Tiger accuracy

[rune]

Ahh...but you are taking range figures and trying to apply them to combat. The 93% figure COULD be hit by an experienced calm cool crew on a range with the second shot. Now, lets add in you just were hit by a 76mm and had your ears rung, you have been on the move for 3 days, and have not had time to adjust your sights, the ammo you loaded in a hurry wasn't even looked at. You last slept an hour maybe a day ago. You are being fired at by people unhappy with you, artillery and air power is trying to ruin your day. Now where does that 93% on a test range on a SECOND shot go?

Range figures are great...for a range. Combat conditions are going to wreck those numbers in a hurry.

Rune

[c3k]

Quick test complete.

I setup an 800 meter by 4000 meter shooting range. A northern, platoon range with 4 firing spots and 4 individual ranges. I will email the setup for anyone interested.

Every 1000 meters is a small pavement surrounded by water. .

First, the platoon of 4 veteran Tiger I's opened up at a T-34 at 2000 meters. By Jentz, the second round accuracy should be 50%. After about 6-8 rounds, accuracy was only 28% for round 7-9 (or so).

Individually, veteran Tiger I's vs. T-34's at 1000 meters. By Jentz, second round accuracy of 93%. Remember, these are assumed COMBAT performance numbers. In CM, after 4-6 rounds, various accuracy of 59%, 65% or 73%.

Rune, I'll be happy to share this test. Email me at the address in my profile. I'd also like to run it with Tiger II's. It seems obvious that Jentz' table 7.1.2 and CMBB do not correlate well.

(A note on the test: I did not edit the ammo supply. Because of that, the Tigers fired until they destroyed the target. That led to various numbers of rounds expended. Jentz' table is predicated on second round accuracy - assuming the first round is sensed. To do a more accurate test, the Tigers should only fire 1 round of AP, and then have some left over so that the to hit percentage of that type of round on the second shot can be determined at the beginning of the next turn. Since you cannot interrupt the game in mid-turn, parceling out limited ammo supplies wouldn't work. The to-hit percentage would only apply to the remaining, different, ammo type.)

Regards,

Ken

[c3k]

Perusing Jentz, op. cit., p.77, "First round hits were usually achieved wtih the 8.8 cm Kw.K. gun at ranges between 600 to 1000 meters..."

More, "Sprengranaten were fired at a moving artillery column at a range of 5000 meters. A direct hit was achieved with the third round." Obviously exceptional, or it wouldn't have been singled out. Yet, try to hit a target at 5000 meters with HE in CMBB and tell me how many rounds it takes to get close.

Also, only "minimal expenditure" of ammo to hit tanks at 1500 meters. Perhaps 3 rounds? Over, under, hit? I can't see a combat unit calling "minimal expenditure" to be too many. Certainly in the single digits. Probably the lower half of that.

CMBB/BO/AK are great games. They're not perfect. I think they undermodel the true accuracy of certain weapons, the Tiger I and II among them.

Ken

[rune]

You aren't reading correctly.

The figures in the second column include the variation expected during practice firing due to differences between guns, ammunition and gunners. These accuracy tables do not reflect the actual probability of hitting a target under battlefield conditions.

That is a direct quote from Jentz.

Again, you are taking test range numbers and putting them into a battlefield situation. This is NOT correct. Let's see what could happen in battlefield conditions.

On 1 July 1944, B Company tanks were assigned to support the 133rd Infantry Regiment's attack toward the eastern edge of the town of Cecina. The tankers moved out at 0800 hours and reached their objective by 1300, joining the infantry in the attack.

Meanwhile, the tankers of A Company were really catching it even further to the east. They had succeeded in crossing the Cecina River and rejoining the 135th Infantry earlier in the morning. At 1400 hours, they resumed the tank/infantry attack toward the critical road junction of Highways 1 and 68. However, about 300 meters to the east of the road junction, at the Sirigatti farm near the Acquerta Stream, the A Company tankers ran into heavy fire from anti-tank weapons that were carefully concealed at Villa Cartoni just north of Highway 68. Five of the Shermans received direct hits and were set on fire, and four more were immobilized. Miraculously, only three A Company tankers were wounded.

Back in town, Company B of the 752nd was ordered to move all of its tanks south of Cecina at around 1600 hours to support a different attack to the western edge of town. The commander of Company E of the 133rd Infantry Regiment heard his supporting tanks preparing to move out, and quickly convinced Major Woodbury of the 752nd to leave one platoon of tanks behind to defend the in-town forces. These were the five tanks that comprised B Company's 3rd Platoon.

