German Motorized Inf Div - 1941

[Runyan99]

Sometimes it seems I have more information about the Russians than I do the Germans.

I am trying to get a complete OOB for the German 29th Motorized Infantry Division in 1941. I found some data at the Feldgrau site which gave me the OOB for a similar Motorized Division, the 16th. Using this info for comparison, I have the following data for the 29th:

Infanterie-Regiment 15 (mot)

Infanterie-Regiment 71 (mot)

Artillerie-Regiment 29

Kradschützen-Battalion ??

Aufkälrung-Abteilung ??

Pionier-Abteilung ??

Nachichten-Abteilung ??

??th DivisionalSupply Units

Now the questions/comments:

1) I notice that the Motorized Division has only two infantry regiments instead of the three in a normal infantry division.

2) Do the regiments contain 3 battalions, or are they also 'light' and consist of only 2 battalions each?

3) Are they likely to have trucks, halftracks, or a mixture?

4) What is a Nachichten-Abteilung? I cannot translate it.

Comments are appreciated. Going to take a trip to the bookstore tonight to see if I can find that German Army Handbook.

I imagine Nafziger has the answers in his collection somewhere. Can anyone point me in the right direction?

[ParaBellum]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

Now the questions/comments:

1) I notice that the Motorized Division has only two infantry regiments instead of the three in a normal infantry division.

2) Do the regiments contain 3 battalions, or are they also 'light' and consist of only 2 battalions each?

3) Are they likely to have trucks, halftracks, or a mixture?

4) What is a Nachichten-Abteilung? I cannot translate it.

The 15th and the 71th Inf.Reg.(mot) both consisted of 3 battailons, an AT company, an Inf.gun company and a Kradschützen (motorcycles) platoon.

IIRC they used trucks since HTs were usually reserved for the Panzerdivisions (even there only one battailon was "armoured", the rest used trucks.)

A Nachrichtenabteilung is a signals battailon, consisting of (usually) a radio company and a telephone company.

[edit: have a look here, all you ever wanted to know about the 29th mot.Inf. but didn't dare to ask:

29. Infanterie Division (mot.) ]

[ July 31, 2002, 06:20 PM: Message edited by: ParaBellum ]

[Andreas]

This might help.

Nachrichtenabteilung is the divisional Signal Battalion.

They would most likely be trucked, with some HTs and ACs in the Aufklärungsabteilung (maybe).

I don't think all motorised divisions were on the two regiment organisation in 1941. Maybe wrong though. I am quite certain they would have 3 BN regiments, however.

Data I have for 13. ID (mot) in 1939 gives it 30 armoured vehicles, 10 of these probably cannon armed ACs, none with the infantry. It has three regiments with 3 BNs each. It has 1,687 trucks, 765 of these with the infantry. Interestingly, it also has a battery of 10cm Kanone 18 in the heavy detachment. Only motorised and armoured division held this gun as standard issue in the early war years, but there is some debate about how many were present in the motorised divisions. 13. ID (mot) became 13. PD in early 1941, so 1939 is the last detailed TO&E I have for the ID history of it.

Hope that helps.

[Michael Dorosh]

There is a detailed OOB for Infantry Regiment (mot)Grossdeutschland at my site below, but I have a suspicion that GD's motorized infantry regiment may not have conformed precisely to the Army standard. Nonetheless, it may be worth a look for you - I do have a complete breakdown of the infantry regiment as it stood in 1941.

[Michael Dorosh]

Oh, Germany Army Handbook was horribly translated - it refers to an Intelligence Battalion when they really mean Signals Battalion, as Andreas points out.

Parabellum is absolutely right about halftracks. Even panzergrenadier regiments often lacked halftracks for their single battalion of SPW-equipped men. And even mighty GD was woefully short of SPWs, at least right after formation in June 1943.

Sd Kfz 247s may have been used by divisional staff; I did some digging on armoured cars - lots of confusing types, and the Germans duplicated designations, so you have Sd Kfz 231 (6rad) and Sd Kfz 231 (8rad) referring to two different vehicles (6 and 8 wheeled). It's not bad if your source keeps the (rad) designation, many do not.

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

Comments are appreciated. Going to take a trip to the bookstore tonight to see if I can find that German Army Handbook.

I imagine Nafziger has the answers in his collection somewhere. Can anyone point me in the right direction?

