Hunting the Bocage and the Plow Myth

[dieseltaylor]

As you know I have strong belief the various devices stuck on the front of tanks in Normandy so they could swan through the bocage are primarily war time spin. The devices existed and did a grand show for the Press and Generals at a selected venue but in actual use against the real bocage?

I have read various accounts of the problems with them such as:

a] damage to the tank [ramming a tank into a mound of earth held together by roots could be painful to the crew and to the tank - how many times do you think you can do that in a day]

b] the small fields* did not give room to accelerate [tiny would be more accurate compared to modern agricultural practice]

c] ditto the mud/damp left tanks trying to gain good grip

Now I have read first hand accounts, probably two or three, over the last decade or two and I would dearly love to find them again and publish the excerpts more widely. I cannot offer rewards currently : (

I am conscious that veterans are dying off also so if any of you are in contact with any vets who may know ......

Lastly for those who have never studied it you will find that contrary to any logic that the light tanks like the Honey swan through hedges in CM faster than the heavy tanks. And of course the German heavy tanks are too weedy to climb over or through any hedge a Honey/Stuart/m8 can negotiate in 20 seconds. I blame the inadequate German propaganda and tactics. : )

Americans in Normandy were challenged by fifty miles of hedgerow country, with "an average of 500 small fields per square mile" (Liberation, p. 21). Hedgerow country was "a patchwork of thousands of small fields enclosed by almost impenetrable hedges. . .dense thickets of hawthorn, brambles, vines and trees ranging up to 15 feet in height, growing out of earthen mounds several feet thick and three or four feet high, with a drainage ditch on either side. The wall and hedges together were so formidable that each field took on the character of a small fort. Defenders dug in at the base of a hedgerow and hidden by vegetation were all but impervious to rifle and artillery fire. So dense was the vegetation that infantrymen poking around the hedgerows sometimes found themselves staring eye to eye at startled Germans. A single machine gun concealed in a hedgerow could mow down attacking troops as they attempted to advance from one hedge to another. Snipers, mounted on wooden platforms in the treetops and using flashless gunpowder to avoid giving away their positions, were a constant threat. Most of the roads were wagon trails, worn into sunken lanes by centuries of use and turned into cavern-like mazes by overarching hedges" (Liberation, p. 17). The narrow, sunken roads were nearly useless to tanks.

From

http://www.geocities.com/findinglincolnillinois/daroldhensonWWII.html

[ April 07, 2008, 01:25 PM: Message edited by: dieseltaylor ]

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

For some facts, permit me to recommend: Michael Doubler, CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY and Belton Cooper, DEATH TRAPS, both of whom treat this issue. Further, back in the 1980s I saw an article in ARMOR magazine in which it says that Culin didn't invent the famous hedgerow cutter. Rather, he got the idea from a brother sergeant, who is named in the article, and ran with it, winding up with inventor credit he didn't deserve.

It doesn't surprise me that a Stuart would do better at cutting through a hedgerow. Why? The Stuart can accelerate far faster than can a Sherman, thanks to light weight and a powerful aero engine. Also, the force at the point of contact is much higher than for the Sherman, because the Stuart's much narrower.

Here's a research paper on bocage busting by Michael Doubler.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/doubler/doubler.asp

Here's an article from Military History Online.

Same basic topic. The description of what Bradley saw should be locatable, given its perceived significance, in his memoir, A SOLDIER'S STORY.

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/hedgerowbreakout.aspx

Steve Zaloga's assessment, parts of which seem to fit what you stated.

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=133

Veteran's recollection from a 1st Army ordnance unit site.

http://www.gocek.net/897/bocage.aspx

Green Ordnance volume passage (p. 253 et seq.),

includes footnotes on demonstration before Bradley of hedgerow cutter's effectiveness.

http://www.history.army.mil/reference/Normandy/TS/OD/OD14.htm

As you can see here, in both the period pic and the modern reconstruction, the cutting stroke is delivered across only a handful of feet.

http://www.robertsarmory.com/hedge.htm

Here's a master's thesis (downloadable) on field expedients for U.S. AFVs.

http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA451272

Hope these help. If I were you, I'd ID the units that used them and start haunting their sites. As you say, those vets aren't getting any younger!

