Questions about Russian MGs.

[Michael Dorosh]

Thanks for the info Slap. Bear in mind one important point - in WW II, despite the 75 mm gun, the M24 Chaffee was officially classified as a "light" tank, intended to replace the Stuart.

Was this tank reclassified before Korea? Either way, the T-34 - officially a "medium" would probably not under ordinary circumstances be the kind of tank an M-24 was expected to tangle with.

At least in WW II. Had the role of "light" armour changed, doctrinally, by Korea?

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Slappy, a couple of questions and comments.

US quality in the initial phases... The US Army in the initial stages were actually worse than 'green'. The post war army was horribly reduced and almost no training was taking place.

This was particularly true of the first units deployed to Korea. These units had mostly been stationed in Japan, where they were part of the occupation army, and had even lower equipment and training readiness than the rest of the army (which wasn't so hot at the time). Things improved a little with the arrival of stateside army units, but the Marines were no doubt the best of the U.S. forces in 1950 (as hard as that is for me to admit).

[Slapdragon]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The UK and other nations had tanks, and the US had a lot of them, but by 1951 tank versus tank was mostly done. You can divide tank warfare in Korea into several phases. In the initial involvement before the UN was putting troops on the ground, the US forces retreating to Pusan and the Koreans had M24s and M19 AA only from a set of provisional companies. Near the end of the retreat M4A3 "Easy Eights" and M26 landed as part of several armored training units. The tanks of these units where mostly salvaged from the Pacific campaign, refurbished in Japan, and never shipped home to USA.

-snip-

I didn't know that any Pershings were shipped to Japan as part of the Pacific camapign, nor a significant number of E8s. Were they already en route when hostilities ended or were they part of the post-war occupation? Or did they indeed see combat in the later stages?

-dale</font>

[Slapdragon]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Thanks for the info Slap. Bear in mind one important point - in WW II, despite the 75 mm gun, the M24 Chaffee was officially classified as a "light" tank, intended to replace the Stuart.

Was this tank reclassified before Korea? Either way, the T-34 - officially a "medium" would probably not under ordinary circumstances be the kind of tank an M-24 was expected to tangle with.

At least in WW II. Had the role of "light" armour changed, doctrinally, by Korea?

No, the M24 was not changed from a light tank. It was however assigned to battalion and company slots that called for mediums, as it was the only tank in Japan that was ready for immediate deployment.

The US had no concept that the cold war was dawning on them and had disarmed to a great degree when Korea came about.

Berli, let me reread the Marine corp armor section in my sources, as they did have M26 tanks and went ashore in Inchon with them. However, the Marines were not the only group with CAS, they just had the best coordination in Korea. CAS started in the Army in WW2 in North Africa, where it was very poor, and was improved until CAS air sets where actually installed in some tanks in ETO. In Korea CAS was an important factor, but not until the front stabilized. In 1950 the air force mostly tasked itself with deeper strikes on lines of communication. I have to read more about Corsair CAS, which is again first mentioned at Inchon but may have been a factor in the retreat.

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by MajorBooBoo:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Iron Chef, why don't you just say sorry BTS, I wont post silly things.

Its too late. He felt the need and pumped his load into the nebelwerfer thread. He did manage to temper his inane post there with a little *smooch* on the butt for BTS.

Very clever little silly man this Chef is.</font>

[Iron Chef Sakai]

What kind of tanks did the Chinese use at the time and how did they fare against the M4A3's?

About a million Chinese crossed the boarder, or actualy snuck into North Korea undetected and launched a huge counter attack on the U.S. (going from memory from a long long time ago so correct me if i'm wrong on some things.)

I beleive this happend in i want to say 1953? It was after MacArther pulled off that nice strategy of sailing behind the Korean fortified front lines and landing an army behind them in some port town in eastern Korea. This cause a huge dissary in the Korean army and eventualy left to there defeat, until MacArther pushed ahead further then the Chinese wanted us too.

I have no idea how many tanks or what kind of tanks the Chiniese used, but either way if i remember correctly it was a brutal winter so this might be a good way to guage how well each sides repsective tanks performed in sub-zero weather.

[Slapdragon]

Berli, here is some Marine tidbits.

Chesty Puller felt that the air force was no good at CAS. He was quoted in Washington as saying "(the air force) has never practiced (CAS)". This was during hearings to determine how the Marines would be fit into the overall defense picture, which we know he won in part because of Marine performance in Korea.

