Commonwealth and German battalion organisation

[YankeeDog]

My point exactly. If the (relatively) cheap 4.2" mortars FO were available as a regimental asset, it would give the US, hard-hitting, quick response artillery asset that would actually be purchasable in, say a 1000 pt. QB.

Even with the additional cost that would be tacked on due to the faster response time of a Regimental asset (as compared to Corps), the 4.2" spotter would still be much more affordable than the exorbitantly priced 105mm spotter due to its smaller tube count and lower ammo load.

But I should stop harping on the whole Allied arty thing. No more patches, and talking about it just makes me grumpy. :mad:

YD

[dalem]

Right. We're talking about how I was wrong, not about how you are right.

-dale

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

Who can afford U.S. artillery in CMAK anyway?

Anyone who gives the Allied player the 200% bonus. Having an entire 105 battalion at your beck and call is a really...comfortable feeling.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

If you go through much of this information, its evident that not many 120mm are even at the Regt level (and so Andreas is wrong).

What's the story Lewis? Google failing you? Another time you throw out stupid statements that you can not back up?

Heelllooo - anyone home?

[Wartgamer]

Artillery was excellent for counter-mortar, but had certain limitations, especially when fire on

enemy mortars close to our own troops was desired.

The 4.2-inch and 81-mm mortars were perhaps the best weapons to use against enemy

mortars.

[p. 237]

The 4.2-inch chemical mortar units were most effective in counter-mortar when trained in

artillery methods, attached to the artillery for fire control, and employed in at least company strength for

massed fire.

A Military Encyclopedia

Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945.

They were in demand as infantry support but also functioned as artillery

[ March 24, 2005, 06:03 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[cassh]

Just to clarify a few facts regarding actual British inf. Bn organisation, doctrine and practice in Italy and the ETO.

The new 18 and 38 radio sets meant forward OP sections were employed to co-ordinate heavy weapons for the battalion from the Bn mortar pln (3" mtrs) and the Brigade Support Group (MMG company and 4.2" Mortar Platoon. These were distinct from the FOO parties and FACs. Source - Public Record Office, War Office Papers, WO 166/10603, 'Divisional Battle Schools conference held at the School of Infantry, 18-23 March 1943', and '49th Division Training Notes No.8'.

Other non doctrinaire practices were the adoption of four Vickers machine-guns in each infantry battalion as standard; they were not part of the War Establishment and distinct from the attached support group weapons. Source - Public Records Office, War Office Papers, WO 204/1904, 'A.F.H.Q. progress bulletin infantry No.2'. Their adoption as a near standard indicated the inherent weakness in firepower of an infantry battalion's War Establishment as laid down by the War Office.

The FOO from the Royal Artillery was the infantry battalion's second-in-command (2iC) and would always be a field office (captain or major, usually the latter) from the battalion's affiliated field regiment.

The divisional CRA and Corps CCRA usually delegated a great deal of latitude to these FOOs to call-in fire missions of massed fires from divisional and AGRA artillery regiments.

The 'Uncle' target fire-mission procedure allowed the FOO to call all divisional guns to bear on a single target in under two minutes. These were commonly employed to break-up German counter-attacks. Source - PRO, War Office Papers, WO 277/5, A.L.Pemberton, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, (London 1951). PRO, War Office Papers, WO232/17, 'Italy: Notes from the Allied Bridgehead.' and WO 166/10603.

Most battalions employed 'infiltration' platoons to dominate the FEBA, denying the enemy reconnaissance of forward friendly positions, increase friendly reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. As German forces often held the front-line with only a thin screen of OPs, infiltration and recce patrols proved of great value. The infiltration platoon specialise in advanced fieldcraf and would often lead attacks, locating enemy positions, and neutralising enemy machine-gun nest and OPs by sniping or close assault. Source- PRO, War Office Papers, WO231/14, 'Report of 78th Div. Activities to D.M.T.' (DMT - director of military training).

All of the above come from official War Office files and reports of primary, or collated primary source evidence. Their accuracy is therefore quite high and in my opinion can be relied on as if not universally true, then at least commonplace practices and methods adopted on an ad hoc basis by the soldiers and most importanly the COs at the front in Tunisia, Sicily, Italy and France.

[Michael Dorosh]

I wouldn't say universally, with respect to at the very least my own regiment, the Calgary Highlanders (one of the rifle battalions in 2 Cdn Div), with respect to the employment of Vickers Guns (I'm unaware of Cdn battalions ever employing a four-gun platoon in any capacity as part of the War Establishment), and the use of FOO as battalion 2 i/c (though I would need to investigate further; I'll ask the regimental curator about this. I've read the War Diary and both regimental histories and not seen reference to this - in fact, our regiment had a CO and a "Battle Adjutant", which I presume was like a Battle Captain in an Armoured Regiment??)

The FOOs were highly regarded, but when a FOO took over a company at Walcheren Causeway (1 Nov 1944) it was notable (the brigade major took over another company, incidentally). To think that a FOO would take over the battalion doesn't seem likely, again, in our example.

I do find it interesting that "firepower issues" were redressed by WASP flamethrower kits in late 1944 - a decidedly close-range weapon which was well loved and highly effective from all accounts. Seems to be the opposite of what a Vickers Gun platoon could provide?

