Tactics of Ambush by Colonel Pavel Rizin

[Michael Dorosh]

Reprinted from CANADIAN ARMY TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 24 March 1943

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Tactics of Ambush

by Colonel Paven Rizin

1. The commander of a Soviet infantry battalion acting on the defensive feared an enemy penetration on his flank. The terrain of the flank was thickly covered with bushes. There was an open meadowland in front, crossed by a shallow depression which ran from enemy lines in the direction of the bushes and ended about eighty yards from them. Small groups of the enemy could use the depression to reach the bushes and then filter through behind the battalion lines.

2. To prevent any possibility of this, the commander decided to lay an ambush in the zone held by the right flank. A section of tommy gunners under Senior Sergeant Bukwin was detailed for the ambush. The tommy gunners crawled into the bushes under cover and took up suitable positions. The sergeant placed his men so that the enemy would be caught in enfilading fire. He ordered the men not to fire without a signal from him.

3. The commander's fear was justified. As soon as the sun began to sink enemy tommy gunners gathered in the depression one by one until there were forty of them. They moved carefully up the depression in the direction of the bushes. Soviet tommy gunners, not betraying their position, followed the movement of the enemy group. The enemy left the depression and made a dash for the bushes. When they were within fifty yards the sergeant gave the signal, and a hail of lead burst on the Germans from three directions. About a dozen were killed instantly. The remainder threw themselves on the ground, but the level land offered no protection from bullets. The tommy gunners continued to mow them down, and disposed of the entire group in less than five minutes. The ambush had removed the danger of enemy penetration behind the battalion lines.

AMBUSCADES USED BY TANKS

4. During the present war ambuscades are being extensively used, not only by infantry but also by other arms of the service, particularly tanks (emphasis in original) The infantry make use of ambushes everywhere on the line of march, on reconnaissance, on convoy duty and during both offensive and defensive actions. The most frequent point of ambush is the road along which the enemy is expected to move. Quite often small groups of infantry make their way behind the enemy lines to his communications and there lay in ambush from which great losses can be caused to approaching enemy columns and transport.

5. A carefully prepared ambush makes it possible to inflict heavy losses on a numerically superior enemy. Success depends upon the suddenness and speed of the action. Sudden fire from a well-camouflaged group of troops or separate machine guns, followed by a bayonet charge, invariably proves successful.

6. The slightest neglect, or too hurried preparation, on the other hand, may lead to the failure of the ambush. Not long ago an ambush of two infantry platoons under Lieutenant Strelnikov was stationed on a road along which an enemy infantry column was expected to arrive. The lieutenant placed his men in position. About a platoon of enemy infantry appeared on the road. These were the vanguard of a column two companies strong. When they arrived at the ambushed point, Lieutenant Strelnikov gave the order to fire. The vanguard was almost annihilated, but the column advancing behind them, hearing the firing, immediately extended in open order and prepared to give battle. The ambushers could only retreat.

7. This ambush failed because the lieutenant gave the order to fire prematurely. He should have let the vanguard pass, awaited the approach of the main body, and poured his fire suddenly into that column. It would have been better to split the ambush itself into several groups i different places, instead of keeping them all together, so that they could fire on the enemy from several directions simultaneously and at the same time confuse the enemy with regard to the size of the ambush.

STRENGTH OF AMBUSH UNITS

8. Experience has shown that on roads and forest paths it is more advantageous to place an ambush on both sides of the road. The enemy is caught in enfilade fire and usually completely annihilated. As far as the strength of the unit used for ambush goes, this must be determined for each case seperately. Sometimes a company is required, sometimes a platoon, while it may even happen that a single section of tommy-gunners or riflemen is sufficient. It is important that the unit detailed for ambush should be mobile and able to make good use of cover.

9. Actual practice has shown that in organizing an ambush every detail of the plan of action must be carefully thought out - disposition of troops, fire strength and actual moment of attack. Particular attention must be paid to the question of communication between groups placed on different sides of the road. And most important of all, it must be remembered that even a well-organized ambush can fail if the troops do not display both endurance and discipline. Poor camouflage, a slight movement or a premature shot can give away the ambush and so lose the advantage of the elment of surprise.

<hr></blockquote>

[Michael Dorosh]

All I remember is an old quote (perhaps dubious) that is attributed to a Soviet General - the exact quote is lost to me, but to paraphrase:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> It is very difficult to train to fight against Canadian Army doctrine as the Canadian Army does not seem to have a doctrine. <hr></blockquote>

I think we are still using the 1914 drill manual, actually. It is embarrassing to see the infantry go out in the field and practice pepperpotting over open ground. Bear in mind I am in a reserve unit, but none of the training I have seen had much bearing on reality - no artillery of any kind, no armoured vehicles, all "light infantry" type training.