August 7th 1950 is an example of a great all arms action. The Marines used tanks, infantry anti-tank weapons, and Corsairs to engage and drive off T-34 armed NKPA toops near Masun. The Marines where using M26 in this particular battle, although all of there tanks where refurbished cast offs.

The Chinese never really had much for tanks. First was because the Russians where charging nearly 75,000 USD per T-34 at the same time that a used M4A3 Easy 8 could be bought on the world market for 25,000 USD. Second, because all sorts of vehicles were dead meat as soon as they crossed the Yalu.

The Chinese officially entered the conflict in 1951, although Chinese soldier in fact were in country from the earliest parts of the war.

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The Chinese officially entered the conflict in 1951, although Chinese soldier in fact were in country from the earliest parts of the war.

Are you sure? The Chinese invaded in force in November 1950.

[Slapdragon]

Current research from Russian archives shows that the NKPA eventually received 450 T-34/85 from Russia. 150 were in hand at the start of the conflict plus some older SU-76 which had been the main stay of the amroed force when it fought the Nationalist Chinese. 2/3 were destroyed in tank battles in 1950. Almost every tank was destroyed by the end of the war, mostly by air power.

[Slapdragon]

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The Chinese officially entered the conflict in 1951, although Chinese soldier in fact were in country from the earliest parts of the war.

Are you sure? The Chinese invaded in force in November 1950.</font>

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Berli, here is some Marine tidbits.

Chesty Puller felt that the air force was no good at CAS. He was quoted in Washington as saying "(the air force) has never practiced (CAS)".

Somethings never change... they still suck at CAS. Part of the reason that Marine CAS doctrine works is that is the primary purpose of the Marine Air Wings, and they constantly train at it. Also, the FAC (Forward Air Control) officer is an active pilot out with the grunts telling the planes where to hit. I spent about 6 months on a FAC team and you wouldn't believe how close we considered safe. That kind of accuracy and trust can only be developed by constant training. During the Korean war, the Air Force actively campaigned to get control of the Marine air assets... and thankfully failed

[ February 14, 2002, 01:16 PM: Message edited by: Berlichtingen ]

[imported_Wildman]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Somethings never change... they still suck at CAS. Part of the reason that Marine CAS doctrine works is that is the primary purpose of the Marine Air Wings, and they constantly train at it. Also, the FAC (Forward Air Control) officer is an active pilot out with the grunts telling the planes where to hit. I spent about 6 months on a FAC team and you wouldn't believe how close we considered safe. That kind of accuracy and trust can only be developed by constant training. During the Korean war, the Air Force actively campaigned to get control of the Marine air assets... and thankfully failed

As much as it forms a knot of bile in my throat to agree with his Darkness, the Mudpuppies are better at CAS that my brethern in blue. Why you might ask?

Doctrine, my good Berli, doctrine. The Air Force perceptive always has been one of interdiction and key points of pressure. Reading John Warden, Col (Ret) book "Air Campaign" will show you the basics. CAS requires a focus and weapons disciple that two services cannot perform adequately. The Air Force is most effective providing Air Superiority and Inderdiction roles. In essense, without the Air Force providing Local Air Superiority, at a minimum, Marine CAS would be untenable. Proper CAS runs are virtually impossible against a viable enemy air threat and true air superiory is not something the Marines can provide and give good CAS support at the same time.

Like most things in the military now, the services are very intertwinted, espically where air power is concerned. Of course, your only glorified bulletstoppers at heart anyway.

[JasonC]

There are a lot of mistakes being peddled about the Korean war armor stuff, probably by people who don't know the detailed operational history, and instead only have a general picture of different stages of the war in their heads. The best antidote for that is to read a full-blown staff history of the war, like "Nakong to the Yalu".

First the threat forces. The NKs had 150 T-34/85s at the start of the war, and around 60 SU-76s. They got only around 30 replacement T-34s in the initial campaign. So the armor force involved in the drive south to the Pusan perimeter was distinctly limited. The Russian record totals of 450 tanks are for the whole war, including the long slow period after the front stabilized in 1951. By then the NK army was not a serious threat, and was dwarfed by the US and UN forces in theater, and by the Chinese forces.

