Rommel as Military Commander

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

The tendency to ignore logistic limitations grows more serious when we consider Rommel as a theatre commander. IIRC, Rommel argued against an assault on Malta because it would divert resources from his own planned offensives. He didn't seem to realize that as long as the Brits held Malta his supply line would be subject to attack.

I think Rommel had one guiding principle all through his career, (okay, this is a simplification, but bear with me for a while) and we can see it in operation here. That principle can be summed up in the words, "Once you get the enemy off balance, don't give him a chance to recover." That's a good principle and when a general gets a chance to apply it, the results can be dramatic, as in the Allies drive across France after Falaise. Rommel's own successful offensives in Libya, especially the first one, are brilliant examples of that. The problem for Rommel was in not always being able to recognize when that wasn't going to play and to reach into his quiver for a different arrow.

So now we have Rommel in late June of 1942. He has just captured Tobruk with a huge quantity of stores including petrol and trucks to move it in. The Eighth Army is shattered and demoralized and most of it is in flight back to the Delta. Rommel's instinct is to pursue them and finish them off before they can be reëstablished and reorganized. From his point of view, that must have looked like the most sensible thing to do.

But Rommel wasn't the theater commander. That position was legally held by Commando Supremo in Rome. But they were largely a figurehead of no great moral authority able to exert only a limited influence on Rommel. If they didn't approve his plans, he tended to act without consulting them and informed them later. Much the same was true of OKH, which by this point Hitler had reduced to a cipher anyway. Kesselring, who was Rommel's immediate superior in the German hierarchy was not especially inclined to disagree with him. In any case, Rommel, especially now that he had been made field marshal, could always appeal directly to Hitler, and he usually got his way.

So here we have a situation where Rommel is advocating what appears from his perspective a reasonable course of action and those whose position should have given them the perspective and authority to rein him in, do not do so.

Rommel goes haring off into Egypt in pursuit of the remnants of Eighth Army, even though his own army is badly in need of rest and recuperation and by the time he gets to el Alamein he's used up the gas he captured, he is at the end of a long logistical line that can barely maintain a trickle of supplies, his troops and their weapons are too worn out to force the issue. Meanwhile the British have been fallling back on their bases where there are abundant supplies and fresh troops are arriving almost daily.

Rommel had reached into his quiver and pulled out the usual arrow. He had shot his bolt and it hadn't quite reached the target.

This invites a question to us armchair generals endowed with the great gift of hindsight: Well then, what should Rommel have done instead? If pursuit into Egypt is a bad idea, what alternative courses should he have pursued?

The original plan was that once Libya was cleared of British forces, Rommel and his army would halt at the border, the Luftwaffe would be concentrated in Sicily, and the invasion of Malta would proceed. Let us allow that it is successful (which I think is the most likely though not certain outcome) and supplies are now flowing relatively freely from Italy to North Africa. It is early August and Panzer Armee Afrika is back in business having in the interim rested and restored its fighting strength. But then, the same is true of Eighth Army. Hmmm. The Axis supply lines are 250 miles shorter and the British correspondingly longer, but the Brits having a rail line to the front and more trucks are better able to cope with the extra distance. The two armies facing each other at the border once again have open southern flanks. Whoever attacks first will have the advantage of being able to swing that flank unlike at el Alamein where the southern flank was resting on the Qatara Depression.

So what does Rommel do? In the long run, even with Malta gone, the British are bound to win the race to build up, so merely waiting passively is a sure loser. If he decides to practice discretion, he engages in a series of spoiling attacks against the British forces as reach the line so that they are not able to amass enough force against him to win a decisive battle. But as the Desert Air Force gains strength and refinement, it becomes ever harder for him to do this.

My guess is that Rommel being Rommel, he goes all out as soon as he can for the Delta and the Canal and the two armies wind up facing off at el Alamein again unless the British seriously blunder once more, which I don't personally think they will. Only now, both armies are probably stronger than they were in July, especially the Axis. But once Alamein is reached and there isn't a flank to be turned, I think stalemate ensues. Rommel would have used up the supplies accumlated in the previous month and once again he is faced with a supply line that can only deliver inadequate amounts.

