Invading Cornwall

[Monty's Double]

I'm sure I didn't dream this, but in the Times a couple of days ago there was an article about some recently unearthed nazi documents going up for sale. Amongst other things were plans and maps of a putative invasion of England via, wait for it... Penzance. Assuming I haven't eaten too much cheese (I ate a whole baked vacherin at the weekend so it's a possibility that can't be discounted), and these documents aren't either fake or misdirection by uncle Adolf and his chums, has anyone else heard of a planned invasion of Cornwall? I mean, have you ever driven on the A30? In August? Nutters.

[Michael Emrys]

Never heard of that one, if they mean a landing exclusively in Cornwall. I think the original blue sky dream plan for Sealion included landings all along the southern English coast including one in Cornwall, but the realities were that that would have involved a longer sea voyage than they were capable of, and they didn't have enough lift to move more than a division or two at the time anyway.

Also, a lot of faked wartime German documents have surfaced over the years, and since the advent of eBay, the flow has increased.

Michael

[Roach]

Yes, I read about that too (in the Express I think) and my first thought was "what??" I'm sure the newspaper report stated that the documents were recently released from government files so I don't think they were a scam, but I can't remember for certain and the newspaper is long gone. I assumed that they could be part of an overall study going through the possibilities of where or where not to invade - with the emphasis (eventually) on not!

Because just like Montys' Double said, they'd have been insane to tackle the A30 in August; I did it once and I was one man in a Ford Escort...

[Monty's Double]

It does make a mad kind of sense though. After all, they invaded Norway , mainly by steaming into undefended ports with destroyers loaded down with troops (though the Blucher can attest to what happens when you try that against shore batteries). That could have worked to get an assault force ashore, as the SW ports would have been all but undefended. The problem would have been breakout, since there are only very limited ways up the peninsula. Ironically, the terrain is very similar to Normandy, including the blindness-inducing apple-based drink.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Monty's Double:

It does make a mad kind of sense though. After all, they invaded Norway , mainly by steaming into undefended ports with destroyers loaded down with troops...

Yeah, but they didn't have virtually the entire Royal Navy waiting for them in Norway, as well as the RAF. Remember, those barges travel awfully slow, and any weather that might have given them cover would likely have also swamped them in the western Channel.

And don't forget, even though the RN got to Norway too late to stop the invasion, they sank a big chunk of the KM's destroyers and damaged several of its larger ships. So those are not going to be around to participate in an invasion of England.

Michael

[Merkin Muffley]

Maybe they hoped for a popular Cornish uprising if they promised no more tourists.

Still, the paucity of communications works both ways - assuming they had somehow persuaded the RN to bugger off because of air and submarine threat.

Seems very unlikely though.

[Noba]

Because just like Montys' Double said, they'd have been insane to tackle the A30 in August; I did it once and I was one man in a Ford Escort...

They probably would have tried the A303....tricked everyone. But which ever way, can you imagine Pz 4's going down Gunnislake ??

Noba.

[Roach]

Originally posted by Noba:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Because just like Montys' Double said, they'd have been insane to tackle the A30 in August; I did it once and I was one man in a Ford Escort...

They probably would have tried the A303....tricked everyone. But which ever way, can you imagine Pz 4's going down Gunnislake ??

Noba. </font>

[Monty's Double]

Remember, those barges travel awfully slow,

But with an intact port, they wouldn't have had to use barges, they could have used proper ships. Don't get me wrong, it's a bonkers idea, I'm just interested in the thought behind it. Can't imagine the Luftwaffe were too keen on the idea.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Monty's Double:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Remember, those barges travel awfully slow,

But with an intact port, they wouldn't have had to use barges, they could have used proper ships.</font>

[Monty's Double]

I think the Luftwaffe would have been more or less irrelevant

That's what I was getting at. Also, the RAF fighter groups who had survived (assuming the Germans won the BoB in the first place) in the South West would have had a field day.

[Peter Cairns]

I am not so sure that this is as daft as people seem to think.

Firstly the key point for me is to use it as a staging post from which to build a bridgehead for the main attack. After Dunkirk the UK had virtually no effective armour or anti-tank. the difficulty of getting out of cornwall is actually an advantage if you are trying to defend it.

Obviously you need to get ashore fast by taking ports and using Paras, but once ashore things change. If the Royal Navy tries to stop reinforcement then the Royall navy has to either run the gauntlet of the lufftwaffa in the channel of come in from the irish sea.