The ROKs started the war with the equivalent of one US cavalry squadron, with nothing larger than M-8 armored cars in the way of AFVs, and only a handful of those (around 30). They had a number of ATGs but they were 37mm, useless against T-34s. They also had large numbers of 60mm bazookas, which likewise proved ineffective. The men were raw, and none had ever faced tanks.

The ROKs were the bulk of the force fighting the NKs down to the Pusan perimeter. Only a couple of US divisions arrived before then, the rest built up inside the perimeter. The ROK army was largely destroyed on the way to Pusan, but still held about a third of the frontage there in the early days. ROK forces were rebuilt once the Inchon operation retook South Korea, but they were cut off from recruits while still bottled up inside the perimeter, making the perimeter fight largely a US affair.

The initial fight, then, was NKs with ~200 AFVs against ROKs with no AT ability to speak of. It was in this phase that the T-34s had their greatest success, spearheading the drive south and breaking the successive ROK lines.

US airpower intervened almost immediately, however, and certainly did not wait for the front to stabilize, or for CAS doctrine improvements, or for Marine carrier groups to arrive. The NKs had a small airforce of about 150 prop planes of mid-WW II vintage. MacArthur had over 1000 aircraft in Japan, the bulk of them modern jet fighters (F80s mostly, some F82), some P51, some B26 medium bombers, and soon a group of B29s relocated from the central pacific. The NK airforce was a factor only for about the first 5 days; by then the USAF had swept them out of the skies or blown up their airfields. Only night harassment bombers in tiny numbers remained. There were no MiG-15s involved. That came much later, well after Chinese involvement.

The first American ground troops sent to the theater were infantry forces, without any tanks (the imfamous TF Smith). They had only 60mm bazookas and a few 75mm recoilless rifles, both of which proved ineffective against the T-34s. They also brought a few 105mm howitzers, but with very little HEAT ammo. They proved quite effective anyway. One gun KOed 3 T-34s with HEAT (and was KOed in turn), and the rest of the battery immobilized several more with just HE, the crews then abandoning them.

The T-34 crews did not show themselves expert at anything. They drove straight down the road, through the American infantry position (which did not break or run on being penetrated by tanks), and past the firing artillery battery. They shot up the soft skinned battery vehicles but could not even locate the firing howitzers (they fired wildly trying to suppress them, but hit practically nothing). They were buttoned, of course. They then drove on, leaving the task force bypassed, but doing nothing further to reduce the defenders. The infantry had taken every few losses at that point.

What defeated the group was not the T-34s, it was the superior NK infantry flanking them through the nearby hills, off road. A full battalion got on their flank, while another pressed from the front. The infantry pulled out when they started taking flanking MG fire from the hills behind them. They took most of their losses in the pullout, as the infantry in front of them rushed, and they had to run the gauntlet of the flanking battalion's firepower. The tanks had "done" the soft vehicles. So the retreat was a shambles, but men did make it out because the T-34s driving on ahead did nothing to stop them. The men just evaded offroad. There certainly weren't any M-24s involved yet, and the only gun duel was between the T-34s and towed 105s, and the 105s can out far ahead in that match up, despite being outnumbered.

The immediate responses to these developments were (1) to order medium and heavy tanks from the states, (2) to order 3.5" bazookas airlifted in from the states, (3) to begin large scale production of AT mines, airlifted in from Japan, (4) to scramble together all the Shermans, and a handful of Pershings, that could be assembled from Okinawa and Japan, (5) to send full divisions to Korea, with M24s organic (more on that below), (6) to step up air interdiction of the roads, and (7) to order more 105mm HEAT ammunition.

From the moment these moves were made, the threat from the NK armor lasted about one month. It fizzled out to nothing before the NKs even reached the Pusan perimeter. By the time they got that far, they were down to penny-packets of less than 10 AFVs and usually more like platoons of 3, supporting infantry attacks. The heavier US armor poured into the theater during the Pusan stand, and there was no NK armor left for them to face. From an operational armor match up of 200 to nothing vs. the ROKs, it swung to 500 to nothing the other way.

