Book on Moscow versus Ukraine (1941)

[Sgt. Steiner]

I have to agree with Kevsharr. In addition to being their main terminus for everything, the loss of Moscow would have been earth-shattering to Russian morale, which was already at rock-bottom.

IMO the Soviet system would have folded up like a house of cards after a catastrophe of that magnitude...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Sgt. Steiner:

I have to agree with Kevsharr. In addition to being their main terminus for everything, the loss of Moscow would have been earth-shattering to Russian morale, which was already at rock-bottom.

IMO the Soviet system would have folded up like a house of cards after a catastrophe of that magnitude...

My! but you do like to make sweeping statements, don't you?

Yes, it is correct that Moscow was the single most important rail junction in the USSR, and its loss would have severely hampered the strategic mobility of the Red Army. No doubt about it.

It is also true that a lot of war production was also located in Moscow, and to have had that interrupted or dislocated would have also proven an inconvenience for the Soviet war making ability.

But as far as that by itself compelling a complete collapse of Soviet resistance...who can say with confidence? You mention Russian morale, how do you measure that? And specifically whose morale? As long as Stalin maintains control of the government, his morale is the important one. As long as Hitler was unwilling to grant terms, Stalin appears to have been willing to stay in the fight. If the situation had been truly hopeless, I suppose a putsch might have replaced Stalin, but the Army appears to have been solidly behind him all the way through in spite of some highly questionable calls on his part early on.

This is one more area where really solid evidence is lacking. But as long as we are speculating, I would say that had the Germans captured Moscow in the winter of '41, the war would have continued, but at a lower intensity over that part of the front. Heavy fighting might have picked up in the South in '42 as the Germans make a bid to capture the oilfields. Maybe this time they might have won, but that's by no means a sure thing.

In any event, I think the odds of the Germans being able to take and hold Moscow in '41 are exceedingly slim for reasons already given.

Michael

[ November 17, 2002, 10:28 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[kevsharr]

{This is one more area where really solid evidence is lacking. But as long as we are speculating, I would say that had the Germans captured Moscow in the winter of '41, the war would have continued, but at a lower intensity over that part of the front. Heavy fighting might have picked up in the South in '42 as the Germans make a bid to capture the oilfields. Maybe this time they might have won, but that's by no means a sure thing.}

How would this have been possible? As I said earlier one look at the show's that all road's led to Moscow.Beyond the Volga there was no rail or road net only wilderness.Even the german's envisioned a stop at the line Archangel-Astrakhan for that reason.The area's beyond this line were so desolate and remote that there were villages that did'nt even know there was a war going on.ALL reinforcment's and replacement's went thru Moscow.What were the russian's going to do build another Moscow a couple of hundred miles farther east on the trans-siberian railroad and then build track's to stalingrad and the northern front's?

[kevsharr]

[by keke And what are those historical documents?]

How obout the chief of the general staff Halder's diary written during the war

"The proposal's of the army for the continuation of the operation's in the east do not accord with my intention's.

The most important objective to attain before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow but the taking of the Crimea,the industrial and coal-mining area's of the Donets basin and the cutting off of the russian oil supplies from the Caucasus.In the north it is the locking up of Leningrad and the union with the Finn's"

Hitler's statement made on August 21st.

[Keke]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

Beyond the Volga there was no rail or road net only wilderness.Even the german's envisioned a stop at the line Archangel-Astrakhan for that reason. The area's beyond this line were so desolate and remote that there were villages that did'nt even know there was a war going on.

You are certainly talking about some other Soviet Union I have never heard of.

[manchildstein (ii)]

i'm not sure what ultimately might have happened but having taken moscow would surely have been a bigger victory than that which actually occurred at kiev... moscow was the center of the soviet 'internal lines' and the germans having taken it would have made a mess of the soviet rail system... one also has to wonder about what it would have cost stalin politically to have lost there...

i'm not saying it would have ensured ultimate victory for the germans but the outcome of the war certainly would have been altered at least somewhat...

and to argue as stolfi does that everything was lost after august 1941 is not too out of line with reality from what i can see...

i guess one thing we can all agree on is that - as andreas stated - if the attack had gone toward moscow, the german flanks would have been difficult to cover in any event...

also, i don't ever recall andreas as in any way having been a apologist for the germans and thus consider his analysis here fairly bias-free...

but i guess we all have our biases...

it is interesting to see the range of opinion though - the one about the balkans having been the beginning of the end; the others appearing to say that the germans never had any chance in any way shape or form; or those of us who think that perhaps things might have gone differently if moscow had been gone for instead of kiev...

i guess we will never know if the germans could have taken moscow; as well we will never know whether - if that had actually occurred - the soviets would have been politically and thus militarily shattered...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

As I said earlier one look at the show's that all road's led to Moscow.Beyond the Volga there was no rail or road net only wilderness.Even the german's envisioned a stop at the line Archangel-Astrakhan for that reason.The area's beyond this line were so desolate and remote that there were villages that did'nt even know there was a war going on.ALL reinforcment's and replacement's went thru Moscow.What were the russian's going to do build another Moscow a couple of hundred miles farther east on the trans-siberian railroad and then build track's to stalingrad and the northern front's?