[cassh]

Michael:-

I cannot comment on Canadian or any other CW Bn organisation. I thought I was clear in outlining these ad hoc practises related to British rather than Commonwealth forces. Whether CW Bns, especially Canadian regiments followed the same practices in-theatre I don't know. The fact they were integral to 21AG would lead me to beleive their may well be the chance of these practices occuring.

Whilst some of these practices where organic solutions and not laid down by the War Office, the Bn's FOO as 2iC was SOP and this is still true even today in British Army doctrine as far as I'm aware at Coy level where FOO parties are deployed on permenant attachment.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by cassh:

Whilst some of these practices where organic solutions and not laid down by the War Office, the Bn's FOO as 2iC was SOP and this is still true even today in British Army doctrine as far as I'm aware at Coy level where FOO parties are deployed on permenant attachment.

Dropshorts commanding infantry? Naah. I can't imagine the folks at Upavon approving such an outlandish idea as doctrine, even after a very good lobster dinner.

All the best,

John.

[Private Bluebottle]

This is a little something I came across which will, I fear add a bit of fuel to the fire. While from a book on WWI, it approaches the problem of British "doctrine" from an interesting perspective, I think.

From - Palazzo, A., Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army & Chemical Warfare in World War I, University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

Doctrine or Ethos

All military institutions, if they are to deal successfully with the evolving nature of war, must possess an intellectual structure that facilitates change. Military professionals and scholars identify doctrine as the underlying system that an army uses to modify its methods and disseminate new ideas throughout its corporate culture. Further, military commentators generally insist that an army's possession of a well-conceived and universally accepted doctrine is mandatory for the preparation and waging of war. Its absence is a damning condemnation of that military institution's leadership and effectiveness.

The identification of doctrine as the standard by which to measure the professionalism of a military institution is particularly troubling for scholars of the British army because, as a number of historians have observed, the British did not have a doctrine prior to or during the course of the Great War. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham comment on its absence in Fire-Power, as does Tim Travers in The Killing Ground. In fact, as late as 1992 a senior British officer could point out that the army had only recently accepted the need for doctrine.4 The officer corps of the World War I era would not have objected to this conclusion. During the years before the war the general staff weighed the possibility of developing a doctrine and actively decided against it. Yet the army's lack of a doctrine was not the result of accident, neglect, or ignorance, but was a deliberate policy decision.5

Doctrine is a military concept that is difficult to define, although certain key principles are evident. Bidwell and Graham identify doctrine as the "study of weapons and other resources and the lessons of history, leading to the deduction of the correct strategic and tactical principles on which to base both training and the conduct of war."6 In a recent essay Brian Holden Reid suggests that the aim of doctrine is not to create rigid dogma but rather to attempt to inculcate a military institution with a common framework of tactical understanding.7Jack Snyder sees doctrine as a "set of beliefs about the nature of war and the keys to success on the battlefield." Snyder continues that doctrine "helps to provide a simple, coherent, standardized structure both for strategic thought and for military institutions."8 John Gooch considers doctrine to be "the bridge between thought and action. It interprets the higher conceptualization of war, embodied in strategic theories and operational plans, into working guidelines for action. In a word, doctrine articulates war."9 Timothy Lupfer defines doctrine as "guidance for the conduct of battle approved by the highest military authority."10

Each of these scholars has identified doctrine as the distillation of ideas into a framework that an army uses to train its forces to achieve maximum battlefield potential. They stress uniformity and an acceptance that commanders must train the entire army within a consistent system following standardized goals, so that the degree of success during training exercises is measurable and readiness reports are comparable. The British did not use such terms in their training, nor in analyzing the capabilities of their forces. Yet, despite the absence of doctrine, the British did succeed, and it was their army that dealt the Germans the terminal blows that led to the Armistice. Historians have been shortsighted in their insistence on doctrine and perhaps could have probed more deeply to determine whether it is possible for an army to base its intellectual structure on a foundation other than doctrine. Instead of doctrine one must identify a different, and perhaps more important, construct to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the British army and its leaders. Indeed, the army had no doctrine, but it possessed instead a unifying philosophy, or, more accurately, an ethos, that provided an equivalent structure for the decision-making process and was the basis for all operations. In ways much more dramatic and all-encompassing than doctrine, ethos provided the British with effective operational and tactical guidelines around which they developed, modified, and inculcated their method of waging war.

In practical terms, ethos obviated the need for doctrine. Ethos provided the continuity of thought that welded the army into a whole; it was based upon the cultural values of the nation and was accepted by members of the officer corps, not only among the senior ranks and general staff but also among junior officers, NCOS, and those of other ranks. Culture played a particularly important role in the British army for it was culture, rather than doctrine, that determined the British method of war-making. Castigating the British army for its failure to create a doctrine obscures the fact that the British did have the means for interpreting the war and guiding their responses to its challenges.

Ethos can be defined as the characteristic spirit and the prevalent sentiment, taste, or opinion of a people, institution, or system.11 To be identifiable, a people's ethos must meet several criteria: it must be representative of the values of the society; it must include a significant part of the population, particularly those in positions of power and influence who are able to shape the culture; it must be enduring; and the state must possess the desire to maintain it and instill similar values in the next generation. While there is a temptation to equate ethos with tradition, ethos is not a static state of irrational beliefs that isolate a society or prevent the evolution of ideas. Only in extreme cases does ethos act as a barrier to change-usually in cultures that are determined to resist change at all costs, or in leaders who see a political benefit in excluding the outside world, as the government of Japan during the Tokugawa period did when it isolated the country from western influence for nearly 250 years.

