WWII doctrines

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

What's more, Mulberry, Hedgerow and the DD are specifically British (well, OK, for the DD, Hungarian) inventions.

Mulberry and DD I will allow as British innovations (and the Mulberry was a stunningly magnificent engineering feat), but if you are going to claim the hedgerow cutter as a British invention, John, I want to see some proof.

Michael

[Brian]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

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An improvement on arrows thrusting all over sketch-maps would be something like the "commander's intent" icons that were introduced in the latest edition of APP-6A, but even those are of dubious value unless one has a list of definitions giving the formal meaning of the effect verbs. The US and German armies have such lists; the British Army still has nothing of the kind. (I feel sure someone will tell me that the British Army has plenty of formal definitions; the problem is that there are at least three sets of definitions, which do not necessarily agree.)

I'm unsure as to what APP-6A is, John, but I get the general idea that its some sort of flowcharting system? While such an approach would be useful, I agree it still represents to me rather a mechanistic method representation of "doctrine", which you also note below:

Another element of doctrine, or "way of command", that would need to be specified is the approach to authority -- principles like chain-of-command, delegation policy, and definition of states of command. There have only been attempts to model this sort of question formally in recent decades, and AFAIK the techniques have yet to be applied to military subjects. This is not to say that armies don't understand how command authority works; they do; but they do so informally, and for their own army, which is not adequate for meaningful comparisons to be made between armies.

Information flows can be represented and I think they would be a much more useful item to be modelled (although, what I'm doing telling a modeller what to model, I have no idea ) - communication is of course a significant determinant of what is achievable. Little factors like the German use of single frequency crystals in their early radios at sub-unit level, which meant that if a reconniassance unit "discovered" something, it had to transmit that information up the chain before it could be relayed across and down again to the Panzers sitting beside it (usually they just leant out the turret and screamed it to the bloke in the Panzer turret).

Neither the protean tactical description language represented by the intent icons in APP-6A nor the discipline of deontic logic (used to reason about questions of duty and obligation) were around fifty years ago. Performing comparisons between

national doctrines from the WW2 period is therefore, to my mind, very, very hard to do at any level beyonf mere literary criticism (and I'm sure lots of people find literary criticism great fun, but falsifiable it ain't, usually).

Thats the problem. We don't have the veterans to tell us and even if we could interest them, they are getting fewer each year and their memories are fading. However, we can discover from reading people like Jary, how engagements were conducted but we have to be careful not to assume that all engagements were conducted in an identical manner. We should though, be able to discover a set of common elements between engagements. Now, if someone was willing to take on the task, I'm sure we could do what Phil Barker claimed he did for his ancients wargames rules - attempt to apply some stats theory to how battles were conducted. It might allow us to determine if the British, as Dorosh has suggested, relied heavily upon artillery, while the Germans didn't and the Americans were in between, somewhere.

Originally posted by Brian:

However, while this is how they might have been taught "how to", rarely would a good commander rely only on doing the minimum that such doctrines represent. They'd build on them and develop their own ideas and of course, the situation might well dictate against them.

Well, there's another problem to contend with. Inded, the extent to which "making it up as you go along" is acceptable is, presumably, itself part of doctrine.

For bonus fun, of course, it should be obvious that TTPs, if not doctrines, change from year to year, theatre to theatre, and in lots of cases between formations or units. As an example, Patton's Third Army employed "marching fire" in preference to the official technique of fire & movement; as far as I knmow, other US armies didn't.

So, for all the above reasons, I don't think it is yet possible to make any meaningful comparison between the TTPs of different forces at any level higher than literary criticism. For those who enjoy literary criticism, I suggest that the following would make a reasonable library of the basic literature:

BIDWELL, S. "Artillery Tactics 1939-1945", Almark, London, 1976.

BIDWELL, S. "Gunners at War", A&AP, London, 1970.

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[Brian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Brian said "Omaha beach was essentially treated as a frontal attack by infantry, nearly all technical "gadgetry" was eschewed...In the hard slog forward through the hedgerows, one reads continually of how the US commanders were attempting to force their infantry forwards, through the use of what appears to be almost pure willpower"

I'm afraid I don't recognize a hint of reality in either statement. OK, there may be a small element of truth in the second, in that the overall push to St. Lo did feature plenty of straight ahead attack in hedgerow country. But both strike me as significant distortions.

