BAR - what was it ?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by BloodyBucket:

The Americans probably figured, in the low budget, post WWI years that the BAR was what they won the last war with and let it go at that.

Errr, are you claiming that the USA won WWI and it was the BAR which facilitated that victory?</font>

[lcm1947]

I see and agree Edward. I misread the post thinking they were referring to a single round from the M1 or BAR and the one round being more powerful then the other when they are one in the same.

[BloodyBucket]

While I can't remember the barrel length of the BAR, I bet it was close to the 24" barrel of the Garand, and both weapons used the same cartridge, as has been pointed out.

The often cited penetrating power of the BAR was no more or less than the Garand, or, for that matter, the M1917 or M1919 type MGs, since all of them fire basically the same cartridge out of a similar length barrel. Purists will point out that the M1 cartridge adopted in 1925 used a 173 grain boat-tail bullet at 2,700 fps, and the M2 load adopted in 1939 had a 152 grain bullet moving out at 2,805 fps. But the prevailing WWII round, the M2, was used in the BAR, M-1 rifle and the MG at the same time.

The reputation of the BAR might be due to the way automatic fire looks and sounds more impressive, the fact that it WAS more powerful than the Thompson SMG, the other full auto weapon then in inventory, or simply a myth generated by the BAR's loyal users. I have heard Marines swear that a .45 caliber bullet from an M1911A1 will knock you flat even if it hits you in the thumb. Good press for old slabsides, but not true.

I agree that Browning was probably simply trying to come up with an automatic rifle that a single soldier could carry, and left the tactics to the army. The lack of a quick-change barrel and a larger magazine were probably due to the fact that they were harder to design in a cheap, light and reliable weapon, and the fact that the army didn't ask for them. At the time the weapon was designed, detachable magazines were still somewhat of a novelty, and a larger magazine would probably be more prone to jamming.

As to the reason for the Marine Corps move to the three BAR squad, the increased firepower is an advantage that would be welcomed by a unit that had outside firepower resources or one that didn't. I think that the reason the Marines moved that way first (the US Army did the same both officially and in the field without a paper T/E change) is that they were more likely to have to rely on organic firepower. Another huge advantage is the tactical equality of three equal fire teams. The old practice of a fire, maneuver and command element was not so hot if your fire element (with the BAR) needed to move and be supported by the command or maneuver elements, etc. The Marines would move more quickly against a defense than the Army, without waiting for support, and the need for improvement in infantry firepower and tactics was more keenly felt.

[ April 19, 2002, 12:21 AM: Message edited by: BloodyBucket ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by BloodyBucket:

The Americans probably figured, in the low budget, post WWI years that the BAR was what they won the last war with and let it go at that.

Errr, are you claiming that the USA won WWI and it was the BAR which facilitated that victory?</font>

[BloodyBucket]

Sorry if I was unclear. I meant that the Americans were on the winning side, and thus, were more apt to be satisfied with the status quo in equiptment. I don't think that the US intervention in WWI was the sole factor in allied victory, nor do I maintain that the BAR was the key weapon in obtaining that result.

Everyone, of course, knows that honor must be shared jointly by the M1911, the M1917 trench knife and the Pederson device.

[Brian]

Thanks. Now we have cleared that up, we can go on. I was afraid you were making the same mistakes someone else had.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by edward_n_kelly:

With all the "interaction" in another thread on the role of the BAR versus the Bren (and others) just what was the BAR ?

[Lots of other good questions snipped]

Here, have some snippets to chew on -- long post, I'm afraid. Here are Ian Hogg and John Weeks to start with:

"The Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) was another weapon which arose from the concept of "Walking Fire", an idea urged upon the Americans by the French army. The weapon never entirely lived up to the designer's hopes; neither a rifle nor a machine-gun, it fell between the two. As a rifle it was too heavy and could not be fired from the shoulder with any accuracy as it vibrated from the forward movement of the bolt. Set for automatic fire it was too light and moved excessively, and the small magazine demanded frequent reloading. For its day, though, it was a brilliant design produced in record time by John Browning, and it was bought and used by many countries around the world. It was the standard squad light automatic of the US infantry during World War Two and saw use in every theatre of war. It was also supplied in considerable numbers to the British Home Guard."

Ian Hogg and John Weeks, "Military Small Arms of the 20th Century", 6th edition (A & AP, London, 1991) page 174.

