Role of Company H.Q.

[JasonC]

I am surprised at your lack of reading comprehension Michael. I was clearly making a distinction between the majors and colonels on the one hand, and the 1st lieutenants and captains on the other. The former are in HQs and on the radio, coordinating map movements. The latter are out leading small bodies of troops, personally intervening in the tactical action. You respond to my post saying so and quoting examples of the second, as though I was saying majors and colonels are out leading small bodies of troops in tactical combat. Which is the exact opposite of what I said officers of those ranks were doing.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I am surprised at your lack of reading comprehension Michael.

Interestingly(?) enough, I am not all surprised at yours.

Regards,

[Salkin]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

I am surprised at your lack of reading comprehension Michael.

Interestingly(?) enough, I am not all surprised at yours.

Regards, </font>

[Airborne]

yeah, Grog fight. Sigh. Anyways, here is something to lighten you up. Taken from "An Army at Dawn" by Atkinson.

In a phone call one evening the corps commander (Patton) grew incensed when Ward (CO 1st Armored) mentioned his good fortune in losing no officers in combat that day. "Goddammit, Ward, that's not fortunate. That's bad for the morale of the enlisted men," Patton snapped. "I want you to get more officers killed." Ward was dumbfounded. "Are you serious?" "Yes Goddammit, I'm serious. I want you to put some officers out as observers well up front and keep them there until a couple get killed."

BTW, this is an awesome book. Thanks to Grog Dorosh for turning me on to this gem.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Airborne:

yeah, Grog fight. Sigh. Anyways, here is something to lighten you up. Taken from "An Army at Dawn" by Atkinson.

In a phone call one evening the corps commander (Patton) grew incensed when Ward (CO 1st Armored) mentioned his good fortune in losing no officers in combat that day. "Goddammit, Ward, that's not fortunate. That's bad for the morale of the enlisted men," Patton snapped. "I want you to get more officers killed." Ward was dumbfounded. "Are you serious?" "Yes Goddammit, I'm serious. I want you to put some officers out as observers well up front and keep them there until a couple get killed."

BTW, this is an awesome book. Thanks to Grog Dorosh for turning me on to this gem.

I actually got tired of seeing everyone else on this forum singing its praises while I sat in the wings! Andreas mentioned it; I am sure JasonC has at least read it. Would be interested in his take on the book, honestly, as I don't have a detailed knowledge of most of what Atkinson discusses. I love the book on the face of it but wonder how accurate the research was, or how well his grasp of the big issues was.

However accurate it was, the prose was terrific and I literally couldn't put the book down. Very exciting and entertaining to read.

Funny, I was just discussing Patton on a 101st Airborne forum....hmm, that quote was something I mentioned also without knowing when he said it or to whom. Interesting monicker you have there, too....

[gunnergoz]

I have to say, whatever may be the case of company commanders in real life, my use of them in CM is to lead the leaderless...typically observe for massed mortars, or lead separate ATG or MG groups a bit behind the lines, or to support one flank or the other with AT guns, a detached HMG, whatever, etc. Good leader units are valuable in the trenches all right, but somehow I resist putting the old C.O. right on the front line if I can avoid it...just don't like losing the Old Man, if you can imagine that! Talk about "projection"...

[JasonC]

Purely factual statement, what has your shorts in a knot? I said majors and colonels aren't in combat they are coordinating from the rear, while 1st lieus and captains are in combat. You quote me saying the majors and colonels *aren't* in combat, and say "And this is simulated in CM by having them blaze away with machine pistols". Specifically of majors and colonels. How is that a fair reading of what I said?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Purely factual statement, what has your shorts in a knot? I said majors and colonels aren't in combat they are coordinating from the rear, while 1st lieus and captains are in combat. You quote me saying the majors and colonels *aren't* in combat, and say "And this is simulated in CM by having them blaze away with machine pistols". Specifically of majors and colonels. How is that a fair reading of what I said?

I don't know, I barely read it.

