BAR question

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by Siege:

What he is saying is that the M-1 Carbine used a totally different round (and was a completely different weapon) than the M-1 Garand.

The M-1 Garand fired the .30-06 full sized rifle cartridge, while the M-1 Carbine fired the .30 carbine round, which had a short bullet and a significantly smaller shell casing. It was more in the performance range of 9mm pistol rounds.

Prior to the war, the US had actually developed a different round for infantry rifles, the .276 Pederson and had intended to introduce the Garand rifles in that caliber. But with war about to begin, and huge stockpiles of existing ammo, it was decided that it was a bad idea logistically to introduce a new caliber for front line infantry without the time to stockpile sufficient ammunition.

-Hans

Yes, thats my point. You design around a bullet usually. You have to accept that there is existing stock of ammo and manufacturing capabilities. The M1 carbine could not be designed around an existing bullet. Its bullet could not be put in the first Garand because it did not exist yet!

The M1 Carbine bullet was a major opportunity for the US Military. The original spec called for a full auto capability. In fact, that part of the spec for full auto could not be achieved and was dropped till much later in WWII (Oct 44).

The design intent was probably driven by the fact that the Garand was too heavy and expensive to equip all the non-front line personnel. The reality was that it was used by front line troops.

In any case, IF the US had opted for a more powerful round AND demanded that the spec be met for full auto, THEN the Garand/BAR may have had some real competition.

The M1 Carbine bullet looks like a throwback to the wild west days. Its blunt and scrubs velocity quickly and (maybe its me) innaccurate at anything beyond 100 meters. Its not much more than a powerful SMG bullet without the full auto capability. The M2 in Korea suffered in extreme weather by the way.

The 276 was supposedly stopped by Doug. Heres some fun stuff

http://www.odcmp.com/Services/Rifles/pipsqueak_pistol.htm

[ December 10, 2003, 12:00 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Tittles, you said previously "only Germany was bold enough to introduce a new round." This is simply false. The other fellow merely pointed it out to you. The US introduced the M-1 carbine at much the same time Germany introduced their cut down MP44 round. It was certainly "bold enough to introduce a new round". Both added a carbine caliber round of 1200 and 1500 joules respectively, for a role between that of full rifle cartridges and the pistol ammo of SMGs.

Several attempts had been made to introduce very light weight machine guns for these roles, but invariably the recoil from the fairly heavy standard German 7.92mm Mauser round made them too difficult to control. The solution was to use a round of "intermediate" power, somewhere between that of the full rifle cartridge, and the pistol rounds. Experiments with several such intermediate rounds had been going on since the 1930s, but had been constantly rejected for use by the army. By 1941 it was becoming clear that there actually was a problem to solve, and one of the experimental rounds, the Polte 7.92x33mm Kurz Patrone (short cartridge), was eventually selected as the basis for future development.

I think the main point is that the Germans were trying to solve the problem of heavy 'LMG' (MG34/42 on bipod) and poor bolt action rifles (K98) and weak SMGs not cutting it in battle. The bullet was designed around battle experience.

The US was trying to make a neato mini-rifle for truck drivers and cooks.

Germany was bold enough to produce a new battle round. They were trying to solve a real world problem from war experience. The US was not involved in ghastly infantry battles when the M1 Carbine round was being designed.

The energy of the bullets is deceptive. the M1 Carbine bullet quickly loses velocity and accuracy. A more modern bullet would have made this weapon historic.

http://www.cruffler.com/historic-february00.html

[ December 10, 2003, 11:22 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

US 30 cal Carbine , AK47 round, 5.56mm

http://world.guns.ru/rifle/rfl08-e.htm

I think this line up sums up my thoughts about the M1 carbine and comparisons to MP44/AK47.

The M1 carbine round was a stretched out pistol round, the MP44 was a shortened rifle round. Both were iterating towards something but coming at it from different ends of the spectrum.

The real goal should have been a smaller diameter and higher velocity bullet like the .223 round.