Basically the British only have to hold out until November and Torch. They may or may not score a great victory in front of Alamein, but as long as they hold Alexandria, the Axis can go no farther. And once Rommel has another army in his rear, the jig is up. If the Axis is very careful and lucky, they may be able to maintain some kind of bridgehead in North Africa for another 6-10 months. But sooner or later the growing mass and expertise of the Allies will tell.

The only thing that could have saved the day for the Axis in NA was a catastrophic defeat of Soviet forces in the middle of 1942 or earlier. And that didn't happen.

Michael

[ October 26, 2003, 01:16 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

"Once you get the enemy off balance, don't give him a chance to recover." That's a good principle and when a general gets a chance to apply it, the results can be dramatic, as in the Allies drive across France after Falaise.

And the failure to apply it can be dramatic, too, as evidenced by the failure to follow up after the capture of Antwerp in September. The Germans were allowed to halt and reform along the Scheldt Estuary, resulting in a very bloody month of October for First Canadian Army. Had the British closed the neck of the South Beveland Peninsula - as they were in a position to do - thousands of lives would have been saved.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

"Once you get the enemy off balance, don't give him a chance to recover." That's a good principle and when a general gets a chance to apply it, the results can be dramatic, as in the Allies drive across France after Falaise.

And the failure to apply it can be dramatic, too, as evidenced by the failure to follow up after the capture of Antwerp in September. The Germans were allowed to halt and reform along the Scheldt Estuary, resulting in a very bloody month of October for First Canadian Army. Had the British closed the neck of the South Beveland Peninsula - as they were in a position to do - thousands of lives would have been saved. </font>

[s3333cr333tz]

One of Rommels short comings, seemed to be a sort of tunnel-vision like focus on one thing at a time.

Part of his failure, but ultimate success in crusader was because of this. He was so focused on reducing Tobruk, he utterly refused any chance of a counter attack. During the initial stages of the attack, he ignored all intelligence stating it was underway. This apparently confused the bejesus out of the British, and they were lured into a killing zone, where they threw their superior numbers against Cruwell I think it was piecemeal. Cruwell (I think) ended up smashing the British armor, then Rommel took all the credit when he had little to do with it ;p

My personal opinion on Rommel was, he may have had some manic-depressive tendencies. One of my aunts and her daughter both have extreme cases of it, and from my readings on Rommel, he seems to display some of these characteristics. He has extreme highs, and extreme lows. He also really has no "staying" power. If the enemy didnt roll over almost immediatly, he tended to throw his hands up in the air and go sulk somewhere ;p

When the going was good, he overstated things, when it was bad, he made it sound totally hopeless.

I wasn't aware of David Irvings political views, however, I found "The trail of the Fox" to be probably the most insightful look into Rommels character of all the books i've read on him. Despite how ignorant and clueless the guy may be regarding the the concentration camps and Hitlers involvement. I still feel that "The Trail of the Fox" is an excellent book on Rommel. I've read some books that dish out mucho love to Rommel, and most of it is hero worship. This one isn't, it deals with the darkside of Rommel as well as the bright side. It seems to be fairly even handed in its treatment.

[Gaylord Focker]

Originally posted by Rommel22:

Yea...I was good! I was a genius, and still am. h4x!!11

So you do keep a diary is what your saying here right?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by s3333cr333tz:

I wasn't aware of David Irvings political views, however, I found "The trail of the Fox" to be probably the most insightful look into Rommels character of all the books i've read on him. Despite how ignorant and clueless the guy may be regarding the the concentration camps and Hitlers involvement. I still feel that "The Trail of the Fox" is an excellent book on Rommel. I've read some books that dish out mucho love to Rommel, and most of it is hero worship. This one isn't, it deals with the darkside of Rommel as well as the bright side. It seems to be fairly even handed in its treatment.

