Land & Matress (or somefink...)

[Xavier]

hi,

I just want to know some info on this weapon. Was it common? Which caliber were the rockets?

Thanks in advance

[chris talpas]

This device was constructed from an aircraft rocket motor (76.2 mm) attached to a naval 13 kg warhead. Length 1.77 m, weight 30.5 kg, Performance: max speed 335 m/s, max range 7225 m, min range 3565 m (with spoiler).

Early versions had 32 barrels, while later versions had 30 barrels.

Went into action on 1 November 1944 by the Canadians during the crossing of the Scheldt using a 12 unit battery. 1146 rounds were fired in a 6 hour period.

A single land mattress salvo would result in 50% of the rounds falling in an area 215 m long by 219 m wide. Rockets were fired in ripples at a 0.25 s interval.

Reference: The Complete Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II Chris Bishop Ed. Prospero Books

Hope that helps!

Chris

[chris talpas]

More Stuff:

In 1942, Col. Mike Wardell was fighting the DAK at El Alamein when his position was being overrun by enemy troops. In desperation he seized an anti-aircraft weapon ordinarily used for shooting rockets at German planes, and turned the fire on the attacking German infantry. The result was electric, the enemy was demoralized by the devestating impact of the rockets and subsequently withdrew. Wardell was wounded and lost an eye in the action, but never forgot the usefulness of this weapon.

Back in England he determined to design a rocket gun specifically for this purpose. The British authorities were convinced however that the war would be over before this weapon could be properly designed and tested.

At this point, Lt. Col. Eric Harris, a Canadian, stepped into the fray after having seen a demonstration.

Together they approached Canadian officials and much to their surprise (and rather uncharacteristically) Gen. Crerar and Brig. Brownfield, head of all Canadian artillery, supported making this undertaking a wholly Canadian venture. Wardell was formally attached to the Canadian Army.

On Sept 15th, 1944, the 1st Canadian Rocket Unit, informally known as Land Service Mattress, was formed.

Reference: The Battle of the Scheldt. Whitaker and Whitaker (Also known as Tug of War) pgs 128 & 129.

I thought I'd add this info presenting a bit of history of the men behind this weapon.

Chris

[JonS]

Originally posted by Xavier:

Was it common?

Not that common. IIRC only one battery was formed for use in NWE, manned by Canadians as already pointed out. However, despite being only one battery, it was fairly devastating when used due to the high volume of fire it generated. It was also fairly busy, being used in all the major attacks by 21st AG between Nov 44 and the end of the war.

Here's something I wrote on the subject a few days ago, sourced from Pemberton A.L. (1951), The development of artillery tactics and equipment, The War Office (Note that the words are mine, but the info was sourced from Pemberton):

With the use of rockets, or "land mattress", the U.K. Ministry of Supply was working on a development of the Royal Navys "sea mattress". It was still in development when 1st Canadian Army asked for a battery to support the assault on Flushing. The was some doubt about the advisability of letting them use it (on a number of grounds), but approval was given anyway. A few days after Flushing it was used again in support of the Polish Armd Div at Breda, and again early in December in support of 15th (Scottish) Division at Venlo. As a result of the latter action R.A. 12 Corps thought there was a definite requirement for one rocket battery to each corps. Early shades of MLRS there.

Incidentally, time to reload after a salvo was 10 minutes.

Regards

JonS

[ June 18, 2002, 06:55 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

It was also fairly busy, being used in all the major attacks by 21st AG between Nov 44 and the end of the war.

All two of them, you mean?

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

It was also fairly busy, being used in all the major attacks by 21st AG between Nov 44 and the end of the war.

All two of them, you mean?</font>

[Xavier]

Thanks for the informations. It's strange to see that western allies didn't develop more rocket artillery during WWII.

If I remember well there was an english rocket battery at Waterloo, no?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Xavier:

It's strange to see that western allies didn't develop more rocket artillery during WWII.

Actually, they had a fair amount during the last months of the war. On the ground, there were various experiments with placing them on armored vehicles. Perhaps the most successful of these was the Sherman Calliope.

Earlier on, there were the rocket firing LCM®s for beach bombardment. These were mostly used in the Pacific, but were also present on D-Day.

Michael

[John Kettler]

Xavier,

There is a Land Mattress writeup, spec sheet and illo in Ian Hogg's little hardback handbook called TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARTILLERY, p. 299, published Barnes & Noble Books, 2000, ISBN: 0-7607-1994-2. For $10 U.S., it is a great buy.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Leta]

Only for didactical purpose, here is an image of the Land Mattress:

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Earlier on, there were the rocket firing LCM®s for beach bombardment. These were mostly used in the Pacific, but were also present on D-Day.