I think my point was that you are correct about officers being up front leading, however, my point was that they get (or can get) (effectively) involved in firefights in CM far more than they would for **real**. Your post didn't seem to address this. I didn't say (or mean to say) that company commanders don't have anything to do in a battle, my point was (and is) that they probably don't spend a lot of time contributing firepower (along with a 6 or 10 man staff, as portrayed in CM) to firefights as we do (or can do).

Anyway, I was going to post in the GF - still can, I suppose - was interested in your reaction to Atkinson's book from the persepective of someone with an intimate knowledge of the US Army. Does Atkinson make a creditable show of knowledge with regards to the US performance in Africa, and the reasons for?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

In the German rifle company, the Haupfeldwebel (company first sergeant or senior NCO of the company) was expected to take over a platoon where necessary.

In the American army, the company exec's slot calls for a 1st. lieutenant and he must be prepared to take over either a platoon or the company at need.

Michael

[ January 28, 2004, 01:45 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

In the German rifle company, the Haupfeldwebel (company first sergeant or senior NCO of the company) was expected to take over a platoon where necessary.

In the American army, the company exec's slot calls for a 1st. lieutenant and he must be prepared to take over either a platoon or the company at need.

Michael </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...I don't have a detailed knowledge of most of what Atkinson discusses. I love the book on the face of it but wonder how accurate the research was, or how well his grasp of the big issues was.

My own opinion is that the "big picture" is where Atkinson is weakest, but that it's not much of a weakness. I don't recall him writing anything that was seriously way off, and there are plenty of books around that dwell on the big picture at great length. I think Atkinson set out to write about the campaign on more of a day-to-day and soldier-to-soldier (or at least unit-by-unit) basis.

His overall point is that the US Army in 1942 was still dreadfully ill-prepared to fight the kind of war it was faced with, but that it learned in record time and had its house pretty well squared away by Sicily and kept learning after that. It will be interesting to see his next book (which is due out this year I believe), set in Italy. For sure, the Army (and especially its generals) continued to make mistakes and was still learning when the war ended, but few armies ever came so far so fast.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

but few armies ever came so far so fast.

Michael

I can think of one....

Thanks for the scooooop.

[CMplayer]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

In the American army, the company exec's slot calls for a 1st. lieutenant and he must be prepared to take over either a platoon or the company at need.

Wouldn't it make sense, then, for the company HQ to be divided into two groups so that the CO and the exec can't both be taken out by the lucky mortar round?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

In the American army, the company exec's slot calls for a 1st. lieutenant and he must be prepared to take over either a platoon or the company at need.

Wouldn't it make sense, then, for the company HQ to be divided into two groups so that the CO and the exec can't both be taken out by the lucky mortar round? </font>

[Kitty]

Originally posted by Airborne:

Taken from "An Army at Dawn" by Atkinson.

I have that book too. =)

Kitty

[xerxes]

I confess.

I've used no bonus Company HQs as throw away scouts and as the "tip of the spear" in an assault on a heavily protected position. Hey, if they're terrible commanders they can still contribute to the victory.

[Conscript Bagger]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

In the American army, the company exec's slot calls for a 1st. lieutenant and he must be prepared to take over either a platoon or the company at need.

Wouldn't it make sense, then, for the company HQ to be divided into two groups so that the CO and the exec can't both be taken out by the lucky mortar round? </font>

[JasonC]

You should never waste company HQs, even if they have low bonuses. When they have high bonuses you should give them their own platoon, or even half a company (for a +2 command leader with other things too) - the entire main body of that company. Assign the worst platoon leaders to mortar spotting duty and the like. If the company HQ is bad, give it that role, and it will also rally stragglers.

Higher level HQs are what give your overall force tasking flexibility. Keeping everyone with just their assigned platoon HQs is a tactical straight-jacket. They aren't half as effective that way as they can be properly "tasked" for their specific mission, using a company HQ to shift forces with each on the fly, and the like.

[JasonC]

As for an Army at Dawn, it is an enjoyable book overall, and a useful one. It does have a few weaknesses, including apologetics in places (detectable pro-US bias, I mean - mild but clearly present). The most debatable stuff in it isn't about the Americans but about Rommel and his handling of the whole Kasserine attack.