Except that much of it seems to be an imaginative fabrication. Those who knew Rommel during the war and were still around to read Irving's book (Admiral Ruge comes to mind) vehemently contradict in detail most of what Irving alleges Rommel to have said in the situations where he (Ruge) was either present himself, had it reported to him afterwards, or knew Rommel well enough to be assured that they were not in character.

I read the book about twenty years ago and was impressed by it in the way that you are. It was only later that I painfully discovered that what had been sold to me as history/biography was really fiction. It's an entertaining read and if you approach it like a novel by Jack Higgins, say, there's no reason why you shouldn't read it with pleasure. I'd be careful though about citing it as a source in a historical discussion.

Michael

[Arrigo Velicogna]

First: being italian I am deeply involved in the Rommel controversy. In my view Rommel was a very good commander at regiment/division level. He was a gifted tactician, very agressive and inspiring. When he was given corps and army level commands he began to show serious deficiencies. As someone here has stated he was prone to tunnel vision, he was ignoring logistical reuiremetns and he was utterly comptentous of his italian allies. Each time he suffered a defeat he was ready to blame the italian navy, the italian army or Kesserling and the luftwaffe. Italian navy fought to death to mantain open the sea lane betewwn Italy and North Africa with a 90% of supplies transported to destination, albei at high cost. Also one the so called "rotta della morte" (sea lane of death) between sicily and tunisia our sailor acheive an impressive 70% of succesfull transfer. The main problems was the supplys system in Africa. The only good port was Tripoli and Rommel constantly refused to allow his engineer to work on Benghazi and Tobruk to improve these ports. He also refused to allo cargo space diverted on port equipment rather than combat equipment. On the italian army our soldier where on par with DAK ones and, citing only one of our achievement, where italian AT gunner with 90L53 and 88L56 guns who have defeated the majority of the british attacks at the Cauldron. The constant offensive activities have rapidly exausthed the Luftwaffe and Regia Aereonautica mainly due to low priority of supply allocation (fuel was reserved to german panzers first, italian tanks second and last to axis aircraft.

Operationally Rommel was severly beaten in spirit and mind during Crusader (but the brits where on the losing side on ground as testified by their rapid break down some weeks later when Rommel again reasoning counterattacked). And at El Alamein was severly outfought by Auckincleck. In contrast the big battle plan of Montgomery was an huge failure due in large part to the stubborn resistance of italian infantry divisions.

As Malta the Rommel interference with Herakles/Eventualità C3 was a lost opportunity. Churchill will have undoubtely commited the scarce resourec of the meditarranean fleet and DAF to the defence of the island and the big fllet engagement of the mediterranean would have fought under Luftwaffe and Italian AF superiority and in the summer of 1942 we have yet enough battleship and cruiser to obliterate the british (and in the period the central meditarranean was an italian lake). If Malta would have fall the entire british position in the near east would have been put in jeopardy until American direct involvement. In the end probabily also the 8th army would have suffered (no more direct convoy). Of course in the end nothing of this will have mattered. The US forces would have launched torch (commiting the bulk of USN atlantic fleet in the mediterranean and shattering italian navy) or better (for them) sledgehammer and the glorious axis force in north africa would have been another useless diversion of german forces (Hitler would have certianly refused to evacuate force forma victorius advance in near east...).

Just my 2 eurocent.

Arrigo

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Arrigo Velicogna:

The only good port was Tripoli and Rommel constantly refused to allow his engineer to work on Benghazi and Tobruk to improve these ports. He also refused to allo cargo space diverted on port equipment rather than combat equipment.

I'm glad you mentioned this as it is a point that often gets overlooked. Many times a convoy was run successfully across the Med but then the ships had to sit in port for days or even weeks waiting to be unloaded. During this time they were vulnerable to bombing by the RAF and cargoes and the hulls that had carried them were needlessly lost. This is just one more example of how Rommel refused to come to terms with logistical realities, preferring to petulantly rail against authorites outside his command. All to often those of us who have come along later have read his version of the story uncritically and not realized the other side.

