Fall of Tobruk 1942 and South African Major-General Klopper’s role

[WineCape]

Found this in the South African archives, written/edited by Brigadier Peter Young:

In 1941 the Australians had held Tobruk for 9 months, until Rommel’s withdrawal to the west. That winter the Middle East Command in Cairo had decided that without naval support it would be impossible for the Tobruk fortress ever to be held in isolation. London had been informed and had – they thought – agreed, but on 15 June 1942 Auchinleck received a telegram from the Prime Minister, “Leave as many troops in Tobruk as are necessary to hold the place for certain.” At length a compromise was reached. Tobruk was to be “temporarily” invested while a new strike force was built up near the frontier.

The main part of the garrison was to be formed by the 1st South African Division with General Klopper – a major general of 1 month’s standing – named commander of the stronghold. The port’s physical defenses, while not in good shape, were hardly weaker than they had been in April 1941. The barbed wire, tank traps and well-placed gun emplacements were still there. Equipment was, if anything, a bit better. There were 2 partial medium-artillery regiments and the garrison was strong in field artillery. Although there were no anti-tank regiments, there were about 70 anti-tank guns, including 18 6-pounders as well as 18 37mm anti-aircraft guns and a number of Bofors plus about 55 tanks. The strength of the garrison was about the same, some 35,000 men. There was important difference, and it was one which Klopper, none too sure of himself or his position, was ill-equipped to deal with: this time the defending troops were exhausted, their morale was lower, and the camp was filled with a feeling of insecurity and impermanence.

As Tobruk prepared for battle the South Africans took up their positions along the northern, western and southern perimeter from the sea to the El Adem road. East from there were the 2nd Camerons, 2/5th Mahrattas and the 2/7th Gurkas. Near the Palestrino ridge in the centre were the 201st Brigade HQ’s, the 3rd Coldstream and the Sherwood Foresters. Meanwhile, the rest of the Eight Army made their way towards the defenses at the Egyptian frontier.

As usual, Rommel had devised a ruse for capturing Tobruk. Only his infantry approached the western perimeter, while his mobile forces swept on past, to give the impression that he was heading straight for the border as he had done the year before - and sending messages in clear to reinforce the illusion. Just before Bardia he and the 90th Light Division turned back to join the Afrika Korps assault divisions and the XX Italian Motorized Corps, who had been waiting southeast of the city. He was using the plan he had intended for 23 November 1941.

Rommel’s zero hour was 05h20 on 20 June 1942. As the first rays of sunlight began to creep over the desert the long black lines of tanks, trucks and infantry slowly started to move forward. As it grew louder small black dots appeared on the horizon, which, as they drew nearer, resolved themselves into waves of Stukas and Ju 88’s. Every airworthy Axis plane in North Africa had been pressed into service for the battle. As the heavy artillery began to fire, the planes released their bombs and quickly got out of the way for the next wave, operating a shuttle service between the defense perimeter and El Adem airfield, 10 miles away. They pounded a gap open 600 yards wide. Behind them, under cover of artillery barrage and half-hidden by smoke and dust, German and Italian sappers raced forward to lift mines and bridge the tank traps with tanks and infantry racing through the gaps. As they move forward, they lit green, red and purple flares and the Stukas dropped their bombs just ahead of the advancing, multi-coloured smoke screen while the other planes and artillery blasted the enemy’s rear with shells and bombs.

The timing of the entire operation was perfect. Panzer Army Afrika might well have been on maneuvers. The first shock troops broke into the fortress from the southeast. A second group breached the defences in the south, along the El Adem road, soon after. As tanks poured into the city they fanned out and headed for the harbor, while parachutists were dropped behind enemy lines to disorganized the defences and protect the supply dumps from demolition.

Inside Tobruk the situation was chaotic. General Klopper – his HQ’s bombed out, his radio and telephone wrecked and his code booked destroyed, lost the last vestige of control. Disconsolately he and his staff watched the Panzers race past their HQ’s on their way to capture the fuel dumps in the harbor. Some British troops broke out to the east. Others fought grimly on, while still others, like the South Africans in the west and southwest, hardly realized anything was happening until the 90th Light came up on their rear.