I'd describe it as a "bipolar" account. Rommel is a genius and the hapless Americans have no idea what is coming for them. But he is a tired genius whose blood has to be up or he just gets depressed. (These psychological great man theory of history explanations are completely unconvincing in this particular context. Rommel is obviously acting on military assessments not his emotions). The overall attack is great because it employs maneuver against plodding Americans, who don't. But it fails because it neglects the principle of concentration of force, pursuing too many scattered objectives after the first break in. The Americans lose initially because they are deployed with criminal idiocy and their equipment is hopelessly outclassed and their corps commander is having a nervous breakdown. But the Germans are eventually stopped because they walk straight into massed artillery fire which shreds them without effort.

He can't make up his mind on any of these points. He doesn't really diagnose each tactical success or failure. He gives you enough information about each aspect of the affair, and throws out enough contrary opinions, that you can think it through yourself in an informed manner. But he does not provide anything like masterly judgment of the campaign, explaining why events played out as they did and what the lessons from it actually were. Not because he doesn't try, but because his efforts in that direction are incoherent.

The narrative is also strongest on the period up to the British turning of the Mareth line in the south and the US attacks around El Guttar. After that it is prefunctory. The careful hill fighting needed to reach Bizerte is not well covered (there is a US army operational history on that) and the breakthrough isn't either. The collapse is an event that requires real explanation, given how many Axis troops were left in the country. He doesn't really give one, just presents it as an inevitable crumbling once the Allies win a few engagements.

The heart of the book is however the Kasserine narrative, and the aftermath counterpoint of El Guttar. The former is supposed to show an inept green army, the latter a force that has learned to fight the Germans and apply its material strength. That much is uncontroversial. The interesting historical questions are what that greenness consisted of and what exactly was learned - and what the Germans knew or didn't know themselves, and its relation to such lessons. And there he is "bipolar", and we have to judge the events he describes ourselves.

What critical elements does he show? On the German side, divided command and lack of operational focus. The former is a real failing certainly. He does not seem to notice, however, that the latter is part and parcel of "vulnerability pull" in the driver's seat. Maneuverist attack - particularly the German doctrine of envelopment before annihilation battle - does not make one plan and force it through whatever the enemy does, however he is positioned. It strikes at gaps that are by definition up to the defender to leave.

The initial German breakthrough used this with complete success. He blames the US deployment, infantry too far apart on widely separated hills. Less remarked is why there wasn't enough gun firepower up there to interfer with German flanking movements around the high ground.

Then doctrinally the way to meet that is with a mobile reserve counterattack. Which is duly delivered, and reduced to shambles almost instantly. He doesn't really investigate why. He presents it as a technical superiority matter, getting a chance to comment on the respective MVs of US and German 75s.

It is hardly a real explanation. The US column involved had an entire battalion of Shermans, plus Priests. Forces like it later in the war (e.g. Lorraine) accomplished things like destroying whole Panzer brigades in a day - with guns no better, and against mixed Panthers and Pz IVs let alone mixed IVs and long IIIs.

The likely answer is that the US armor was incredibly green and did not use what cover there was, or that it advanced well into the German lethal fire zone despite the lack of such cover. It reads like a US "Knightsbridge". But he doesn't really explain why - he is sympathetic to the US armor formations throughout the narrative. The reason certainly wasn't any masterful envelopment stuff - the Germans had bagged 2 infantry battalions but the armor came straight at them with solid rear and no threats to its flanks.

Then comes Kasserine proper. Envelopment isn't the story anymore. He continues to lean on technical explanations somewhat when simple green fear is clearly the dominant one (he does admit this), with fog also very important. See, it needs explanation that the Germans succeeded easily and almost costlessly at Kasserine proper, while failing expensively a few days later when attacking defended ridges frontally. The later cases show it was not any great tactical virtuousity on the part of the Germans that did it. They didn't have any.