Michael

[Sergei]

One thing about Rommel nowadays is that quite a lot of people seem to have the misconception that, because he ended up in trouble with Hitler, he wasn't a Nazi (Rommel was a Nazi; of course, so was Oscar Schindler). Thus he can be seen as a gallant soldier, a hero betrayed by the leadership. There is something mythical about it so that nowadays even leftists can approve of him. The following is translated from a song by Ultra Bra:

Verses for Erwin Rommel

If you lived today you wouldn't interest me one bit

you'd be an engineer or a soldier

and I'm a humanist, you didn't understand art

of a beautiful monastery you said

you would place a bunker on its place

You lived in the age of violence and your profession was war

you sent thousands to a certain death every day

yet you were greater than the brutal age around you

you fulfilled the hardest command

you could love your enemy

When politicians and humanists were quiet

you looked Hitler in the eye and called him a villain

you had a normal brain but you thought by yourself

those too honest will surely be murdered nowadays too

will surely be murdered nowadays too

The Devil sent a letter to your funeral

your great victories would be remembered in the history

that doesn't interest you

you were more than the history required

in the age of violence you were a wholly humane human being

[CombinedArms]

I had forgotten just how squirrelly the Axis command structure in the Med actually was. Of course, that's what Hitler liked, a confusing command structure that left him in ultimate authority. One of the advantages of the Western Allies was a far clearer and better command structure. Patton, who had many of the strengths and weaknesses of Rommel, was part of a clear chain of command and his weaknesses were to some degree kept in check by that structure. But it's hard to say who was really in charge of what for the Axisin the Med and that was equally true later in Normandy.

The Axis high command in Normandy gets a D- from me for their performance on June 6 and immediately thereafter--and that might be grade inflation. Everybody blew it from Hitler on down. They misread the Allied intentions profoundly and failed to respond effectively once the attack began. An offensive that should have been one of the least surprising in world history ended up as an almost complete tactical and strategic surprise. Rommel gets some of the blame for this, but, as usual the ultimate target of blame is Hitler himself.

[JonS]

Originally posted by s3333cr333tz:

Part of his failure, but ultimate success in crusader ...

Rommel didn't 'win' Op CRUSADER.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

I had forgotten just how squirrelly the Axis command structure in the Med actually was. Of course, that's what Hitler liked, a confusing command structure that left him in ultimate authority. One of the advantages of the Western Allies was a far clearer and better command structure. Patton, who had many of the strengths and weaknesses of Rommel, was part of a clear chain of command and his weaknesses were to some degree kept in check by that structure. But it's hard to say who was really in charge of what for the Axisin the Med and that was equally true later in Normandy.

The Axis high command in Normandy gets a D- from me for their performance on June 6 and immediately thereafter--and that might be grade inflation. Everybody blew it from Hitler on down. They misread the Allied intentions profoundly and failed to respond effectively once the attack began. An offensive that should have been one of the least surprising in world history ended up as an almost complete tactical and strategic surprise. Rommel gets some of the blame for this, but, as usual the ultimate target of blame is Hitler himself.

The brilliant Mortain counter-offensive - which ensured the destruction of 7th Army's heavy equipment and transport when they tried to retreat through the Gap - was another few points off the score...

[Keith]

I would say one reason Rommel is so highly rated is because the British generals who fought against him were so terrible. The concept of combined arms completely escaped the British generals until late in the Normandy campaign. The British in Afrika were constantly hurling their armor in a piecemeal, unsupported fashion at the combined arms of the Afrika Korps. The British command and control was lethargic and completely out of touch with the pace of the battle, issuing outdated orders decided by long drawn out committee discussions. This is in comparison to Rommel, who was always up front and made relevant, snap decisions on the spot. This is why Rommel was able to consistently out-fox his numerically superior opponents time and again in Afrika. But eventually the mathematics of logistics and sheer Allied material superiority (from America factories) made the outcome inevitable.

If Rommel had a weakness, it was because we was too impetuous. Examples include his first bloody attempts at trying to take Tobruk in 41. Also, following the Gazala battles Rommel's superior, Kesserling, pleaded with Rommel to halt temporarily in order to allow the Luftwaffe to concentrate its resources on the suppression and capture of Malta rather than supporting Rommel's drive to Egypt. Characteristically, Rommel ignored his superior, dashed to El Alamein, and his logistics system utterly collapsed due in no small measure to the resurgence of Malta.