[ December 10, 2003, 05:21 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Aco4bn187inf]

From- Battle Experiences HQ ETO US Army consolidated 15 April 1945...

in the Town and Village Fighting chapter...

Comments of a BAR man. "The BAR should be in the leading echelon and every likely target should be treated to a generous dose of fire--especially before entering a house. Often there is not sufficient time to get a clear sight picture, but fire must be delivered to cover the riflemen. More training should be given in hip shooting and in the use of the BAR asd a close-in weapon."--Pfc Hadash.

[Mr. Tittles]

Yes. That demonstrates the real mission that the BAR takes on in the attack.

Often people look at things and think they are seeing similar items and therefore feel the need to make direct comparisons. People look at the BREN and BAR and think they are the same thing. I believe they were as different as they were alike. The BAR was a more mobile application of full powered automatic firepower. It HAD belted MGs both light and heavy backing it up. The BREN did not have such common backup and WAS the full powered automatic firepower in most instances. In other words, running the BRENs around willy-nilly would not be a good idea. They were not only heavier and crew served but needed for defense.

The BAR is even more different than the German MG34/42. The air-cooled belt fed US 30 cals (either bipod or light tripod) were more comparable to the MG34/42 than the BAR.

[Mr. Tittles]

Anyone notice BAR may be purchased as support weapon in CMAK?

[Tero]

Originally posted by aco4bn187inf:

More training should be given in hip shooting and in the use of the BAR asd a close-in weapon."-

That is curious. I was under the impression the US Army was big on walking fire to begin with.

[K_Tiger]

My opinnion on the Bar:

1. To clumbsy for infight action compared to MP`s

2. to heavy for accurate long range aiming from the shoulder.

But better than no automatic riffel!

[Mr. Tittles]

A Military Encyclopedia

Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945.

[p. 169]

Chapter Four

INFANTRY

Section 1. Aggressive Action

One of the most important lessons learned by our Infantry troops in the Italian campaigns was the

value of prompt aggressive action in any situation where our troops were advancing. The lesson was not

easily learned, but based on costly experience.

A tendency to stop and take cover whenever they received enemy small arms fire became prevalent

in our small units. This tendency was not only shown by some troops in their first engagement with the

enemy, but was more common among troops that had been in continuous action for a prolonged period.

Troops that thus permitted themselves to be pinned down were inevitably subjected to deadly

mortar and artillery concentrations which very often caused excessive casualties. German positions were

habitually so well concealed and camouflaged that they could not easily be located. Our troops had a strong

inclination, when fired upon, to dig in without returning the fire, inasmuch as they could see no suitable

targets at which to fire. When they did return fire into the hostile area, the German fire either materially

decreased or stopped. Some units quickly learned that the proper procedure to take, when fired upon, was

to return the fire promptly, deploy a force sufficient to overcome the resistance, and keep on going. It was

shown repeatedly that units which pressed their attack vigorously suffered far fewer casualties and were

more uniformly successful than those which hesitated or stopped when fired upon. Our troops learned that

whenever they stopped moving against small arms fire, they always received heavy mortar and artillery fire

which caused more numerous casualties than would have been inflicted by the small arms fire had they kept

moving. Those few units which, after having been pinned down, broke under artillery and mortar fire and

attempted to get out of a shelled area suffered most heavily.Section 2. Fire Control in Small Infantry Units

Controlling and directing the fire of their units proved to be one of the most difficult tasks of squad

and platoon leaders. When an Infantry platoon engaged in a fire fight, the platoon leader could not

personally control the fire of the whole platoon, and had to rely upon his squad leaders. Often in rugged

terrain it was impossible for the squad leader to direct the fire of all men in his squad. Too often, squad and

platoon leaders engaged in, rather than controlled the fire fight. This practice, which was admittedly wrong,

was most common among inexperienced leaders.In an advance our troops were often reluctant to return enemy fire because they felt the flash and

muzzle blast of their rifles would reveal their positions and thus subject them to more accurate enemy fire. It

required great effort on the part of the small unit leaders to get the men to fire their rifles, and in mountain

attacks, few rifle companies ever employed a sufficiently large volume of small arms fire. When a platoon

did engage the enemy with the controlled fire of all its weapons the results were usually most successful.

