Ok Steve Grammont, you are far too quiet - here is a question

[Michael Dorosh]

I am wondering about squad depletion in CMBB. Forgive me while I use the Commonwealth situation to frame the discussion.

My question is: "How often will squads in CMBB start at depleted strength, and how historically accurate will this be?"

Having researched my share of small level battles from a tactical perspective, all of us on the board who have done the same know that it is very rare to find a detailed order of battle for one side of a battle, even rarer to find it detailed down to the squad level (actually, I have yet to come across a document or unit history that would actually do this), and the odds of finding such supporting evidence for both opposing sides of a WW II battle are probably impossible (especially without access to European archives, a working knowledge of the language, and a couple of weeks to spare for each company or battalion size action you want to research).

Having said that, one can generalize on two reasons why squads would be depleted - previous casualties, and battle procedure.

I would like to concentrate on the latter, as applicable to the Germans and Russians, but first I'll touch on the former as the two aren't unrelated. Even if we know that Regiment 123 suffered 291 casualties between 22 June 1941 and 12 August, and we are setting a scenario on 13 August, we still need to know what policy the Regiment would have followed with regards to the (say) 709 men left. Would squads be combined/platoons disbanded to make up the shortfalls in other areas/etc. This assumes the 291 casualties were all in the rifle sections.

Has BTS been able to research this aspect much? Were there specific policies in place that applied globally to the Russian and German (and allied) forces? Or was it (more likely in my opinion) a matter left to individual battalion/regimental commanders?

And will we see a difference in CMBB scenarios? I have a feeling this may be a major issue - sort of like mixing troop quality in scenarios. It is the hallmark of a sophisticated scenario designer - but since the ratings are applied not through historical research but through whimsy, the question becomes how subjective a practice is it - and thus, how realistic, and how common should it be.

But the main point was Battle Procedure. The Commonwealth armies routinely left key personnel LOB - Left Out of Battle. I believe it only applied to set piece attacks; a company OC would take his company in but his 2 i/c would be left in B Echelon, likewise Platoon Commanders and their Platoon sergeants - only one would go in on the attack. The idea was to keep a nucleus of trained men in the rear to rebuild the unit on in case of a disaster.

The LOB system was also extended to the rifle squads - so a 10 man section (or more likely a 7, 8 or 9 man section, due to casualties and the constant lack of reinforcements the CW troops suffered) might see itself leaving 1 or 2 riflemen LOB.

Again, I am curious what BTS was able to find out about Russian and German policies in this area. Was there such a policy in these armies? Is it something scenario designers should be aware of when attempting an honest simulation?

[LGMB]

Soldiers,

[stevesvoice] Squads take far to long to gain experance. Therefore it is out of the scope of CMBB. [/stevesvoice]

[ February 24, 2002, 12:56 AM: Message edited by: Lord General MB ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Not that I don't appreciate the bump, LG, but what the hell are you talking about? I was discussing depleted squads - you know, not starting out with 10 men in a squad, but, like, fewer? BTS has already said this will be a feature of CMBB and I was enquiring about the historical background and likely impact of it on scenario design. I was comparing it to scenarios where some squads are designated regular, others green, others veteran, etc. My point was that this is really hit-and-miss since its impossible to research or quantify stuff at that level, and was wondering how common it would be in CMBB.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by scope.

[Seanachai]

Originally posted by Lord General MB:

Soldiers,

[stevesvoice] Squads take far to long to gain experance. Therefore it is out of the scope of CMBB. [/stevesvoice]

Sobriety, lad, is no vice when posting. Have a bit of a lie down, and come in again. We'll all just give this gibberish a miss while you sleep it off.

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

Originally posted by Lord General MB:

Soldiers,

[stevesvoice] Squads take far to long to gain experance. Therefore it is out of the scope of CMBB. [/stevesvoice]

Perhaps you should read the thread before you reply....

[Michael Dorosh]

Hmph. Steve must be toiling away as we speak.

[Martha Stewart voice]And that's a good thing[/Martha Stewart voice]

[Lindan]

From memory, I'm at work:

In "jenseits der steppe" (beyond the steppe)

an east front biography, the author, a company commander, has on one(1) single occasion 60 men in his company. the rest of the time, his company has a combat strenght between 25 and 40, on 2 occasions only 13. (He reorganized his men into 6 "squads", 2 Mg-gunners per squad.)This from 1942-1944. NEVER more than 60 men. His unit was with AG South and later B in the Kaukasus.

ps: how expensive is a 14-strong company??

[Battlefront.com]

Michael wrote:

How often will squads in CMBB start at depleted strength, and how historically accurate will this be

It is up to the designer or whomever does the settings for a Quick Battle. If you question were, "how often did squads in real WWII battles start out at depleted strength" the answer would most likely be "nearly always" (or pretty darned close to that). Remember that men who broke their ankle getting out of a HT the day before, someone who took ill, someone on leave, etc. means the unit will not be up to full strength.