The hallmark of British society in the years before World War I was the challenge to the existing order by new ideas, inventions, and experiences, as modernism made its assault upon British culture. It was a tumultuous period, and issues such as Irish separation, the women's vote, and the reform of the House of Lords convulsed the nation. Conservatives resisted but generally, if reluctantly, gave way. Samuel Hynes has identified a standardized response to the introduction of the new theories of modernism. During those tense years before the war, whenever they appeared the pattern was the same: "the New behaved brashly, insolently, or violently, and the Old responded with an arthritic resistance."12 One part of society sought stability while the other fought for change. Yet Britain did slowly change, for its ethos was not rigid; change gave the nation a mechanism to assess new genius and to shape the adaptation of novel ideas into a recognizable and comfortable form so they could be incorporated into the existing order.

The institution of the army also contained the necessary elements to create a viable, sustainable, and dynamic ethos, thus the army mirrored society by also undergoing a struggle with change during the years leading up to the war. The army derived its ethos by borrowing its values from the broader culture, institutionalised it by imposing it upon the vast majority of the officer corps, particularly at the senior levels, and assured its continuance by incorporating mechanisms to pass it on to the next generation. The army's ethos revolved around certain intangible qualities such as a preference for amateurism, a parallel aversion to professionalism, and an emphasis on the character of the individual. More directly, the army identified particular values such asloyalty, self-confidence, physical courage, obedience, moral virtue, and sacrifice as representative traits of its ethos. This emphasis comes through repeatedly in the testimony of Maj. Gen. Sir Hugh Sandham Jeudwine, who proudly listed the traits the British brought to the war as "courage, devotion to duty, determination, and endurance."13 Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson believed victory was the result of the invincible will to conquer in every officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and man.14 One gunner, W. H. F. Weber, observed that technology might achieve temporary success but victory depended upon national character.15 J. F. C. Fuller described the officer corps as being composed of "men of honour, men who could be trusted, who were loyal to King, country, their men and to their caste."16 Last, the Field Service Regulations (FSR) concluded that "skill could not compensate for the want of courage, energy, and determination."17

During the prewar debate about doctrine, .the army's stated rationale for rejecting doctrine also helps to reveal the nature of the army's ethos. At a conference of staff officers in 1911, Capt. C. A. L. Yates suggested that the army should produce an officers' manual of applied tactics. The guide would provide a series of situations and solutions to tactical problems for the benefit of junior officers. Many officers at the conference loudly condemned the proposal as the first step toward creating an officer corps imbued with standardized responses to potential situations. Maj. Gen. F. S. May believed that the idea was dangerous because officers would study it to the exclusion of works of a more general interest. He believed that it would lead to stereotypical responses, which he considered a liability since Britain might have to fight anywhere in the world under greatly differing circumstances. Another officer, Brigadier General Davies, objected as well. He feared officers would become tempted to seek answers to tactical problems in a book rather than using their intelligence. After brief consideration, the general staff directors opposed the suggestion, supporting the arguments of Davies and May and citing the additional difficulty of keeping the FSR current with other manuals and their additional concern that it could not possibly be sufficiently comprehensive to cover all potential situations.18 An article in the Army Review announcing the publication of a new edition of Infantry Training reinforced this viewpoint. It stated that "considerable latitude in applying principles and instructions to local conditions has been left to commanders," and that due to differences of training programs throughout the empire, strict adherence to one method would be impossible.19 Finally, while this insistence upon geography provides one explanation, another author simplified the issue with the suggestion that all an officer needed to solve any situation was common sense.20J. F. C. Fuller, certainly among the most erudite of British officers, made the same observation. Writing in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution in 1914, he concluded: "I have no doctrine, for I believe in none. Every concrete case demands its own particular solution, and ... all that we require is skill and knowledge, skill in the use of our weapons, knowledge of our enemy's formations." He continued, "if there is a doctrine at all then it is common sense, that is[,] action adapted to circumstances."21 A leading proponent of professionalism, Fuller did not belong to the school of thought that advocated an amateur army. He strongly believed that success in war required practice and study, yet he, too, saw no need for doctrine and preferred to let commanders, properly trained, find their own solutions to local situations.