You greatly exaggerate.

I don't know what maps you have been looking at, but there was already a rail line running, albeit somewhat indirectly, from Archangel to Rostov and points south that ran about 300km east of Moscow. More to the point, once you get south of Moscow, there were several lines running east-west and a few more that ran north-south.

Certainly, the rail net west of Moscow was denser, but it was not non-existent east of the city. The loss of the Moscow rail center would have been a serious blow to Soviet mobility, but would not have forced it to a halt by any means. Don't forget that the Soviets were also perfectly capable of laying track wherever they felt they really needed it. While not exactly a speedy process, it could be done to close the occasional gap.

Michael

[manchildstein (ii)]

by the way, that 'suv' dude over on the matrix games thread is a trip... i've never seen anyone who at once fawns over stalin _and_ thinks the soviets were about to attack in 1941...

[Keke]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

[by keke And what are those historical documents?]

How obout the chief of the general staff Halder's diary written during the war

"The proposal's of the army for the continuation of the operation's in the east do not accord with my intention's.

The most important objective to attain before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow but the taking of the Crimea,the industrial and coal-mining area's of the Donets basin and the cutting off of the russian oil supplies from the Caucasus.In the north it is the locking up of Leningrad and the union with the Finn's"

Hitler's statement made on August 21st.

Read the really positive comments of Halder in the diary about the number of Soviet formations there were supposed to be left after July. From that you can see how erroneus German estimation about the number was.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by manchildstein II:

...the others appearing to say that the germans never had any chance in any way shape or form...

Oh, I think the Germans might have had a chance. But it would have required "perfect play" on their part as well as a lot of luck with the dice. It all seems to me to hinge on the will of the political leadership. If that breaks, Germany wins.

But what would cause it to break? The capture of Moscow? I personally doubt it, especially in the absence of the destruction of the Red armies in the Kiev pocket. But possibly the simultaneous capture of Leningrad and Moscow, combined with the grievous losses of the Red army that would have necessarily accompanied that outcome, might have turned the trick. But how the Germans were realistically supposed to accomplish all this is quite frankly beyond me.

Michael

[kevsharr]

[i don't know what maps you have been looking at, but there was already a rail line running, albeit somewhat indirectly, from Archangel to Rostov and points south that ran about 300km east of Moscow. More to the point, once you get south of Moscow, there were several lines running east-west and a few more that ran north-south.]

To what militarly important industrial area's were these lines running to?

[Don't forget that the Soviets were also perfectly capable of laying track wherever they felt they really needed it. While not exactly a speedy process, it could be done to close the occasional gap.]

All this while Moscow was occupied and Leningrad besieged?THE most important rail line was the one running from the Ural's to moscow.The russians were supposed to build a rail line from it to Stalingrad and to the Leningrad area during the worst winter in russian history?I'm not sure what map you're looking at but you're talking a tremendous distance with an outlay of hundred's of thoasand's of ton's of steel not counting the workforce that would have to be supplied even with lend-lease[which by the way was just barely starting].Speaking of lend-lease where did the line from Murmansk run?Vladavostok?I think it went to Moscow

[Keke]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

Speaking of lend-lease where did the line from Murmansk run?Vladavostok?I think it went to Moscow

I just checked from an old map. The railroad from Murmansk goes through Volkhov, Tikhvin, Vologda (where one line goes to Moscow) and all the way to the Urals. So it didn´t just went to Moscow...

[ November 17, 2002, 11:41 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[kevsharr]

Just so you guy's know I find discussion's like this enjoyable and informative and if everyone agreed about everything would'nt this be a boring world?

[how does one get those smiley faces in a post?]

[ November 17, 2002, 11:53 AM: Message edited by: kevsharr ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

To what militarly important industrial area's were these lines running to?