The BAR [browning Automatic Rifle] was respected not alone by our Infantry but also by the enemy.

Generally the BAR man controlled his own firing in the attack, selecting and attacking targets he could see

or selecting likely spots at which to fire. Too often the squad leader and other members of his squad

depended too much on the BAR. Although it proved itself a valuable weapon in all terrain and under all

conditions, it was often used to engage targets that were more suitable for the M-1 rifle.

Section 23. Assault Team Weapons

Assault teams armed with the rifle, the BAR, and the Bazooka were employed to a great extent

against fortified houses and dugouts. The BAR formed the nucleus of the team. It was usually employed

with a few riflemen as a base of fire, while the building was being investigated. The bazooka rocket had little

effect on thick stone or concrete walls but was very effective through doors and windows. In many instances

the anti-tank grenade was used in the same manner. The flame thrower was seldom used as an additional

weapon in such assault teams. It was found that they were not essential in attacking houses since the

bazooka rocket or anti-tank grenade fired through the door or window of a house usually sufficed. The flame

thrower, however, was used to great advantage in assaulting pillboxes or well protected dugouts, since the

bazooka rocket or anti-tank grenade failed to penetrate their reinforced walls.

One reason for not using the flame thrower to a great extent was the lack of specialist operators. To

operate it successfully in combat the soldier must be very proficient with the weapon and be able to keep it

in proper adjustment. It was generally believed that these specialists should come from Combat Engineer

units, and should be made available to the Infantry when needed.

[ December 11, 2003, 10:52 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Different types of ammunition will be used while in different

terrain. In rolling country more mortar will be used while in mountainous

terrain most expenditures will be small arms and grenades. Likewise

fighting in towns will require more grenades and caliber .45 and 81mm

mortar HE heavy than fighting in open country.

This regiment carries the TBA prescribed load with the weapons. On

the regimental train, the six, 2-1/2 ton service company 6x6. Following

is the load carried:

Type Number of Rounds

Cal. .30 carbine 33,000

Cal. .30 Ball 8 rd clip 61,824

Cal. .30 Ball 5 rd clip 30,000

Cal. .30 Machine Gun 72,000

Cal. .50 Machine Gun 1,325

Cal. .45 10,000

60 MM HE 972

81 MM HE light 900

81 MM HE heavy 150

81 MM HE smoke 150

Grenade, hand offensive w/fuse 250

Grenade, hand fragmentation 750

Grenade, rifle HE AT 300

Rocket, HE AT M6A2 200

Signal Air Craft 120 rounds each color,

red, green, and white.

Heres a load of ammo from US Forces in Italy. The M1 carbine certainly stocked ammo.

I have a couple of questions about the full powered 30 cals.

1. Did the BAR use loose rounds to load its magazines?

2. Did the M1 Garand, BAR and 30 cal belt MGs share a bullet or were the MGs firing different ammo?

3. Why were the forces in Italy using 5 round clips? Not for bolt action riflesI presume. were these how the BAR magazines were filled?

[Los]

Interesting thread.

Full magazines are almost never issued from the factory or even depot. A soldier is issued x amount of empty magazines and it's his responsibility to retain them, though certainly more are made available through the supply system. This is why virtually every war movie you ever see where the guy throws away the magazines is a crock. What's he gonna do when they he runs out of mags? Magazines are not pre-loaded in the factory (this has a detrimental effect on the springs in the mags and leads to more jams, leads to problems with corrosion and various climates, not to mention being more labor intensive and costly.)

For U.S., Ammunition normaly came in "stripper clips". (Apparently for the BAR it's five or ten round stripper clip)s, The clip is seated atop the magazine and then the rounds are pushed into the mag. Or you can get loose rounds and load them individually. Garand ammo comes pre-loaded in stripper clips and since the magazine on a garand is internal (It's really just a well) the stripper clip is just inserted whole into the weapon. (Hence that trademark k-ching after you've fired your eight rounds.)