Skip the German Army Handbook... It won't really have what you are looking for. Order Niehorster's German World War II Organizational Series volume 3/1 "Mechanized Army Divisions (22 June 1941)"

Avoid Nafziger... his stuff is best as a last resort

29. Infanterie-Division (motorisiert)

- 15. Infanterie-Regiment (motorisiert)

-- I Infanterie-Bataillon (motorisiert) (1-4 kp)

-- II Infanterie-Bataillon (motorisiert) (5-8 kp)

-- III Infanterie-Bataillon (motorisiert) (9-12 kp)

- 71. Infanterie-Regiment (motorisiert)

-- I Infanterie-Bataillon (motorisiert) (1-4 kp)

-- II Infanterie-Bataillon (motorisiert) (5-8 kp)

-- III Infanterie-Bataillon (motorisiert) (9-12 kp)

- 29. Artillerie-Regiment (motorisiert)

-- I leichte Artillerie-Abteilung (motorisiert) (3 10.5cm batteries)

-- II leichte Artillerie-Abteilung (motorisiert) (3 10.5cm batteries)

-- III schwere Artillerie-Abteilung (motorisiert) (3 15cm batteries) Officially, all ID (mot) were to have 2 15cm (KStN 462) and 1 10cm (KStN 454) batteries... the 29th had 3 15cm (KStN 462) batteries

- 29. Kradschützen-Bataillon

- 29. Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung

- 29. Panzerjäger-Abteilung

- 29. Pionier-Bataillon (motorisiert)

- 29. Nachrichten-Abteilung (motorisiert) motorized signal battalion

If you want specific details of any of the above formations, e-mail me... I have no intention of typing it all out here.

The division used trucks. Halftracks were reserved for Panzer Divisions. That remains true throughout the war as there were never enough HTs to fully equip the Panzer Divisions

[Runyan99]

All,

Very good links and information. More data than I had dared to hope for. That is why this is the king of all grog forums!

Thanks

[Nidan1]

originally posted by Runyan99

3) Are they likely to have trucks, halftracks, or a mixture?

I think in 1941 even so-called motorized units were mostly horse-drawn. A lot of the TOE information that you can get from various sources give a "wish list" of what an organization was supposed to have. In reality the German Army in 41 lacked sufficient motor transport for the scope of Operation Barbarossa.

[ August 02, 2002, 07:36 AM: Message edited by: Nidan1 ]

[JasonC]

2 regiments of motorized infantry was standard for motorized and later Pz Gdr divisions. They never had the big 3 regiment organization. But then they had recon and engineer battalions, so the overall formation size was 8 battalions.

The recon battalion was initially mostly motorcycle infantry with just a few MG and 20mm armed armored cars, and later in Pz Gdr divisions was armored cars supposed to be mixed with half tracked infantry. Those would be the only half tracks in the division, but often they weren't available and the recon infantry was still on motorcycles. In the main regiments, the infantry was all trucked. The AT battalion would initially be towed ATGs, but would transition to Marders and StuG later on. The pioneer battalion is trucked engineers.

Motorized infantry divisions were commonly used behind panzer divisions, with the idea of keeping up with them and holding the ground they gained, protecting their flanks, screening the long sides of deep penetrations, etc. In practice, they were also called upon to add their infantry weight to Panzer corps attacks.

Remember that a Heer panzer division had only 4 infantry battalions, plus one recon and one engineer. So in a panzer corps of 2 panzer and 1 motorized infantry divisions (the common mix), 40% of the infantry-type battalions (8 out of 20) were in the motorized infantry division.

I hope this helps.

[ August 02, 2002, 12:41 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

2 regiments of motorized infantry was standard for motorized and later Pz Gdr divisions. They never had the big 3 regiment organization.

Jason, that is a wrong statement. I am looking at the Kriegsgliederung of 13. ID (mot) in 1939, based on Mobilisierungs Plan (Heer) 1939/40 and it gives it 3 infantry regiments. The book ('Die Magdeburger Division') then goes on 'With the same OOB and TO&E, three more motorised infantry divisions existed (2. 20. 29. ID). 13. ID had IR 33, 66 and 93. The change only happened after the war against Poland. In 13.ID (mot) IR 33 (mot) was taken away. The official reasoning was that the 3 regiment structure was too cumbersome. They also lost their integrated Beobachtungsabteilung then, and the artillery regiment was restructured.