Well, there were a couple that ran to Sverdlovsk. You do know, don't you, that it was fast becoming a major center of war production? Then there were many lines feeding into the Don Basin. Once you get to Stalingrad, which was also plentifully supplied with various routes, and/or Rostov, there are all the usual routes into the Caucusas oil fields.

Besides, we were talking about the mobilty of the army. Moving military goods is important too, but we were talking about getting the armies to where the fighting would be going on. In the case of a campaign in the south, they are going to have plenty of ways to get there.

THE most important rail line was the one running from the Ural's to moscow.The russians were supposed to build a rail line from it to Stalingrad...

There was already one that ran through Samara.

..and to the Leningrad area...

Leningrad was besieged and therefore no rail lines were going to run all the way into the city. However, since you did say "area", there was a line running west from Sverdlovsk through Kirov and Vologda all the way to the city in normal times.

Speaking of lend-lease where did the line from Murmansk run?Vladavostok?

No need to be offensive. I am trying to give you serious answers. You might show a little appreciation.

There is a track that connects to the Murmansk line just south of Belomorsk and the Archangel line about 100km south of that city. I have my doubts that it was a high capacity line at the time, but it could have been improved, and as you say, there wasn't a lot of Lend-Lease material the first year anyway.

Michael

[kevsharr]

And while were speculating what would the outcome have been if the Japanese had adopted the Army's Northern Option and attacked the Soviet Union in Dec,'41 instead of The U.S?

[kevsharr]

Michael I apologise if I sounded offencive the intent was'nt there and I don't mean to sound argumentative but a discussion require's two sides or tour just preaching to the already converted sort of speak.Again I appologise

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

And while were speculating what would the outcome have been if the Japanese had adopted the Army's Northern Option and attacked the Soviet Union in Dec,'41 instead of The U.S?

There was a long discussion of this in soc.history.war.world-war.ii a few months back, if you are really interested. The gist of it is that there was really nothing of pressing strategic importance in the Soviet East at the time, and especially nothing that would immediately help the Japanese economy or war effort.

The move south was predetermined by the Japanese need for oil. Once the Western powers slapped an embargo on that, Japan had about six months to find more or the jig was up. And the NEI was the only place within reach where they could get it in anything like the quantities they needed.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by kevsharr:

Michael I apologise if I sounded offencive the intent was'nt there and I don't mean to sound argumentative but a discussion require's two sides or tour just preaching to the already converted sort of speak.Again I appologise

No problem. Do you feel satisfied that your questions have been answered, or is there something further?

I would just say as a generalization that one must be cautious about making pronouncements about the war. Any one source, even one with the best of intentions (and often those too were absent), cannot tell the whole story.

Michael

[Andrew H.]

IMO, Stofi's book is most interesting not so much for his thesis about how Germany could have won, but for his explanation of why Hitler fought the way that he did - his fear of encirclement and need for space.

I will point out, though, that Stolfi believes that the Germans needed to take both Moscow *and* Gorki, not just Moscow alone.

[manchildstein (ii)]

i'm not sure what value a japanese assault into the soviet far east would have had to the overall axis effort. given the earlier results between soviets and japanese, perhaps in 1941 the soviets could have blocked imperial japan with minimal forces.

i wonder what would have happened if japan had only attacked the dutch east indies instead of u.s. and commonwealth interests... but that's probably _too much_ speculation for one thread...

[Sgt. Steiner]

Now that is another interesting speculation. With a Japanese invasion of Siberia, that would likely have tied up the Siberian troops, and therefore no miraculous 11th hour reinforcements for Moscow. And with no Pearl Harbor, no US involvement? Interesting!

Unless of course, Stalin would have been willing to give up large chunks of Siberia in order to stop the Germans.

But, to paraphrase Mannchildstein II, all of this is speculation. My own opinion that Moscow's fall would have been the beginning of the end for Stalin, Emry's belief that the Germans could never have held on to Moscow etc etc; it is all speculation, and 60 years-on we will never know. But having a forum to discuss the what-ifs and might-have-beens is still a lot of fun..

[Keke]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Germans would have had better chances if:

1. Their operational planning was based on better intelligence appraisals. FE Germans failed to notice that Stavka had 6 armies well back from the frontier on June 1941. In fact, Soviets always sought to keep a sizable mass in reserve, rather than committing everything up front. This was seen in the winter counterattack, where the so called "Siberians" constituted only a small part of the attacking force.

2. Their war economy would have been properly prepared for the prolonged fight in the east. By the time of Barbarossa it was ludicrously underpowered.

3. More rational occupation policy instead of the brutal one. There were many ethnic groups ready to fight against Stalin´s terror regime, but under the circumstances many chose to fight against Hitler´s.