[ October 28, 2003, 03:13 PM: Message edited by: Keith ]

[The Green Rascal]

OK Keith, this is nothing personal, but I'm bored

Originally posted by Keith:

I would say one reason Rommel is so highly rated is because the British generals who fought against him were so terrible.

He never had to face O'Connor who could well have had him for breakfast. Monty was good, I agree that the ones in between were average to poor. Possibly Strafer Gott and Jock Campbell could have accomplished much more had they lived to reach full generalship.

The concept of combined arms completely escaped the British generals until late in the Normandy campaign

Rot. For example ever heard of Jock Columns? As early as 1940-41 they had heard of and tried to apply a combined arms approach, but it took them a long time to get it right.

The British in Afrika were constantly hurling their armor in a piecemeal, unsupported fashion at the combined arms of the Afrika Korps.

One major caveat: In 41-42 a very large percentage of infantry in the theater were Commonwealth, and accordingly politically the British armor had to try to bend over backwards to assist them. Whenever a Commonwealth commander demanded armor cover - which they almost always did - the armor was split amongst them. British infantry commanders were just as insistant, but could be ignored more often. Rommel had no such demands placed on him.

The British command and control was lethargic and completely out of touch with the pace of the battle, issuing outdated orders decided by long drawn out committee discussions.

Frequently true, especially around the time of Crusader, but surely not as utterly hopeless as that. Remember Rommel was beaten. Rommel's command at Crusader was obviously even worse than the British you malign.

This is in comparison to Rommel, who was always up front and made relevant, snap decisions on the spot.

OK explain to me how the 'Dash to the Wire' was relevant, then we'll move on to some of the other silly mistakes. Like for example how he decided to stay with his planned attack on Tobruk and ignore the start of Crusader perhaps.

This is why Rommel was able to consistently out-fox his numerically superior opponents time and again in Afrika.

He didn't. He lost Crusader, Alamein, and actually had the doubtful honor of being in charge of the first defeat suffered by the German Army in WW2, when he attacked Tobruk.

His sucessful offensives of 1941 and 1942 were greatly aided by over extended supply lines and political developments outside theater. In 1941 the British stopped and sent their best units to Greece. In 1942 they had to redeploy to face Japan.

Oh and BTW, the only time Rommel that was significantly outnumbered was by Alamein, and even then by just under 2 to 1.

But eventually the mathematics of logistics and sheer Allied material superiority (from America factories) made the outcome inevitable.

Aaaah, it had to happen. American factories won the Desert War did they. Do you seriously contend that was more influential than the men who fought there. Also how much equipment do you think was from America and how much from Britain. Ever heard of Lee Enfields, Brens, Spitfires, Crusaders, Valentines, ad infinitum.

See, told you I was bored.

[JasonC]

Rommel had nothing to do with the "brilliant Mortain counter-offensive". He was strafed on July 17 and in hospital. Then on July 20 came the bomb plot. Mortain wasn't planned until 4 days before it was delivered, early in August and a week after the breakout. Rommel was never returned to command after the strafing. He was presented cyanide on October 14, and told he would be executed for treason if he did not take it. The official lie at the time was that he died of his wounds.

[HeinzBaby]

..I thought the term 'Jock Columns' was a term used only in Brit Armoured Divs? the 7th..I don't think their armour 'bent over backwards' to help the Inf. [ask the ANZAC's]. I got the impression that the Ind. Armd Brigs doctrine WAS to support the Inf. with their Vals and Matildas. The down fall of the Armd Divs was their continual use in penny packets ie. un-coordinated Bde attacks, Rommels famous quote taken from Wellington? at Waterloo, .."they came at us in the same old way and we shot them in the same old way..." Sidi Rezegh and Gazala were good examples. Monty also put an end to the 'aparthid' existence of British Armoured Divisions and centralised the Arty, or did the Aulk' do that at Alma Halfa?.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by HeinzBaby:

Monty also put an end to the 'aparthid' existence of British Armoured Divisions and centralised the Arty, or did the Aulk' do that at Alma Halfa?.