Michael

I think you'll find they were primarily LCT®s, not LCM®s which would have been a bit small to really carry enough rockets. The LCT®s were utilised from Sicily onwards.

Interestingly, while I was looking the LCT® up, I came across the LCI®, which I'd never heard of before:

[Xavier]

:eek:

it seems there were no possibility to increase or decrease the angle of the firing tubes on these boats.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Earlier on, there were the rocket firing LCM®s for beach bombardment. These were mostly used in the Pacific, but were also present on D-Day.

Michael

I think you'll find they were primarily LCT®s, not LCM®s which would have been a bit small to really carry enough rockets.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Xavier:

:eek:

it seems there were no possibility to increase or decrease the angle of the firing tubes on these boats.

You are most likely correct. I can't recall if the later models had some means of altering elevation, but the basic technique was that you motored in to a determined distance from the beach, pointed the boat at your designated target and let fly. Remember, these were area saturation weapons and not very precise anyway. Presumably that's why the 5" was included on the LSM®s: to take care of point targets. Would have been very nice to have at Omaha.

Michael

[ June 20, 2002, 11:48 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Xavier:

:eek:

it seems there were no possibility to increase or decrease the angle of the firing tubes on these boats.

You are most likely correct. I can't recall if the later models had some means of altering elevation, but the basic technique was that you motored in to a determined distance from the beach, pointed the boat at your designated target and let fly. Remember, these were area saturation weapons and not very precise anyway. Presumably that's why the 5" was included on the LSM®s: to take care of point targets. Would have been very nice to have at Omaha.

Michael</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Brian:

Well, the British developed their own LCS(G) (the "G" standing for "gun") which consisted of 6 Pdrs and/or 17 Pdrs in turrets for direct fire support.

True enough. My book lists a whole slough of modifications on basic landing craft hulls intended to bring supporting firepower in with the beaching craft. Most of these were of British origin. I found one, the LCG(L), a conversion of either the LCT(3) or LCT(4) hull, that mounted two 4.7" naval guns.

BTW, are you sure of that designation? I couldn't find it in my reference, but I did find one matching your description called the LCG(M).

The LCT® was only ever intended for mass bombardment on the approach run-in, to keep the heads down of the defenders.

They could do that if the defenders were not too heavily dug-in. A more realistic use for them in Normandy was to clear mines on the beach proper.

The firepower of the LCT® was two and one-half times the salvo power of a battleship), carrying 792 rockets (I'm unsure of

their calibre - 6 inch?).

Five inch. And I found one that carried 1,064.

Not bad for an Army and Navy which has been classified by some on this BBS as "hidebound" and conservative.

I find it hard to believe that any serious person could find the RN lacking in dash or imagination.

Michael

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I believe I've read the book you're using as a reference many, many, moons ago. I seem to remember it utilised US Navy designations rather than the British ones. My designation might be wrong, I admit but I suspect the US and RN designations were different.

The problem is like with most things, the US Navy believed its designations were more sensible so the world unfortunately labours with them, rather than the RN ones.

Problem is, they were simply too inaccurate, being fired from the heaving deck of a landing craft at an approximate range. I also think they'd crater the beach too much. One thing on these sorts of operations is that you must make sure that your tanks can get across that sand to the defences behind the beachs, so its important not to make it too hard for them, so you have to accept you can't cause too much damage on the beach itself. Otherwise they'd have been firing 16in over open sights, if they really wanted to destroy the beach defences for sure.

I think you'll find that was a late war, post-Normandy development. One of the problems in the original design was they weren't sure how close they could pack the firing frames. They were frightened of sympathetic ignitions.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Brian:

Michael, I note you rather diplomatically left the army out of your reply.

The Army is more problematical and I haven't formed a final opinion yet. I'd say that at high strategic levels they were as good as anyone on average. On the lowest tactical levels, they were good enough to get by, meaning that by midwar they had learned from their mistakes and worked out techniques on the company and battalion level that worked for them.

It's that in-between operational stuff run by colonels, brigadiers, major generals, and sometimes lieutenant generals where the wicket gets uncomfortably sticky. Seems that a lot of those guys just never quite "got it". They let opportunities pass unseized, and failed to create opportunities when they might have. On the whole, the Germans come off looking better here. And since WW II has received the most scrutiny at the operational level, that tends to make the whole Army look rather worse than it deserves to.

Of course there were exeptions; O'Connor springs immediately to mind as does Wingate, who may have been three-quarters of the way to the loony bin (according to his harshest critics in the service) but definitely had the right idea in Burma. Also I am sure that there were many who achieved no great reknown, but who discharged their offices competently. But one does keep stumbling across stories that make one cringe in sympathy.