The invasion itself

RIGHT! Stop, right there, Jason. I will not allow you to erect a strawman and attempt to run a non-existent argument of mine. Nothing pisses me off more than when someone attempts to twist things like that. No wonder Fionn is annoyed with you.

I was not referring to the "invasion" as such. I was referring to ONE, I'll repeat that, one landing beach. Further, I will define "gadgetry" as being "unusual technical means of decreasing your sides' casualties by securing its objective in an innovative manner." An excellent example of that is the various "funnies" operated by 79 Armoured Division and which were largely (except for a few DD tanks which were misused anyway) eschewed at Omaha. Further, during the attempted advance inland from the beaches, into the hedgerows, US commanders were relieved at a dizzying rate in the first few weeks of the campaign because their men lacked the technical means to overcome the German defenders in the Bocage. It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI, when British commanders were relieved for the inability of their men to overcome the German defences on the Western Front, again, because they lacked the technical means to do so.

If one looks at the US Army's inventory of AFVs and compares to the British Army's, one percieves a decided uniformity and a lack of innovation reaching the troops in the front line - a case of one size fits all it seems. Which rather negates the claims of a "love of gadgetry", compared to the British.

Now, if you'd care to discuss what I was talking about rather than what you believe what I was talking about, we can continue this discussion.

[Michael Dorosh]

Brian, would British use of the 17 pounder, vs. US inability to field an adequate Tiger and Panther-defeating anti-tank gun for their tank destroyers, also fit into your model?

I would suggest it does.

Both from a gadgetry point of view (having the 17 pounder in the first place), and a doctrine point of view "tanks are not meant to fight tanks, tank destroyers do that, ergo, why upgrade the 75mm".

[ June 12, 2002, 10:48 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Brian, would British use of the 17 pounder, vs. US inability to field an adequate Tiger and Panther-defeating anti-tank gun for their tank destroyers, also fit into your model?

I would suggest it does.

Both from a gadgetry point of view (having the 17 pounder in the first place), and a doctrine point of view "tanks are not meant to fight tanks, tank destroyers do that, ergo, why upgrade the 75mm".

I think possession doesn't count. The innovation of shoe-horning it into a Sherman turret does, though. But its more the "funnies", the DDs, the Crocodiles, the AVsRE and perhaps most importantly, the Kangaroos and Montgomery's creation of his "collosal cracks" doctrine (desperately trying to drag the discussion back to the original topic) which indicate that the British Army wasn't as "hidebound" as its all too often portrayed IMO.

I think the failure of the US Army to put the 3in or even the 76mm into the Sherman is a good indication of what I'm suggesting, Michael. The Americans were willing to innovate, one only has to look at the relevant pages in Chamberlain and Ellis on the Sherman to see that - the problem was getting it or rather all too often, allowing it to get to the frontline troops to be used.

Even the Cullin device originated in Europe, not the USA, was created down at the lowest levels of the Army and it was only allowed to be fitted because of sheer desperation IMO.

[JasonC]

Brian - so, Omaha as a straight ahead infantry attack, and two months of hedgerow fighting in the American sector as just shoving infantry forward relying on "willpower" - those aren't strawmen. Calling you on them, though - oooh, that is so strawman.

Yes, we understand that you believe only the funnies are gadgets in the true metaphysical sense of the term; praise be to the funnies. You said that already, and it was unobjectionable, if a bit overblown.

Pretending everything else was mindless first day of Somme revisited, however, is beyond strawman, it is sheer fantasy. You've been engaging in your own private hyperbole festival, you see, so bringing up the subject of strawman arguments is poor salesmenship.

[ June 13, 2002, 05:09 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

What's more, Mulberry, Hedgerow and the DD are specifically British (well, OK, for the DD, Hungarian) inventions.

Mulberry and DD I will allow as British innovations (and the Mulberry was a stunningly magnificent engineering feat), but if you are going to claim the hedgerow cutter as a British invention, John, I want to see some proof.

