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Rommel as Military Commander


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Kind of afraid to post on the site. Due to stories of people getting pretty hot and talking bad about other people. But what the hell.

The question is has anybody besides myself have read the book titled “Rommel as Military Commander” by Ronald Lewin? I think it is a good book. But there will be people who will say other wise. :rolleyes:

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Originally posted by Red 6:

Kind of afraid to post on the site. Due to stories of people getting pretty hot and talking bad about other people. But what the hell.

The question is has anybody besides myself have read the book titled “Rommel as Military Commander” by Ronald Lewin? I think it is a good book. But there will be people who will say other wise. :rolleyes:

Well, I guess we are forced to agree with you.

Rommel as Military Commander by Ronald Lewin is a good book.

We certainly wouldn't want to say other wise. Lord knows, we don't like to offend new posters here.

Did I mention that Rommel as Military Commander by Ronald Lewin is a good book?

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CMMCII - hmm, haven't heard much in awhile.

I've read Irving's THE DESERT FOX and as you may be aware, Irving's work has drawn a lot of controversy.

Rommel's "skill" as a military commander has been oft debated here. And of course in print by many different authors. So I'm not sure you can discuss it without being heated; there is a wide range of opinion on him - I was surprised how many people here feel he was over-rated (though the opinion is far from universal.)

Haven't read Lewin though, to answer the question directly.

So tell us - what do you know about Rommel before reading the book, and what is your pre-conceived opinion of him?

Would one book be able to sway you?

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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

So tell us - what do you know about Rommel before reading the book, and what is your pre-conceived opinion of him?

Would one book be able to sway you?

The only thing I know about Rommel was from the movies "Desert Fox" and from the History Channel on TV.

As for one book to sway me in my opinion of Rommel after reading one book? No, I would like to read more about him if someone would direct me to books about his actions during battles in North Africa.

Red 6

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Originally posted by Esper:

I don't understand? The 1st post you said has anyone but me read this book and thought it was good?, then you're next post your asking if it's a good book or a waste of time reading? as in should I read this book or not?

Poor choice of words. What I meant was that yes I read the book and thought it was good. And was it a waste of time reading it. If there where other books out there that was better then the one I read.

Red 6

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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I've read Irving's THE DESERT FOX and as you may be aware, Irving's work has drawn a lot of controversy.

I vaguelly remmeber that book. Most of it was about how much the Italians sucked and how Rommel couldn't get the supplies he needed. On the other hand, it seemed to me like Irving sure pointed out a lot of errors Rommel made, so I don't know what the whole controversy is about.
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Originally posted by JonS:

Interestingly, the German Official Histories published over the last decade (and they haven't finished yet) tend to savage Rommels' conduct of the war in Africa.

Regards

JonS

Mentioning Cooper's book again from 1978, he seemed to like to point out how the German high command thought Rommel was quite irresponsible with his aggressive tendencies, and points out repeatedly how little was gained in the end. Of course, since Rommel never got those two extra panzer divisions he said were all he needed I guess we'll never know.

I think ULTRA, and the ability to sink enemy shipping at will, was the real star of the North African campaign rather than the commanders involved.

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Originally posted by Captain Wacky:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I've read Irving's THE DESERT FOX and as you may be aware, Irving's work has drawn a lot of controversy.

I vaguelly remmeber that book. Most of it was about how much the Italians sucked and how Rommel couldn't get the supplies he needed. On the other hand, it seemed to me like Irving sure pointed out a lot of errors Rommel made, so I don't know what the whole controversy is about. </font>
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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I've read Irving's THE DESERT FOX and as you may be aware, Irving's work has drawn a lot of controversy.

A few years ago I got a book by Rommel's naval commander, whose name at the moment escapes me, that was written in rebuttal to Irving's portrayal of Rommel's conduct in Normandy. I never finished the book and now can't find my copy (still trying to get unpacked from a move two years ago), so I can't give much of an account of it. He was incensed by Irving though.

Michael

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An interesting thing about Rommel is that he often seems to be more highly rated by Allied historians than by German historians. I'm by no means an expert on his tactics and won't attempt to rate them here, but it seems to me the reasons why he's so highly rated by Allied historians might be worth looking into. I note the following:

1. He was known as a manueverist--they always get the ink (cf. Patton). Interestingly, however, on defense he was into trenches, pillboxes, some uniquely tall asparagus, and lots and lots mines.