Not sure exactly what you mean by 'apartheid' here.

Auckinleck was gone from the Middle East by the time of the Battle of Alam Halfa, but the defensive plan was essentially as devised by him and his staff with some minor alterations by Montgomery, so yes he may have had something to do with that. The need to fight divisions as whole units had been recognized and moves afoot to organize the defense along those lines.

Michael

[HeinzBaby]

I'd just finished reading "Fighting the Desert Fox" by Delaney where he used that word 'Aparthied' trying to describe the attitude [eliteist] or use? of the 7th Armd Div seperate to the rest of the Army [8th] it struck me as an unusual tag that stuck in my mind...

[Wisbech_lad]

Couple of points.

My take on Rommel is that, post war, the Western Allies needed a "good loser" to mythologise. Rearming the Bundewehr was easier when people could point at Rommel and say "ah, not all Jerries were bad. Good news they are on our side now, what?" Rommel was safely dead, unlike other (better?) generals. Plus, he had been soundly beaten in the end.

On Winston Churchill's speech. He may (conjecture) have been looking back to another speech during the Boer War, when Campbell-Bannerman severely lambasted the British conduct of the war. Oddly enough, that speech (by the leader of the opposition) persuaded some important Boer commandos to surrender, because they felt they were facing an honourable opponent.

So, AK troops, hearing Churchill praise them (and Rommel) would be more inclined to surrender than fight to the death, feeling that they were facing a "gentlemanly" opponent. Certainly alot surrendered in Tunisia.

In "By Tank to Normandy" there is an account of how the British capture a strong garrison of troops in Belgium (1,200) by negotiating with them they can "surrender with honour". The Germans march with arms to pre arranged spot

"The colonel addressed his men for about a quarter of an hour, explaining what had happened, telling them he had made an honourable surrender and bidding them farewell. When he had finished, he nodded to the unit's RSM, who gave the soldiers the order to break their arms by crashing the rifle butts on the ground. Then each man raised his right hand and shouted "Seig heil" three times. Off they all went to captivity"

[42317]

Thinking about Rommel, read this:

The Rommel Myth

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB] Rommel had nothing to do with the "brilliant Mortain counter-offensive".

I was referring to what the original poster was referring to "the German high command in Normandy", of which Rommel was only a part, until, as you point out, his wounding and permanent departure.

[Sokal]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

Interestingly, the German Official Histories published over the last decade (and they haven't finished yet) tend to savage Rommels' conduct of the war in Africa.

Regards

JonS

Mentioning Cooper's book again from 1978, he seemed to like to point out how the German high command thought Rommel was quite irresponsible with his aggressive tendencies, and points out repeatedly how little was gained in the end. Of course, since Rommel never got those two extra panzer divisions he said were all he needed I guess we'll never know.

I think ULTRA, and the ability to sink enemy shipping at will, was the real star of the North African campaign rather than the commanders involved. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Sokal:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

Interestingly, the German Official Histories published over the last decade (and they haven't finished yet) tend to savage Rommels' conduct of the war in Africa.

Regards

JonS

Mentioning Cooper's book again from 1978, he seemed to like to point out how the German high command thought Rommel was quite irresponsible with his aggressive tendencies, and points out repeatedly how little was gained in the end. Of course, since Rommel never got those two extra panzer divisions he said were all he needed I guess we'll never know.

I think ULTRA, and the ability to sink enemy shipping at will, was the real star of the North African campaign rather than the commanders involved. </font>

[arax3]

I often wonder how well Nazis would have done if Rommel was given the reinforcements sent over for the latter part of the Africa campaign? A3

[Ant]

Originally posted by arax3:

I often wonder how well Nazis would have done if Rommel was given the reinforcements sent over for the latter part of the Africa campaign? A3

I think the Russians would have been pretty happy to see divisions taken from the Eastern front and moved to north Africa.