Disintergrating link ammo usually comes already linked but for cloth belt fed ammo like early war machine guns you can see in some documentaries, the troops, prior to an operation, hand loading the rounds into a device that inserts them into the cloth or whatever type of belt. This is stuff guys did during their down time or on the long boring ride on the assault ship out into theater.

And while we're on the micro-subject of ammo packaging, most grenades and mortar rounds (back then and today) came in crates and then sub packed in wax cartons. (they tried to shy away from metal due to danger w/ static electricity.) The mortar rounds were often sealed in way so prior to an operation you had to do the fairly laborious task of unsealing each round individually and then normally putting it back into the carton so you can carry it but then get it out in a hurry. In cold weather this is a fairly easy task but in hot weather it's a sticky and mucky job. Grenades are a bit easier in that the little can has a tape pull that removes the top and you slide out the grenade. Today's grenades have further packing material around the fuze and spoon you have to remove I don't know if the ones back then did.

The Germans due to resource restraints used reusable wicker containers for their artillery and mortar round packing materials.

Back to the BAR it was very popular by those who used it both in WW2 and Korea, which says a lot for the quality and utlity of the weapon itself. (Not that it does the same job as an MG42) Even up to early Vietnam, BARs were highly sought after by SF units. An interesting AAR I just read, conducted a few weeks after Normandy, by all the Battalion Commanders from the 82d has them unanimously claiming that BARs should be upped to two per squad, and that Machinegun squads should put all their M1919 LMGs in bundles and have them recovered later while every LMG gunner actually drops with a BAR. After the initial assault those additional BARs can be handed off to the infnatry squads (who could always find use for extra BARs).

Los

[ December 11, 2003, 12:07 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Los:

An interesting AAR I just read, conducted a few weeks after Normandy, by all the Battalion Commanders from the 82d has them unanimously claiming that BARs should be upped to two per squad, and that Machinegun squads should put all their M1919 LMGs in bundles and have them recovered later while every LMG gunner actually drops with a BAR. After the initial assault those additional BARs can be handed off to the infnatry squads (who could always find use for extra BARs).

Interesting! I hadn't come across that before. Do you know if this was actually put into practice? We know that the squad allocation of BARs was doubled after the beginning of 1945, but that was Army wide. Is there any indication that the Airborne started doing it earlier?

Michael

[Mr. Tittles]

BAR

S

P

O

I

L

E

R

CMAK

Theres a neat little scenario built around the WWII movie "A Walk in the Sun".

Unfortunately, the two man BAR teams that are support weapons are medium speed class and can not advance or assault! I suppose they model two men, a bipod and both men wearing those Mag vests.

Compared to BREN-BAR:

40 meters 42-34

100m 32-26

250m 18-15

500m 9-7

BREN is also 2 man team. In the case of BAR, one of the two men would be firing his personal weapon more. He really cant load the BAR for the firer. I would expect the firepower at 40 meters to be higher for the BAR/carbine (I imagine the extra BAR man in the two man team is carrying a carbine. The M1 carbine is 21 (40m) 8 (100m) 2(250m) firepower in the game.

The firepower of a squad based BAR is the same as this two man team. The squad can throw grenades, assault, advance. Ammo is 60 for BAR support team. Its 60 for the squad also. The squad is a fast class also. It also does not lose firepower for a BAR 'loader'.

[ December 11, 2003, 01:35 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Los]

Michael,

I don't know the answer to your question, but here's a link to the AAR:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=32

I find it fascinating to read the thoughts of these legends from the 82d in their own words, so soon after the legendary operation.

Los

[Siege]

To answer the question, other than the M-1/M-2 carbine, all .30 cal US weapons used the same interchangeable cartridge. The .30-'06 (.30 caliber government design of 1906).

This means that a single bullet could be used in any of the following. M1903 Springfield rifle, M1917 Enfield rifle, M-1 Garand, M1917 and M1919 Browning machine guns (both ground and aircraft mounted), M1918 Bar, Johnson rifle and Johnson LMG. I think there were a couple other limited service rifles also, such as civilian hunting rifles used as sniper weapons that used the caliber.