2. He won some dashing early victories in North Africa, using aggressive tank tactics.

3. He started out respecting Hitler but ended up despising him.

4. He won the battle of Kasserine Pass, setting up a morality play that appeals to both British and American sensibilities. To the Brits it suggested (or might suggest to some, anyway) that their Allies were no damn good and would always have to be rescued by the British. For the Amis, it showed how much the US Army still had to learn about fighting the Germans--and how well they learned it. Fortunately, he was smart enough to pull back after Kasserine, making it only a symbolic setback.

5. He was defeated by the Allies in his three most important battles: El Alemain, Tunis, and Normandy (interestingly, he sort of wasn't there for the start of two of these battles and absolutely wasnt there for the end of the third--Tunis.)

6. He was increasingly impressed by Allied military capabilities and said so--proving that "were getting better all the time."

7. He was implicated in the plot to kill Hitler and forced to commit suicide.

This makes him a kind of ideal figure from an Allied perspective--a general we can respect for his military skill and political stance but whom we ultimately beat resoundingly. We even outfoxed the Desert Fox in the location and timing of the Normandy invasion. This package might also explain why he's disparaged by some German historians.

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To your list, CA, I would offer one more item. Admittedly it is somewhat more speculative than the ones you brought up, but I have never been able to escape the thought that it was crucial to the enduring image created in the minds of the Western Allies.

And that was the extraordinary gesture that Churchill made by praising him in the House of Commons. Churchill was criticised for doing this, and I've always wondered if the reason he did it he never revealed. And that was to provide some kind of rationalization for the continual frustration the nation, and most particularly he himself, had experienced at Rommel's hands. Thus, if Rommel is so great, so "nearly" unbeatable, there is no shame in losing to him. Whether Churchill sat down and figured all this out, I have no idea. He was a pretty shrewd cookie about this kind of thing, so he very well might have. But even if he were just reacting instinctively, the psychodynamics are still there.

At any event, that seems to have gotten the ball rolling. The generals may have resented it because it made their job of convincing their men that they could beat Rommel and were expected to do so that much harder. But I think for the men in the trenches, removing the shame of losing by just that much may have actually hardened their determination to learn the lessons and come back fighting.

Just my 2¢.

Michael

[ October 21, 2003, 09:11 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

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Micheal, I think you're right. Churchill's speech helped to define Rommel as "the man we have to learn to beat" if the Allies were to beat the Germans. He became, for the western Allies, the active symbol of the tactical and operational skill of the German army. Monty kept his picture on the wall to remind himself that Rommel was the man to beat. The American defeat at Kasserine sent a similar message to the US forces and Patton also focused on beating Rommel. German generals on the Russian front were using some of the same tactics on a larger scale, but that was remote from the experience of the WA. And, in a sense, the Allied focus worked for them. After learning to beat Rommel, they were also able to beat some of the German generals imported from the Russian front--Kluge, Model, Manteuffel, Manstein, et al.

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Rommel was a brilliant maneuverer as CA previously stated.

As for the battles he lost El Alemian - out gunned 5 to 1 or greater. Normandy - his hands were tied by Hilter refusing to free the troops from Pas de Calias. Sorry, I don't know enuff aboot Tunis to comment. But plan on reading more when CMAK comes out.

Captain Whacky:

I vaguelly remmeber that book. Most of it was about how much the Italians sucked and how Rommel couldn't get the supplies he needed. On the other hand, it seemed to me like Irving sure pointed out a lot of errors Rommel made, so I don't know what the whole controversy is about.

Yes, he was chronically under supplied.

In the book "Bodygaurd of Lies" by (i forgot the name) the author points out how many on the attempts to supply DAK the Brits were in full knowledge of time and path of the supply convoys. They were able to intercept these convoys including the flight of sixteen ME-323s (the German Spruce Goose).

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Originally posted by DingoBreath:

Rommel was a brilliant maneuverer as CA previously stated.

As for the battles he lost El Alemian - out gunned 5 to 1 or greater. Normandy - his hands were tied by Hilter refusing to free the troops from Pas de Calias. Sorry, I don't know enuff aboot Tunis to comment. But plan on reading more when CMAK comes out.

What's so brilliant about maneuvering your entire force until its so short of fuel that you have no ability to retreat? At El Alamein he tried to lure the British out, but Monty wasn't about to commit prematurely. I remember a fondly remember history professor quoting Rommel (after apologizing for the language) as saying "Why won't the ****er attack?" Don't know how accurate that was, but it seemed to fit in with what I have read about Rommel's temperament.