At 2030 hours, the five tanks from the 3rd Platoon of B Company of the 752nd received word via radio that the Germans were launching a combined tank/infantry counterattack from the eastern side of Cecina. The various American accounts differ in their estimates of the strength of the German counterattack, ranging between 5 and 10 Tiger tanks and between a platoon and 200 infantry. From the German accounts, it is now known that the counterattacking strength consisted of two Tiger tanks, one StuG III, and less than 50 grenadiers from the I./SS-PGR 35 of the 16. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division RFSS.

Twilight was approaching as the Germans attacked, but there was still sufficient daylight left and visibility remained good. The sun was just above the horizon, and the moon was nearly at full transit, and three-fourths illuminated.

The German column was led by Tiger 221 of the 2nd Platoon of the 2nd Company of the 504th Heavy Panzer Battalion, commanded by platoon leader Leutnant Keitel. The grenadiers were following their tanks in close ranks, in columns of two on either side of the road. The counterattacking column halted briefly in the cover of the brick factory that still exists today in the northern part of Cecina. Resuming its counterattack, the column advanced down a road from the vicinity of Villa Bianca, and turned left onto Via Marrucci. Moving slowly past Via Trento and Via Trieste, Tiger 221 began to negotiate a curve to the right onto Via Montanara, which was a gravel road that formed the eastern border of the town.

Meanwhile, the five Sherman tanks of B Company's 3rd Platoon went out to meet the German counterattack. The platoon leader was Lieutenant Edwin W. Cox, commander of Sherman 11, which was a mid-production 75mm M4A1. Lieutenant Cox's plan was to advance toward the brick factory near the northern part of town, where the German column had first been spotted. As the 133rd Infantry took cover in the buildings in town, Lieutenant Cox strategically dispersed four of his five tanks into the streets of Cecina, then took his own tank alone up Via Montanara in an attempt to intercept the advancing German column. The German and American lead tanks were about to come face to face with one another, but neither crew was aware of this because the topography and buildings obstructed their view.

Cox's Sherman had just passed Via Manzoni on its left. Just moments before Tiger 221 rounded the curve onto Via Montanara, the crew of Sherman 11 spotted a German infantry soldier in a ditch alongside the road. Unknown to the American tankers, the German scout was acting as a "spotter" for Tiger 221. As the infantry scout stood up to motion the Tiger on, he was immediately hit by machine gun fire, clasping his stomach as he fell.

As the German spotter fell, the Sherman tank crew saw the main gun barrel of Tiger 221 emerge from behind a two-story house on the left side of Via Montanara near the curve in the road. At that moment, Tiger 221 rounded the curve onto Via Montanara and came face to face with the Lieutenant Cox's Sherman, at a distance of 75 to 100 yards.

Both tanks fired simultaneously. The Tiger's 88mm shell struck the ground close to the left side of Cox's Sherman. The concussion of the Tiger's shot lifted the left side of the Sherman off the ground, but no damage was inflicted. At the same instant, the Sherman fired a 75mm armor piercing (AP) round, hitting the lower front hull of the Tiger. Crew members of the Sherman recalled seeing the shell merely bounce off the Tiger's hull. The only damage inflicted upon Tiger 221 by this hit was a chip in the Zimmerit coating, which is clearly visible in after-action photographs.

The two tanks momentarily lost sight of each other in the dust that had been raised by the firing and movement of the tanks. Tiger 221's crew was further handicapped by the loss of their infantry spotter. Lieutenant Cox ordered his driver, Sergeant Raymond Holt, to back Sherman 11 into the dust, and then turn left through a small garden and position the tank tightly against the wall of a two-story home midway between Via Manzoni and Via Marrucci. In this position, the front of the Sherman was facing Via Trieste, and the rear was facing Via Montanara, where the Tiger remained. Lieutenant Cox then traversed the turret to the rear of his tank, with the main gun at the 5 o'clock position. Lieutenant Cox positioned his tank in that fashion to allow for a more rapid escape in the event that the Tiger approached from their rear and could not be successfully disabled. He had taken a calculated risk that the Tiger 221 would continue along its original path, and cross in front of their traversed main gun.

Sherman 11 maintained this position for several minutes, while the German armor (or perhaps U.S. artillery) shelled the surrounding buildings. When the shelling stopped, Tiger 221 slowly lumbered down Via Montanara, unaware of the position of Cox's Sherman. In recent interviews, Tiger 221's crew members say that they believed the Sherman was in some brush to their 11 o'clock position.