Why did the US Army prefer the BAR to the Lewis?

"Although Lewis energetically promoted his weapon to various US authorities, it was not until the gun had been produced in tens of thousands in Europe and proved in war that it was adopted in the land of its inception. In spite of subsequent combat experience, though, the US Army were quick to get rid of it after 1918, retaining only a small number for training purposes, though the Army Air Corps adopted it as a standard weapon. The truth of the matter will probably never be known, but it seems to have been a personality clash between Lewis and some of the higher elements of the US Ordnance Corps."

Ian Hogg and John Weeks, "Military Small Arms of the 20th Century", 6th edition (A & AP, London, 1991) page 285.

Some historical bits from Jane's:

"Browning returned to the USA and in 1917 gave a demonstration of 2 new weapons -- the Browning water cooled machine gun and his Automatic Rifle. The tests at Congress Heights of the BAR on 27 February 1917 were very impressive. The rifle was fired at semi automatic, automatic and whilst carried by a walking soldier. In addition it was completely stripped down to its basic 70 components and rapidly re-assembled.

"Colt's held the rights to Browning's design and they provided the drawings and gauges to enable other companies to manufacture the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). Browning returned to Winchester's plant and there the working drawings were produced. Production started in February 1918 and in November of that year when the war ended, Winchester were producing 300 guns a day. Other guns were made by Marlin-Rockwell who were turning out 200 guns a day when the war ended. Colt made a total of 9,000 to bring the overall figure up to 52,000 guns. The weapon first saw action on 13 September 1918."

Major F Hobart, "Jane's Infantry Weapons 1975" (Jane's Yearbooks, London, 1975) page 312.

Ian Hogg says pretty much what he did with John Weeks:

"The Browning Automatic Rifle was a good design in its way: the trouble was that it was neither one thing nor another. It was too heavy to be an automatic rifle, and it was too light to be a machine-gun. As a rifle it was cumbersome to try and fire it from the shoulder, and it needed a strong man to fire it with any degree of accuracy. As a light machine-gun it vibrated too much and the bottom-mounted magazine was inconvenient for changing in action. Nevertheless, the US Army adopted it and kept it in service until after the Second World War. They admitted it wasn't the perfect light machine-gun, but they couldn't develop anything better."

Ian Hogg, "The Complete Machine-Gun" (Phoebus, London, 1979)pages 37-38.

...and John Weeks says pretty much what he did with Ian Hogg:

"Critics of the BAR have to tread warily, because this gun arouses the same feelings of loyalty in ex-GIs as the does the Bren in Britain. However, these same GIs can usually be persuaded to admit that the Bren was the better of the two, without prejudicing the BAR. But a study of the BAR does show that it lacked many of the qualities needed to make it a really worthwhile squad gun, and the design seems to fall midway between that of an automatic rifle and a machine gun with most of the vices of both. It had been designed in 1916 by John Browning to be a light shoulder fired rifle to be used in the advance across No Man's Land, and fired while on the move. It never succeeded in being a light rifle, and weighed 16lbs from the start. When firing automatic the vibration was too great to hold the gun onto the target, and the bipod issued with the Second World War models was heavy and clumsy. It was difficult to adjust, and

most gunners ended up by throwing it away and reverting to using the weapon as a rifle. The barrel could not be changed, and so there was no capability for any form of sustained fire, and the magazine held only twenty rounds. Really the kindest thing that one can say about the BAR is that it was a compromise that did not work out."

John Weeks, "Infantry Weapons" (Pan/Ballantine, London, 1972)page 126.

What John Weeks would have thought a better scheme:

"Looking at the infantry weapon armoury of the US Army as it entered the Second World War, one cannot help but notice the lack of an effective squad light machine gun, and it is a thousand pities that General MacArthur was not able to get one. One wonders if he ever tried, but even if he had, the financial climate of his day would undoubtedly have killed it, and he might have lost the Garand also. But what a wonderful combination the squad could have had with the Garand and a .300 Bren!"

John Weeks, "Infantry Weapons" (Pan/Ballantine, London, 1972) page 128.

