Twilight of the Gods - Berlin - was this trip necessary?

[Michael Dorosh]

Ok, grogs and grogettes...two questions come to my mind from reading THE UNKNOWN WAR

a) why was Berlin not taken in February 1945 by the Red Army?

was Berlin simply a prestige objective? Was it necessarily to militarily capture Berlin in order to bring about a successful conclusion to the war?

[Wallybob]

I don't know about A, but as far a B goes, it WAS a political, not a military objective. Both sides wanted to be the ones to roll thru Berlin. Eisenhower thought he had worked a deal with the Soviets that they would both work towards the military objective of destroying the German Army by heading towards Southern Germany (Dresden or so) but Stalin pushed his commanders towards Berlin. It was...politically important. Consider the propagana value.

[Andreas]

There was a post-war debate in Soviet circles on this. Chuikov, GOC 62nd Army (of Stalingrad fame), and an Army commander in Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front during the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations made the claim that when 1st Belorussian Front seized the bridgehead at Kuestrin, they could (and should) just have taken Berlin. Zhukov in his memoirs takes him to task for that in no uncertain terms, indicating this was indeed a touchy issue.

According to Zhukov there were a number of reasons, and they sound fairly believable.

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• Supply lines were over-stretched. By mid-1943, the Soviets had understood the art of the possible. Going for Berlin without the required supplies would have been a huge risk, and had the potential to end up like Charkov in spring 1943, or Warsaw in 1920 (an explicit reference in Zhukov's memoirs)</font>
• Open flanks. The Baltic fronts had gotten stuck, leaving the northern flank of 1st Belorussian Front wide open (300 km or something), and a counter-attack from there was not just possible, but actually attempted. It was roughly handled by switching a tank army (IIRC) onto a northerly axis. Had that not been done, the main assault force on Berlin Feb.45 may have been cut off. In the south, Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was busy clearing Silesia, a very complicated operation. They would not have been able to support a thrust.</font>
• Fest Plaetze. Posen/Poznan was still occupied until the end of February. It was a major communications centre, sitting on Soviet supply lines.</font>
• Risk. The operation would have been possible, but at a huge risk of failure. Had they failed, the Soviets may have ended up driven out of Poland again, something that they could not risk. </font>
• Western Allied advance. In February, the British and Americans were still very busy clearing the west bank of the Rhine. Nobody could know that (in Zhukov's words) they would get across it without a fight, or when. This put a major burden on the Soviets, and increased the risk that more units might be switched east to west by the Germans, to meet them.
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Just off the top of my head - hope this helps a bit.

[Len]

I was watching a biography of Eisenhower yesterday, where it was claimed that the taking of Berlin was unnecessary - Germany would have surrendered in 2 weeks, and that Eisenhower held American troops back to avoid the massive casualties that would have been incurred in the street-by-street fighting.

[Michael Dorosh]

Heh...thinking about how bloody that fighting in the Rhineland really was in February 1945 makes me think the Russians probably knew as little about operations in the west as they claim we in the west know about their battles....

[Andreas]

Michael, Zhukov was referring explictly to the actual crossing. I think by the standards of east front fighting, what happened there could be called 'skirmish'

Regarding Berlin as an objective, I fail to see how the nerve centre of the military and political leadership of Germany can be seen as 'prestige-object'. The Wehrmacht was controlled from Zossen, just outside Berlin, until Rybalko's army overran it. All the government and Hitler himself were in the city. It is all well to claim that Germany would have surrendered in two weeks, but it sounds like a bit of a blithe statement to me. More like post-war posturing 'Yeah, we did not go for Berlin, because it would have been a waste. Silly Russians, they just did not get it. Always with the head through the wall, that Stalin.'

[Wallybob]

The correct military option is the destruction of your enemies army. Period. Kill them, and the war is over. Look at Grant in the American Civil War.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Wallybob:

The correct military option is the destruction of your enemies army. Period. Kill them, and the war is over. Look at Grant in the American Civil War.

Well, one could argue that had happened by about March 1945, and still the Germans did not get it. I also think that ACW is not quite comparable, since despite Sherman's rife up the Shenandoah Valley and the sacking of Atlanta, or the nastyness that was Andersonville POW camp, it was not a war of annihilation, as the Soviet-German war certainly was.

[busboy]

Except for a few die hards, most German defenders were knocking themselves out to surrender to the Anglo-American forces instead of the Russians. Berlin would have been captured by the Americans with minimal casualties had we gone after it. And if we did, it would have saved a lot of trouble in the Cold War.

The fact is that we asked the Soviets before the Normandy invasion to take Berlin (i.e. not expect any Anglo-American help) as we didn't think we'd even be into Germany by the winter of 45. Churchill asked Ike to tell the Russians that Berlin was theirs, so he did.

Then, it turns out that we get into Germany a full year ahead of what we had expected, and only the Battle of the Bulge and supply issues causing a real problem. Suddenly, Churchill sees that the Western Allies can take Berlin, and Churchill, knowing the Cold War is fast approaching, asks Ike if he can take it.