The question of doctrine, though, begs the other question - what are you training to do?

Our main focus as been peace missions, and at that, we have done reasonably well overall. But it does not contribute in any way to a war fighting doctrine. I would argue we don't have one, or perhaps we have several, but either way we are trying to define one.

Some of the articles in Infantry Journal and Canadian Defence Quarterly would seem to bear that out.

What are your thoughts?

Also, I assume "Soviet" doctrine - the massed land battle between conventional armour-heavy forces - is a thing of the past now that the Cold War is over?

[Mr. Johnson--]

Heck Pillar can use Snipers and Light machine guns to demonstrate Soviet Doctrine!

You should get Shadow 1st Hussars in here, thought he was driving Leopards for the Canucks.

I wonder if the Chinese have their Generals studing Western warfighting for their opfor wargames?

[Brian]

Pillar, your comments remind me somewhat of the debate that has been going on, at a low level, in the Oz army now for most of its existence for the last century. Lacking a clearly defined threat for the most part, we've tended to focus on what we think are likely contingencies, as well as trying to ensure that if the army needs to rapidly expand, in time of war, we have the trained and experience cadre to carry out that expansion.

The result has been that defence planning has tended to swing between two schools of thought - "forward defence" or "fortress Australia". Each has had its time in the limelight. Presently, we've moved into another period where "forward defence" has began to find favour with both politicians and the theorists.

This has also resulted in, at times, quite considerable inter-service rivalry for funding, as each service in turn has recieved a lion's share of the money, in order to fulfill its part in the grand scheme in things. Its also resulted in some very strange proposals being put forward, the most recent by the Army whom attempted to claim we needed to have a heavy anti-armour capability 'cause the government's policies could see us becoming involved in repulsing a potential DPRK attack on the ROK. After everybody calmed down and had a good laugh, the government clarified its policies a great deal more after that.

We are still faced with the problem of no clearly definable threat nor a role for our defence forces beyond the general ones normally associated with them. The government recently promised a massive increase in funding for defence because, in their view, our region has become considerably more volatile. However, when closely examined, the promises were seen to be very much on the never-never...

[Michael Dorosh]

Pillar - I agree that we need a warfighting doctrine, and the ability to fight wars, in addition to our peacekeeping duties. As for having three armoured regiments - buying tanks is one thing, maintaining them is unfortunately another. How many troops are serving in the QYR? Most reserve "regiments" couldn't field an entire company or squadron. I'm a bit loathe to say anything else in open forum in these troubled times - I've probably said too much already. But I agree that we have a real need for a conventional army that can fight.

We also both know that as long as Ontario keeps voting Liberal, and as long as there is no viable opposition in Canada, it will never happen.

[Scott B]

Interesting discussion - don't get to read too often about Canadian national strategy.

When you say "Soviet Military Doctrine," are you talking about adopting a form of operational art, or something else?

Scott

[The_Capt]

Gentlemen,

I think you are both mistaken in saying "We have no doctrine". Our doctrine is in fact very much derived from British and American schools of thought. I have attended staff college with members from many nations and when it comes to "planning" warfighting we really stand up and deliver. What you may be mistaking as a lack of doctrine, is in fact a change in doctrine and a gap between doctrine and capability. We are leaving our Attritionist British roots and moving over to an American/German style of Manueovre Warfare.

I think that you are mistaking doctrine with a gap in capability. Doctrine says "This is how we will do business in the event of war". Capability demontrates and exercises doctrine.

You may want to go down to your unit library and track down our pams on the subject of Operations, Command and Manueovre. I would also strongly suggest you look at the Army Training and Doctrine Bulletin. I guess if there is a failure here it is that our doctrine has not been communicated down far enough and has remained at the lofty realm of Staff College where it can do the least harm.

Now as to Strategic Objectives, well gentlemen I would argue our wonderful government is very goos at that. We sent Canadian troops on a lot of useless missions in the early 90s, the result was a "morale highground" and strong leverage for a temporary seat on the Security Council and more say in world events, when compared to our role in the 80s..little brother trying to keep up.

As to how a warfighting doctrine could help us achieve Strategic Objectives...well I ask what do you suppose those Objectives are?

As to capability, well I always say push with the prick you have and stop staring at other people in the shower. We do with what we have and become better for it. One thing I have heard about us all over the world is just how resourceful and well trained we are. This is due in large part to how little we have. I think what we do need to do is define a solid role for ourselves in Coalition Operations and then develop and carry over what parts of doctrine we need. We have yet to accept that we will never take on the world on our own so there is no need to have a military capable of the entire spectrum of capabilities required in High Intensity Conflict. Once we do we can assign a role for what we are willing to field and then focus on that aspect of our doctrine.