In part, the rejection of doctrine was a continuation of the debate between advocates of a professional versus an amateur army that Tim Travers and others have described.22 However, such a rejection also represents the recognition of structural realities that made ethos a more viable intellectual structure to follow. As an imperial army with widely different theaters of responsibility and an organization structure based upon the regiment, the British army's emphasis was on unit commanders making their own decisions with reference to the local environment. John Terraine noted that the British forces were not so much a single army as a reservoir of imperial garrisons, lacking the organizational unity and common doctrine to bind the regiments into a whole. John Keegan describes membership in the army not in terms of a military organization but rather as a large Victorian family, complete with ornate silverware in the mess and photograph-laden histories. The regiment contained all the components of upper-middle-class society, including an ancient lineage, connections to the gentry through an emphasis upon country life, and associations with the court through the practice of naming members of the Royal family as honorary colonels.23

For ethos to be effectively followed, however, an institution must disseminate its values widely, a requirement that the British readily achieved. Facilitating the dissemination and integration of the army's code was the fact that the officer corps recruits were traditionally drawn from a narrow, cohesive layer of society.24 Class stratified the nation into a series of well-defined groups, and the army drew its officers from strata that shared its values and assumptions on the nature of society and their role in the military. Originally the preserve of the nobility, military families, and some clergy, the officer corps extended itself, over the course of the nineteenth century, to include the gentry and professionals. This relatively narrow pool of candidates encouraged a similarity of outlook and station.

Class barriers, however, while critical to one's acceptance as an officer were not totally impermeable, and it was possible for outsiders to cross the divide that separated the officers from the other ranks (witness William Robertson's rise from private to field marshal). During the war the permeability of the caste system became critical, as the army's rapid expansion and high number of officer casualties greatly increased the need to draw leaders from beyond the traditional sources of supply. When pressed by the needs of war, the army broadened the acceptable criteria of membership. The most important trait that determined a candidate's acceptance into "the circle" then became whether or not the individual was "a gentleman." Throughout the war the British strove to maintain the social exclusiveness of the officer corps. While they resorted to a number of expedients, such as shortening training periods and speeding up the process of commissioning, the army consistently made "gentlemanly qualities" a prerequisite for obtaining a commission. Initially the universities and public schools provided a ready source of suitable material, but after casualties forced the army to promote from the ranks it selected first from soldiers belonging to the professional and managerial classes and not the working class.25

Officer training battalions served not only to teach potential subalterns leadership but also to measure a candidate's gentlemanly qualities. Henry Ogle, promoted from the ranks, wrote a journal of his experiences at officer training school in 1917. The unit's commander, according to Ogle, believed it his duty to make his students into "officers and gentlemen." Commenting on mess practices, Ogle observed that the commanding officer had a "rota for cadets to dine at the officers' table, so many every day, so that he [the commanding officer] could note how we shaped at table talk and eating peas."26 Social class was a potential indicator of a candidate's worth, but what really unified the officer corps into a monolithic institution was its adherence to the idea that all its members had to epitomize the ideals of a gentleman and possess a willingness to adhere to the values of the majority.

While one would expect an officer corps composed of individuals with similar backgrounds, educational experiences, and social attitudes to develop or adhere to a common ethos, would the rest of the army- the NCOS and other ranks-also share these values? In a society in which class played such a dominant role, one might assume that each group of people would develop its own ethos, derived from the unique experiences of the middle class, the working class, or the various nationalities that composed the United Kingdom. However, this was not the case. The top echelons of British society were responsible not only for the running of government but also for the setting of a national ideology. Moreover, the non-public school world recognized the supremacy of the upper class's cultural ideas and they filtered downward and permeated all of society. Before the war anyone who could afford servants had at least one, a reflection of the divisions in society between those who led and those who obeyed. After the war began, this distinction continued. Capt. Arthur Gibbs, a young officer in the Welsh Guards who had attended Eton, reported that his new batman was "a very nice boy who promises well. An ex-footman, he has quite the correct manner."27 By providing junior officers with servants the army was not merely preserving a tradition but deliberately attempting to perpetuate the supremacy of the upper class; as the officer class expanded the army symbolically issued all the temporary officers their own batmen. The class system worked in both directions. It required the deference of the lower classes, not only in appearance or demeanor but also in ideas. Volunteers responded by the tens of thousands to Field Marsh. Lord H. H. Kitchener's call to arms and grown men readily accepted in the trenches, with little resentment or reluctance, the leadership of officers who were little more than boys but who were also public school men.28

As the war progressed the army had to rely heavily upon the youth of the upper classes to provide it with the necessary numbers of officers. Fortunately for the army, it was virtually impossible for a boy to pass through the cultural system of elite society and not absorb the qualities and attitudes expected of an officer. Before the war the majority of the army's officers had attended public school and university, a pattern that was to play an important role as the army expanded. The schools emphasized education "in a gentlemanly tradition of loyalty, honour, chivalry, Christianity, patriotism, sportsmanship and leadership, " which assured that their graduates met the army's educational and social requirements.21* Furthermore, private schools fostered devoted allegiance to one's house, school, and country, sentiments that the army could easily adapt into devotion to one's regiment. Reinforcing these tendencies were the schools' nearly maniacal emphasis upon sport, which not only developed the physical body but also instilled moral virtues, developed team spirit, and integrated the concept of striving for the common weal over the individual. The widespread use of sporting metaphors to describe the war is no accident. Every officer understood the need to "play the game." Boys were not merely graduates of these institutions but rather the products of a deliberate molding process, and throughout the British public school system the mold was the same. With such focus upon character-building in the schools, the staff at the army's schools at Sandhurst and Woolwich did not include leadership training in their curriculum but assumed that their candidates came equipped with the necessary social and moral qualities to be future officers.30