As for the replacement systems for German and Soviet forces... totally irrlevant to CM's scale. But as it happens, I do know a thing or three about their respective systems and how they changed over time. Having said that, it has been several years since I dug into such classics as the rather thick and dull "German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II - Final Report." This was one of Dupuy's works for the US Army.

Too many details and changes as the war went on to detail them here, and since it is irrelevant to CM I don't have the time to brush up on them. But both systems were, in theory, fairly similar.

Each unit had a "home" unit which was responsible for feeding replacement units which, in turn, fed in individual replacements to frontline forces. Due to circumstances sometimes depleted units were withdrawn and replaced (in full) by a replacement unit. In dire circumstances the depleted frontline units were kept in the field in addition to the replacement formations. Units were also disolved, amalgamated, or otherwise dramatically altered instead of using the replacement system. The Germans and Soviets also made fundamental TO&E changes to work around manpower shortages (either on an individual unit basis of force wide).

Yup, big topic

Again, I am curious what BTS was able to find out about Russian and German policies in this area. Was there such a policy in these armies? Is it something scenario designers should be aware of when attempting an honest simulation?

No, since I think this is getting far too detailed. The scenario designer should simply get a feel for the condition of the units in the scenario should be and wing it. It is probably useless to attempt to do anything but that. Dupy's team of researchers, who had access to resources which included top German Army leadership and detailed records (even Soviet records), concluded that no exact accounting could be made at either the micro or macro levels in terms of vacant positions.

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

Much what I thought, Steve, thanks for the reply. So we "lowly" scenario designers will be on an even playing field with BTS as far as that goes.

I know a thing or two about Ersatz and Ausbildings Battalions, etc., and it was a very interesting system - and I agree, way out of CM's scope. I have much to learn about it, come to that, but will do my own research - thanks for the response.

[Battlefront.com]

Michael,

No problem. I think that you, us, and everybody else are on the same playing field here The kind of data you are seeking apparently does not exist. As I said in an earlier thread where you asked a similar question, it is the kind of data that wouldn't have been recorded (or even tabulated!) because it changed too quickly. Armies only cared about statistics like this as aggregate numbers. "1st Platoon is short x men" would be the kind of thing written on a scrap of paper or passed on verbally in most situations. Company HQ would then likely pass a more formal report to Battalion saying "short y men", then Battalion to Regiment "short z men" and so on and so on. The only numbers likely to be kept with any regularity (and apparently they weren't) would be the BIG numbers for Divisions, Corps, Armies, Army Groups, or Fronts for entire periods (many weeks, many months, etc.).

Only the historian cares about how many men were in some small unit on a particular portion of a particular day. The nation state, busy with the war at the time, cared nothing for such details. And that is why they do not exist So winging it is the only solution unless there is some scrap of information which, contrary to the odds, survived to be recored and dug up by some researcher. But even then, you won't likely find a detailed picture of a battle, but instead "our platoon was down to 10 men effective" statements which tell you nothing about the other platoons (for example).

Steve

[Panzer Leader]

The books I have been reading lately, namely "Citadel" by Robin Cook, "History of Panzerkorps GD" by H. Spaeter, "Panzer Aces" by (I forget, in the other room - too lazy to get up) etc, mostly from 41 through Kursk, have very good accounts of how their own formation and their neighboring formations were down.

In fact these accounts, either personal, or unit histories, usually list, in passing, unit strengths with fair regularity, and almost always mention when and how many recruits arrived.

Of course, it always seems to be something along the lines of "...such and such company was down to 18 men and 2 officers..." or "...the division had 12 working tanks..." or "...of the 112 new recruits sent to reform 2nd battalion, 89 of then would not return from battle that day..."

Incidentally, "Panzer Aces" which I bought in paperback at B&N for a pulp read, is utterly fascinating, recounting the lives, in GREAT detail, of the six most famous Wermacht tankers of the war. Hauptman Bix (I just finished this section) was in the vangaurd of Manstein's 4th Army sent to relieve 6th Army in Stalingrad, and he mentions that when the campaign kicked off, they had on 50 odd something tanks! When it was called to halt, 48 kilometers from Stalingrad, there were (IIRC) 12-18 tanks operational!

Numbers are there, but they are in unlikely places.

[Michael Dorosh]

Spaeter will tell you that at one point, Panzer Regiment GD was down to exactly one operational tank...

The more I read Spaeter, the more I realize what a missed opportunity it was. There are no appendices, no photos, though the companion photo history is not bad, there are still no lists of regimental commanders (much less battalion commanders), and the numbers he gives out are in very small doses. I think he tried to do too much, but he had a lot of units to write about. Would have been better had the FBB and FGD, Kurmark, etc. written their own histories and Spaeter concentrated solely on GD.

The release of God, Honor and Fatherland gives me faint hope that much in the way of primary sources will one day be used to reconstruct further the history of this unit. The suggestions made about war crimes in Yugoslavia suggest there is much more to be learned about their history.