The time was 2045 hours. Tiger 221 slowly rumbled down Via Montanara, crossing the position of Sherman 11, which was hidden behind the building. With its crew unaware of Sherman 11's position, the Tiger moved perpendicular to the Sherman's rear and directly in front of its traversed main gun. As Tiger 221 slowly crossed before them, Lieutenant Cox calmly told his gunner "Hold on, hold on…" until the Tiger was squarely in front of them. Employing a tactic that exploited the Tiger's thinly armored sides, Lieutenant Cox then gave the order to unleash an armor piercing (AP) round through the Tiger's right rear sponson, into the fuel tank.

Private Lord E. Ashercraft of the 34th Infantry Division's 133rd Infantry Regiment inspects the 75mm hole in Tiger 221 on 3 July 1944.

Crew members of Sherman 11 estimate that they were between 25 and 30 yards from Tiger 221 when they fired. The very close range is corroborated by infantry eyewitness reports, by the commendation for the Silver Star that was later presented to Lieutenant Cox, and by detailed maps and photographic evidence.

The 75mm AP round penetrated Tiger 221's hull and immediately ignited the fuel tank. Eyewitnesses from both the 133rd Infantry and the Sherman crew say that Tiger 221's engine compartment burst into flames when it was hit. Just a few seconds later, Sherman 11 fired another round into the Tiger's right track for good measure, severing it.

So much for 100% kill at 75 meters. Range figures are good, for a range, it doesn't factor all the things in I mention over and over.

Rune

[c3k]

Rune,

Several points. First, you are correct in that Jentz' table is expected firing range results.

Second, your posting highlights your typing skill (or are you taking the easy way out and merely scanning or clipping all those long-winded passages? ).

Thirdly, the 75 yard miss means nothing. That was a snap shot situation. They came around a corner, were surprised, oops. I'm talking about a stationary situation with time to observe a target. Remember that part in Jentz about a gunner expected to fire 3 shots in 30 seconds and hit a moving target at whatever range?

I do not believe in the uber theory of all German tanks should destroy all their targets. I do believe that BF.C consistently undermodels the real effects of superior sights and weapons.

Ken

[Ace Pilot]

Originally posted by BadgerDog:

It is only my opinion as an old Sherman gunner that the many of the up close engagements of tanks within the Combat Mission series, tend to be a bit gamey and the accuracy/hit ratio is far too low when engaging targets at less then 1,000 yards, but it's still a fantastic piece of entertainment software and I love every minute of it.

Regards,

Badger

Badger,

For these close range engagements, were you trained to to aim for specific points on enemy tanks, or just center of mass?

Also, did you have a different procedure for a "snapshot" as compared to a shot with plenty of prep time (like from an ambush position)?

Thanks,

Ace

[rune]

Ken,

Glad you saw the firing range stuff.

As for typing skills, some of it was typed, and some was cut and paste.

Snap shot, yep, but again, all the other factors STILL weigh into the equation. One thing I have learned, is seldom do things go right in combat.

Some cool sites I found while looking up things.

http://www.lonesentry.com/tigerflorence/

http://pkka.narod.ru/tiger.htm

http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/Arena/5096/upgtiger.htm

Just some interesting reading...

Rune

[Mark Gallear]

I may turn Runes account into a CM scenario to see if the game works or not but then he might have thought of that one already .

[rune]

Mark,

Go ahead, I am busy with other things.

Rune

[c3k]

Rune,

Interesting links. However, I do not have any issues with regard to the Tiger's vulnerability. (That seems to be what each of the sites focus on - effective methods of knocking out Tigers.) Rather, I'm trying to focus attention on real life accuracy of the Tiger main armament. Of interest in the pkka.ru link, was the statement that Tigers often open fire at a range of 1.5 - 2.5 kilometers. Hmmm, why would they do that unless they had a reasonable chance of a hit?

Assume it would be platoon volley fire, as was frequently used at long range. Perhaps 3-4 rounds at 2000 meters per tank, per target. This is the area which CM models poorly.

Thanks,

Ken

[rune]

I just posted them as they had interesting stuff on the Tiger.

As for the column shot, it hit at that range..but the target was a column. What did it hit? Would it be an area fire against a column of trucks? Too many unanswered questions.

Found on other sites, the preferred open fire range was 1200 meters, but the tank was most effective between 800 and 1000. They were also told to fire occasionally at 2000 meters, as it was a way to demorlaize the enemy tanks since they couldn't hit htem back. Most effective doesn't mean anything. I was looking for combat reports where XX rounds were used to kill XX targets. Found one where 15 tanks were destroyed and the Tigers [2] only had 2 rounds left...but without ranges, does it also mean anything? Nope.