The pioneers were not meant as infantry in early Barbarossa. I have a statement from GHQ 1. GD from Oct/Nov 41 ordering that they were not to be used as such since they were too valuable and it was impossible to get the trained replacements.

[JasonC]

Ah, in Poland - I believe it, thanks for the correction. By France they were on the 2 regiment standard, and certainly throughout the Russian campaign.

As for pioneers as infantry, it was officially frowned on of course, but I believe quite a common practice, though often as a reserve or screening position that gets sucked in to actual fighting. It was certainly common by the time of Stalingrad, and I believe the infantry-poor panzer divisions were resorting to it even earlier. Especially with the first company, in the case of panzer divisions (SPW mounted).

Remember that higher HQs don't issue orders against practices nobody is engaging in. An order not to employ pioneers as infantry in the fall of 1941 implies people were using them that way, both then and earlier.

[ August 02, 2002, 03:46 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Remember that higher HQs don't issue orders against practices nobody is engaging in. An order not to employ pioneers as infantry in the fall of 1941 implies people were using them that way, both then and earlier.

Hehe, yep. Good thing too, because otherwise everybody could figure it out and discussing it would not be fun.

I think my point was that the Germans for some reason or other seemed to believe they could get away with motorised corps structures that contained only 14 battalions real infantry (if it was 2 Panzer and 1 ID mot). Plus 3 Pioneer, 3 Recce, and probably 3 Replacement battalions, neither of which was meant to work as infantry. As a consequence, the specialist units had to work as infantry. Something they were never intended to do doctrinally, and which also cost the Germans to waste a stock of trained specialists that could never be replaced.

In the 49. AK (Gebirgs) in late autumn 1941 (the GJ Divisions were also 2 regiment structure) things were so bad that flank protection was provided by a Beobachtungsabteilung (hardly good use for some very skilled folks), and the Aufklärungsabteilung. Pioneers and replacement battalions (the latter were meant to front-train recent arrivals) ended up in the line.

The two regiment structure was a non-starter, and IMO materially contributed to the failure to close pockets off completely.

[Michael Dorosh]

GD used their Aufklaerungs battalion also to sometimes guard flanks and hold ground while the grenadiers and fusiliers were off doing their thing. It would seem it was a common German practice - did Allied recce regiments do this? I wouldn't think that CW divisions were so closely co-ordinated as that but that is just a gut instinct and nothing I've really researched.

However, in terms of the orders you cite, does temporary flank protection really count as "employing them as infantry" though? Simply holding ground is no big thing - it is when and only when the enemy attacks that flank that the men - be they arty observers, kitchen personnel, or recce - that they become "employed as infantry" by having to shoot back. Otherwise, one bivvy is as good as the next, no?

Which isn't to say that stopping to hold ground isn't an inconvenience since your arty observers can't be out spotting enemy batteries, your pioneers can't be blowing things up and your recce can't be out snooping around - but you are not incurring any casualties with them either if they are charged with merely holding a flank temporarily. Would the orders you cite, Andreas, refer to this kind of employment - or are you (they) talking about the use of, say, pioneers for straight out assaults?

[ August 02, 2002, 10:23 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JasonC]

I think the 2 regiment format was fine. The heer Pz divisions didn't have enough infantry because their regiments only had 2 battalions apiece. Bumping those to 3 each would have been enough. That is what the SS panzer divisions had, and worked fine. The Americans made due with only 3 battalions, way too little.

The reason you didn't need a 3rd regiment is that they could deploy shallower. You did not need a full regiment off the line in reserve, when every part of the formation could be switched to a threatened point rapidly. And you didn't need the extra vehicles, fuel demand, road space, etc. Divisional extras - recon, Pz Jgr, engineer - and "back" battalions from each regiment, were quite sufficient for "fire brigade" work. The Heer panzer divisions were the only ones really pressed, because they didn't have "back" battalions.

But 4 battalions in the front line was the same for all the division designs. In the case of a 3 regiment division, that was a full regiment in reserve and 1 battalion in each of the other 2. In a 2 regiment division, you have 4 on line and 2 back, which was adequate, especially with the divisional extras around too. The heer panzers only had the extras off the line.