For me a crucial factor would be how quickly german airborne forces could slaughter the home guard in Cornwall and get the airfields open and for ferried Me-109's to operate.

Once ashore and the bridgehead is established with ground based aircover, then the UK would be hard pressed to drive the Germans in to the sea with the state they were in post Dunkirk.

It's a risky strategy, but that very unlikelyhood means that cornwall was probably underdefended.

In Scotland the Poles were based in fife, because they're were fears that an attack from norway could take the kingdom (for historic reasons it's know as the Kingdom of Fife) and use it to build up and then break out to take Glasgow and cut scotland in half.

As a peninsula with the deep Tay and Forth to North and South, it would be easy to hold while building up for a break out.

Again an unlikely scenario, but it was taken seriously at the time.

Talking about a scenario, as it's easy to get good maps of fife, it might have the makings of a CM campaign.

Peter.

[Roach]

I find it difficult to believe that the Luftwaffe could have been effective enough to prevent the RN from mauling the troop barges. If the RAF had been taken out of the picture, perhaps, but, as we know, they hadn't and so the Luftwaffe wouldn’t have been allowed to have an unchallenged run at neutralising the RN and thus preventing them from causing havoc.

Still, assuming that the seaborne troops successfully run the gauntlet, get ashore and establish a bridgehead, you then you have to take into consideration the terrain the invading army first find themselves in, and then up against.

If it’s a road network suitable for lightning vehicular breakouts you’re after, then Cornwall (and then Devon) is most definitely not the place. Lots of narrow lanes and only one really major road worthy of the name out of the West Country into the heart of England. Not promising for a Panzer spearhead in a hurry.

In fact, we are talking about terrain not very dissimilar to the Normandy bocage – especially as you move eastwards into Devon. More narrow lanes, more hedgerows á la Normandy – in short, a defender’s dream. And I can well imagine that the Germans would have had an equally as difficult task as the Allies did in Normandy – but ultimately with a far costlier outcome.

Even against an initially small (but probably determined) defensive force, I imagine that any gains would have been small and strictly limited, and as resistance stiffened (and I am not sure how, without air superiority, the Germans could have prevented defensive reinforcements arriving) the entire operation would bog down. And unless the re-supply could be maintained over such a long distance and in the face of constant RAF and RN interdiction, well…

Realistically, I don't see how any invasion force landed in Cornwall would have achieved anything other than very quickly becoming an isolated force cut off on a very extended limb with fatal consequences.

If we assume that all the factors were in the German’s favour, i.e., the RAF had been neutralised, and the RN could have been prevented from having its say, then maybe a landing in the West Country might have had a chance of success. But then again, in that case, with no RAF and RN, the invasion could have come straight across the Channel to the South/South East Coast with no need to take the long way round.

So basically, in my uneducated opinion (and without the benefit of historical research to back me up of course!) I imagine that the German High Command would almost certainly have looked at this area, and carried out a feasibility study, but then, in the end, the consensus of opinion would have been, “Nah, sod that for a game of soldiers…”

[Peter Cairns]

What makes people think the RAF had air superiority over the channel in 1940. Over the south east of england yes, but the closer you got to france the worse it got.

Also short of scaping the white cliffs of Dover almost anything of any size would need to be within artillery range of the french coast.

As to the type of terrain in Cornwall, the tanks we are talking about are Pz11, and PZ111,s, not King Tigers, and again look up the figures for Dunkirk, sure we got nearly 400,000 out but we lost virtually every anti-tank gun we had.

The Germans if they got a foothold would have been facing an army that was seriously looking at using molotovs as it's primary anti-tank weapon.

The if in if they got ashore is the big issue, but by late 1940 the British army was a shell in no fit state to take on the Wermacht in a straight fight.

Alos like Normandy, would the British have committed everything or held back seeing it as a faint for a larger attack in to Kent, giving Hitler the space he needed to build up.

Oh and in the debate on the Royal Navy no one has mentioned that concentrating that many ships in that area, would have been a U-boat's paradise.

Peter.

[junk2drive]

Would there have been a period of bad weather to take the air war out of the situation?

Would a landing during B o B succeded if the air war was away from the landing?

[Beta1]

Originally posted by Peter Cairns:

What makes people think the RAF had air superiority over the channel in 1940. Over the south east of england yes, but the closer you got to france the worse it got.

Also short of scaping the white cliffs of Dover almost anything of any size would need to be within artillery range of the french coast.