I really don't want to bother my Uncle again, but I may. He was a Tiger crewman and eventually a tank commader. He has answered questions on the T34 [when he crewed a Pz III] and navwhachamacallit for us before. However, the process to get it translated by my mom and translated back was a bit much. He doesn't like to talk about the war, and his replies was the first anyone of my family ever got him to talk about it.

Rune

[c3k]

Rune,

As for that 5000 meter HE shot, I agree, and stated so, that it must've been exceptional for it to've been mentioned. (Plus, the effect of disrupting the column was observed when that 3rd round hit, but I don't know if it was an actual, hard, hit, or the Russians fled to avoid a possible hit. At 5000 meters I think it would be difficult to tell if a round landed 10 meters short and then everyone ran.)

I have also run into the same information dead end: I can quote many "Tiger hit a target at X range" but no rounds fired info, or the preferred range is X, but, again, no info on whether that means 1 or 2 rounds to hit.

(I wouldn't think a game question would be important enough to dredge up your uncle's war memories, especially if it is a subject he and the rest of your family feel would be best kept sleeping.)

Regards,

Ken

[Zulu]

Interesting stuff.

A simple calculation shows that at longer ranges, determining the range is vital.

I don't have the exact muzzle velocity of the 88 but let's assume it was 1000 m/s.

Using d = 1/2 * a * t * t we get (not taking into account shell velocity drop due to friction)

Range Shell Drop

800 m 3.2 m

1000 m 4.3 m

1200 m 7.1 m

So at longer ranges, missing the range by 200 m could cause a miss if you are firing at centre of mass. In this example, it the target was at 1200 m and you dialed in 1000, the shell would impact 8 feet below where you expected.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Zulu:

So at longer ranges, missing the range by 200 m could cause a miss if you are firing at centre of mass.

Assumptions:

1) MV = 3070fps / 935m/s (8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 firing AP40)

2) Ignoring everything except gravity drop

3) Aiming at centre of mass

4) Target is actually at 1000m

5) Target is a Sherman M4A2 2.74m high

6) Target and shooter are on a flat plain

Any range estimate from 870m to 1115m will result in a hit on the target.

Regards

JonS

[rune]

hey jon,

Look at the first link I posted.

Rune

[fridericus]

another interesting point was the using of 88-flak, which had the same barrell as the tiger.

i read books from 17.ss.pd GvB defending the rhine-area between Karlsruhe and Speyer (i live between these 2 towns, thatswhy my interest).

they used the 88 to destroy enemy tanks at a range of 8 to 10km with indirect fire. as the author described, with indrect fire (shooting only 1m or so over houses of Bad Bergzabern) the killed a company of allied tanks. the author describes, that the 88-flak has a accuracy on 8-10km of 5m.

so it is really possilbe to hit enemy with direct fire at 4km soon.

[JonS]

Originally posted by rune:

... the first link I posted. ...

Hi Rune. Cheers for that. I'd seen it a while ago, and have read the back-story in the various OHs and other places (mostly Plowman). It's interesting stuff, and a good example of how pussy M4s were able to defeat the Tigers.

Jon

[JonS]

Originally posted by fridericus:

another interesting point was the using of 88-flak, which had the same barrell as the tiger.

Are you sure? I thought the barrel of the tank gun was shorter (among several other changes)?

[fridericus]

Originally posted by JonS:

Are you sure? I thought the barrel of the tank gun was shorter (among several other changes)? [/QB]

Yes, I am sure.

both had the 88L56, the kingtiger had the 88L71.

the only difference bettween flak- and tigerbarrel was the muzzelbreak of the tank.

[Mr. Tittles]

I recently thumbed through a StuG war diary book (700Km in a StuG?). One of the interesting battle descriptions includes an attack by T34s across the StuGs front. I think the range was 800-1000 meters (going from memory).

The crew KOs all but one T34, which is reversing rapidly. The author comments that stopping for the T34 would mean certain death (in other words, the StuG wouldnt miss). His only chance was moving. The StuG had the range and it would have meant death to stop.

I think this demonstrates the accuracy of these high velocity weapons against non-moving targets. At long range, a moving erratic target on undulating terrain is a hard shot. A hull down target is a hard shot because of its small height and difficulty in determing its range.

[Dognozzle]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I believe abandonment/self-destruction was the number one German reason for loss of armor. Whether this was because of lack of fuel, breakdown without hope of recovery, battle damage, etc. is not exactly known. Certainly the air force was a direct/indirect contributor to the losses. But as far as directly knocking out panzers they would be a minority cause.

My Father was a 1st Lt with the 2nd Armored Div in Europe and had observations on this topic that I think are interesting to note.