You did not need to be "infantry deep" when you were fast. But you did need something off the line to stay flexible. The heer panzer divisions were OK attacking, because then they only put one regiment up and attacked on a narrow front, in depth. A whole panzer corps would attack one defending enemy division.

But when you didn't have concentration, and especially in prolonged defense of a long frontage, you needed 6 battalions of infantry. Heer division commanders used their pioneers and recon battalions for this - or put in the engineers one battalion's place, and put the half tracked Pz Gdr battalion in reserve with the recon guys.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The two regiment structure was a non-starter, and IMO materially contributed to the failure to close pockets off completely.

This structure was doubtlessly forced on the Heer due to the acute shortage of motor transport. I doubt they would not have preferred to keep the three regiment structure had they been able to. I suppose they could have by producing one-third fewer motorized divisions, but that would have left too many Panzerkorps without any at all.

Michael

[ August 03, 2002, 12:38 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Americans made due with only 3 battalions, way too little.

But I think the Americans were better able to get away with it because the usual corps structure matched each armored division with two or more infantry divisions, so there was always plenty of infantry around to guard flanks, etc.

Of course, having a couple more battalions of infantry organic to the division itself would perhaps not have been a bad idea. But I think what happened was that the Americans stayed closer to the early war ideal of the armored division as an armor-heavy formation. The Brits did the same, more or less. I think the Germans would have too if they had had enough tanks to maintain that TO&E.

Michael

[Smiler]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Avoid Nafziger... his stuff is best as a last resort

Why is this? I was considering embarking on the road to groglydom by ordering some of his books. Are there better libraries out there (or a "starter kit" list)? I'm mostly interested in high-level organization and doctrine at the moment.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

GD used their Aufklaerungs battalion also to sometimes guard flanks and hold ground while the grenadiers and fusiliers were off doing their thing. It would seem it was a common German practice - did Allied recce regiments do this? I wouldn't think that CW divisions were so closely co-ordinated as that but that is just a gut instinct and nothing I've really researched.

However, in terms of the orders you cite, does temporary flank protection really count as "employing them as infantry" though? Simply holding ground is no big thing - it is when and only when the enemy attacks that flank that the men - be they arty observers, kitchen personnel, or recce - that they become "employed as infantry" by having to shoot back. Otherwise, one bivvy is as good as the next, no?

Which isn't to say that stopping to hold ground isn't an inconvenience since your arty observers can't be out spotting enemy batteries, your pioneers can't be blowing things up and your recce can't be out snooping around - but you are not incurring any casualties with them either if they are charged with merely holding a flank temporarily. Would the orders you cite, Andreas, refer to this kind of employment - or are you (they) talking about the use of, say, pioneers for straight out assaults?

Mike, I have seen references to the use of Recce Regiments as flank protection in Normandy, so that seems to have happened. They were pretty useless otherwise then anyway.

The use of Beobachtungsabteilung 34 as infantry was to protect the only supply road of 49.AK in the Stalino area 'infanteristisch' (like infantry) against Soviet raids. This flank was left open because of the failure of the Italian corps to pull their finger out and close up.

The pioneer stuff I can't find now, but it referred to their use as leg-infantry in combat that brought unnecessary losses and prevented them from upgrading the supply road or building fortifications.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

But when you didn't have concentration, and especially in prolonged defense of a long frontage, you needed 6 battalions of infantry. Heer division commanders used their pioneers and recon battalions for this - or put in the engineers one battalion's place, and put the half tracked Pz Gdr battalion in reserve with the recon guys.

Or when you are fighting an encirclement battle while your infantry divisions are 100km+ behind your panzer/mot spearhead, and the pesky Russian refuses to accept that he has been beaten and insists on fighting on. That's when this comes back to hurt you in a bad way, because you can not lock them in due to lack of infantry. The French and the Polish did not fight on to the same degree, so the wrong lessons may have been learned and applied for the war in Russia.

Michael, I agree - I think this 'cumbersome' argument was just used to make it sound nicer. The real reason may well have been the quick expansion, and the need to 'stiffen' the newly created units, although in the case of 13. ID (mot) IR 33 was split and went to 2. PD (one BN) and 4. PD (Rgt Staff and 2 BN).

[Michael Emrys]

Something I forgot to mention earlier regarding the use of engineers as infantry: We do all know that it was common to assign some squads from the engineer battalion to the assaulting infantry companies in the case of either set piece attacks or in mobile actions where defended obstacles such as pillboxes were encountered, don't we? The recon battalions of Pz. and PzGrd. divisions in fact had engineer platoons as a permanent part of their establishment mostly for this reason.