Michael</font>

[jrcar]

Ref Brians list of books on doctrine

G'Day Brian, having read a few of these and flicked through a few more they mostly talk about the concept of doctrine... or look at battles/situations that can be drawn upon for Doctrine, rather than being books on doctrine

The cost in developing doctrine in terms of manpower and intellectual capital is extensive. Very few nations have ever really tried, and that is usually as the result of defeat (In the case of Germans in WW2 and the USA after Vietnam) or due to percieved threat (USA and the Soviets).

In the broadest sence doctrine is about having a "knowledge base" of what does and doesn't work, and how to do things (attacking with infantry, use of artillery). Its because of this that you don't find "doctrine" as a single book, or a coherant series of books. In writing doctrine much is assumed in the training system, the culture and the attitude of the country and its people. As a general example doctrine in CM armies is handed down within regiments via the training system, rather than being formalised (and in trying to formalise it which regiments doctrine do you follow?). As abnother example the lessons that the Australian Army has learnt in Timor were quickly intergrated into the training programs of the following forces, frequently without being formally documented. This I believe was a strong point of the WW2 German system where experianced officers and SNCO's were sent back from the front to teach the next lot of cannon fodder. I believe this occured to a lessor extent in the Allied armies (although it did occur).

To get coherant doctrine I think that one needs a definate aim and geographical location (German doctrine would not work well in the Pacific), you also need an overall war fighting strategy and you need to put the intellectual capital into it. The only people that have ever tried to do this on a comprehensive scale were the post WW2 superpowers.

So in short you won't find a countries "doctrine" in a single book, it will be spread about all over the place, and much will be embeded in the training and social system in place at the time.

And yes I've done a bit of doctrine development, but I wouldn't call it all that successful...

Doesn't add much to the origional posters questions, except that doctrine is spread out all over the place and needs to be gleaned from reading battle reports, textbooks and military theory, so set asside a few thousand dollars and start reading

Cheers

Rob

[Tarquelne]

Pretending everything else was mindless first day of Somme revisited, however, is beyond strawman, it is sheer fantasy.

The part where Brain pretended "everything else" was "Somme revisited"? I agree, sheer fantasy.

I assumed, Brian, that you were in touch with JasonC via e-mail, and he was simply responding to your arguments here. It seems that this is not, in fact, the case.

So, Brain, what is your argument, the support for your statements?

[Brian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Brian - so, Omaha as a straight ahead infantry attack, and two months of hedgerow fighting in the American sector as just shoving infantry forward relying on "willpower" - those aren't strawmen. Calling you on them, though - oooh, that is so strawman.

Jason, I've no desire to get into a slanging match with you. Change your tone and your attitude and we might be able to talk. Until then, rail as much as you like.

ps. Where did I mention the Somme, Jason? Talk about strawman!

[Soddball]

*sigh*

[Brian]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />

Pretending everything else was mindless first day of Somme revisited, however, is beyond strawman, it is sheer fantasy.

The part where Brain pretended "everything else" was "Somme revisited"? I agree, sheer fantasy.

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[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

...I am talking about Hedgerow, the landing-craft based bombardment rocket system based on Hedgehog.

Oh. Never mind.

Michael

[Tarquelne]

Yes, a fantasy created by Jason, I think you'll find Tarqulene.

(Yes, that's what I meant - "sheer fantasy.")

In the eyes of the higher-ups, it was the fault of the commanders that they had failed to press their men to advance,

Was that explicit? (ie, "I sacked so-and-so because he didn't push his men hard enough.")

Do you (or anyone else) know if the lower ranks/ enlisted pressed for more gadgetry? I'd gotten the impression somewhere that the guys on the line, at least, were all for new gadgets.

As to Omaha being a frontal assault, without any effort to make use of "gadgetry" to achieve its objective, I'd have thought it was rather obvious.

Sorry, I'm neither anywhere near an expert nor am I telepathic...

The commander of that beach reluctantly took some DDs but only when pressed to do so by Eisenhower, as I understand it. The US Army refused any of the other "funnies".

The whole US Army? They weren't used at Utah either, then? Weren't needed at Utah?

And offer for the "funnies" was on the table well before the landings? There would have been time to train with them?

Doctrine, the US, and gadgets: How about Marines in the Pacific and gadgets?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

How about Marines in the Pacific and gadgets?

AIR, there was a certain amount of clamoring to get more LVTs.