As to the type of terrain in Cornwall, the tanks we are talking about are Pz11, and PZ111,s, not King Tigers, and again look up the figures for Dunkirk, sure we got nearly 400,000 out but we lost virtually every anti-tank gun we had.

The Germans if they got a foothold would have been facing an army that was seriously looking at using molotovs as it's primary anti-tank weapon.

The if in if they got ashore is the big issue, but by late 1940 the British army was a shell in no fit state to take on the Wermacht in a straight fight.

Alos like Normandy, would the British have committed everything or held back seeing it as a faint for a larger attack in to Kent, giving Hitler the space he needed to build up.

Oh and in the debate on the Royal Navy no one has mentioned that concentrating that many ships in that area, would have been a U-boat's paradise.

Peter.

Your right about the U-boats but again RAF patrols would make their life harder. you have to remember that the further West you go in england the further you get from france - the channel generally widens as you move west. The RAF may not have had supremacy over the channel in the east but in the west the range would have made life much harder for the germans. I dont think you would need much RAF prescence to make a real mess of things. I think its probably safe to say that anywhere in cornwall is way out of range of any artillery based on the continent so unless your going to fly a lot of unescorted bombers over the channel or put some serious naval firepower in the area your not going to have much backup for your landing force.

Also if youve been to some of these small cornish ports you really wouldnt want to try attacking them. Outside the big towns most of the fishing ports are really very small harbours with very poor access back into the town (although admittedly I've been to more N cornwall than S cornwall). But you would have difficulty getting a kubelwagen ashore and off the beach/dock let alone a panzer! Theres also a suprising amount of coastline with very large cliffs!

Although molotovs may be all we had its about as good terrain as you could wish for given that is what you have!

Given the inevitably heavy defenses at plymouth I would have though trying to land anywhere east of st austell would be suicide. Falmouth would probably be well defended too which leaves you looking west of the lizard. You could maybe manage on the bay between penzance and porthlever...

[oi_you_nutter]

an invasion of Britain though the West Country that would have been a laugh

imagine the locals being interrogated for information, who needs navajo windtalkers when you have the wess cun-tree accents

and the blitzkrieg has no defence against scrumpy

i knos cos i be frum bristle an all and i gurt luvs the blakforn !

[CombinedArms]

What makes this concept interesting, IMHO, is flipping it around, since, as many have noted, the eventual Allied invasion of Normandy in many ways mirrored this proposed invasion of Cornwall. I agree with the majority that the Germans couldn't do it because:

1. they lacked air superiority and their main fighter, the ME-109, lacked the range to reach Cornwall.

2. The RN would have chopped their seaborn transport into little bits.

3. Any troops surviving the sealift to Cornwall would then have to fight their way out of some very difficult country. (I'm a US native but have visited Cornwall and seen the roadnet for myself. Yikes!)

So the Germans, who wisely (or cravenly) backed off from crossing from Calais to Dover, would never in a million years have tried to fight their way to London from Penzance.

My sense is that the Germans had a very clear idea of the diffculties, for them, of an invasion of Cornwall. And they applied that sense of difficulties to what they thought was Allied thinking. They assumed the distance to Normandy would daunt the Allies. (It didn't--after all, they'd covered thousands of miles in the Pacific.) The Allies had no fear of the sea; had enhanced the range of their fighters; had developed the art of airborne warfare well beyond the German practice of late 1940, AND had a firm conviction that if they could once get safely lodged on the European continent, they would win the war. On the the other hand, the Allies did have a healthy fear of the German defenses around Calais and the channel ports. When it came to the Normandy invasion, the German high command (and not just Hitler) took council of their own fears, rather than accurately reading the fears (and the areas of confidence) in their opponents.

[oi_you_nutter]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

What makes this concept interesting, IMHO, is flipping it around, since, as many have noted, the eventual Allied invasion of Normandy in many ways mirrored this proposed invasion of Cornwall. I agree with the majority that the Germans couldn't do it because:

1. they lacked air superiority and their main fighter, the ME-109, lacked the range to reach Cornwall.

2. The RN would have chopped their seaborn transport into little bits.

3. Any troops surviving the sealift to Cornwall would then have to fight their way out of some very difficult country. (I'm a US native but have visited Cornwall and seen the roadnet for myself. Yikes!)

So the Germans, who wisely (or cravenly) backed off from crossing from Calais to Dover, would never in a million years have tried to fight their way to London from Penzance.