The same round is still very popular in civilian use here in the US. While supposedly a slight bit less accurate than the current 7.62 Nato, it is also a lot more powerful. Between that and the .45/9mm, We really came off on the short end of things with Nato standardization.

-Hans

[jwxspoon]

Boy that's a great link. Thanks LOS

jw

[Mr. Tittles]

Section 24. Relative Merits of Cal. .30 Ball and Cal. .30 AP

Ammunition

Both AP and ball caliber .30 ammunition were very effective when employed on targets for which

they were designed. The armor penetrating quality of AP ammunition was desirable during the period when

the enemy was employing numerous light vehicles and strafing planes. During that period front line leaders

requested an increase in AP ammunition. Both AP and ball ammunition were carried.

Ordnance reports indicated the following comparison between AP and ball ammunition:

a. AP ammunition was not as effective against personnel as ball ammunition in that it did not

have the same spattering effect. AP ammunition made a clean hole through flesh and bone, whereas ball

ammunition frequently ricocheted from heavy bone and caused greater tissue damage.

b. AP caused more damage to the bores of rifles and MGs than did ball ammunition.

c. Ballistic qualities of AP and ball ammunition up to medium range were practically the same.

d. AP ammunition was more effective against light armored vehicles.

The use of a single type of ammunition (AP) was preferable to using both types, and after the Fall of

1943 only AP was shipped to the theater. However, both AP and ball were used thereafter to utilize existing

stocks of ball ammunition.

Section 25. Ammunition Stockage for Mortars and MGs on

Positions in the Defense

[p. 189]

Resupply of ammunition was difficult in mountain defensive positions. Mule trains were used and

the minimum resupply time was usually between four and six hours.

Machine guns, at positions difficult to resupply, maintained a supply of 25,000 rounds per section of

heavy machine guns, and 20,000 rounds per section of light guns. In positions more easily resupplied,

12,000 rounds per section for both the light and heavy machine guns were usually maintained.

Positions that were supplied by mule train experienced a great deal of difficulty in protecting

machine gun ammunition from the weather. On long hauls, mules could not carry a case (1,250 rounds) on

each side so the cases were opened and split, thus exposing the ammunition to the weather. It was also

impossible to keep moisture away from ammunition stored on position. Belts became wet and ammunition

corroded so that it could not be used.

[p. 190]

A constant resupply was necessary to replace ammunition rendered unserviceable by the weather.

[ December 11, 2003, 02:33 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

October 2001, TechLaw, Inc. Final Archives Search Report - Camp Beale Ordnance & Explosives Cleanup Project 2

.30 Caliber

(Caliber .30

Ball, used in

rifles, BAR,

LMG, HMG,

carbines)

Firing and

Transition

Range (Range

12); Close

Combat Range

(Range No.

11)

Range 12;

Range 11

A subcaliber rifle is also known as Caliber .30

(Photo in 1944 Catalogue, p. 220)

Browning machine gun, Caliber .30, M2,

aircraft—standard, was predominant aircraft gun in

WWII, rate of fire 1000-1350 rds./min.; Ball, A.P.,

tracer, and incendiary ammunition (Photo in 1944

Catalogue, p. 375)

Browning machine gun, aircraft, fixed and flexible,

Caliber .30, M2-standard—1000-1350 rds./min.

[Photo in 1944 Catalogue, p. 401].

Browning machine guns, Caliber .30, M1919A4,

M1919A5—standard and M1919A6—substitute

standard: 400-550 rds./min. (Photo in 1944 Catalogue,

p. 406)

Browning Machine Gun, Caliber .30,

M1917A1—standard: standard for ground use; rate of

fire 450-600 rds./min. (Photo in 1944 Catalogue, p.

407)

Browning automatic rifle, Caliber .30,

M1918A2—standard, known as the BAR—a shoulder

weapon: 300-350 and 500-600 rds./min. (Photo on p.

409).