The military instruction of public school boys had existed in British society for some time, but for most of the nineteenth century it was a rather minor affair and most of the schools did not sponsor a cadet corps. At schools that did have their own corps, they tended to be small, poorly run, and little-respected activities. However, after the Boer War the environment quickly changed as the debate over military efficiency and fears of German invasion swept the public schools along with the rest of society. More schools founded cadet corps, participation increased, and the schools' administrations, as well as the boys, showed more enthusiasm for the program. Lord Haldane's establishment of the Officer Training Corps in 1908, as part of his military reforms, introduced the routine training of boys in the military arts. Haldane saw the Officer Training Corps as a potential source for officers for the regular army, the auxiliary, and the territorials. The War Office issued regulations for this training and undertook the examination process, thereby providing the army with an opportunity to expose cadets to its military values at an early age. Thus, while at school the boys not only acquired the gentlemanly character expected of an officer but also received exposure to basic military training and the idea that their future role was to be leaders of men. By 1914 over 100 public schools and 22 universities had officer training programs.31

Haldane's Officer Training Corps scheme helped to provide the army with a pool of candidates who could not only be quickly commissioned in case of national emergency but who also had already incorporated the army's ethos into their beliefs. On the day Britain declared war, the War Office sent out 2,000 invitations to university and public school men to apply for commissions. The War Office believed that these men had the background and Officer Training Corps experience to take up leadership positions with minimal additional training. Reliance upon the Officer Training Corps for a ready supply of officers quickly accelerated, particularly candidates from the universities. By the end of the first year Oxford had supplied 2,500 officers, Cambridge 2,300, and the Inns of Court 2,500, with smaller amounts contributed by the lesser centers of education.32

Other older boys who rallied to Kitchener's call but who wanted to serve with their friends instead of accepting commissions in a host of units, formed their own "pals battalions." The 18th through 21st Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers were organized into the University and Public School Brigade, while another battalion became the 16th Middlesex Regiment. However, these men came under pressure to take up their proper roles and the units became depots for officers. By 1917 the University and Public School Brigade had given off over 7,000 officers while the Middlesex a further 1,400. Instead of serving as ordinary soldiers, these older boys had to fulfill the responsibility for which their training and breeding had intended them: the leadership of men.33

While the need to be gentlemen helped make the officer corps into an exclusive club, the expenses of membership further contributed to the creation of a homogeneous institution. Not only was a public school or university education a major drain on a family's resources, but even after commissioning considerable private resources were necessary to support a young officer determined to pursue an army career. A subaltern's salary fell far short of the amount needed for the purchase of uniforms, mess bills, cases, servant's outfit, annual maintenance, the costs of field sports, and social events. In addition, officers in cavalry units had to provide their own charger and several ponies for hunting and polo. The regimental system helped to stratify the officer corps even more, as the costs of joining a regiment varied greatly, with the more prestigious units generally being more expensive. Financial resources helped to assure that one served with comrades who were from similar economic and social backgrounds and further strengthened the trend toward a uniform ethos.34

Kitchener's call to the colors might easily have resulted in the creation of new armies that were detached from the ethos and values of the Old Contemptibles. However, the army took advantage of the regimental system to instill a sense of tradition and familial association within newly raised units. Instead of inventing names or assigning arbitrary numbers to the new battalions, the War Office appended these

units to existing regiments. Thus the four battalions raised from the city of Hull became the 10th to 13th Battalions, East Yorkshire Regiment, while the units enrolled in the Newcastle area became part of the Northumberland Fusiliers, and those from Glasgow joined the Highland Light Infantry. The raw recruits to the Sherwood Foresters inherited the regiment's glory gained by the winning of Canada, the victories of Wellington, and service in India and Egypt, while the volunteers of Tyneside became part of the Northumberland Fusiliers' record of service in the Peninsula, India, Afghanistan, and South Africa. Henry Ogle, a war-time volunteer, provides an example of the success the army had in inculcating regimental loyalty in the members of the expanded army. After receiving his commission in the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment, upon his arrival in France he protested his assignment to the rival Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. A staff officer brushed aside his protests, but in due course he made it to the"King's Own. Kitchener's decision for the naming of new units linked these units to the victories of the past, created loyalties, and helped to ensure a continuity of ethos between the regular army and the new army.35

If this was the nature of the British ethos, did it matter that the army lacked a doctrine? Many historians have emphatically maintained that doctrine is an essential prerequisite for military effectiveness. It would be tempting to dismiss these scholars with the observation that, after all, the British were among the victors, which is surely the epitome of "effectiveness." But flippancy will not do justice to the full examination of this difficult issue. What these scholars have failed to note is that doctrine conforms to ethos, and it is ethos that provides the system through which an army interprets the problems of combat and tests the feasibility of solutions. The ability of a military institution to place the combat environment within its intellectual framework is a vital prerequisite if that army is to respond fully to the need for adaptation and innovation. In order to change an army must have the ability to adequately examine new ideas and situations. Ethos provided the British with this ability. Doctrine is important, but ethos is essential.

End Notes

2. "Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College," 9-12

January 1911, 5-9, 28, Haig Collection, 3155/87, NLS; and "The British Army and Modern Conceptions of War," fournal of the Royal United Service Institution 55 (September 1911): 1182-84.

3. Bidwell and Graham, Firepower, 2-3.

4. Reid, War Studies, vii.

8. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Di

sasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1984), 27.