Michael

[JasonC]

"It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI, when British commanders were relieved for the inability of their men to overcome the German defences on the Western Front"

Because they didn't have... funnies. Praise be to the funnies. I don't have to make these things up. Your statements are sillier than the silliest straw man I could construct.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by JasonC:

"It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI, when British commanders were relieved for the inability of their men to overcome the German defences on the Western Front"

Because they didn't have... funnies. Praise be to the funnies. I don't have to make these things up. Your statements are sillier than the silliest straw man I could construct.

Actually, Jason, I think you'll find that his contention is simply that they were relieved for lack of progress. An atypical turnover in commanders during the period in question should be easy to prove or disprove, for those who know which records to look at, I'd think.

Why the troops were making insufficient progress (or not, that's debatable too) is a completely different question. I'm afraid, Jason, that your position on this issue isn't very clear in your last response. Why do you think the commanders were being relieved? Or do you deny that commanders were relieved in unusual numbers during (early?) Normandy?

(We all agree that Jason was simply being unclear, right? Not just willfully misintrepreting Brian's post, or demonstrating grammer-school level reading comprehension.)

[ June 13, 2002, 07:03 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Michael Dorosh]

[ June 14, 2002, 08:55 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

Hastings makes it rather clear that was the case. It got the point that even Bradley realised his turnover was ridiculus.

When I refer to the "US Army", I'm referring to the organisation, not necessarily its members. I don't doubt that its members were quite interested in making use of "technical means" to lessen their casualties but the people both higher up and back in the USA didn't believe such things were necessary (nor did they unfortunately believe that simply having better tanks or guns were important either, it would appear). It was, as I suggested a case of one size fits all.

[Priest]

Lets take a count shall we.

Germans:

Panther

Tiger

KugelBlitz (Balled Lightning)

Maus

V1 rockets

V2 rockets

Jet power

Bismark

U-Boats (initially)

Vampire technology

Panzerfaust

PanzerShrek

and the list goes on and on. The Germans were rampant techno freaks. The Panther is the perfect example, they missed one of the whole advantages of the T-34 when trying to emulate it, that of simplicity.

Now I am sure you can make a list for the Americans also, but you will also find most of the "gadgets" did not make it into the front line or at least not until it was too late (ie the Pershing being spurned until after the Ardennes).

I think the funniest statement i have read on this thread is the list of gadgets Jason put out with regards to the Normandy landing by the Americans. Why on earth would you include the P51 and bombing missions in that? Considering you were trying to state that the Americans used gadgets more than anyone or at least relyed on them to do the work. Some of the things you listed are true, but if you consider the basic arguement here (arguement in the scholastic sense) is basically the Americans (and Allies in general) used technology and numbers to battle the Germans who were using high level and more intricate tactics. So going back to Jason's example of the Americans using bombers and P51's in the landings and thus relying on technology, the reverse would be that the Germans would use tactics instead of the Luftwaffe if they had run SeaLion. That is totally and completely not true.

I think Brian for this discussion's sake described "gadgets" pretty well. Every army would use naval bombardments and air bombardments in a water-borne assault. Duh!

In the end I think the Germans "V" weapon policy and their end of war tanks and planes show that if any country relied on technology it was the Germans, who in vain (IMHO) tried to use it to even the manpower ratio. Luckily it was not enough, in the end the ultimate gadget fell into the hands of the Americans! I think you all know what that is!

[Tarquelne]

Utah was planned better it appears, as well as different terrain/defences.

I was referring to ONE, I'll repeat that, one landing beach.

Ok, lets take the lack of highly usefull gadgets at Omaha beach as a given.

I'm not sure we have enough evidence of some sort of doctrinal bias - or any sort of bias at all - in the US Army against gadgets or tech in general.

It's certainly obvious the US Army wasn't the "techno freak" the German armed forces often seemed to be... but then there's the question of necessity for the Germans. They needed something to make up the material inequailties they faced. I'm not sure if German's quest for the "superweapons" is a sign of technical bias or just desperation.

But back to the US Army...

Normandy: The high turnover rate for commanders is more sign that the higher-ups were out of touch with the realities of the situation, not that they - or anyone - had some sort of bias against gadgetry. I think what's needed to demonstrate that anti-gadget bias is examples of rejected techs. Esp. techs that the Commonwealth was using. There seems to be good examples of this for Omaha beach... so, how about examples for Normandy? (I wonder if this will quickly become an examination of tactics, not techs.)