U.S. rifle, Caliber .30, M1—standard: shoulder

weapon; ranges of 100, 300, 500, 700, and 1100

yards, depending on set of elevation: used

ammunition types Ball, A.P., trace, semiautomatic

(Photo in 1944 Catalogue, p. 410).

U.S carbine, Caliber .30, M1 and M1A3—standard:

the regulation arm, semiautomatic; range of up to 300

yards (Photos in 1944 Catalogue, p. 413).

U.S. rifle, Caliber .30, M1903A1, M1903A3,

M1903A4 (sniper’s): range is 600 to 1000 yards

Ball Caliber .30 cartridges: use approximately 50

grains of IMR 4895 powder: case was brass, and the

bullet consisted of 90% lead and 10% antimony or

97.5% lead and 2.5% antimony (range of up to 1,000

yards, with a table of angles of elevation, maximum

ordinate, and angles of fall included on p. 431

(Photos in 1944 Catalogue, p. 431).

Caliber .30 balls are 396 grams (ball) 193 grams

(carbine) (1944 Catalogue, p. 434).

Ordnance Used With Target/

Range

Weapon Characteristics Ordnance/Ammunition Characteristics

.30 Caliber

(cont.)

(Photos in 1944 Catalogue, p. 413).

According to 1943 Basic Field Manual for .30 Caliber

Rifle, M1903 (and M1903A1, M1903A3, and

M1903A4).

Caliber .30 cartridges for M1903 and M1917 service

rifles assembled in 5-round clips; for M1 rifle,

assembled in 8-round clips (1944 AIG, p. 185).

(Photos of clips in 1944 AIG, p. 186)

Caliber .30 used in aircraft machine guns, anti-aircraft

machine guns, semiautomatic and automatic rifles,

ground machine guns (1944 AIG, p. 189)

[Charlie Rock]

I don't have my copy around, but one of the best references on the subject came from Infantry Weapons and Usage by SLA Marshall, written about the Korean campaign.

A couple of advantages that are not immediately self-evident is that at squad level one of the more experienced /reliable soldiers would be assigned the BAR. BARS tended to get in the fight more often--recall that Marshall was aproponent of the theory that 80% of riflemen don't shoot in combat, etc. If you had one or two BARs in your squad it became important as to who was manning them. In a static position or rapid moving action it was fairly simple to maneuver the BARs within the squad formation; they tended to be employed more frequently in small unit actions then the average riflemen. While you shouldn't get your tactics from Hollywood, the bit in Saving Private Ryan when the BAR gunner sprints up to a roof top to shoot up a flak piece is a good advantage of this--the mobility of a one man weapon was seen as a big advantage in fluid situations.

Another characteristic of Brens and BARS is that they were often fired in (gasp) semiautomatic; even on low rate of fire the M1918A2 could be fired on semi. Unlike the MG42, you could fire a bren or BAR on semi or tap it off on low rate and the Germans could not locate it among the lee- enfields or M1s, as the case may be. The theory went that once you fired aimed shots, area fire style, at the machine gun and pinned those guys then maneuvering was relatively easy. Unless you had good reason to BAR gunners knew that if you fired a burst you could be mistaken for an M1919 and be treated accordingly. If you have 240 rounds in a bandolier you could shoot off your ammo in a couple of minutes, in a pinch. Te heavy weapon with bipod could suppress quite well on rapid semi, and I suspect you lived longer if you did that.

In English's On Infantry there was a piece somewhere that the Germans tended to phase out some of their MG42's in a few predominantly MP44 equipped squads and platoons, late war. If mobility is the goal the idea of rifle-equipped infantry relying less on their LMGs is not a US-specific concept.

[flamingknives]

Marshall's piece on weapons use in Korea can be found here in .pdf format. web page

[Mr. Tittles]

The German WWII squad would normally have the SL command the LMG. He would point out targets for the gunner. The assistant SL would handle the rest of the guys. If attacking, they would be the manuver element while the LMG blazed away. In CM terms, they would operate as half squads but the break in weapons should acknowledge this.