As for Normandy, it was his brilliant plan to fight on the beaches - a tactic that has never worked in the history of amphibious operations, save perhaps for Wake Island (the first time). It was von Runstedt who advocated the mobile defence...Note how long it took the Americans to get off Omaha Beach - half a day - despite ineffective pre bombardment and lack of armour support. It wasn't a pretty sight, but it also wasn't the victory on the beaches that Rommel thought was possible.

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It seems to me many on this thread are overlooking one key source of Rommel's military reputation. He was a military writer in the interwar period. Western officers went to school with him, not only in the field but in the classroom. As soon as his successes were common knowledge, men went and got his books. He writes clearly, conveys a vivid impression of military events, and conveys a sense of easy grasp of tactical essentials in whatever situation confronts him. To men looking for the thought behind stunning early war German successes, a current practitioner that had already published obviously attracted attention.

As for his actual military accomplishments, they were substantial. Rommel was a gifted commander. He showed that even in WW I, at the tactical level. He confirmed his reputation at Sedan. His wasn't the main pronge that drove to the channel, but he kept up anyway, forced an independent crossing of the Meuse, and held the interior (right) flank of the penetration successfully against large scale armored counterattack by the pocketed forces. Any of these taken alone would have made the reputation of a lesser armor commander.

He wasn't a household word until North Africa. There was a headline grabbing quality to his accomplishments there. He was the biggest fish in a small pond. Some of his strokes were operationally brilliant, notably the turnabout after the first defeat in the 1941 campaign, on a shoestring but successfully against the overextended Allies. Also Kasserine, using the moment of juncture with the forces in Tunisia, before Montgomery had arrived, to deliver a blow against the Allied forces from the west.

You have to remember that this was an attack launched by a beaten force in pell mell retreat out of Egypt. Few commanders would have had the audacity to plan either stroke, let alone execute them with the tactical success each enjoyed. Rommel had an acute sense of an opponent's weaknesses, and a heroic, not to say foolhardy, disregard for his own when he thought he could bring one of those weaknesses into play.

He had his limitations as well, certainly. And not just in the conditions he labored under. His command of the whole logistical side of things was mediocre. His tactical sense, which had been extremely fine earlier in his career, declined as he rose in echelon and as new developments changed tactics.

His staff corrected his orders where they were tactically out of date. E.g. if he ordered motorized infantry, alone, to attack a dug in position over open desert, they interpreted it to mean he wanted that unit there but must send the appropriate all arms force needed to accomplish it. The whole German system was professional, and the role of a commander was often morale booster and politician, while staff made the actual system work. In the case of a commander as good as Rommel, the main operational decisions remained with him rather than being delegated to a chief of staff or operations group. But much of the rest was the work of subordinates.

His ideas about Normandy, late, were also questionable. Some try to see in the cost of Omaha a vindication of the idea that stopping the Allies at the water's edge was correct. If anything it shows the opposite. The best prep and a strong unit delayed the Allies for half a day and took losses nearly as high as those inflicted.

Whereas the notion that air power would prevent any concentration of armor opposite the invasion proved too pessimistic. It delayed that concentration, but sending sufficient armor reserves - not beach fortifications - is what actually stopped the Allies. To keep them stopped would have required a thousand tanks and 100,000 men per month. It was the Russian success that summer that made that level of replacement out of the question in the west.

It is also noteworthy that Rommel managed to be absent for most of his defeats. He was on leave at the time of El Alamein, for the start of it anyway. He left Tunisia before the failure there. He was strafed and hospitalized after the successful halt in Normandy but before the breakout. Some of this may have been reputation managing - Hitler pulled him from Tunisia in part to avoid having him preside over a loss. Some of it was luck. It probably adds to his later reputation.

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Originally posted by JasonC:

... Also Kasserine, using the moment of juncture with the forces in Tunisia, before Montgomery had arrived, to deliver a blow against the Allied forces from the west.

You have to remember that this was an attack launched by a beaten force in pell mell retreat out of Egypt. ...

Minor quibble: A fair proportion of the German forces involved at Kasserine were new to the theatre, and hadn't come back from Egypt. The former DAK had a role, but they were only part of the whole.

Otherwise I agree with your post smile.gif

Regards

JonS

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Originally posted by DingoBreath:

Yes, he was chronically under supplied.

A fact aggravated by his allowing his ambitions to exceed his narrow means. That's what Halder et al were always complaining about.

In the book "Bodygaurd of Lies" by (i forgot the name)...
Anthony Cave Brown. A good book to read as a starter on the intelligence war, although as always I would caution the serious student to read more than one book on any historical subject.

Michael

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