This is a sacred cow to many...NO MBTs MY GAWD!!! Well guess what? We don't have enough anyway, let's get light tanks and focus on Raids, Ambushes, Flank Security and Deep Battle Ops. Leave the Heavys for someone else.

I guess the best way to describe Canadian Doctrine is a plan for a whole heap o butter on the toast. But our capabilityy it is too little butter on too much toast. So the mistake that we don't have a doctrine at all can easily be made.

[Hoopenfaust2]

Bring back our Airborne Regiment.

Living in Ottawa I can see how the Liberals do run things. Kickback city. Your taxes pay for the NCC who are the biggest crooks in the country. Since you must be bilingual to be employed by the NCC the majority of the power figures are french canadian. They like to spend "our" money on language issues. Francophone games that kind of stuff. If we want our military back into game we have to get rid of the liberals or at least the liberals who are in power now. If bombardier (quebec company) made military helicopters we'd have replaced those Seakings in 1993.

Michael, if they sent you into combat right now do you feel properly supplied?

[Michael Dorosh]

Warren - you might want to check out the latest DOCTRINE AND TRAINING BULLETIN - including an article by LCol Hope called "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva - The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine."

Hoopenfaust - I can't really speak for the logistical system - but if you are talking about Afghanistan, the troops there will be supplied by the US Army, and I am sure they have logistical support in spades.

We know how to run a field army, we just don't have any practice at it. The Logistics Branch has a lot of experienced officers and NCOs, and the basic methods of "customer service" are sound. If there was a full blown war, I would be confident - assuming we had time to acquire the proper equipment - that the Army would be able to provide me what I need.

As it stands right now, we have received a lot of quality kit in the last few years, uniforms especially (including cold and foul weather clothing, boots, etc.)

[Christian Knudsen]

IMHO, the Cdn Army suffers not so much from a lack of doctrine as a lack of defined role. Within the restrictions of this debate on role, I think that there are attempts to develop doctrine within the Army, and the fact that a discussion is taking place on the subject is of itself a good indicator. The fact remains that the Canadian Army has simply not been recently tested in such a manner as to reveal severe weaknesses in the current (and evolving) combat doctrines. Therefore the reliance on other, more tested doctrine. For instance, the similarities between Cdn. and Brit Infantry drills are pretty large, so far as I know.

As to the lack of role and the whole war-fighting

Trg and Equipment as opposed to peacekeeping needs, this is a debate which cannot be answered by the military, although they are the ones who have to deal with the results of this mainly political and public debate.

I do agree with you Michael that watching Infantiers pepperpot about the place is painful to watch, but then watching the Cal Highrs do anything at all is pretty excruciating at the best of times. As for the Tease the Soldier Program, the kit we have been given is (mostly) pretty neat (ahhh, Goretex), but woe betide one that has his/her new kit damaged beyond repair. You would need pretty good luck indeed to get an exchange item, as there is not enough kit in the system. Still waiting on a lot of this kit, as well...

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Christian Knudsen:

I do agree with you Michael that watching Infantiers pepperpot about the place is painful to watch, but then watching the Cal Highrs do anything at all is pretty excruciating at the best of times. .<hr></blockquote>

Ok, smarty pants - who are ya? N Sask R? R Reg Rif? Sask Dragoons?????grrrrr

[ 01-24-2002: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]</p>

[Michael Dorosh]

We can sell LAVs to the Marines and make $$$$$$$$$$

[Brian]

Isn't money always the final arbitar, Pillar?

Otherwise mech infantry would be riding in APC's as well protected and mobile as the MBT's which they are meant to be protecting, based on MBT hulls themselves. Instead, they get tincans with little real hope of surviving even the smallest calibre weapons.

As for political decisions WRT military equipment, its a common failing, in all militaries, even the US one. Remember, your government represents domestic constituencies with vested interests. The result is more often than not, the best, foreign built piece of equipment is not selected over the domestic, second-best or an allies piece of kit is adopted, for "closer integration" rather than a different non-allied nation's weapons which are actually better.

Downunder, we have suffered from all these problems and some. An excellent case is the example of the adoption of the M60 GPMG in 1961 to replace the venerable Bren. The weapon which actually won the competition, the FN-MAG58 GPMG ironically ended up replacing the M60, 25 years later. The difference between 1960 and 1985 was that in 1960 the Australian government was seeking much closer ties with the US, whereas in 1985 the party in power sought greater self-reliance and diversification of supply.

[Christian Knudsen]

RRR, actually. Sorry, I just couln't resist a dig. After all, what fun is life if you can't have an occasional poke at another regiment. I guess this is what is known as the downside of the regimental system.

