Losses in the Italian campaign

[coe]

I did some reading on the Italian campaign...from my interpretation there is a view that it was a German defensive success in that it tied down large amounts of Allied units and was a rather orderly withdrawal from fortified defensive line to fortified line (granted some were incomplete)...yet when I read the casualty counts, it seems like the Allies were always getting the better of the Axis. Are there reasons for this? especially when attacking prepared positions? Were the german losses on counterattacks that went into a hail of fire?

[JasonC]

The allies were logistically superior throughout, and that meant a greater weight of artillery fire, of air attack, armor support, etc. The Allies found Italy hard compared to previous fighting - they romped in the Med before then (Torch and after).

The figure I've seen for Allied combat losses in North Africa is 70,000. The Germans alone lost that many as prisoners at the fall of Tunis. Total Axis losses in North Africa were apparently around 475,000, 275,000 of them PWs and at least 3/4 of them Italians.

In Sicily, the Allies lost 22,000. The Axis lost up to 169,000 including up to 140,000 PWs - most Italian units on the island surrendered.

Similarly, the invasion of Southern France cost only 10,000 US and French military casualties, but cost the Germans something on the order of 100,000, as many of the static formations failed to get away or stayed in their garrisons and were captured.

During the positional fights in Italy, the Germans had a favorable loss ratio and Allied losses could hit quite high figures in short periods of time. E.g. the offensive from 11 May to 5 June 1944 that took Rome, cost the Allies 43000 men. They also had occasions when non battle casualties were outrageous - e.g. in the period 15 November 1943 to 15 January 1944 - the rainy onset of winter - the Allies had over 50,000 non-battle casualties, due to exposure and conditions caused by it trenchfoot and pneumonia e.g.

Overall the Allies lost 312,000 in Italy, battle. Feldgrau gives an incomplete record through the end of November 1944 only, as 309,000. So there is no question overall German losses were higher. The official US history claims they reached 435,000, nearly half of them missing, while giving a similar figure to the German one for KIAs. It is perfectly believable that the Germans lost the difference in the final Po offensive, including a large ~100k prisoner bag as the army gave up in the field etc.

So the picture is a very lopsided ratio when fighting Italians or hitting unprepared places, falling to something more like unity in the Italian campaign. Rising modestly above that only at the end, due to overall collapse as much as anything tactically happening in theater.

I have noticed that many brought up on either wargames or memoire spin have the impression that the Germans always outscored their opponents and only lost because they were outnumbered. This is not remotely the case in the west. It is true in the east, where Russian losses ran up to 5 times German ones, and remained high clear to the end of the war.

In the west, large bags of prisoners on multiple occasions allowed the western allies to outscore the Axis in absolute loss terms. Tunisia, Cobra-France (and the channel port garrisons in particular), and the later war Ruhr pocket are the major cases. Failure to get everyone out of Sicily (mostly Italians it is true), southern France, and the bay of Biscay area are additional but smaller cases. Losses were not far from unity at the best of times, maybe running 3 to 2 German favor when they were in position and holding successfully, rather than running. All the large retreats involved considerable loss.

Various analysts calculating "combat efficiency" numbers for the purpose of arriving at combat factors for early wargames and for military sims akin to them, calculated German performance per man above that of the western allies, by a factor of order 1.2 or so. But that does not remotely mean they outscored the allies but such a factor. They didn't, they underscored them in absolute terms.

They faced odds throughout, and materially superior enemies throughout. Those making such calculations estimate some effect from odds alone, and arrive at such CE factors as a residual after they have removed all odds-correlated factors. Which is always a messy inference to make (odds do not operate uniformly, specific mix of weapons matters, one is averaging over very different sorts of incidents, etc).

FWIW.

[dieseltaylor]

Given the level at which CM is fought I am not aware that final figures for a campaign have much relevance to the local level or reflect the amount of odds required at local level to achieve victory at modest cost.

In Sicily, the Allies lost 22,000. The Axis lost up to 169,000 including up to 140,000 PWs - most Italian units on the island surrendered.