The US squad would be harder to command because the SL would have to get all the firers to concentrate on a target. But the US squad and platoons, when they did concentrate, would be very effective. I have heard of SLs using M14s with tracers to show the rest of the squad what to fiire at. I wonder if this was done in WWII?

On a side note, i saw a bazooka definetly firing rifle fire at a flak gun. Is this new?

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.korteng.com/BrowningMG/T1205S1.HTM#FIG-4

An interesting thing about the US 30 cal MGs is that the water cooled 1917 had a light barrel. The tripod 1919 had a heavy barrel and the bipod 1919 went back to a lighter barrel (but not as light as the water cooled weapon). The bipod version would probably overheat if fired like the tripod version 1919. The water cooled weapon, of course, did not have the need for a thick barrel because of the water cooling.

Is the 1919A6 in CMAK? To me, it should be a support weapon and the BAR should not.

Weight of barrel

1917_3 lb

1919A4_ 7.35 lb

1919A6_ 4.65 lb

[ December 12, 2003, 11:57 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Maj. Battaglia]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

We know that the squad allocation of BARs was doubled after the beginning of 1945, but that was Army wide.

What is the basis for this in CM? By that I mean was this an official change in TO&E or is CM reflecting the fact that people found the BAR to be valuable and enough squads scrounged an additional one and CM assumes most will have two?

A while back I was looking for backup on this but had no luck. I would be grateful if you can provide either a print or Internet source for this.

[Charlie Rock]

Flamingknives--thank you.

Here it is: SLA MArshall, 1950-51

THE MAINSTAY

Under the conditions of the average infantry fight in Korea, the BAR, even more

than the machine gun, provides the fire base around which the action of other infantry weapons builds up and the force expresses itself unitedly.

It is not alone the case that analysis of company operations warrants this appre-

ciation of the weapon; the men also make this estimate of its effectiveness; they state frankly that it is the mainspring of their action, and that wherever the BAR moves and fires, it gives fresh impulse to the rifle line. Appreciation of the BAR within Eighth Army therefore reaffirms experience with the same weapon in World War II operations both in the Pacific and in Europe.

What makes this reaction all the more noteworthy is that there has been a markedly higher incidence of failure by the BAR in Korean operations than in World War II fighting, for reasons which will be explained later. Even so, there is no diminishing of general infantry confidence in the effectiveness of the automatic rifle. It is still considered “indispensable” and troops shudder at any suggestion that it might ultimately be replaced by some other weapon. They cannot imagine having to get along without it. The reason that the BAR is rated as the mainstay of the fire base is because of the greatly modifying influence of the Korean terrain upon the utility of the machine gun. The CCF are good machine gunners; they are more expert in their employment

of this weapon than in all else; they are persistent; their guns are of every type under the sun; even so, they have the knack of keeping them going; in the attack, they bring the gun in very close; but they are good at concealment behind brush, thicket, and rock ledge, and therefore the close-in target remains very elusive. The record contains many examples of CCF machine guns bearing on our positions at 30-40 yards range and continuing unseen. To counter this fire with one of our own machine guns usually necessitates bringing it far forward, with consequent sudden death, either in transit or soon after placement. Our MG crews are far more obvious in moving and in setting up. The BAR, which is a lesser target and usually has as its operator an individual who combines boldness with a requisite stealth, is therefore the main counteragent.

BAR fire is also the chief depressant of sniper fire delivered from ranges which

are too close in for the mortars and too far out for the grenade. One man with a BAR, if he is the right man, will have a stronger neutralizing effect upon a local sniper-infested area than the’ random fire of five or six riflemen. Almost invariably, BAR men are exemplary in their conservation of ammunition. They do not have nervous fingers; they sustain fire only when the situation truly demands it. Why this is so is something of a mystery; it is recorded here as fact because the BAR record in Korea is one of consistently strong performance by the operators. On defense, the machine gun will usually be sited to cover a draw, the gentlest hill facing, or some other avenue of approach which seems particularly favorable to the enemy purpose. Because, as the attack develops, the threat from that quarter will continue more or less constant, even though the enemy does not initially take advantage of it, the employment of the machine gun is more or less rigid. But under