Edit: For some curious reason there was year 1944 instead of 1941 in my text.

[ November 17, 2002, 04:22 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[kevsharr]

I believe so but I still believe that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the collapse of the communist regime.I realise that it's only one city but it was the economic and political centre of the Soviet Union.Capitol's have there importance like France capitulating right after the fall of Paris,Hitler's own stubborness in realizing that the Soviet's goal was to capture the lair of the facist beast-Berlin.The bombing of Rotterdam led to the surrender of the low countries,Warsaw was the focus of the attack on Poland.The capture of Belgrade by the 2nd SS led to Yugoslavia's demise so one must be carefull to underestimate the importance of these politicaly important target's.

As to the question of the japanese I believe that the army was a bit more farsighted in it's strategy regarding the Soviet Union.With it's collapse the balance of power in the world would have experianced a major shift toward's the axis.China,Japan's Vietnam,would have been outflanked and with the concentration of germany's attention on Britain our ability to enforce the embargo that led to the adoption of the navyies southern solution would have been severly effected

[interesting note-The part of the tripartite pact that germany signed with Japan that they agreed to declare war on countries that the other signer's engaged in was the only treaty that Hitler ever stood by which eventually led to his downfall.

[Sgt. Steiner]

Yeah, not going the "hearts and minds" route cost the Germans dearly. In the early days of Barbarossa, the German troops were greeted with flowers by the Ukrainians. To squander such good-will by letting the Gestapo/SS terrorize after the frontline troops passed by is incomprehensible to me.

But, as I read somewhere else, "for the Nazis to have done anything else; they wouldn't have been Nazis"...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Germans would had have better chances if:

1. Their operational planning was based on better intelligence appraisals. FE Germans failed to notice that Stavka had 6 armies well back from the frontier on June 1944. In fact, Soviets always sought to keep a sizable mass in reserve, rather than committing everything up front. This was seen in the winter counterattack, where the so called "Siberians" constituted only a small part of the attacking force.

2. Their war economy would have been properly prepared for the prolonged fight in the east. By the time of Barbarossa it was ludicrously underpowered.

3. More rational occupation policy instead of the brutal one. There were many ethnic groups ready to fight against Stalin´s terror regime, but under the circumstances many chose to fight against Hitler´s.</font>

All good points. But if #1 had been realized, Hitler might not have attacked the USSR at all. At least he is reported to have said something along those lines to Guderian.

As long as we are speculating in this thread, I will give my own what-if with the caveat that it is dependent on several factors whose true magnitude I must confess myself ignorant of.

It presupposes a minimal effort in the south, only enough to prevent the Soviets from withdrawing significant forces from that region. A slowly-developing or even static front there the first three months or more is acceptable.

My main effort would be between the Pripyet Marshes and the Baltic Sea with thrusts aimed at Moscow and Leningrad. Major effort would be devoted to advancing railheads and opening Baltic ports as supply sources. This is where some of the uncertainty comes in. I have really no idea at this time how much traffic Riga and the lesser ports could carry, even assuming they could be captured intact and/or brought back into service rapidly. Probably the Germans would still have to rely on rail for most of their supply and reinforcements even for the northernmost wing of their army.

Early capture of Leningrad is emphasized. This makes possible the overland connection to Finnland. Supply via Helsinki through Leningrad then becomes possible as well as later thrusts isolating Murmansk and Archangel. But the main thing after the capture of Leningrad is to turn everything toward the capture of Moscow before winter.

The key to success in reducing and taking major cities lies in first surrounding and isolating them from reinforcement. The Germans failed in Stalingrad because they could not prevent the Soviets from running in supplies and reinforcements. The isolation of Leningrad is relatively easy because it lies on an isthmus bordered on two sides by water and a hostile army on the north. Therefore, it is economical to take it out first, freeing up large forces to strike at Moscow.

These should make generous enveloping sweeps north and south of the city, meeting somewhere around Orekhovo, say. Then the encirclement would have to defend against efforts to break through from the east, but that is still easier than trying to attack into a city that still has communications with the rest of the country.

Assuming all that is successful, the '41 campaigning season is now ended. The victorious German armies now turn south. If there are still Soviet armies in the Ukraine, the northern armies sweep down both banks of the Don to Rostov and encircle them with the aid of AGS. If the Soviets have discretely withdrawn them earlier, then the Germans attack south-eastward to the Volga first, and then sweep down its banks. Either way, there is a good chance that they capture or at least isolate the Caucasian oilfields in the second summer of fighting.

Pipe dreams.

Michael