[coe]

this is rather interesting...one might guess that the russian tactics on the offensive were more "wasteful" in man power...(perhaps it was the way the charged over open ground? I don't know)... but if there were a way to properly deduct the prisoner account. But even so it seems that when assautling fixed positions, the Germans did more poorly than the Allies (probably due to massive artillery fire?) I presume POWs aside the Germans would have to have had a better loss ratio against the western allies to win.

[JasonC]

Why would PWs be backed out? Nobody thinks they should back out the millions of Russians taken prisoner in 1941, that is put down to operational ability and the success of blitzkrieg, and Russian unpreparedness.

Italians had the same limitations in the North Africa campaign (O'Connor famously took over 100,000 prisoners with 30,000 men himself), and the whole strategic deployment of additional forces to Tunisia was an obviously stupid move that predictably resulted in massive loss. As was leaving everyone in the channel ports in France, etc.

The same is seen on smaller scale actions, too. E.g. the Americans taking Cherbourg beat a German force numerically as large as their own with a loss ratio in their favor of many to one, because they were able to exploit their logistic and transport edge and pocket large German forces. I mean they had complete control of the sea and air and used it to reduce the pocket easily, etc. Tons were lost in the fall of France because the allies were more mobile than the Germans, same as the reverse situation in Russia in 1941.

Such operational and planning and "stacked deck" achievements are every bit as much a matter of skill as closing the Kiev pocket.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As was leaving everyone in the channel ports in France, etc.

That actually appears to have been a fairly good idea.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

Half a million men could have accomplished far more elsewhere. Demolition work, blocking channels, mines etc could have delayed allied use of the ports without handing so large a force over to them.

[Andreas]

That's 20/20 hindsight speaking. At the time you can not know how much you will actually be able to achieve in terms of destruction, and how quickly the clean-up will be performed. Also, the order to destroy installations would have to be carried out in a very short time, due to the rapidity of the collapse of the German position in Normandy.

The 1/2 million personnel (I'll check the figure tonight) were for the most part useless in any role on land. And they managed to deny the use of the ports when it mattered, i.e. during the dash across France. Once Antwerp was open they could have surrendered - before then they provided a vital service that, on balance, was probably more valuable than they could have done elsewhere.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

I just checked the figure in Hugh Cole and you are right it is lower - he gives 230,000 as the number left in the "western fortresses" at the start of September. (Brest fell in mid December).

As for "hindsight", Cherbourg fell on June 26. It was wrecked enough that it contributed nothing to the time of the breakout, which might have been noticed and considered enough. (Incidentally, the Germans lost another 45-50k there, twice allied losses taking it).

As for speed with which France fell and limited utility of the forces involved, without any plan to evacuate them that is true enough. Although at least half the troops in the Bay of Biscay area walked clear across France after the breakout, in time to make the German lines ahead of the allies advancing from the south. Those that didn't, it was mostly due to partisan delays and poor organization of the withdrawl. Basically the Germans had no coherent plan to retreat from Normandy. When they needed one they indulged the Mortain pipedream instead.

[coe]

Well the reason I'm trying to back out POWs is more towards evaluating fighting ability (and thus also the question does CM adequately model that)...for example ideally we'd love to know if two equal forces met (same experience) etc. perhaps over equal ground what will happen...or if one force outnumbers the other 2 to 1 will the fact that being german or being allied nullify that some of that outnumbering (e.g. weapons, fighting ability etc.)...of course this is optimistic and waaay to unrealistic but it is interesting that many of the accounts tell of some G.I. leaping up, eliminating several machine gun posts and then taking out a squad of Germans (the reverse doesn't seem to be as common a story) - perhaps taht's because there are many tales from the victorious side.

[dieseltaylor]

In CM game terms I think the Germans benefit greatly from the great flexibility they have in the very varied weapons they can purchase. You will note that when it comes to artillery the Germans have some cheap stuff whereas the Allies pay large prices for their artillery.

It may well be doctrinally true but it does provife flexibility on spending. The most potent Allied weapon was artillery and in CM it is emasculated.