And remember, I'm not an expert, nor am I telepathic - it may be obvious to others, but not to me. (That's why I'm asking, eh?)

Tanks and Tank destroyers: Bigger guns and thicker armor certainly would have been nice. However, the US Army did have:

Bazookas (They pre-dated a successfull 'shreck design, didn't they?)

Tac. bombers, and good coordination with them

Tungsten and other advanced ammo.

Wet storage

Designated TDs (something like an 88 or a really-long 75/6 on the TDs would have been great - but, combined with the advanced ammo, I thought they were actually rather successfull. Is that incorrect?)

As examples of "techie" things.

And then there's the fact that the Allies were, in fact, winning. Thus no "neccessity" to respond to. Bigger guns/thicker armor would have cost more $$ and some time... Not introducing a Tiger or Panther equivilent certainly shows the lack of a pro-gadget/tech bias, but, from what I've seen so far, it doesn't seem to indicate an anti-tech bias.

I think what might be needed to show an anti-tech bias is a consistent record of rejecting new technologies when those technologies were needed, or at least obviously worth the time and (especially) money they'd cost. A small research and development budget would be a good indicator too.

The Army on the otherhand, seems particularly in WWII to have been rather hidebound and conservative in its outlook, to a certain extent

I really would like more examples. I used to think that the US had missed the U-boat, tech wise, but in recent years I've come accross what seemed to be many examples of US technical innovation in other branches, some in the Army... but mostly a greater appreciation of how well the Army's rather boring tech did compared to the flashy German stuff.

This is a bit of a oversimplification, but it might clarify things: Maybe the US Army only seems to have been hidebound when compared to the German armed forces. The questionable record of the German advanced weapons, furthermore, implies that even if the US policy wasn't the correct one, it was in no way obviously incorrect.

[ June 14, 2002, 08:46 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Pak_43]

Priest mate,

I don't understand this bit, probably because I'm being thick!

"So going back to Jason's example of the Americans using bombers and P51's in the landings and thus relying on technology, the reverse would be that the Germans would use tactics instead of the Luftwaffe if they had run SeaLion. That is totally and completely not true."

To be fair to Jason I don't think he's ever claimed:

"Considering you were trying to state that the Americans used gadgets more than anyone or at least relyed on them to do the work."

just that the American didn't rely on

"Omaha as a straight ahead infantry

attack, and two months of hedgerow fighting in the American sector as just shoving infantry forward relying on "willpower" - "

as an approach...

Whether that was Brian's original point I'm not so sure...

So are we arguing about American WWII doctrine regarding NW Europe amphibious assaults and their relation to British WWII doctrine regarding NW Europe amphibious assaults? And more specifically gadgets? Or American doctrine in general applied to a willingness to use gadgets as compared to other nations in WWII (and only Brian has defined the term gadgets so far...)

[Tarquelne]

Maus

How much (material, $$) did the Germans devote to unsuccessfull projects, anyway? I don't think I've ever seen even a guess.

[Michael Dorosh]

The high turn over of commanders had nothing to do with gadgets or non-gadgets! It was inexperience - on the part of both commanders and troops - that likely caused this. At least in the CW instance, battalion commmanders were in action that had no business being there, becuase they arsed about in the UK for so long and never learned anything. Stacey makes the point that many battalion commanders simply "played at war" during the years of training, and when it came time to do things for real, they couldn't do it.

That is not necessarily an indictment of the doctrine, or equipment, used. It may well be the case that the failure of their men was indeed linked to those issues, but it is not in and of itself justification to conclude that the Allies were or were not gadget-crazy or not gadget-crazy enough.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

However, the US Army did have:

Tac. bombers, and good coordination with them

Tungsten and other advanced ammo.

Designated TDs

As examples of "techie" things.

Techie, maybe. But neither of these were US inventions. The Germans used Tungsten a long time before the US, so did the Red Army. The Germans introduced the closely controlled fighter-bomber in their Blitzkrieg campaigns (complete with FACs in HTs), and they introduced SP tank destroyers as stop-gap solutions in the East (Marder, Panzerjaeger I) in 1942 or thereabouts.