Regards,

John Kettler

[ April 08, 2008, 03:18 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[dieseltaylor]

Thanks JK - I will work my way through those links, of which over half are new to me.

Interestingly nobody mentions the downside of digging into a slope that you wish to climb : ) - so far that is.

In CMAK of course the removed hedges do not permit troops to scamper through or halftracks to drive through .... Definitely a bodgey job.

[JasonC]

The main way through was to blow the hedge with TNT stuffed into holes dug in the supporting berm. Plow anythings are a secondary method.

[dieseltaylor]

JasonC - theory fine, shortage of explosives was a concern. Also it did rather do away with the surprise element as you inserted your charges into the bank - well there could be a surprise stonk by the Germans.

I think it is covered in one of the sources above from JK.

Edit :

I might aswell quote Zaloga

The tactics worked, but the engineers decided that a charge double the size was really needed. Ploger began a more careful study of the problem. A tank company, penetrating one and a half miles through bocage country, would on average encounter 34 separate hedgerows. This would require 17 tons of explosive per company or about 60 tons per battalion. This was clearly beyond the resources of any engineer battalion.

A hedge every 75 metres.

Curiously if you multiply that out as 75*75 it gives you a field of slightly over an acre - 1.16 to be a tad more accurate.

[ April 08, 2008, 10:36 AM: Message edited by: dieseltaylor ]

[dieseltaylor]

I am carrying on a parallel discussion at Band of Brothers and someone quoted this:

The American troops who fought in Normandy will remember fighting in the hedgerows or bocage. Stock raising and fruit growing are the main rural activities in this part of Normandy, and the field system is characterized by a patchwork layout of irregular fields varying from narrow ribbon-like strips to squared-shapes. These range in size from 10 or 15 to a 100 acres or more. The majority however, ranged from 50 to 75 acres. Some contained orchards of apple trees, more are used for pasture, and there are occasional patches of grain.

Boundaries between the fields follow north-northeast to south-southwest and west-northwest to east-southeast axes in the Omaha region, and they could not be counted to provide a safe direction-line for keeping an axis of advance (www.army.mil.com). The hedgerows form a natural fence and vary in shapes. Some are low bushes, five to six feet high, growing from the ground level of the field and not hard to break through. Others are thick, densely matted walls of tough and briery hedge, running up to 10 feet in height and interspersed with large and small trees. Many hedge embankments are not passable for tanks. Communication between fields is usually limited to small openings at the corners. Narrow trails or sunken roads, running between parallel hedgerows give access to fields far off the regular road net (www.army.mil.com).

The important thing here is that apparently that most fields fell into the 50-75 acre size which given the 640 acres to the square mile sounds reasonable number of say 10 fields to the square mile.

It does not work so well if the contention of 500 fields to the square mile is also true. This would give an average figure of 1.6 acres to each field. For comparison apparently the modern English field averages 12 hectares or 30 acres and that is after 60 years of grubbing out hedges and mechanisation.

Therefore I have a suspicion that the the figures first quoted are wrong - or I am : )

One acre is equivalent to:

* 200 parked cars

* about a third of a football (soccer) field, which is between 90 and 120 m (100 and 130 yard) long and between 45 and 90 m (50 and 100 yard) wide (2.67 acres)

* three quarters of an American football field, which is 160 feet (48.5 m) wide and 360 feet (109.1 m) long (1.32 acres)

So the US football field seems right about mathematically averaged fields. Photo-recon photos do show a maze of fields and sizes in 1944 but unfortunately I do not have a scale to use on the photos.