Ike says no because:

-It would cost too many lives to advance that far that fast.

-It would cost too many lives to take the city itself.

-We promised it to the Russians

-If we did take it, we'd have to just give it back.

Plans were drawn up to take Berlin. The 101st airborn was, in fact, preparing to drop into the area. Patton was just waiting for the word to swing north toward the Baltic instead of continuing to Czechoslovokia, but Bradley wasn't keen on taking Berlin either. Even Montgomery thought he could and should beat the Russians to Berlin.

As I have mentioned, by March of 45, any non-fanatical German was putting up only token resistance to the Anglo-Americans. They were hoping against all hopes that they could ssurrender to the Americans, or that their lands would fall under Anglo-American occupation. The German troops in the East kept fighting as hard as they could in the hopes that the Western allies would advance farther.

Even the citizens in Berlin were preying that it would be the Americans or British who took the capitol, not the Russians.

Would it have cost lives to get to and take Berlin? Yes. As many as Ike thought? Certianly not. (Ike and Bradley were estimating 500,000 casualties.)

Would the losses have been justified? If we didn't turn Berlin over to the Russians afterward, then yes, it would have. I think it is a great tragedy that we stopped and let the Russians swallow up Eastern Europe, thus condemning millions to suffering under Communist oppression. We could have occupied so much land and saved those people without starting WWIII. Instead, we decided to stick to the agreements made during the war, and all we did was make for a longer, more hostile, and more deadly Cold War.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

...more units might be switched east to west by the Germans, to meet them.

I think you got your directions transposed, Andreas.

For some reason, nearly every book I pick up these days does this same thing at least once. Has the earth's magnetic field flipped or something?

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I think you got your directions transposed, Andreas.

For some reason, nearly every book I pick up these days does this same thing at least once. Has the earth's magnetic field flipped or something?

Michael

Indeed I have - it is called 'stupidity', and I suffer from it. Woe is me...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Wallybob:

The correct military option is the destruction of your enemies army. Period. Kill them, and the war is over.

The correct military option is to convince your enemy that further resistence is not in his best interest. There are lots of ways to do that but most of them do indeed require the defeat of at least a large portion of the enemy's forces.

A lot depends on the enemy's psychology, since it is ultimately a psychological question. Against a relatively rational enemy, the sight of his inability to prevent the systematic destruction of his cities from the air would have convinced him to seek terms, thus avoiding further bloodshed on the battlefield. But Hitler was nowhere near being that rational. His belief system was such that he was willing to countenance the utter destruction of Germany if it failed to carry him to the victory he felt was his destiny. As long as the armed forces of Germany saw it as their duty to protect and obey HItler, the only way to end the war was to get Hitler. And the only way to get Hitler was over the dead bodies of his soldiers.

It is important to realize that not every war is fought on those terms.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I think you got your directions transposed, Andreas.

Indeed I have - it is called 'stupidity', and I suffer from it. Woe is me...</font>

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Ok, grogs and grogettes...two questions come to my mind from reading THE UNKNOWN WAR

a) why was Berlin not taken in February 1945 by the Red Army?

Two major factors there I believe. A short-lived counterattack by Third Panzer Army (at that point quite a misnomer) on his northern flank drew Zhukov's attention away from a quick encirclement of Berlin. And there were the inevitable logistical problems of having advanced all the way from the Vistula to the Oder as rapidly as they did. That said, I have heard that an encirclement (not storming) of Berlin was the planned capstone of the Vistula offensive.

[ September 08, 2002, 05:19 PM: Message edited by: Shosties4th ]

[Grisha]

Andreas,

The strange thing is that Glantz has been recorded recently of stating that he has new evidence that indicates Berlin could've been taken in February-March, and with far fewer casualties. The reasons it wasn't was political and on Stalin's orders. I don't know what evidence Glantz speaks of, but it should be interesting if/when it's published.

Personally, I find it all confusing, since it's well known that during the Vistula-Oder operation there was an emerging threat from Pomerania with up to 40 German divisions forming there. However, Glantz doesn't make such claims lightly. From what I've gathered from Glantz and my own knowledge, Stalin initially gave the order to continue on to Berlin into mid-February. Then, there was the Yalta conference, and during this time Stalin called a halt to operations up north once he obtained the west's promise not to take Berlin. After this, Stalin immediately called for an operation to take Vienna, shifting significant forces from the Berlin direction southwards. Once, this was complete, the operation for Berlin was planned.

Makes for interesting discussion, even 60 years later, no?

[dizee]

i read that stalin held the final thrust towards berlin back, to pile up more forces.

he assumed that the war would be over as soon as berlin falls, and he wanted to control as much territory as possible before the armistic e.g. before the fall of berlin.

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Grisha:

From what I've gathered from Glantz and my own knowledge, Stalin initially gave the order to continue on to Berlin into mid-February. Then, there was the Yalta conference, and during this time Stalin called a halt to operations up north once he obtained the west's promise not to take Berlin. After this, Stalin immediately called for an operation to take Vienna, shifting significant forces from the Berlin direction southwards. Once, this was complete, the operation for Berlin was planned.