9. John Gooch, "Military Doctrine and Military History," in The Origins of Con

temporary Doctrine, ed. John Gooch (Camberley, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997), 5.

10. Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical

Doctrines during the First World War (Fort Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute,

1981), vii.

11. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ethos as "the characteristic spirit, preva

lent tone of sentiment of a people or community; the 'genius' of an institution or system." See The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 314.

12. Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton NJ: Princeton University, 1968), 7-8.

13. J. O. Coop, The Story of the 55th (West Lancashire Division) (Liverpool: Daily

Post, 1919), 8-9.

14. Henry Rawlinson, "Forward" to The Story of the Fourth Army: In the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November nth, 1918 by Archibald Montgomery (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), x.

15. W. H. F. Weber, A Field Artillery Group in Battle: A Tactical Study Based on the

Action of 2nd Brigade, R. F. A. during the German Offensive, 1918, the 100 Day's Battle,

and the Battle ofCambrai, 1917 (London: Royal Artillery Institute, 1,923), 131.

16. While the antitraditionalist Fuller identified these as the army's characteristics

he did not think too highly of them. He continued: "As soldiers they lacked one thing only-a knowledge of their profession."J. F. C. Fuller, The Army in My Time(London: Rich & Cowan, 1935), 39.

17. General staff, Field Service Regulations, Part 1: Operations (London: HMSO,

1909), 42. (Hereafter cited as FSR.)

18. "Conference of General Staff Officers," 9-12 January 1911, 5-9, 28, Haig

Collection, NLS.

19. "Infantry Training," Army Review 1 (July 1911): 86.

20. W. D. Bird, "Infantry Fire Tactics, "Journal of the Royal United Service Institu

tion 49, no. 332 (October 1905): 1175.

21. J. F. C. Fuller, "The Tactics of Penetration: A Counterblast to German Numerical Superiority, "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 59 (November I9H):389.

22. Tim Travers, "The Hidden Army: Structural Problems in the British Officer Corp, 1900-1918,"Journal of Contemporary History 17 (1982): 524. For the benefits of

amateurism see John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (London: Leo Cooper, 1987).

23. John Keegan, "Regimental History," in War Economy and the Military Mind, ed. Geoffrey Best and Andrew Wheatcroft (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 10-11.

24. Keith Simpson, "The Officers," in A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University, 1985), 63-90.

25. Simpson, "The Officers," 69-71; and Edward M. Spiers, "The Regular Army in 1914," in Nation in Arms, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University, 1985), 39.

26. Michael Glover, ed., The Fatejul Battle Line: The Great War Journals and Sketches of Captain Henry Ogle, MC (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), 152.

27. Peter Parker, The Old Lie: The Great War and the Public School Ethos (London: Constable and Co., 1987).

28. Geoffrey Best, "Militarism and the Victorian Public Schools," in The Victorian Public School: Studies in the Development of an Educational Institution, ed. Brian Simon and Ian Bradley (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), 140-41; and Simpson, "The Officers," 78.

29. Parker, The Old Lie, 17.

30. Simpson, "The Officers," 65; Best, "Militarism and Public Schools," 140-41; Parker, The Old Lie, 17, 56, 99; and Spiers, "Regular Army," 42.

31. Basil Williams, Raising and Training the New Armies (London: Constable and Co., 1918), 63.

32. Williams, Raising New Armies, 64.

33. Parker, The Old Lie, 34,157-62.

34. Simpson, "The Officers," 65-66; and Spiers, "Regular Army," 43.

35. A. Hilliard Atteridge, The History of the 17th (Northern) Division (Glasgow:

Robert Maclehose, 1929), 10-11; Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by cassh:

[---] British rather than Commonwealth [---]

So Britain was not part of the Commonwealth during WWII?

Regards

Dandelion

[cassh]

Dandelion -

The language is clear; Britain, rather than the Commonwealth (Britain and the Dominions).

John D Salt -

Well, I'm afraid this is most certainly true at present at Coy level. Just had super last night with friends, one of whom FOO'd in the Gulf and he confirmed that if the OC got it, he was techically in command, which he thought was rather strange.

[Dandelion]

To a monolinguist speaking his native tongue, debating national issues that must be completely obvious to him, I suppose much of the language will seem wonderfully clear.

I guess I still don't quite get it, if Britain was or is a component of or a separate addition to the CW, or a component of unique status such as France in her postwar CW. But then again, I can look it up, should an interest in the matter assault me once again.

Dandelion

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

To a monolinguist speaking his native tongue, debating national issues that must be completely obvious to him, I suppose much of the language will seem wonderfully clear.

I guess I still don't quite get it, if Britain was or is a component of or a separate addition to the CW, or a component of unique status such as France in her postwar CW. But then again, I can look it up, should an interest in the matter assault me once again.

Dandelion

I think the point at issue here is that national forces were free to pattern their forces as they liked. (While in most areas (equipment, uniform design, war establishment (aka TO&E)) the CW did conform to "Imperial" practice, and even published ACI (Army Council Instructions), they often varied in substantial ways (and published their own instructions - in the Canadian case, CAROs (Canadian Army Routine Orders, both domestic and (Overseas))). I would suspect the use of the FOO as a battalion 2 i/c was one of those ways. Unfortunately, the only solid examples from my own research, backed by primary documents, are from the relatively uninteresting and unimportant field of uniformology.