I should point out that GD's documents were used by Bartov in Hitler's Army, which I thought was an unfair use of them. I should get the book out from the library again and revisit that issue, actually. (see the Günter Martens thread for more info).

Don't get me wrong - Spaeter is very readable and gives a lot of flavour and personal accounts - but as a critical historian, I found it wanting at times for detail.

As Steve points out, this detail may well be lost forever. In GD's case, with the destruction of the division in 1945, many records were lost and few photos taken. There is at least one Knight's Cross winner in the Division whose Christian name has been lost to the ages. No one knows who he was, yet he was given their highest award for bravery.

[ February 26, 2002, 12:05 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Bullethead]

Panzer Leader said:

Hauptman Bix (I just finished this section) was in the vangaurd of Manstein's 4th Army sent to relieve 6th Army in Stalingrad, and he mentions that when the campaign kicked off, they had on 50 odd something tanks! When it was called to halt, 48 kilometers from Stalingrad, there were (IIRC) 12-18 tanks operational!

That's nothing. You should read Crisp's The Gods were Neutral about his experiences as a Brit tanker in the Greek campaign. His battalion lost all its tanks and only 1 was destroyed by the enemy. The rest just broke down, mostly from thrown tracks, for which there were no replacement pins. In fact, the 1 combat loss had immobilized itself in this way just prior to being bombed, and it was the last tank in existence by that time.

[Panzer Leader]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...There is at least one Knight's Cross winner in the Division whose Christian name has been lost to the ages. No one knows who he was, yet he was given their highest award for bravery.

Guy Sajer?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Panzer Leader:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...There is at least one Knight's Cross winner in the Division whose Christian name has been lost to the ages. No one knows who he was, yet he was given their highest award for bravery.

Guy Sajer?</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

You should read Crisp's The Gods were Neutral about his experiences as a Brit tanker in the Greek campaign. His battalion lost all its tanks and only 1 was destroyed by the enemy. The rest just broke down, mostly from thrown tracks, for which there were no replacement pins. In fact, the 1 combat loss had immobilized itself in this way just prior to being bombed, and it was the last tank in existence by that time.

It's been decades since I read that book and my memory isn't all that trustworthy anymore, but I have the distinct impression that Crisp's own tank made it back almost to the embarkation port during the bug out. Do you have your copy at hand to check?

Michael

[Battlefront.com]

Panzer Leader:

In fact these accounts, either personal, or unit histories, usually list, in passing, unit strengths with fair regularity, and almost always mention when and how many recruits arrived.

You'll find stuff like this all over the place, actually. Especially in the "official" unit histories. There are many German units which have official histories available, besides the unique and the "elite", but DAMN those prices are up there. Also, my German isn't good enough to justify spending $150 on a book I can't read

Even when this information is available, it is almost always too general to use "as is", so winging it is still necessary. Even if the author says "at 10:00 hours, June 23rd we had 12 men in our Company" he most likely does not say how they were organized or what weapons were issued to them. So while better than nothing, it is still far away from what a scenario designer needs to make that 100% accurate battle.

Steve

[Panzer Leader]

Yeah, like MD was saying in regards to Spaeter, more often than not he will use general terms like "assault gun" or "armored troop carrier" when I want to know if was a 250 a 251.

In fact, I have been UNABLE TOTALLY to find out which exact half tracks the Recon Battalion of GD was equipped with, and I have ALL the GD books and a few of the Squadron Recon and Semi-track books. Its driving me bonkers.

I believe the company commanders (in fall/winter) had the 250/10 (I was hoping to find out if they had 250/11) and I know there were 222s but that's it.

[Battlefront.com]

PL,

You are unlikely to find this information (at least for average inquiries) beacuse nobody bothered to record it at the time. It was unimportant. Official TO&E can also be totally different than what the unit actually had on that day, not only in terms of numbers but types. It is also HIGHLY date sensitive.

The 1943 pattern Panzergrenadier Division (which the GD was organized around, plus differences) could have Kübelwagens, trucks, Kettenkrads, motorcycles, armored cars, and SdKfz 10 HTs in the Heavy Company. Which units had what varried unit by unit, probably day by day.

For a 1943 Panzer Division the Aufklärungs Abteilung had SdKfz 231, 232, 222, and 223 Armored Cars in its 1st Armored Car Company. The 2nd Armored Car Comany had SPW 250/5 and 250/9 Halftracks. The Armored Recon Company had SPW 250/1, 250/3, 250/7, and 250/8 Halftracks. The Heavy Company had SPW 251/1, 251/3, 251/7, 251/9, 251/11, and 251/17.

The best thing to do is look at the official TO&E and then wing it. Er... in fact, that is generally the only thing one can do

As for generic "assault gun" or "halftrack" refferences in books... that is standard. These kinds of details were not generally noted even at the time, so the authors have to keep things generic otherwise they would be injecting their own assumptions into things. Again, nobody making notes at the time of a battle CARED if it was a 251/1 or 251/3. Only researchers 60 years later care, and even then very few of them do

Steve