Michael

[ June 22, 2002, 06:07 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Well, I'd suggest that at the strategic level they excelled, myself (as long as Brooke could manage to control Winston and make him keep his fingers out of the pie). While they might have lost in say, Greece and Crete, which was one of those cases where Winston did interfere, at virtually the same time Wavell was organising and conducting campaigns in Iraq, Syria and East Africa and all on a severe shoe-string as well.

I'd suggest that though, its actually at the tactical level that all too often the British Army failed to shine. More often than not the same mistakes were made by inexperienced officers after the experienced ones were killed. While every effort was made to transfer "lessons learnt", even so, a certain lack of tactical flair was noted by many German officers, with the resort to the same formations, despite the inadequacies of those formations already having being displayed.

Wingate. Perhaps one of the most difficult commanders to get a handle on. I think Slim's views on him, while charitable about him personally, indicate that Slim didn't exactly see eye-to-eye with his ideas on how to conduct a war. I tend to agree with him that Wingate's campaign's returns were not commensurate with the resources utilised. I agree that O'Connor was very good, its a great pity he fell foul of Montgomery and spent that period in captivity which prevented his full potential from being realised.

Overall though, I suspect the reputation of the British Army for being hidebound and conservative in its tactical theory is not warranted from my analysis.

[ June 22, 2002, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Brian:

...at virtually the same time Wavell was organising and conducting campaigns in Iraq, Syria and East Africa and all on a severe shoe-string as well.

Iran too about the same time, wasn't it? Yes, Wavell was one of the best, especially in his post at Middle East Command. Huge tragedy that Churchill lost patience with him. Also think much the same can be said of Auchenleck, whom I regard as among the top half-dozen or so of British generals. Too bad he was too senior to be named outright as commander of Eighth Army with Wavell retaining the post of GOC/ME. That could have been a winning combination. It seems that after he got the boot in August '42 he went back to India and more or less sat out the war, didn't he? Major waste of talent.

I'd suggest that though, its actually at the tactical level that all too often the British Army failed to shine.

You really think so? I would have thought that could be applied to armour tactics, but that the artillery-infantry battle was pretty well shaken out by Normandy. Of course there are always individual commanders and units that don't come up to the mark in all armies, but I should have thought that though not particularly brilliant in most cases, they got the job done.

...even so, a certain lack of tactical flair was noted by many German officers

Well, but compared to the Germans, nearly everybody showed "a certain lack of tactical flair".

Wingate. Perhaps one of the most difficult commanders to get a handle on. I think Slim's views on him, while charitable about him personally, indicate that Slim didn't exactly see eye-to-eye with his ideas on how to conduct a war. I tend to agree with him that Wingate's campaign's returns were not commensurate with the resources utilised.

I think it's pretty clear that after Wingate's death there was no senior officer in the theater who knew how to use the Chindits and similar forces correctly. They were underarmed and undersupported for fighting stand-up battles against the Japanese main forces as they were latterly called on to do. They were actually guerillas or partisans whose greatest strength lay in their ability to strike unexpectedly against unprotected logistical infrastructure and then retire before the Japanese could organise a reaction.

This provokes a further observation. Since much of our discussion has revolved around innovation and the (supposed) lack of it in the British army, I have always found it striking that where the British and Commonwealth soldiers really shined in that regard was in their special forces, which were never surpassed and seldom matched. The SAS, SBS, LRDG, Commandos, Chindits, and early exploits of the Parachute Regiment (such as the Bruneval raid) were magnificent. It seems that most of the best men in the Army found their way into such units rather than into the regulars, much to the loss of the latter. This was true to some extent in most if not all armies, but is most striking in the British services.

Overall though, I suspect the reputation of the British Army for being hidebound and conservative in its tactical theory is not warranted from my analysis.

No, I wouldn't say that they were always sluggish or unimaginative in formulating theory, after all, they more or less invented Blitzkrieg in the form of experimental combined arms mechanized units during the late '20s-early '30s. It was the process getting those theories out to the actual fighting forces where they lost a lot of ground, especially compared to the Germans. Rommel had to teach them all over again how to fight with tanks. Which was likely his greatest contribution to Alllied victory.

Michael

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Originally posted by Brian:

...at virtually the same time Wavell was organising and conducting campaigns in Iraq, Syria and East Africa and all on a severe shoe-string as well.Iran too about the same time, wasn't it?

It occurred just after the Iraq campaign. Slim's brigade was moved from Eastern Syria to Iran, IIRC.

Yes, Wavell was one of the best, especially in his post at Middle East Command. Huge tragedy that Churchill lost patience with him. Also think much the same can be said of Auchenleck, whom I regard as among the top half-dozen or so of British generals. Too bad he was too senior to be named outright as commander of Eighth Army with Wavell retaining the post of GOC/ME. That could have been a winning combination. It seems that after he got the boot in August '42 he went back to India and more or less sat out the war, didn't he? Major waste of talent.