Most of the discussion so far has revolved assigning the engineer battalion a sector of the front all their own, and this was probably the practice that higher headquarters was trying to discourage, but aside from that engineers were utilized in combat quite normally. They weren't just used for road building.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Most of the discussion so far has revolved assigning the engineer battalion a sector of the front all their own, and this was probably the practice that higher headquarters was trying to discourage, but aside from that engineers were utilized in combat quite normally. They weren't just used for road building.

Michael

Of course. But don't forget that infantry regiments had their own organic pioniers in addition to the seperate Pionier Battalion that fell under the Division. (Much the same way that a CW infantry battalion had an Assault Pioneer section all its own in addition to the Divisional engineers, though the Germans concentrated their infantry-pioniers (if I may use that term inaccurately) at the regimental (brigade) level rather than at the battalion level as in the CW.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

But don't forget that infantry regiments had their own organic pioniers in addition to the seperate Pionier Battalion that fell under the Division.

True, but it was only a platoon. Wouldn't you expect that from time to time for certain tasks it would require extra help from divisional assets? Like for a major attack going in?

Michael

[JasonC]

"The early war ideal of the armored division as an armor-heavy formation" is the one that actually was a non-starter. It never worked right. The 1 to 2 ratio of the German panzer division was the right level. In the late war, the Pz Jgr battalion had become another (half) armor battalion, so you needed 6. The US 1 to 1 ratio was chronically short of infantry and hamstrung because of it. They made do with cross attached infantry battalions, but those weren't trained to work in the same task force structure and lacked halftracks. In Poland, the panzer divisions also had to work with infantry because they did not have enough organic.

Everybody started with armor heavy. But the ones learning better abandoned it soonest. In fact, it tracks poor armor doctrine, specifically the "cavalry thinking" mistake of tanks used without adequate support of other arms, exactly. As long as the armor heavy formations persisted, the Allied armor drastically underperformed. E.g. as late as 1942 in North Africa, and Russian brigades.

It wasn't enough infantry for real combined arms effects, and that allowed expedients like PAK fronts to stop armor formations easily. The French armor in France was stopped by infantry formations. The Brits there by gun fronts. In North Africa, the Brits lost whole armor heavy brigades in single engagements against gun fronts. Similar things happened in Russian local counterattacks by armor in 1941.

The Russians eventually developed the Mech corps, and slimmed down the armor component of the Tank corps while beefing up its infantry with additional designated tank rider infantry, organic. The Brit armor division went to 3-4, and the US to 3-3. These changes were not made because of inadequate trucks or inadequate tanks. They made the most of the existing assets, yes, by increasing the number of armor and motorized formations. But they also were closer to the right mix for combined arms.

Also, remember that the early war German Panzer divisions had no more medium tanks than the later 2 armor battalion versions. They had more tanks, but no more mediums. It was the Pz Is and IIs that went away. Half the tank force in France (a transitional case) were Pz IIs, and half the tank force in Poland were just Pz Is.

As for Russians getting away because there wasn't enough infantry to stop them, this seems to me somewhat revisionist. Yes, by the time of the Bryansk pocket some did get away - about half of the originally "pocketed" forces in that case. A higher portion ran without being pocketed in the 1942 southern campaign. But more troops were successfully pocketed and captured in 1941 than in any battle, any war, any previous campaign. More than all previous encirclements in the war, or than in the war plus WW I, come to that, combined. It was not exactly a broken system.

Nor is it transparently obvious that one additional infantry regiment in trucks - taking up road space and fuel of course - would have stopped every trickle out of those pockets that did leak. Often it was simply a matter of too many miles wrapped around too many men. Often the escapees left through marsh and deep forest.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

But don't forget that infantry regiments had their own organic pioniers in addition to the seperate Pionier Battalion that fell under the Division.

True, but it was only a platoon. Wouldn't you expect that from time to time for certain tasks it would require extra help from divisional assets? Like for a major attack going in?

Michael</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

http://www.chez.com/barbarossa/dim29.htm

There is a site in French that lists this OoB but I don't know what HE uses for a source so take with grain of salt.

Nice colour photos at his site, by the way, from Signal magazine. Decent size scans.