John George compares the BAR with the Japanese "Nambu" LMGs, and sticks with American terms ("machine rifle"):

"Those light machine guns (more properly called machine-rifles) were good weapons, either the hopper fed M-11 (1922) or the clip fed, Bren-profiled M-96 (1936) job. They had many points of superiority over our equivalent weapon, which continued to be the BAR throughout the entire war. Most of these points arose from the fact that the BAR was a weapon which had been adapted to do a machine rifle job, while both of the Nambus were designed for machine rifle purposes in the first place. I have shot both weapons rather extensively, and I am sure of myself when I say that I would rather be armed with a M-1936 Nambu than with any of our BAR types. I believe it to be a better gun, though slightly less reliable in function. And if I had an equal amount of experience with the older M-1922, hopper feed and all, I might even prefer it to the BAR as a machine rifle.

"The Browning Auto Rifle, stripped of all its machine rifle adaptations, has a role of its own in jungle warfare that is entirely different from the ordinary mission of the machine rifle. In that capacity, the Browning is a good gun, and I would not put any other brush-sprayer we have in the more vital section of a moving column on a jungle trail. Criticism here is directed against the weapon as a machine rifle, not as an assault weapon to be fired during movement. For that type of work, the Nambu would be no better."

Lt-Col John George, "Shots Fired in Anger", 2nd edition (National Rifle Association of America, Washington DC, 1981) page 323.

...and compares it with the TSMG and Bren:

"At the outset of the war our old BAR had been much changed from its original person, in both appearance and function. Ordnance had thrown a lot of gadgets -- buttrests and bipods and hooked buttplates -- on both ends of the poor weapon so that the man carrying it looked from a distance like a travelling tin shop. This was an effort to give the weapon long range accuracy and sustained steadiness throughout long bursts; a typical American attempt to substitute gadgets for skill. The BAR as originally issued was wonderful in the hands of a good man. The gadgets worked beautifully on the range -- the gun would practically fire itself and on the thousand inch targets it would hold a burst smaller than some of our heavy machine guns fired with tripods firmly sandbagged.

"Seeing this -- back in 1940 -- we all congratulated ourselves on having such a splendid weapon, but not for long. Two weeks after we were on Guadalcanal we had thrown away all of the gadgets and were using the gun stark naked -- the way old John Browning had built them in the first place. The only times when bipods and buttrests were worthwhile were in long range sniping from hilltop to beach, opportunity for which was rare in occurrence. We did, however, make good use of the guns we stripped down.

"We used them for blind shooting -- for taking care of surprise targets. We placed them at the head of patrols we knew would run into trouble, and we found them very valuable. We had always thought of the Tommy gun as the standard "sprayer", but we found that it lacked penetrating ability -- it could not cut down brush or penetrate small treetrunks as could the rifle or BAR. The more powerful .30-06 was many times better for shooting into cover. It soon became almost standard procedure for two BARs (carried slung in the assault position) to be placed at the head and tail of all large columns moving through coconut groves or jungle.

"Actually, I believe our fondness for the BAR was more concerned with the type of fire than with the weapon itself. We would have been equally pleased with the Bren gun -- perhaps more so. What we yearned for was a good gun to throw a lot of lead, faster and harder than the Tommy gun. This the Browning did, moderately well.

"I say "moderately" because the twenty-shot magazine of the weapon was too small, and because the gun seemed to require too much maintenance. The ones we used broke too many parts and malfunctioned just a little too often -- in my experience, much more often than the British Bren.

"I hesitate to say these things about the BAR because of the great esteem my friends have for it..."

Lt-Col John George, "Shots Fired in Anger", 2nd edition (National Rifle Association of America, Washington DC, 1981) page 399.

I hope people have been able to find something of interest in that little lot...

All the best,

John.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

[/QB]"Actually, I believe our fondness for the BAR was more concerned with the type of fire than with the weapon itself. We would have been equally pleased with the Bren gun -- perhaps more so. What we yearned for was a good gun to throw a lot of lead, faster and harder than the Tommy gun. This the Browning did, moderately well.

"I say "moderately" because...etc..[/QB]

In short, it wasn't the perfect weapon, but, it was--as someone said above, "good enough" for its job. It was good enough to be requested in ever greater numbers by the troops who used it, not because it was perfect, but because it was the best weapon available to them for the task. And, despite its drawbacks, it was good enough for good soldiers to achieve victory with. In general we can sometimes obsess about the fine points of advantage a given weapon has over others, but ultimately, in CM, as in RL, we have to find a way to make the weapons we're given good enough to win with.

