reasoning to do so...IF you have the tools to provide support. The Russians were overclassed by the Germans as well by tactics as by modern weaponry. Stalins childish way of putting out strategic plans made the East War fairly easy for the germans to be succesfull, and to my opinion if they would have stayed foot at some point, the war WOULD have been different, at least in the East. Now, there was such a vast space now between the troops at the front and the suply, that it was nearly impossible to nurture them as it should. Besides. The Russians learned after huge defeats and made the Blitzkrieg tactics ineffective. German forces DID advance, but they were incapable of enclosing Russian forces to completely destroy them. At day they advanced, and at night the Russians simple withdraw their front. They weren't using weapons anymore as a major weapon, but vast space against the Germans. Wanting to destroy Stalingrad at all cost was too much of the good. Blitzkrieg was impossible, modern machinery the least and old fashioned man to man fighting came to the call. And since the Russians were way more determined to protect their land...it turned into a huge massacre. Thats what you get for being stubborn and ignorant about the determination of your enemy. Of course this is a simplified and shortned version of the real thing. Lots of other factors are involved, but this could be considered being one of the most important.

[TSword]

JasonC,

Once again a superb writing ! I also think that fixation on the offensive was a major error.

In the East the fundamental superiority laid in the ability of the german units to sustain heavy fighting and still react swiftly and agile to new opportunities or threats. This ability was foremost one of the smaller units like Companies and Battaillons. Kursk in my opinion is the Masterpiece on the tactical scale where 2ndSSPz Corps drove steadily forward for 10 days without rest against armies too many to name them all.

In the Battle for Prokhorovka alone Rotmistrov arrayed 600 tanks against the 300 at most of DR, LAH and T only to have them halfed in the evening gaining nothing (OK, LAH and DR were stopped, but T advanced unimpressed) and by far not reaching the intended Goal to destroy 2ndSSPz, this after 7 days of the hardest fighting with 60-90 tanks per Division. An achievment on the tactical level unsurpassed in my eyes.

The gap was huge and a fundamental one. The russians had to assemble much larger formations to create something of the same power as an elite PzDiv (Like LAH, DR and Tot in particular), and those larger formations are naturally more bulky and more difficult to control (and in case of 1943 Russ. army much more crude, specialized weapons-units where almost exclusively Army-,Front- or Stavka ones). Therefore russian armies were weakest when on the move and strongest when digged in. Luckily for the russians the germans did not have the ressources (and not the will ?) to exploit this weakness on a strategical scale.

Greets

Daniel

[josefhesser]

Looks like I kicked off my membership with a bang! The topic will be discussed longer than we will be around.

I wanted to let you know the WW2 public event went very well. We didn't have any tactical battles, only scripted. That was a bit boring for us but the public liked it. We might have gotten another gig at a college. We might lose many men to the dorm parties! More dangerous than guns.

I won't put any more post about reenacting on this discussion area. It isn't on topic. I might just start a new topic instead.

[Pacestick]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Fugate and Dvorestky in 'Thunder on the Dnjepr' mention a study by the logistics department of OKH under von Paulus, conducted in early 41 or sometime 1940, stating that the Wehrmacht was incapable of winning a war against the Soviet Union. Can anyone point me to some easily accessible information on that?

The authors name escapes me. This may point you in the right direction and give you a clue to his identity.He became famous after authoring the report and went into intelligence and became known as Germany's super spy. After the war he went to work for the Americans during the cold war setting up intelligence networks in East Germany using escaped expatriots. You would think that after remembering all that detail that I could recall his name but alas, I must be suffering early onset of dementia :confused:

[Michael Emrys]

Gehlen.

Michael

[Grisha]

The problem is Gehlen was absolutely convinced in Germany's victory over the Soviet Union as head of Foreign Armies East. It's documented in Kahn's book, Hitler's Spies.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Gehlen.

Michael

Nope, von Paulus, later of Stalingrad fame.

[Pacestick]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Gehlen.

Michael

Nope, von Paulus, later of Stalingrad fame.</font>

[Grisha]

Pacestick,

Could you be confusing the episode with Guderian and Hitler in winter '44/'45 when Guderian submited FHO's assessment of the Poland sector (Vistula-Oder operation was imminent)? Hitler wanted Gehlen thrown in an asylum then as well.

[Gaylord Focker]

Well the German army racked up the highest kill rate in Russia then any other nation in any other conflict in world history so i would consider them effective.

The German Leadership on the other hand was not effective.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Gehlen.

Michael

Nope, von Paulus, later of Stalingrad fame.</font>

[Frunze]

Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

Well the German army racked up the highest kill rate in Russia then any other nation in any other conflict in world history so i would consider them effective.

By kill rate, you mean the ratio of German to Soviet dead? If so, then...

Please. The highest in world history? Higher than the wars against the American Indians? Higher than the British in their many colonial wars? Higher than the U.S.-led forces in the Gulf War? (The last took more casualties from friendly fire than from the Iraqis, didn't they?)

It's normal, in a conflict between a more economically and technologically developed country, and a less economically and technologically developed country, for the latter to take more casualties. It's not just weaponry, all kinds of things are involved, e.g. the educational level of the people available to use the weapons...

The gap between Germany and the USSR wasn't as huge as in some of the wars I just mentioned, but undeniably Germany was more industrialized than the USSR. So it's not surprising there'd be a certain disparity in the casualties. It certainly doesn't prove that the Wehrmacht was the greatest army ever.

[Gaylord Focker]

I'm not stating that they were the greatest army ever, only that they were an effective army, like the question of this thread asked.

[Michael Emrys]

BTW, if we want to compare kill rates throughout history, I think the Spanish Conquistadores ought to get at least honorable mention. An early adoption of biological warfare even if unplanned was quite effective.

Michael

[fridericus]

1. the whole world can say "thanks" to hitler because of his actions as german "groesster feldherr aller zeiten". he was the main-factor of allied victory in 45.

2. you needed the whole world for beating germany, a very small country comparised with russia, france and usa. (germany fought allone, forget germans "axis"-countries)

3. the german army was unbeaten in quality the whole time of war. BUT you cant win with quality about quantity, when quantity is too big.

4. german army had no lack of strategic thinking, they were not allowed to do so; only hitler made the strategic.

5. germany is a country without much ressources, so you have concentrate on important things and cant build all usefull thing for warfare you want (see usa....)

6. it seems, german army had only one mistake in ww2, they were too less men.

[Marlow]

Should we demolish the "Deutchland Uber Alles" post above, or ignore it?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Marlow:

Should we demolish the "Deutchland Uber Alles" post above, or ignore it?

Ignore it.

EDIt - although a serious deconstruction of "the German Army was always great" could be instructive. I am sure we could find examples of the German Army doing things the wrong way.

[ August 22, 2002, 11:03 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[PeterWhite]

I had read somewhere that Stalin's great paranoia lead him to horde the best equipment with "elite" (read "unquestioningly loyal") troops in the rear.

The immediate effect was that the Germans got a very skewed vision of the quality of weapons the Russians would be able to hit them with in '42, having just captured mountains of junk in the Summer of '41. The small numbers of T-34s they met later in the year made a lesser impact than their first impressions (although perhaps the not case for german tankers).

In hindsight historians usually interpret these special reserves as a Soviet habit of secrecy. My take is different: the main reason from Stalin's POV is to keep good troops under a watchful eye and where they are an effective deterrent to potential political rivals, the military secrecy advantages are just a secondary effect.

Does anyone have T-34 production numbers and deployment information that would support or debunk the statements above?