Makes for interesting discussion, even 60 years later, no?

Hunh, why Vienna, if that was the one capital he was eventually going to 'give up' entirely (though as a neutral rather than a future NATO-member)? Did he have a notion of making Austria a satellite state that he gave up on later?

[Soddball]

Beevor's book "Berlin - the downfall 1945" cites Stalin's desire to control the nuclear production and testing facilites at the southern end of Berlin as part of his desire to control the city. Anyone else have any more detail on this?

[Andreas]

Greg, very interesting post. Not sure what info Glantz has. It sounds an awful lot like the stuff Chuikov was alluding to, according to Zhukov.

I think that the fairly violent reaction to the establishment of the Kuestrin bridgehead was a portent of things to come. While it would no doubt have been groovy to take Berlin from the move, it ceases to be such a smart idea once you look at the way the railway lines and autobahnen run, and who can get there with the mostest if need be. The 1st Belorussian Front may well have been able to get there and take part of it. Would they have been able to hold it though? I don't know, but I know I would not have taken that gamble.

[benpark]

It certainly ended the war in Europe. Part of the reality of the situation was that the "head of the snake" had to be removed. There was enough Soviet intellegence that suggested that Hitler was in Berlin, along with the remaing structure of OKH/ OKW. The Western Allies, primarily the Americans, were unnerved by the German "Werewulf" talk enough to not risk having to assault two main fortresses of die hards (Alps+Berlin).

I think (from reading quite voraciously on the subject for the past 2 months) that the USSR assault on the city was a prestige assualt as much as a necessity. The nazi capitol was as much of a symbol to those Germans that would have kept fighting as Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow combined had been to the Soviets (even if most Berliners claimed to be rather cool on the nazi's themselves).

It speaks volumes that the war was brought to a speedy conclusion as soon as the city's fate was sealed, as well as the announcement of Hitler's death. The fall of Budapest or Vienna would not have carried the same finalizing defeat. One could argue that this final battle was Hitler's plan once his defeat was sealed in early 1945. Any suggestion that he would have left the city is not in keeping with his narcissistic personality.

For the Soviets, Berlin had become the prize, and it seems a necessity that THEY took it.

[Breakthrough]

Stalin, like Lenin before him, knew the value of synbols. Taking Berlin would symbolize the utter destruction of the Reich and triumph of Soviet arms.

[TSword]

Hitler moved to Berlin in Feb. 1945 after being in the Adlerhorst near the Western Front for several days near Rundstedt's HQ.

As Hitler realised that everything was lost he decided to go back to Berlin and stay there no matter what. His last ressort was there. He took over Power in Berlin and he would fight there to the end.

If for instance Hitler would have left Berlin to the South as Himmler and many others insisted, the fight would have commenced probably some weeks longer. Berlin and the death of Hitler was the key to end the game. Germany was Hitler and Hitler was Germany (If one reads the Wolfsschanze protocols or the extremly interesting memoirs of his private clerk Traudl Junge this becomes evident by itself), he was the spirit behind the whole no doubt (It's unbelievable the kind of control and influence Hitler had on people around him). After 1943 Hitler's dead would have put an abrupt end to Nazigermany, only the unconditional surrender clause would have hindered this a bit. Himmler, Goering or Goebbels wouldn't have had the power to take the kind of control of the Wehrmacht as Hitler did.

The Allieds would have been able to kill Hitler up to 1944 in Wolfsschanze relatively easy by a massive air raid since the shelters were not strong enough up till then. Strange in retrospect that it was never tried.

Greets

Daniel

[Grisha]

Andreas,

To expect anything but fanatical defense of their homeland would've been naive of the Soviets, no doubt. And we're talking of an operation that while amazingly successful (very light causalties as well), was still on the very end of exploitation when it reached the Oder River. I really can't comment one way or another on it, and hope that Glantz puts something together on this before too long.

Michael E.,

Your comment about psychological will of the enemy is interesting. The Germans believed in this concept as a precept of war, but the Soviets didn't.

To all,

As for the obsession for Berlin, I can say with confidence that Stalin didn't need to do much cajoling, if any, to get the Soviet people behind him on this. Actually, it probably would have been a very unwise decision domestically if Stalin had given Berlin to the west. For the average Soviet citizen during WWII, taking Berlin was the only way they were going to feel any sense of justice to what had happened, and they said as much. Alexander Werth's book can really give you a sense of the outrage Soviet citizens felt about the German invasion of their homeland. I'm not trying to pass judgement, or make political calls, just making an attempt at ensuring a particular perspective is addressed. Namely, the people who probably suffered the most in the war in Europe - the Soviet people.

[mcgivney]

The Soviets didn't want to take Berlin too early- they wanted to grab as much of central Europe as possible before the clock ran out.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by mcgivney:

The Soviets didn't want to take Berlin too early- they wanted to grab as much of central Europe as possible before the clock ran out.

But weren't the agreements already made at Yalta in February - meaning that whoever grabbed what was irrelevant?