Well, he did take control of ABDA command when it was created after the Japanese attack (more because the Americans knew they were on a losing wicket and didn't want to be associated with a defeat I suspect than necessarily they believed Wavell was necessarily the best man for the job) but he was already on the decline mentally, I suspect by that point. He couldn't seem to grapple with the fact that the Indian troops he was commanding in Malaya and Burma were not of the same standard as those he'd known in the Middle East. The result was a serious over-estimation of their abilities versus those of the Japanese and when reality intruded, he found he couldn't really come to terms with the results as the Japanese defeated his forces. He appeared to suffer a serious mental decline after that point. He did though, publish his anthology of poetry, Other Mens' Flowers after that, which makes interesting reading. He was a bit too intellectual in some ways for the British Army IMO.

I'd suggest that though, its actually at the tactical level that all too often the British Army failed to shine.You really think so? I would have thought that could be applied to armour tactics, but that the artillery-infantry battle was pretty well shaken out by Normandy. Of course there are always individual commanders and units that don't come up to the mark in all armies, but I should have thought that though not particularly brilliant in most cases, they got the job done.

Oh, I agree, they got the job done but all too often at a cost which wasn't very good IMO. It was a problem I suspect with overtraining in the UK for previous 3 years. The units which were brought back from the Middle East for the invasion faired better but still had to come to grips with the changed environment (and foe).

...even so, a certain lack of tactical flair was noted by many German officersWell, but compared to the Germans, nearly everybody showed "a certain lack of tactical flair".

Yes, well there is "flair" and there is "flair". I sometimes wish that de Guingard's wish had been answered. I often wonder how the 9 Div AIF would have done in Normandy.

Wingate. Perhaps one of the most difficult commanders to get a handle on. I think Slim's views on him, while charitable about him personally, indicate that Slim didn't exactly see eye-to-eye with his ideas on how to conduct a war. I tend to agree with him that Wingate's campaign's returns were not commensurate with the resources utilised.I think it's pretty clear that after Wingate's death there was no senior officer in the theater who knew how to use the Chindits and similar forces correctly. They were underarmed and undersupported for fighting stand-up battles against the Japanese main forces as they were latterly called on to do. They were actually guerillas or partisans whose greatest strength lay in their ability to strike unexpectedly against unprotected logistical infrastructure and then retire before the Japanese could organise a reaction.

Yet, Wingate himself did not utilise them in the manner, himself. His final operations were directed more towards establishment of a semi-permament base in the enemy's rear. Therefore, it anybody is guilty of "misuse" of the Chindits, you'd have to blame him. However, as Slim points out, there was this massive outlay in resources which he believed, as theatre commander could have been better utilised in pushing the enemy back.

This provokes a further observation. Since much of our discussion has revolved around innovation and the (supposed) lack of it in the British army, I have always found it striking that where the British and Commonwealth soldiers really shined in that regard was in their special forces, which were never surpassed and seldom matched. The SAS, SBS, LRDG, Commandos, Chindits, and early exploits of the Parachute Regiment (such as the Bruneval raid) were magnificent. It seems that most of the best men in the Army found their way into such units rather than into the regulars, much to the loss of the latter. This was true to some extent in most if not all armies, but is most striking in the British services.

I suggest you read Slim's views on that, as well as George McDonald Fraser's Quartered Safe Out Here for an interesting view of what it was like to become mixed up with the sorts of odd chaps that those sorts of private armies attracted.

Overall though, I suspect the reputation of the British Army for being hidebound and conservative in its tactical theory is not warranted from my analysis.No, I wouldn't say that they were always sluggish or unimaginative in formulating theory, after all, they more or less invented Blitzkrieg in the form of experimental combined arms mechanized units during the late '20s-early '30s. It was the process getting those theories out to the actual fighting forces where they lost a lot of ground, especially compared to the Germans. Rommel had to teach them all over again how to fight with tanks. Which was likely his greatest contribution to Alllied victory.

Michael

Well, Guderian always maintained that it was his copy of the provisional training pamphlet for the British Mechanised Force exercises of that period which was one of his inspirations for his theories on all-arms warfare.

I think the biggest problem is that the British have always made such an effort at maintaining their air of amatuerism that they have convinced many people that they were all bumblers and fumblers. In reality, while the peace-time hangers-on who were in control for the first period of the war might have been, with some notable exceptions such as Wavell and O'Connor, etc. by the middle of the war, just as in the previous conflict, that had largely been replaced by a cold, calculating, efficient military machine, which while it might still have not quite got the hang of how to wage modern war, was on the verge of doing so.

[ June 23, 2002, 02:01 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]