My sense is that the Germans had a very clear idea of the diffculties, for them, of an invasion of Cornwall. And they applied that sense of difficulties to what they thought was Allied thinking. They assumed the distance to Normandy would daunt the Allies. (It didn't--after all, they'd covered thousands of miles in the Pacific.) The Allies had no fear of the sea; had enhanced the range of their fighters; had developed the art of airborne warfare well beyond the German practice of late 1940, AND had a firm conviction that if they could once get safely lodged on the European continent, they would win the war. On the the other hand, the Allies did have a healthy fear of the German defenses around Calais and the channel ports. When it came to the Normandy invasion, the German high command (and not just Hitler) took council of their own fears, rather than accurately reading the fears (and the areas of confidence) in their opponents.

thinking like your enemy thinks is the sign of a good military leader which is something that Hitler etc were never known for

remember the Panzer Divison sent to Greece to defend against an allied invasion, the prospect of fighting from Greece to Berlin makes Cornwall seem like a good way to get to London

[Andreas]

Which one was that? Not 1.PD? Because they were sent there for R&R more than anything else, and equipped with mighty French booty tanks.

[Leopard_2]

Some stuff I'd like to throw in, brainstorming style:

* what about paras taking an airfield, and Bf109 flown over to protect the landing / beachhead from Britain soil? Removes several of the shortcomings they had during BoB (range, bailing pilots being lost).

* I don't know Cornwall geography, but is it really worse than the Ardennes, which the French considered impenetrable by a tank force, too?

* most important what-if in such scenarios, consider not Hitler and his sycophants being in charge, but real Generals - not sharing Hitler's dream of befriending Britain, anticipating the need to build up a real threat to Britain before the Blitzsieg in France (instead of an afterthought, as Hitler did), and pushing Sealion as primary instead of secondary option. That might have resulted in a couple of capable landing craft being build beforehand, instead of the haphazard collection put together in reality...

Just throwing in my 0.02€...

[ February 09, 2005, 12:15 AM: Message edited by: Leopard_2 ]

[Monty's Double]

Some thoughts on Leopard_2's ideas:

* Siezing an airfield would have been about the only way to get aircover I guess. I can't help but think that what swung the Norway campaign was the use of Stukas as mobile artillery. Even with a captured airfield I don't think this would have been possible - in Norway the British only had a handful of biplanes. It would have only taken a few Hurris or Spits to spoil the party. 109's operating on siezed airfields would at least have given protection from RAF bombers I suppose, but it wouldn't have stopped bombardments from RN ships steaming down the Irish Sea.

* Most of Cornwall is very similar to Normandy, but hillier, and if anything the roads are narrower and twistier. There are lots of small fishing ports but most of them don't have proper harbours, and some aren't even accessible by road. Once you get towards the Devon border, round about Bodmin Moor, things open up a bit, but you are still very restricted on movement.

* The final point is the one that has to be born in mind in any Sealion counterfactual. The problem is that for the high command to start palnning in 1937, you have to have a rational Hitler surrounded by gifted men who would challenge him - and it's doubtful he would have ever come to power in the first place. Part of his fanaticism included an unrealistic attitude to the British - he was convinced they would "see sense" in the end, and this meant Sealion was never a viable plan.

For what it's worth, if you could create a viable Sealion counterfactual, I'm beginning to think the Cornwall plan could have been a useful diversionary attack, but never the real deal.

[Leopard_2]

Originally posted by Monty's Double:

Part of his fanaticism included an unrealistic attitude to the British - he was convinced they would "see sense" in the end, and this meant Sealion was never a viable plan.

That's the point. Hitler thought he could annect Austria and Czechia (sp?), "neutralize" France and Poland, and "seize" Russia without having to fight an all-out war against Britain (which would be mortally threatened by a Germany so large and warlike). Probably his biggest mistake ever.

[The_Enigma]

everyone keeps saying that the uk left all there AT weapons in france,

am sure we kept producing them didnt we? Also there was alot of flak and arty available could have been used in an AT role couldnt have they?

[Monty's Double]

And, as I understand it, a hatful of obsolete WWI arty that could still leave a nasty bruise. As I said before, in order to make Sealion viable, it had to have been planned well beforehand, and would have essentially been an extension of the French campaign (including annihilating the Dunkirk pocket, as much for the morale value as the material one). The window of opportunity was June/July; by September it was already too late, and by Spring '41 the gaps had been plugged properly.