As a side note, I hope I have fulfilled the unpublicized quest among the CW posters of successfully posting a non-gratuitous triple-ellipses and would urge for a ruling from the CW judge so I may collect my winnings post haste.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

I guess I still don't quite get it, if Britain was or is a component of or a separate addition to the CW, or a component of unique status such as France in her postwar CW.

At least in the WW II history buff circles I run in, it has become customary to write of the BCE, meaning the British/Commonwealth/Empire forces. 'British' in this case refers to those belonging to the UK. 'Commonwealth' refers—as has been mentioned—to the self-governing dominions. 'Empire' refers to those forces originating from colonies and other possessions of the Crown that are not part of the UK. I do not claim that this terminology has any official standing, but it is a handy way to describe the different parts of the larger political and economic body that comprised the British Commonwealth (in the official sense). The reason it is handy is that it acknowledges detail differences between the different forces in the ways that they were raised and organized, their equipment, who they reported to, their own unique histories, and often how they performed in combat and where.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by cassh:

Other non doctrinaire practices were the adoption of four Vickers machine-guns in each infantry battalion as standard; they were not part of the War Establishment and distinct from the attached support group weapons. Source - Public Records Office, War Office Papers, WO 204/1904, 'A.F.H.Q. progress bulletin infantry No.2'. Their adoption as a near standard indicated the inherent weakness in firepower of an infantry battalion's War Establishment as laid down by the War Office..

Thanks - something on topic after all the interesting stuff on 12cmGrW or 4.2" mortars.

That is quite interesting, and I think goes to show that on an infantry battalion level, the Commonwealth (I include the British here for ease of reference) was seen to be weak in firepower, unless supported by attached weapons from higher echelons.

This attachment argument is IMO a bit of a smokescreen. The Germans also did not intend to have their battalions fight unsupported, and they did certainly not do worse in terms of cross-attaching support units, or indeed developing units specifically for the support of infantry battalions (Stugs, anyone?). German Artillerieabteilungen also had FOOs, and these were also accompanying infantry battalions. They had fewer guns, but the same amount of batteries per battalion in the division, and in the reigmental gun company held some guns that did not exist in the Commonwealth OOB.

The question then is whether it is correct to say that the Commonwealth infantry battalion was purposefully designed as a weaker formation, and if that view is correct, why that was the case. It may of course have been unpurposefully been designed in such a way. Or maybe the view is wrong, and the Commonwealth battalion was not actually weaker?

[dalem]

From my point of view, I don't see how one can come to any conclusion but that CW battalions were weak in FP as compared to German (or U.S.) battalions. If I'm right then that has to have been "on purpose" to the extent that someone designed and refined that TO&E on purpose.

Now, as you are asking, did someone sit and say "Hmm, looks like other folks are designing their battalions toward Firepower X. I'm going to shoot for Firepower X-1." I find that hard to believe. But I also find it hard to believe that such a "mistake" could go essentially uncorrected the entire time the CW was fighting the war. I was just re-reading some of the changes to U.S. TO&E the other day (ain't I exciting?) and there were several of them just between 1941 and 1945.

Is it akin to the U.S. Tank vs. Tank Destroyer doctrine issue? Were there people telling the CW army that they needed changes to battalion FP and the generals and planners refusing to listen?

-dale

[Michael Dorosh]

It's entirely doctrinal, dale. In WW I MGs were in specialist units. Between the wars, the Machine Gun Corps was a seperate combatant corps, at least in Canada. It was still viewed as light artillery in WW II.

In practice, things were different - much like the notion that the US Sherman was a "tank" and therefore would never have to shoot at enemy armour. Tank Destroyer command was a lovely concept. Pity it didn't work in the real world.

[JonS]

to further what Michael said, you might look it as the dctrine of centralising resources, vs the doctrine of dispersing resources. There are strengths and weaknesses in both approaches, and both can - if done reasonably well - end up in nearly the same place, FP-wise.

[Andreas]

As I pointed out in the other thread - at least with sMG/MMG firepower, that similarity in FP is rather unlikely though, since you just need to pool one German regiment's sMGs (36) to have almost the same sMG/MMG firepower as the whole British division has (42 - clearly the British Army knew the answer to life, the universe, and all the rest). The German division could call on 110-150 sMGs (with most at the very low end of this figure).

To me it is clearer now that the British simply thought the MMG would occupy a wholly different role (one honed in WW1), from what the Germans were thinking (although their thinking may also have been on WW1, just a different experience in it). In the process of adapting the organisation to that role (or better, failing to think of a new role, and therefore not adapting the organisation), they weakened the key maneuver element of their infantry formations, compared to their opponent. This they may have been able to fix by cross-attaching, but in reality, I think they would have been better off not putting themselves into this position in the first place, or at least to change things as the war went on.

If they had given 12 MMGs to each battalion, they could still have done all the arty etc.pp. attachments they liked, and motorised the lot, because these developments were quite independent.

How much it mattered in the end on the tactical level is another question.

[cassh]

British Army doctrine was not the product of a prolonged philosophical or practical application of known developments in combat. The concept of overwhelming firepower from the infantry arm was a minority view.