What wore out the NK armor in the meantime? A combination of factors, with Tac Air the single biggest, breakdowns probably also serious, and with contributions from the better bazookas, the artillery, and the Chaffees to a minor degree. One airstrike on a large armor column in the middle of the month after TF Smith accounted for perhaps 50 AFVs. It was a huge column, caught backed up behind a destroyed bridge, and once spotted the air force threw everything they had at the column. There were a number of occasions where the NKs lost a dozen or more tanks, from a combination of 3.5 zooks, CAS, artillery, and occasionally M24s as well. Even the ROK began to do better once there were AT mines and better zooks. A dozen here, a dozen there, and over a month it added up to only small remnants of the NK force remaining. There was no giant tank battle involved.

The M24s were not independent battalions, as all the mediums and heavies later sent to the theater were. They were organic to each infantry division. This was a post WW II TOE change. Every infantry division was given an organic light tank battalion, with M24s, to do the kind of tank-infantry cooperation the independent Sherman battalions have supported in WW II. The tanks were parcelled out into companies, one in support of each regimental combat team. In the fight before the NKs reached the Pusan perimeter, there were only 6 of these company sized packets in the country. They rarely ran into NK tanks, and when they did it was as part of combined arms positions.

Some M24 units did lose heavily in the period before the Pusan stand. But not to the T-34s by direct fire dueling. What happened was quite different, and was not focused on the armor at all. The superiority of the NKs in the summer of 1950 was their conditioning and their expertise in infantry fighting in mountain or hill terrain. The small US forces in the theater blocked the roads and held towns and villages.

The NKs just went off road and flanked them through the hills, then hooked back to the road behind the Americans. Who then pulled out in disorder, losing to road ambushes along the way. The US forces were not yet holding continuous fronts off the roads, up in the hills. There weren't enough of them, they were trying to delay the enemy, they were green, and they were in poor physical condition for continuous hill climbing, up and down and up again.

When an M24 unit was bypassed in this manner, sometimes it managed to run the gauntlet back to US lines. But often the roads were blocked completely, the tanks could not break through along them, so the crews abandoned the vehicles and escaped on foot through the hills. Abandonment was the main cause of M24 losses in the first month or so after TF Smith. They were caused by NK flanking maneuvers with infantry, through the high ground.

They certainly did not stop the NKs, either the tanks (on their own) or the infantry. But it was the NK infantry that kept going, long after their tank support had melted away. Beating them, up in the hills, was the tough part in the first few months.

Korea is very much infantry country, terrain wise, especially in the rugged southeast, where the approach to Pusan and the Pusan perimeter stand, both occurred. There were few roads and those essentially all unimproved dirt tracks.

This was also, incidentally, the reason the M26 was such a failure in Korea. The critical problem with the Pershing is that it was grossly underpowered for its high weight. This was not a matter of ground pressure, just hp to weight. On flat ground with lots of improved roads, like western Europe, this might not be such a large drawback. But in Korea, tanks are called on to climb significant grades to go 2 miles, even along a road, and movement offroad requires both low ground pressure and substantial engine power. The M26 just did not have the power to climb the hills.

That was the reason for redesigning the whole hull to accomodate a much more powerful engine in the successor, the M46 Patton. In the meantime, the easy eight Sherman proved maneuverable and reliable enough to be used in the rough Korean hill terrain. So did the M24, incidentally. People did notice the M24 was undergunned if enemy armor was faced, and the result was a redesigned light tank, as speedy as the M24, but with a long 76mm gun - the Walker Bulldog (named for the commander in the Pusan perimeter fight, incidentally).

But the US tank business was not a matter of mastering a still intact threat from the NK T-34s. The US mediums and heavies were certainly called for with that in mind. But the threat had already evaportated by the time they got there. The largest NK armor forces you read about in fights at the Pusan perimeter are things like - 12 NK AFVs were encountered here, supporting such-n-such division's attack on the nth regimental combat team. 3 NK tanks raided here, after a battalion infiltrated between who and him during the night. Penny packets.

As for later in the war, the US forces had a huge armor edge in all subsequent fighting. The Chinese did have some T-34s, and some reports say a handful of IS-2s, even. But they played practically no part in the fighting, operationally. The US forces had many battalions of E8s, Pershings, and later M46s as well, by then. UN air support was enourmous, thousands of modern planes against practically nothing. (The MiGs, later, fought north of the Yalu for the most part, or right along it. They interfered with US strategic bombing and fought dogfights, but never seriously disrupted UN tac air).

What the Chinese had going for them when they intervene was again, superior off-road movement in their experience infantry; "mountain" infantry in effect. In Korea, mountain infantry was the mobile combat arm, not armor. It could go places the armor could not. The progress of armor was tied to clearing roads through the valleys, which depended on clearing the hills. The fight for the hills was an infantry and firepower affair.