[Brian]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

"Actually, I believe our fondness for the BAR was more concerned with the type of fire than with the weapon itself. We would have been equally pleased with the Bren gun -- perhaps more so. What we yearned for was a good gun to throw a lot of lead, faster and harder than the Tommy gun. This the Browning did, moderately well.

"I say "moderately" because...etc..[/QB]

In short, it wasn't the perfect weapon, but, it was--as someone said above, "good enough" for its job. It was good enough to be requested in ever greater numbers by the troops who used it, not because it was perfect, but because it was the best weapon available to them for the task. And, despite its drawbacks, it was good enough for good soldiers to achieve victory with. In general we can sometimes obsess about the fine points of advantage a given weapon has over others, but ultimately, in CM, as in RL, we have to find a way to make the weapons we're given good enough to win with.[/QB]</font>

[BloodyBucket]

American practice in adopting small arms has left much to be desired, to be sure. "Bullets and Bureaucrats, the machine gun and the United States Army, 1861-1916" by David Armstrong talks about the problems the army had with figuring out just what the heck they wanted to do with machine guns to begin with, and IIRC, the decision to pass the Lewis gun by had something to do with animosity between Lewis and a member of the ordnance board that began with the two men romancing the same woman.

IMHO, the BAR and the Bren are so similar as to be the same thing. The MG34 beats them both by a mile, and the allies almost forced the Germans to think the MG-34 up by forbiding heavy machine guns in Germany post WWI. Another example of the law of unintended consequences.

As recently as the 1980's the US was using fireteams that had an M-16 as the SAW, and the belt fed guns were a platoon or company, not a squad, asset. The idea of basing the squad around a belt fed machine gun, proven so effective by the Germans, has been slow to gain favor in the US. If I had to guess why, I would say that excellent outside fire support, a tradition of teaching aimed fire and plain old inertia from on high are the main reasons.

As to the Johnson family of weapons, I think the main hit against them was reliability. Johnson was a former Marine, and got the Marine Corps to look at them, but the Garand and the BAR were too firmly entrenched for any advantage the Johnson guns offered to oust them.

The Americans never suffered badly (on a operational level) from the lack of a squad level LMG during WWII because of outside firepower, but during the Korean war, they got trounced a few times when support wasn't available and they found they didn't have the organic infantry firepower needed to stop the North Koreans and Chinese infantry.

It is my impression that the Brits were more aware of the importance of the Bren as the "center" of the squad than the GIs were with the BAR. I freely admit that my knowledge of Brit infantry tactics, training and usage are limited. I am guessing that the Brits used the Bren to better effect than the Americans used the BAR, mainly because of doctrine and training, and had the weapons been reversed, the results would be the same. Any more informed opinions on this?

[Brian]

Originally posted by BloodyBucket:

IMHO, the BAR and the Bren are so similar as to be the same thing.

Mmmm, not quite. There is one major and significant difference - the removable barrel. This allows the Bren to have a higher sustained rate of fire than the BAR. Something which should not IMO be quite so easily dismissed. While the magazine capacity is slightly larger, what is clearly superior in the Bren is its location (IMO top mounted magazines on LMGs are the only sensible location, if you're going to utilise a magazine that is).

The MG34 beats them both by a mile, and the allies almost forced the Germans to think the MG-34 up by forbiding heavy machine guns in Germany post WWI. Another example of the law of unintended consequences.

Not quite. What they did force the Germans to do was figure out how to make an LMG do the same job as an MMG. However, they weren't alone in coming up with the solution they did. The Czechs were there as well, and dare I mention it, from that lineage, so were the British. The German ideas on the LMG were formed in WWI, where they used primarily captured Lewis guns, simply 'cause it seems they couldn't produce anything themselves.

As recently as the 1980's the US was using fireteams that had an M-16 as the SAW, and the belt fed guns were a platoon or company, not a squad, asset. The idea of basing the squad around a belt fed machine gun, proven so effective by the Germans, has been slow to gain favor in the US. If I had to guess why, I would say that excellent outside fire support, a tradition of teaching aimed fire and plain old inertia from on high are the main reasons.

Did you say, "slow"? I'd suggest it crept with the speed of a glacier if it took to the '90s to get through to them.

As to the Johnson family of weapons, I think the main hit against them was reliability. Johnson was a former Marine, and got the Marine Corps to look at them, but the Garand and the BAR were too firmly entrenched for any advantage the Johnson guns offered to oust them.