As to the MBT vs IFV debate, I am surprised that noone has brought up the direction that the US Army seems to be moving, with, as I understand it, more emphasis on lighter vehicles such as the LAV III (although heavily modified). The debate in the States seems to follow (or precede) much of what we in Canada are talking about, with one signifivcant difference: The emphasis seems to be on a warfighting stance, with detractors claiming that a move to the "wheeled brigades" will lower combat effectiveness, and the supporters, of course, claiming the opposite. It seems to me that this it the only approach to take. While peacekeeping may seem to be less dangerous than more involved conflict, anyone who has been on one of the more "dire" tours that Canada has sent its troops on in the past will tell you that bullets were flying and people were dying, as the old phrase goes. If that has been the case, and will yet be again, as I at least am sure, then do we not as a nation owe it to these troops to give them the best chance to survive present and future conflicts? Part of this involves not only suvivability but offensive punch as well.

The crux is this. As it stands, Canada is fairly well equipped to take on small scale peacekeeping missions such as the ones in Bosnia and Cyprus. The next few months will tell if this will be good enough to sustain 3VP as it goes where the potential for things to go really wrong is sizeable. Thank goodness that Canadian troops are so well trained...

[The_Capt]

Sorry guys I haven't read that one yet..it is sitting on my desk at work waiting for a spare moment. From the title I would say that LCol Hope is correct that we do not have an Operational Doctrine BUT if he was using the word in it's correct tense and I assume he does, it does not mean we lack ANY doctrine.

Pillar you missed my point completely. We have to accept Coalition Operations, they are a fact of life. We will not be able to go alone nor is it concievable that we ever will.

In Coalition Ops it is not nec to bring the full suite of capability to the table. In fact we can't. So we have two choices..go with the flow or continue to pretend. In the end I think there will be littel choice. The gov't has forced our hand in this and the CLS recognizes it.

If there has been a failure it has been in our own leadership at the highest level to "make the call" and get on with it.

In your example, we would need to look at other tanks in sp of FIBUA or another force taking on the job. Our forces may be able to ensure the flanks are secure while doing it.

We are not going to establish "decisive control over an area" or "accomplish stategic objectives" in isolation. We will support these aim which will be developed in cooperation with other partner nations. We either accept that as reality and live with it or we spend 100 billion and make a world class military, capable of standing on it's own. Now ask yourself if the Canadian people would support that?

We need to pick a role and find a niche and become th ebest on the planet at that job. I am not surprised the LAV was developed and the Coyote. Next is a light wheeled tank and bang you have a Light Bde.

Now the questions remains "do we need a National Operational Doctrine" if we will never exercise it. Or do we adopt the Coalition Doctrines we will be working in?

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Christian Knudsen:

RRR, ...<hr></blockquote>

Well, Up the Johns, then! The wheels vs. tracks debate is indeed a hot one in the US as well as Canada. Be interesting to see how it turns out.

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I think we are still using the 1914 drill manual, actually.

<hr></blockquote>

If you're talking about the 201 you are gravely mistaken....

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The wheels vs. tracks debate is indeed a hot one in the US as well as Canada. Be interesting to see how it turns out.<hr></blockquote>

Talks have been going on since the late '80's. They'll never decide. Both wheels and tracks have major advantages and disadvantages. I can't really imagine a MBT with wheels......

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Shadow 1st Hussars:

Talks have been going on since the late '80's. They'll never decide. Both wheels and tracks have major advantages and disadvantages. I can't really imagine a MBT with wheels......<hr></blockquote>

More than likely not, because of the problems associated with weight distribution and vulnerability but say, a "tank destroyer"?

Personally, I've always felt the problem for "light forces" is that they have concentrated too much on the belief that only a tank can defeat a tank. If, instead they focused on what can destroy a tank, then it is quite possible to build a vehicle which is quite a deal lighter and still able to take on and destroy tanks at much greater range than the tanks themselves can. By either mixing vehicles or providing one with two weapons (one, such as the 165mm low pressure gun of the Centurion AVRE, designed primarily for bunker-busting/infantry support and say a FOGM or even a Strix/Merlin mortar round), you end up with a vehicle which is considerably lighter and still able to fulfill the functions of a tank. If handled well, tactically, it would even possible to engage other MBT equipped forces.

The key though, is moving away from the turret-heads' contention that only a tank can defeat a tank.

[Richard Morgan]

This thread confirms my long held suspicion that the Canadian Army is one of the very few that is actually worse equipped than us Brits And we think that we have it bad!

Richard.

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

We may not have the best equiptment, but we damn well know how to use it. Outdated or not, a rifle will still put a nice hole in you.

[Richard Morgan]

Couldn't agree with you more.

Richard

[Richard Morgan]

Back to Ambushes... In CM, I have tried to do a "by the book" ambush with rear protection, killer group and cut-offs. However, it never seems to work as the cut-offs always seem to open fire first :mad: :mad: I was using veteran troops as well! Does anyone have any suggestions on how to make this work in the game?

Cheers,

Richard.