Then comes exploiting it and division of effort. I think it is a fair criticism to some extent. But Rommel clearly wanted results like the first day or two, not frontal bludgeoning into the next line of US positions. And you can only get that by sending some guys to go around. I mean, if the initial flankers on the first day had run into MLRs they would have looked like they were dividing their efforts, too. What happens is all the prongs run into something, none is left free to turn behind the guys blocking a different prong.

Which sort of shows there wasn't really a "breakthrough", while Rommel's decisions were clearly based on thinking there had been. After you go through the line you expect scattered enemies, not strong MLRs in every direction you send a column. But that is what happened. The German prongs each run into strong enemies who don't run away this time. Also, no fog. The German go in frontally - tactically dumb - and get plastered by gun lines and especially by US arty. Leaving the question - where was US arty earlier, or why did it suddenly get strong?

Which I think is really an organizational issue. The guns were wielded effectively in the positions beyond Kasserine, and later at El Guttar. They weren't earlier. I suggest part of the reason is that armor force guys at a quite low level were directing the battle before - often micromanaged by the corps leader, ordering around every task force let alone every combat team. They weren't thinking in terms of winning the soft firepower HE war, as a way of stopping the German armor as well (by stripping it, as well as damaging tanks).

Rommel would have had a significant operational victory if he had stopped earlier. Atkinson thinks it would only have been a success if he'd gone whole hog for the dumps. I have my doubts about that working, even with unity of command and an operational focus on it from the outset. If they run into an MLR with its arty act together, more won't break through. It'd just get stopped in one place instead of two, with just as bloody a nose.

The right way to use more armor against such an MLR is to flank the position with half the armor - and that is what Rommel was trying to do. That something fails operationally does not mean it was an operational mistake. There is no question attacking such MLRs frontally as they did was a tactical mistake. But when they attacked frontally at Kasserine the defenders were so scared they just bugged out, and it worked. They thought the same might happen again. Without fog though, it didn't.

Atkinson wants to present the whole lesson as Rommel not being sufficiently bold - or to excuse him, sufficiently backed by the rest of the German divided command - and the Americans eventually learning to concentrate armor against them. It is an unconvincing pair of maneuverist piety arguments. Strong counterattack by a serious body of armor failed miserably on day two. Rommel's division of effort is synonymous with trying to turn flanks.

The first position did fall because it was turned (maneuver theory correct), armor counterattacking did not work while guns (green tankers can't impliment the stock maneuverist counter) defending a prepared (and unturned) MLR did (firepower kills) - at least when there wasn't any fog and resulting panic (a green wildcard - fog in Lorraine helped level the field between US tanks and Germans - at Kasserine it let the Germans get through US arty and the rest bolted instead).

Anyway, some good issues are raised by the book but not really answered by it. It is definitely worth reading. But keep in mind that the author has a clear pro US and pro armored branch of service bias. These don't make him wrong, they just mean he has an opinion. On Kasserine, I think he has too many of them and they don't "jive", but that is an opinion of my own. I hope this is interesting.

[Los]

Well I guess there's no reason to read the book now since you posted the whole damn thing here...

Los

:cool:

[Kitty]

Originally posted by Los:

Well I guess there's no reason to read the book now since you posted the whole damn thing here...

Los

:cool:

There's still 541 more pages.

Kitty

[gunnergoz]

Ok, Ok, so now I'm going to have to go out and buy the damn thing so I know what you people are talking about. Is it out in trade paper yet?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by gunnergoz:

Ok, Ok, so now I'm going to have to go out and buy the damn thing so I know what you people are talking about. Is it out in trade paper yet?

Yes, and it's highly recommended.

[Michael Emrys]

Michael, on the recommendation of several people here, I am presently reading and enjoying Ken Tout's Tank. What I am wondering is whether anyone ever did a CMBO scenario on the battle around Robertsmil that he describes? This is the one where Wittman bought it, and I think someone did cover that part of it, but I am wondering about the rest of the battle. If not, it would offer interesting possibilities for a CMAK scenario.

Michael

[JonS]

Michael E.,

yes they did, and it's a goody. It's called August Bank Holiday, and is available from the depot.

Jon