I've heard this criticism of the Johnson weapons before but I've recently read a book on 1 Special Service Brigade (I won't call them 1 SS Brig., what was their abbreviation? where it seems they preferred the Johnson Model 41 over the Bren. While this web page suggests that the primary reason that the Johnson lost out to the M1 Garand and the BAR was because of the large installed base, rather than necessarily any technical problems associated with either design. Of the LMG designs, perhaps the Model 44 would have been the one which was most comparable to the Bren, albeit with a smaller magazine at least it had a removable barrel. Interestingly, the nascent Israeli Defence Force adopted the Model 44 LMG and manufactured it in small numbers as the "Dror" LMG.

The Americans never suffered badly (on a operational level) from the lack of a squad level LMG during WWII because of outside firepower, but during the Korean war, they got trounced a few times when support wasn't available and they found they didn't have the organic infantry firepower needed to stop the North Koreans and Chinese infantry.

So, in otherwords, US doctrine compensated for the lack of firepower by providing it through other means?

It is my impression that the Brits were more aware of the importance of the Bren as the "center" of the squad than the GIs were with the BAR. I freely admit that my knowledge of Brit infantry tactics, training and usage are limited. I am guessing that the Brits used the Bren to better effect than the Americans used the BAR, mainly because of doctrine and training, and had the weapons been reversed, the results would be the same. Any more informed opinions on this?

Well, speaking from the British viewpoint, yes, the section did operate with the Bren as its centrepiece. I have no idea whether it was used to "more effect" but suspect it was.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Brian:

So, in otherwords, US doctrine compensated for the lack of firepower by providing it through other means?

Yes. For instance, the infantry was lavishly supplied with belt fed MGs at the company and battalion level to the point where one could be easily alloted to each platoon to bolster its firepower. The disadvantage was that these guns were a bit slower to haul around in the assault, as you will have discovered by playing the Americans in CM. But by using them as a base of fire while the rifle squads maneuvered and then moving them up to the next bit of cover before the next jump off, they could prove serviceable.

I too am of the opinion that the US forces would have been better off on balance had they adopted the BREN (rechambered for the 30-06), but they were able to get good use from what they had on hand, just as they did with the Sherman.

As an aside, I wonder if the total firepower of the American squad with the BAR and Garands might not stack up pretty well compared to the British section with its BREN and Lee-Enfields. Different approaches to the same, or at least similar, ends.

Michael

[BloodyBucket]

Well, this is going to make me look silly, but I had no idea the Bren had a removable barrel. That does "change" my view of things (Pun intended). I still think that the MG-34 would be the ticket to base a squad around, given the choice of the three (Bren, BAR and MG-34).

The Johnson seems to have suffered a similar fate to the Stoner weapons, that is, they were a good idea that didn't have the support or the political clout to get fully developed or adopted by other than a few specialty units. The technical shortcomings could probably have been ironed out with sufficient backing and interest.

I don't think the Garand made up for the lack of firepower in American squads, although it is a good rifle, probably the best general issue rifle of the war. The key weapon available to the US platoon commander in WWII was probably the FO.

The glacial nature of change in US doctrine is probably due to the fact that until recently, the idea has always been that outside fire support would be available whenever needed. Now that the idea of light infantry that can be inserted and extracted quickly is in favor, the need for a good SAW has been filled. This might be in part a response by senior leadership to their days as junior officers in Vietnam, where lavish fire support was not the the war winner it was in WWII.

Can anyone reccomend a good book on Commonwealth infantry tactics in WWII? I would like to learn more about this.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by BloodyBucket:

[snips]I still think that the MG-34 would be the ticket to base a squad around, given the choice of the three (Bren, BAR and MG-34).

Most people would probably agree -- the Bren was replaced by the belt-fed FN MAG (in the guise of the L7 GPMG) in British service during the 1950s.

However, if you have Jac Weller's "Weapons and Tactics: Hasting to Berlin", there's a dissenting opinion in there (I may get round to posting some more tactics-connected snippets including this, if people are interested). At any rate, I think the difference between the two is probably exagerrated in CM for most types of fire. PRO document WO 291/474, "Rate of fire of the LMG", gives results of a theoretical study indicating that a belt-fed weapon with a cyclic rate of 1000 rds/min is only about 20% better than a mag-fed one with a cyclic rate of 500 rds/min firing short bursts. The advantage is greater in traversing fire, and greater still in enfilade fire.