The basic precept of fire-to-movement ratios of at least 3-1 went largely missed in what little intellectual interest their was in warfighting amongst the British officer corps. No one save ' the muggs' had read the likes of Rommel's Infantry Attacks.

The whole concept of Sturmtruppen, with heavy suppressing and direct fire, rapid movement, mobile firepower and close assault weaponry was not understood by most platoon leaders and company leaders in the pre-war period.

Therefore the cadre that formed the basis of the liberation army in 1944 - its field officers, COs and Brigs - were not greatly knowledgeable in the tactical awareness, battlefield appreciation, and all the other moral (mental skills and experience) factors of warfighting that help overcome friction and outfight an enemy.

The infantry arm suffered a massive hangover from the Great War. As victors the British were not forced into introspection and analysis. For Britain, indirect firepower was the key. Artillery was the heart of the British army's fighting doctrine from 1916 to 1945.

In 1944 the British infantry's main duty was to advance, take ground and repel any counter-attacks; not actually assault the objective with their own organic weaponry, momentum and tactics.

Thus the infantry lacked a philosophy of dynamic offensive methods, and more importantly the means to conduct such a tactical approach organically. Neither their war establishment nor doctrine clearly outlined this as a goal, desire or intent.

That the British poked about at it piecemeal is certain. They partially moved towards a more dynamic infantry between 1941 and 1943, but this was stifled for the safer bet and conservative approach they already knew of artillery domination.

The order of the day was therefore massed fires, creeping barrages and very heavy concentrations of supporting arms. This doctrine eschewed mission tactics, preferring to 'lay-on' an organised battle where possible.

The emphasis of this approach was that the infantry were to advance and hold ground, rather than take it off their own bat. Clearly though, this was not the case, and many bloody battles were fought with the PBI (poor bloody infantry) having to attack unsupported without the organic firepower they needed.

The mid war army had reverted to Imperial policing and actually 'unlearnt' much of its offensive knowledge that had been honed at the end of WW1. The 'ten year rule', defence cuts and general pacifism that prevailed after the trauma of the war meant that their wasn't the drive or desire to get better at killing the enemy.

When war did come much of the marshal knowledge and expertise developed by 1918 regarding offensive operations and tactics was diluted or forgotten.

That the infantry arm was able to present the semblance of competence was down to a few individuals rather than army doctrine.

The British owe more that they could hope to men such a Gen. H. Alexander, Gen. Paget, Gen. Utterson-Kelso etc for the implementation of the battle drill philosophy which taught basic tactical awareness and skills to an army largely devoid tactical understanding or appreciation.

[Michael Dorosh]

Heehee...Utterson-Kelso makes me giggle. Actually, the reactions of others are what is so funny.

When he declared that "every man is a general" in his battle drill training, a grumpy GOC replied "I want to be the only general in MY division."

[JonS]

42:150 yes, but the British, if they so chose, could put all 42 in support of a single bn. Or coy. Or a single pn for that matter. Same thing with the A-Tk guns, arty, etc, etc. Quite why the 3-in mtrs were left out of this scheme is a bit of a mystery, although the mtrs had 'always' been infantry weapons, so that may have something to do with it.

I have some correspondence from our good friend the LtCol bemoaning first the disbanding of the MG Corps post-WWI, then the disbanding of the DivSptBns post-WWII. He felt that the loss of flexibility and ability to concentrate was a poor, bean-counting, decision. But then he had a vested interest

Too, recall that pre-WWII the British infantry bns were trying to simplyfy their own lives by divesting themselves of weapons-systems. They successfully got rid of their own A-Tk weapons just before the war (only to be screaming for them back in a few years). With that mindset (simplification), it's probably not surprising that the MMGs were kept out of the bns.

OTOH, the motor bns (and paras who also had their own bn-level MMGs) were expected to operate dispersed (one motor coy per armd regt) most of the time, hence it made sense for them to have their own MMGs.

[dalem]

Originally posted by JonS:

to further what Michael said, you might look it as the dctrine of centralising resources, vs the doctrine of dispersing resources. There are strengths and weaknesses in both approaches, and both can - if done reasonably well - end up in nearly the same place, FP-wise.

But was there additional FP available even at the regimental/brigade level as compared to other forces?

Again, I know most about U.S. doctrine, so I'm sorry for polluting this fine CW thread with U.S. factoids , but with the more triangular structures used by the U.S. and Germans there was firepower available TO the battalions in the cannon/infantry gun companies, AT companies, and the like.

Is that where CW doctrine stubbed its toe - it wasn't triangular enough? (Sorry for so many questions.)

-dale

[ March 29, 2005, 11:38 AM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

42:150 yes, but the British, if they so chose, could put all 42 in support of a single bn. Or coy. Or a single pn for that matter. Same thing with the A-Tk guns, arty, etc, etc.

Yes, but so could the Germans. All it needed was an order from a regimental commander to put 4./8./12.Kp in support of I./123 and you are off. Now you have 36 sMGs and 18 81mm mortars, and the possibility to add an IG coy and an AT coy, and you have not divested the division of any support asset at this stage. Everybody else still has their sMGs.

Still appears more flexible to me, and with higher FP.

I take cassh's explanation over some attempt to post-rationalise it, I think.