attack, the defensive dispositions seldom remain static; the lines contract and expand as the pressure changes; men and weapons are shifted as an excess of danger threatens from a new point. The BAR is the pivotal weapon in this eddying of the tactical situation. Should the rifle line begin to bend at one point, the BARS are sent there to stabilize it. If the machine gun, stopping the enemy frontally, is threatened by flankers circling toward it over dead ground, BAR fire is used to cover the corners and save the gun. During the mop-up, it is the main weapon for neutralizing foxholes; when, on defense, strong out-posting is required, the BAR is also given that assignment.

EFFECT OF RECONDITIONING

Concerning the new BAR, fresh from the factory, there is no problem. Practically

without exception, this weapon has met with full success every test which the inclement weather of Korea and the dust and grime of the countryside have imposed upon it. The record is unmarred by any major entry of cold-weather failures. When, during the November battle, it became evident that locking and misfires in the BAR were occurring at such a rate as to raise the question as to what had gone wrong with the weapon, the circumstances were investigated. Particularly in one battalion - the 2nd of the 38th Infantry Regiment - there had been so many failures by the BAR in the fighting along the Chongchon River and near Kunu-ri that the commander and his men all said that it no longer had their confidence. (No other unit held to this extreme view, though others had experienced some BAR failures.) Much of the trouble seemed to be centered in a weakness in the recoil spring, though because of complications due to seeming frost-lock it was not always possible to determine theseat of the difficulty.

The check-up revealed that almost without exception, the BARS which had

gone out of action were old weapons, reconditioned by Ordnance in Japan. The old springs, it was reported, had been cleaned but not replaced. Also, according to staff information supplied from Tokyo, the inspection system (native Japanese) during the initial phase of the weapons-reconditioning program had been technically inadequate and generally weak, with the probable consequence that some of the rebuilt weapons had not been adequately tested.

In the circumstances, it was impossible to determine whether the 2nd Battalion,

38th Infantry (a remarkably staunch fighting unit and one of the few that spoke

favorably of the carbine) had chanced to receive a disproportionate number of reconditioned weapons, and that this accounted for its bad experience. Very few of its BARS had survived the battle and the retreat through the fire gantlet south of Kunu-ri, though the men remembered quite well when and where the BARS had failed them. Also, the ordnance records had been lost. So there was no way of checking through on this significant detail.

Elsewhere, though the record was occasionally spotty, the rate of failure was

not such that the troops felt any real distress because of it or tended to sell the BAR short. However, the spot check revealed that almost invariably where the weapon had failed, it was a reconditioned BAR. As troops got further along into the cold weather campaigning, there were fewer and fewer complaints of this character. On the whole, therefore, the BAR in Korea merits a clean bill. Under conditions of even greater difficulty, the prestige of the weapon is not less than during World War II, and its tactical employment is more greatly varied.

AUGMENTATION

In the view of the great majority of infantry troops and commanders in

Korea, the fighting strength of the infantry company would be greatly increased by doubling the number of BARS, while reducing the number of Ml carriers proportionately. This could be done without adding an upsetting burden to the company load. The final argument for the change is that it would make more perfect the balancing of offensive-defensive strength within the infantry company.

[ December 12, 2003, 10:56 AM: Message edited by: Charlie Rock ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Heres a 8 round M1 clip or magazine.

The M1 Garand was only loaded this way. That is, after the last round, the metal part ka-chinged and you put in a new one. So there is a psychological effect here also. Once I fire 3-4 rounds, I can not top up till I shoot off the rest. Since firing attracts attention, the Garand firer may become doubly disuaded from firing once he has fired. A veteran would probably fire the first half of the clip aimed fire, then rapidly clear the rest of the rounds area fire so as to get another magazine in. A greener GI might lean the other way, that is; hold his fire.

At least the ammo appears light weight compared to a real magazine and is 'pre-filled'. A bandolier full of them allowed ammo to be moved about quick also.

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/m1clip.htm