1. German tanks were exceptionally difficult for American tanks to defeat in an even engagement. US AT guns were not much better.

2. Standing 2nd Armored SOP called for disengagement if possible when Shermans were confronted with Panther or Tiger variants and calls made for air and/or artillery support.

3. Given the option Dad preferred to call the P-47 with 500 lb bombs over indirect guns as often simply the sight of a flight of T-bolts caused German crews to bail-out.

4. Although few 500 lb bomb acutally hit the intended target, often the concussion of the blast from a near miss would injure or stun the crews enough for a mission kill and leave the tank undamaged.

5. Dad said no P-47 pilot ever bought his own drinks while he was around.

[rexford]

The Tiger 88L56 APCBC round was superior to just about every other WW II projectile in terms of round to round random scatter. If one aimed the 88mm at a target and did not move the aim, the shot impacts would be close together. Fletcher's book on Tiger tanks notes the findings from a British test of constant aim scatter.

But random scatter is not the major issue for WW II first shot accuracy.

Battlefield accuracy during WW II brings into play something that is not a problem with Abrams tanks, namely range estimation for the first shot.

The average tank crew on a firing range would average a 25% error at all ranges from the actual on their first estimate, where the errors would spread around 0% error according to a bell shaped statistical curve.

Tiger crews were expected to estimate first shot ranges to within 10% of actual during their training.

Using the Tiger velocity-vs-range and random scatter characteristics we calculated the first shot hit percentages against a 2m high x 2.5m wide target assuming 10% and 25% average range estimation errors:

10% average estimation error

============================

97% at 500m, 79% at 1000m, 40% at 1500m

25% average estimation error

============================

93% at 500m, 42% at 1000m, 18% at 1500m

The above figures assume that the gun sight is perfectly aligned with the gun barrel, the gunner elevates the gun to the estimated setting, wind effects are negligible, the first shot corrects for jump and other effects, the tank is on level ground so trunnion cant does not come into play, the ammunition is highest quality, the target profile is clearly seen against the background, etc.

What actually occurred on the battlefield could vary quite a bit from the above ideal calculations. While a crew might obtain a 10% or less estimate error on the proving grounds against wooden targets, having to hit something that is trying to hit you back brings new issues into play.

There is a scene in the movie Glory where a recruit is routinely hitting the target with musket shots while everyone stands around and laughs, so the commander goes over and demands that the rifleman fire accurate shots as fast as he can and all the while the commander is yelling at the soldier to shoot faster and firing his pistol.

The recruits firing technique fell apart when things got hectic and loud.

There is a combat report, which may be in Jentz' Dreaded Threat book on the "88", where a number of 88mm Flak guns took on a group of Russian tanks at 1200m or so. The final tally resulted in about 10 to 12 shots per knocked out tank.

Research by Miles Krogfus noted that a few Tigers usually accounted for most of the kills in an engagement, and reports by Tiger commanders indicate that gunner skill was very important when it came to hitting targets. Some gunners missed easy targets at moderate ranges.

On the other hand, a Russian vet who fought with 76.2mm field guns noted that Tigers and Elefants would sometimes knock out their guns at 1200m range with the first shot.

[Omi]

Originally posted by Sgt Barger:

Hiya everyone,

Also the AI needs some tweeking when it comes to target selection. We all know that a WWII tank gunner often used bracketing to get the proper range and azmuth to his target. In CMAK I constantly see my tanks switching targets after 1 shot is fired, negating the accuracy of his second shot. This just isnt how tank gunnery was done.

What also bothers me is when a turret rotate all the way to fire at a target and right before shooting, it switches to another target and starts rotating in the opposite direction. This is especially frustrating with slow turrets.

[fridericus]

Originally posted by rexford:

The Tiger 88L56 APCBC round was superior to just about every other WW II projectile in terms of round to round random scatter.

There was a reason for developing the 88L71 of the Kingtiger, so this gun was better.

[Mr. Tittles]

Rexford claims 25% range estimation innaccuracy at all ranges. I would think it would be a function of range, further being worse estimation. But at shorter ranges, the 25% becomes unimportant as the drop of the round will be much less.

But the smaller the target, the more critical the range estimation. So a hull down tank is very hard to estimate. Its also less forgiving of 'misses' that would typically hit a tank. A 2 meter by 2.5 meter target is forgiving, since hitting is what is important. A 1 meter by 2 meter target is not. Typical scatter from all causes being clear misses sometimes.

88mm crews probably could use Flak stereo devices to get range readings that were accurate enough to dial in their weapons at longer ranges.

But I would claim that motion is the greatest variable to accuracy. I doubt any tank would stand still if a round flew past with a crack.