Incidentally in March the IFAB:

Another decision at Gleneagles was to fix the size of a soccer field for men's international matches at 105 x 68 metres. Until now, football's law number 1 stated that the field could be between 100 and 110 metres long and 64 to 75 metres wide. The Welsh Football Association proposed the change, arguing that size variation was an advantage for home teams, who could alter the size of the field against what the visiting team was used to.

[Harry Yeide]

There are plenty of AARs that mention use of the hedgerow cutters, but except for those armored outfits that wound up in the hedgerow country around Brest, the "Culin phase" was pretty short. The best example of the cutter's use en masse was the "sortie" mounted on 26 July by the 2d Infantry Division with the 741st Tank Battalion and several cavalry units. The AAR reads:

With the new [Rhino] device, it was felt that the unit would be enabled to operate with more freedom, as the hedges were much less an obstacle than they had been before. . . .

The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after conferring with Lieutenant Colonel Skaggs, conceived a plan for the use of tanks in the next attack that would very nearly approximate the manner of using tanks in open country suited for tank combat. This plan, which came to be called a sortie, involved the maximum number of tanks, equipped with the Rhino device, that could be brought into position, allowing for the variation of the terrain. In most cases the full number of tanks could be used. The tanks would be placed in position at the line of departure and the infantry elements withdrawn several hundred yards in rear, for safety purposes. At H-hour a barrage of timed fire would be laid down over an area from 300 to 500 yards in depth past the [line of departure]. The tanks would advance rapidly under the airbursts, smashing hedges and uprooting enemy emplacements in the zone of action, at the same time placing a maximum amount of direct cannon and machine gun fire on the enemy. After breaking the enemy defenses the tanks would return to the line of departure, establish contact with supporting infantry, and resume the attack with the infantry-tank team.

On 26 July, 1944, at 0600, this battalion attacked in support of the 38th and 23d Infantry regiments, with the line of departure south of the St. Lo-Berigny road. . . .

The attack started on schedule and the tanks smashed through the hedges on the tank sortie. With their cannons blasting and machine guns stuttering, the tanks were an awe-inspiring spectacle as they churned their way through the enemy positions after a crashing barrage of timed fire. The enemy was obviously stunned by the ferocity of the attack, as not a single tank was lost on the initial sortie. Hundreds of German infantrymen were killed as they lay in their foxholes, and then ground under the tracks of the onrushing tanks. Machine gun emplacements were ripped out of the hedges by the impact of the Rhino devices, and the enemy lines, to a distance of 300 to 500 yards, were a shambles.

At H+20 [minutes] the tanks returned from the sortie, joined the infantry half of the team and resumed the onslaught at H+30.

[End quote]

The use of TNT versus cutters was more a matter of timing rather than primary versus secondary methods. The use of hedgerow cutters was banned until Operation Cobra. By that time, 60 percent of the tanks involved had been fitted with devices. Within days, most armored units had broken loose from the hedgerows.

[dieseltaylor]

Thanks Harry,

Where did that come from? My gut feeling is that this would have been light bocage rather than the anywhere else. So if I locat the sector ....

It seems to me the key was the selection of the terrain and the very important artillery bombardment to beat the Germans up prior to being stomped. A very cunning plan.

The Press claims for the plow[plough] do seem over the top. Certainly BF's interpretation seems bizarre and given its unsatisfactory implementation probably should have been left out of the game. Of course skilled designers have found away around it by avoiding tall hedges in later scenarios or using trees to even up the game.

[Mudhugger]

Another testimonial. This one from the 747th TB, which was with the 29th Infantry.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

No. 34 31 AUG 1944

"The rhino devices solved a tank problem in hedgerow country. The trouble with demolitions was that they gave away our positions and the infantry would receive mortar fire. With the rhino in use we need only one tank dozer per company, instead of one per platoon."--C0, 747th Tank Battalion.

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Thanks Harry,

Where did that come from? My gut feeling is that this would have been light bocage rather than the anywhere else. So if I locat the sector ....