Generally speaking the German troops have excellent weapons so there squads can be very tough. British in 1944 where most infantry is rifle armed fare badly if they cannot fight at their optimum range. So no surprise if your opponent tries to maximise the advantage : )

I mention the British attacking as obviously in Italy thye mainly were. I was quite shocked to find that an HMG42 basically has better firepower than a British rifle squad at any range so when buying battalions the vast number of intrinsic MG's is quite an advantage. The Brits having to buy them separately at additional cost - and of course suffering from the gross under-modelling of the HMG in terms of non-jamming and length of time able to fire uniterrupted.

Lastly as in all battles the terrain should act as a force multiplier for the defender unless he is dropped into a position quickly or is faced with an attacker who has more appropriate kit.

I mention appropriate kit as in the case of Cherbourg where the US army borrowed a platoon of Crocodiles who demonstrated the length of the flame thye could put out which lead to a rapid surrender of the bunkers that had been resisting.

Not masses of weapons just the right ones in the right location at the right time to achieve the result without loss. Makes the stats look good.

[The_Enigma]

Jason, out of intrest - the figure you give for POWs in your orginal post, does that factor in the Italian 10th Army?

Edit: talking about German troops getting left behind in fixed positions etc

I recently read that the Channel islands were occupied until the last day of the war ... they where just completly bypassed.

40000 German troops tied up and it would seem 10% of all resources for the "Atlantic Wall" sent there way! :eek:

[ November 21, 2006, 11:21 AM: Message edited by: the_enigma ]

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Regarding Cherbourg, I think it fair to note that the German commander of one fortress complex surrendered when shown a meticulous map of his entire position, showing the location, type and quantity of the weapons in the strongpoints, together with their fields of fire. The Americans literaaly had better information on his defensive position than he did. Faced with that shattering knowledge and facing certain systematic annihilation of his force, he caved. Had he not, we would've had to reduce that entire position much the way it was done on Iwo Jima. Also, I think part of the unspoken reason for defending the fortress cities had to do with plans to get the V-1s and V-2s really cranking out launches, never mind the dirty bomb variants.

I agree that the Germans screwed up big time in Tunisia, first by going in, then compounding it by willful failure to evacuate all but a relative handful of specialists once it became clear the gambit had failed. Basically, most of the German troops were punished by Hitler for failing him by leaving them to be captured.

the_enigma,

What a colossal waste of scarce troops and valuable resources!

Regards,

John Kettler

[The_Enigma]

the_enigma,

What a colossal waste of scarce troops and valuable resources!

Aye, i believe it stated somewhere that Guernsey was the 2nd most fortified island in Hitlers little empire.

Some info on "Fortress Guernsey" (well and the other islands too):

The islands were fortified out of all proportion to their strategic importance, for example on the island of Guernsey alone, the second largest in the group, four giant Russian guns of 30.5 cm were installed in a site known as 'Batterie Mirus'. These massive pieces of artillery were joined by hundreds of other guns ranging in calibre from 75 mm to 105 mm, and included the dreaded '88'. Many tunnels were constructed for various purposes, along with battery control towers, underground bunkers, flak towers and coastal defensive positions; which eventually swallowed up some 60,000 mines, flame-throwers, mortars and machine guns.

Restoration of these impressive sites is an ongoing project, with one of the more ambitious schemes being the replacement of a massive 20.2 cm coastal gun at the site of the 'Dollmann Battery'.

[The_Enigma]

Sorry to split this in 2 ... stupid internet connection! :mad:

cont from above post:

This is one of 41 tunnels identified on Guernsey alone. This particular tunnel was originally a fuel storage depot for refuelling U-boats and for this purpose four enormous tanks, each capable of holding 30,000 gallons of oil

source: link

[coe]

hmmm I wonder what would have happend if those channel island fortifications had guns that could reach a port in Britain or if it had a massive radar installation or could hit the cherbourg.. that would have been an interesting campaign.

[Kingfish]

Behold!

Scroll down to see the Channel Islands fortifications.