The Johnson seems to have suffered a similar fate to the Stoner weapons, that is, they were a good idea that didn't have the support or the political clout to get fully developed or adopted by other than a few specialty units.

AFAIK, the Johnson was officially acquired only for the USMC, who had, and I believe to some extent still do have, their own ideas on what weapons to procure. I also get the impression that the USMC has also, by the nature of its role, always paid more attention to infantry minor tactics than the US Army. Some Johnsons were fielded by 1st Special Service Force, to be sure, but I believe that these were traded with the Marines in exchange for a few tons of plastic explosive.

[snips]

The glacial nature of change in US doctrine is probably due to the fact that until recently, the idea has always been that outside fire support would be available whenever needed. Now that the idea of light infantry that can be inserted and extracted quickly is in favor, the need for a good SAW has been filled. This might be in part a response by senior leadership to their days as junior officers in Vietnam, where lavish fire support was not the the war winner it was in WWII.

Don't forget that, during the Viet Nam era, the US Army was not immune to the fashion for GPMGs that everyone followed after WW2. The M-60 was used as a squad weapon, as well as a platoon one, once the silliness of the M-14 modified and M-16 heavy-barrelled automatic rifles had subsided. For reasons I don't pretend to understand, the UK is now going through the same silliness with the LSW. Meanwhile, the USA has got itself probably the best 5.56mm section LMG available anywhere by buying the Minimi. But I don't think anyone ever went too far wrong by buying FN.

Can anyone reccomend a good book on Commonwealth infantry tactics in WWII? I would like to learn more about this.

The best single volume I can suggest, long out of print, is Anthony Farrar-Hockley's "Infantry Tactics 1939-1945" in the Almark "Mechanics of War" series (Almark, London, 1976; ISBN 85524-255-8). It covers British, German, Russian and American infantry tactics, but I think covers British ones best (as one might expect from a British soldier). If you find a copy of the "Squad Leader" issue of the Avalon Hill "General", the article on infantry tactics in that is largely drawn, uncredited, from this book.

British platoon and section tactics did not officially change greatly between the end of WW2 and the adoption, finally, of 5.56mm weapons in the 1980s. This means that there are a lot of people around, myself included, who were trained to do section and platoon attacks the same way the book said to do them in the North-West Europe campaign. Whether people always did them that way, of course, is another question...

All the best,

John.

[Brian]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Mmmm, dare I mention EM-2 versus L1a1, John but I agree that was a political decision forced upon Whitehall by people in another white building which they once burnt, for having the temerity to try and dispute UK military decisions.

Apart from that, I concur wholeheartedly with the rest.

Now, wheres my turn?

[BloodyBucket]

Thanks for the tip on the book. I confess to being much more familiar with American tactics and weapons, partly because of my location, and also because of my father's service in Europe during WWII with the 28th ID. He was, at least for part of his time there, a BAR gunner.

He liked the weapon, but was well aware that it drew fire and the Germans were using something better. He told me that they sometimes employed the BAR for making long shots at individuals who got careless and assumed they were out of range, and also that he loaded the magazines all AP or every other round AP and tracer, mostly for pointing out targets to supporting armored vehicles.

My father echoes the common claim that the BAR was well made, accurate and very reliable if maintained properly. He also remembers that they were not allowed to go to the rear with wounded men, and they were always seeking to "upgun" the TE.

[Shatter]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

[QB]Just some quick, wrong answers to see if I can mess it up enough to provoke someone else to answer more correctly and informatively.

just what was the BAR ?

The gun you see the big guy carrying in WWII movies.

-------------------------------------------------

Not always true for real life though. My grandfather carried a Bar in Africa and Italy and he was 5'11" and from the pictures he showed me around 150 to 160 pounds. He showed excellent ability to handle the weapon and fire accurate bursts.

Yes hollywood has a way of distorting the truth, infact from the footage I have seen on history channel I would say that definate body type that carried the BAR.

I think it was pretty much determined by ones ability to use the weapon effectively.

[ April 21, 2002, 10:52 PM: Message edited by: Shatter ]

[Charlie Rock]

For the record, US rifle companies were not lavishly supplied with machine guns at the company level. They were armed with two M1919s.