The US was caught with its pants down (again) by the Chinese going off road in the middle of a harsh winter. The Chinese also had enourmous numbers. It was Matthew Ridgeway in the spring of 1951 who discovered and exploited their weakness, and by doing so restored and stabilized the front. Their weakness was logistics.

The same foot bound army that had excellent physical conditioning and could move operationally through the hills, was unable to move large mountains of supplies to support a war of material. When stocked up, the Chinese were very dangerous. When their ammo was low, and their artillery unable to intervene because of it, they were very vunerable. Air interdiction made this effect more pronounced, and so did any long advance, or any protracted, heavy combat.

So Ridgeway withdrew and gave ground whenever the Chinese showed they were ready enough to launch attacks, stretching their supply lines and making them move their ammo dumps again (under UN airpower). When they were exhausted and just holding their positions, he counterattacked, with heavy artillery firepower support which the starved Chinese could not match at such times. He managed to keep these flurries and lulls "off beat", unpredictable, and thus prevented the Chinese from adapting.

These methods inflicted tremendous losses on the Chinese and restored the front. As it stabilized, the war wound down into the endless cease fire negotiations; neither side ever managed to threaten any battlefield decision from then on.

On the armor story, then, the issue on choice of US tank was dictated by mobility because the war as a whole was dominated by terrain, by hill fighting. The early NK armor edge was gone very quickly. It carried them through the ROKs when completely unopposed, but was gone before the Pusan perimeter was reached. From a variety of causes, especially tac air but also other AT means (3.5 zooks, 105 HEAT, AT mines) and just breakdowns over the course of a few months fighting. It was never that numerous to begin with.

The better US tanks certainly *could* have defeated small bodies of T-34s, but they never really had to, the armor scare was already over by the time they arrived in strength. They certainly outmatched the remaining NK "penny packets" of armor. But mostly they were called upon to support US combined arms attacks (and counterattacks) against NK infantry, or to support by fire up into the hills, when they could not reach the battle location directly.

[Slapdragon]

You have to realize that the above is a reinterpretation leaving out some very important data to make things look different than they really were. First was that provisional company groups which were suppose to hold medium tanks entered battle with M24. Next that the US tac air power from the air force really did little of no CAS until the hills campaign. They did strike deap, but they did not support units well on the front lines with the exception of the Marine air wings.

Of the recorded tank battels of Korea, all were combined arms battles. Also the comment that the Korean tankers just drove down the road is just a recognition that in the hilly terrian tanks just could not head off cross crountry in many circumstances. The NKPA fought very well, with considereable skill, and got their butts kicked.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

There are a lot of mistakes being peddled (emphasis added) about the Korean war armor stuff, probably by people who don't know the detailed operational history, and instead only have a general picture of different stages of the war in their heads. The best antidote for that is to read a full-blown staff history of the war, like "Nakong to the Yalu".

My mistake - no charge for my posts guys - if anyone has inadvertently sent me money, let me know, and I will refund it.

It is interesting to note that the Canadian armour squadron was initially equipped with SP 17 pounder Tank Destroyers (Archer? the one with the M10 chassis) but before going into action, the LdSH squadron was reequipped with M4A2E8s. Both types were US built, so I understand, but I was wondering why the switch was made?

[gunnergoz]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...snip:

It is interesting to note that the Canadian armour squadron was initially equipped with SP 17 pounder Tank Destroyers (Archer? the one with the M10 chassis) but before going into action, the LdSH squadron was reequipped with M4A2E8s. Both types were US built, so I understand, but I was wondering why the switch was made?[/QB]

Michael, this is conjecture on my part but I think that a compelling reason for the change might be that the E8 Sherman had a wider track and lower ground pressure than the Achilles 17-pdr tank destroyer. This would help alot in the Korean mud and paddies.

Also, the Achilles was open-topped and there might have been thought given to it's lighter armor as compared to the Sherman. They might have been anticipating firefights with the tanks engaging enemy infantry relatively close up, where the open-topped Achilles would be at a distinct disadvantage.

Finally, you can warm up inside a closed Sherman a lot easier than in the open turreted Achilles. And Korea gets real cold, my old Dad told me!

Just my 2bits worth...