It seems to me the key was the selection of the terrain and the very important artillery bombardment to beat the Germans up prior to being stomped. A very cunning plan.

The Press claims for the plow[plough] do seem over the top. Certainly BF's interpretation seems bizarre and given its unsatisfactory implementation probably should have been left out of the game. Of course skilled designers have found away around it by avoiding tall hedges in later scenarios or using trees to even up the game.

The account is from the 741st TB's AAR. The 2d Infantry Division formed part of V Corps and attacked through heavy bocage east of the main VII Corps attack. The end of the story was that the sortie worked great, but the division soon enough ran into heavy German resistance. Planners had not taken into account that the Germans typically held most of their infantry strength back at an MLR hundreds of yards to the rear of the first line of defense.

[Harry Yeide]

Oops! Double post.

[dieseltaylor]

Thanks again Harry

So the victory reported was against a German screening force. Its funny how leaving out bits can so alter the importance of a story. Not suggesting you were being selective as you were quoting what was writ but that accounts in general do not always give the fullest picture.

BTW I do think the stonk and advance was clever - having thought further the absence of infantry and the introduction of German mines may have made it a not so good idea - subject of course to the artillery barrage not being heavy enough to detonate sufficient.

BTW do you agree with my field sizes work?

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

You're welcome!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Steve McClaire]

There seem to be two things you're trying to disprove:

1) That US armor employed improvised attachments to crash through hedgerows.

2) That CMs modelling of this is accurate.

I don't think you're going to get much argument that CMs bocage model is lacking, including vehicles crossing bocage.

But there seems to be a reasonable amount of evidence that US tanks, on at least company scale, really did employ improvised 'cutters' to crash through hedgerows.

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

BTW do you agree with my field sizes work?

Go to the public folder at my website (http://homepage.mac.com/yeide/Menu2.html) and look at the file Hill192TerrainStudy.jpg. There's some real bocage for you to mull.

[dieseltaylor]

Steve

a] I have no doubt they were used and in certain areas would have been very effective. My problem is I suppose the common view that they were THE battle winning invention. Over-hyped I suppose is what I mean. : )

Also the fact there is bocage and serious bocage with no distinction made for the difficulties of the two. Unless one has seen firsthand the ten foot embankments with all the gubbins growing in there and simply think of a hedge as something people grow to separate their garden from neighbours you cannot appreciate the scale.

b] CM's attempt sort of adds salt to the wound. If a "realistic" game gives that kind of tank power then the story is even more exaggerated.

Given how much play is made of tanks being able to ride-up hedges but not wishing to expose the belly armour it was denying the Germans the tactical choice whether to risk it that made it all a mockery.

**

Harry - thanks enormously for the map. I am not quite sure what the grid scale is and whether the contour lines are French derived and in metres rather than feet. I assume all the little measure marks are the actual hedge heights in feet ..?

Ranging from the solitary 5' to about 18' therefore

Great map.

I am sure there were no large fields there : ) With scale I can calculate a few but await your confirmation as what WW2 scale they were using. Is it an annotated French map worked over ...

Super stuff though and I am very impressed with the MAC set-up also. Very slick.

[Harry Yeide]

The scale is 1:10000. Sorry, I though that was on the map. I'm fairly sure elevation is in meters, and the areas marked with feet are gates through the hedgerows, not the height of the hedgerow.

[dieseltaylor]

Doh! Gates.Now you mention it it does seem more obvious. I hope you got the Google map. I have calculated the big trapezoidal wood with sides of 400,446,467,and 477 metres.

A smallish field 46*110 metres

[Melnibone]

Some nice bocage aerial shots from 1948 here:

http://www.normandybattlefields.com/battle_sites.htm

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

Here's some more tactical stuff regarding lessons learned in Normandy.

http://www.lonesentry.com/normandy_lessons/index.html

Regards,

John Kettler