A standard german rifle company had 4 per platoon. Two with tripods, I think, at company level. So 14 overall.

Balkoski's Beyond The Beachhead is a terrific source. Rifle companies had difficulty achieving local fire superiority because a rifle platoon with 3 BARs could not generate enough to overcome Germans with MG42s.

From reading "Automatic Weapons" by Melvin Johnson (pub around 1942) I think that there was a rifle-centric attitude in the U.S. Army, that good shots with garands generated enough firepower that machine guns at the squad level were less important. There also was a misguided idea in some circles that mobility was paramount, and by keeping the squad 'light' one soldier with an GPMG wouldn't slow down the group. There also was a belief that area fire at approx. 500 meters could be done en masse by Garand shooters, and it was just as effective.

Less you think we are better off nowadays, a German rifle company of 1944 had twice as many 7.62 MGs than a US rifle company in 1994. 14 vs 6.

The argument could go that US rifle companies move faster and are not slowed down by heavy weapons. US units used artillery more, belt fed weapons less. Worked OK enough, notable exception being the bocage.

[edward_n_kelly]

Originally posted by Shatter:

Too true.

Have a mate who was the M-60 gunner in a section in Vietnam. He was 6'1" and played top-level Australian Football before and after going "on tour" - he weighed in at just on 149 lbs when he was admitted to hospital (for a football injury !). For states that play this game - he was played as a "knock ruck" or "ruck follower" in the "old" terminology....

Another was 5'10" and about 160lbs (and he can still pick out the "splash" from his eyes from the round that hit the bipod when it was in front of his face while changing his "arc" when patrolling).

Anyway - back to the questions that started all this...

So JM Browning developed his weapons and then tried to "flog 'em" to the whomsoever would buy them...

He would not have tried to invent/develop something that did not have some prospect of sale (somewhere). So the BAR was standardised to suit the doctrine and practice of employment as it then stood in the US - 1916 and "walking fire".

How did doctrine change during WWI, between the wars and early WWII if it did at all (I pick early WWII 'coz anything later would have had little prospect of development and fielding in the timeframe)?

Were new/alternate weapons considered (if it did change ?

Did the weapon fit the doctrine or was the doctrine made to fit the weapon(s) then availble ?

Edward

Edited to fix the "scanning" of a line or two...

[ April 22, 2002, 02:46 AM: Message edited by: edward_n_kelly ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Shatter:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by CMplayer:

[QB]just what was the BAR ?

The gun you see the big guy carrying in WWII movies.

Not always true for real life though. My grandfather carried a Bar in Africa and Italy and he was 5'11" and from the pictures he showed me around 150 to 160 pounds.</font>

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

Mmmm, dare I mention EM-2 versus L1a1, John but I agree that was a political decision forced upon Whitehall by people in another white building which they once burnt, for having the temerity to try and dispute UK military decisions.

Apart from that, I concur wholeheartedly with the rest.

Now, wheres my turn?</font>

It's also intresting to note that of the 'white' Commenwealth the Brits are the only ones to return to the LSW concept. The Cunauks, Aussies and Kiwis have all settled on german type to&e with the C-9 (FN Minime) New Zealand even going to the extent of having two C-9s in eight and nine man sections.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Bastables:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

Mmmm, dare I mention EM-2 versus L1a1, John but I agree that was a political decision forced upon Whitehall by people in another white building which they once burnt, for having the temerity to try and dispute UK military decisions.

Apart from that, I concur wholeheartedly with the rest.

Now, wheres my turn?</font>

It's also intresting to note that of the 'white' Commenwealth the Brits are the only ones to return to the LSW concept. The Cunauks, Aussies and Kiwis have all settled on german type to&e with the C-9 (FN Minime) New Zealand even going to the extent of having two C-9s in eight and nine man sections.</font>

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JonS:

Yes, yes, all very interesting Bas - now where's my turn? Only two files to go and I'll be out of your hair.[/qb]

Getting a little cranky in our old vet age eh?

[ April 22, 2002, 09:00 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Hakko Ichiu]

Originally posted by edward_n_kelly:

Too true.

Have a mate who was the M-60 gunner in a section in Vietnam. He was 6'1" and played top-level Australian Football before and after going "on tour" - he weighed in at just on 149 lbs when he was admitted to hospital (for a football injury

6'1" and 149 lbs. What was he, the goal post?