By dawn 21 June Tobruk was a pile of ruins. The streets were a maze of rubble and in the harbor the masts and funnels of sunken ships rose pathetically from the water. General Klopper have his compass and staff car to 7 young men from South African 6th Brigade who were determined to escape, saying, ”I wish I was coming with you.”

A few hours later a small part of officers set off in a truck, a little white flag fluttering over the hood, and at 09h40 on Via Balbo Klopper officially turned the city over to Rommel. Soon after, a large white flag was hoisted over 6th Brigade HQ’s by South African native drivers.

The signal to surrender created even more confusion. Some units never got it. Others, like the 3rd Coldstream, decided to ignore it and try to escape. The Cameron Highlanders, along with remnants of some of the Indian brigades, held out for more than 24 hours – surrendering only after being told that if they did not the Germans would concentrate every piece of artillery in Tobruk on their position. Finally giving in, they marched down to the prisoners of war cage in parade formation, with the pipes skirling “The March of the Cameron Men.” As they approached every man along the way - prisoner and German sentry alike - snapped to attention.

After 2 years in British hands Tobruk had fallen in 2 days – and despite Rommel’s anger at the extend of the destruction effected by British demolition squads on vehicle parks and fuel dumps, he still had captured enough o carry him on his drive to Egypt. The fall of Tobruk came as a shattering blow to the British public (as Churchill had known it would), as well as to the Australians and South Africans. General Klopper came in for most of the criticism, but he was not entirely to blame. The decision to invest in Tobruk at all had been, in General Bayerlein’s phrase, ”a fatal decision.”

Though a more experienced general might have made more progress toward pulling the garrison into shape in time, there was also confusion among the British High Command. For example, Auchinleck realized full well that Rommel was almost certain to stick to his original plan to attack from the southeast. When Ritchie flew into Tobruk on 16 June 1942 to confer with the defenders, he warned Klopper to pay special attention to the western perimeter.

On 22 June Rommel received a message from the Fuhrer informing him that at the age 49 he had just been appointed Germany’s youngest Field Marshal. Rommel celebrated that night with canned pineapple and a small glass of whisky, but after dinner he wrote his wife, ”Hitler has made me a Field Marshal. I would much rather he had given me one more division.”

True to his cardinal rule – he never give the enemy breathing space – he did not celebrate long. The next day his Order of the Day read: ”Soldiers of the Panzer Army Africa! Now we must utterly destroy the enemy! During the coming days I shall be making great demands upon you once more, so that we may reach our goal.” The Nile.

He would never get there. Hitler, by discontinuing the attack on Malta and refusing to send Rommel adequate supplies, would make defeat in the desert inevitable. Later, the Field Marshal would find himself presiding over another fiasco - the defence of Normandy – and still later would come involvement in the plot against Hitler and, eventually, forced suicide.

All this was in the future; in June 1942 the Desert Fox was as he is still remembered - dashing, resourceful and brave, racing across the desert with tanks of the Afrika Korps, heading to the pyramids of Egypt…

Sincerely,

Charl Theron

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[ October 15, 2003, 02:51 PM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[WineCape]

Does anyone have more specifics/concrete material on the role of unfortunate Major-General Klopper's involvement in the fall of Tobruk in 1942?

Much obliged in advance.

[JonS]

Parachutists? For real?

BTW, thanks for that WC.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by WineCape:

Found this in the South African archives, written/edited by Brigadier Peter Young:

General Klopper have his compass and staff car to 7 young men from South African 6th Brigade who were determined to escape, saying, ”I wish I was coming with you.”

Did they make it?

Hmm, see my comments on Roy Farran in the earlier thread - Peter Young was also a commando - not so sure they make great historians!

Ask Andy McNabb.

[Kingfish]

The main part of the garrison was to be formed by the 1st South African Division with General Klopper – a major general of 1 month’s standing – named commander of the stronghold.

This site shows the 2nd SA div, not the 1st, as being the main unit at Tobruk in '42. IIRC, the 1st was at Gazala, but managed to retreat back into Egypt following the British defeat

2nd South African Division

[JasonC]

Um, how is it supposedly the fault of the troops manning the west side of the perimeter if the break in occurred on the southeast side?

Something here does not add up. Just because he was the highest ranking guy inside, and surrendered after the fall of the city was already inevitable, he gets the historian's hemlock?

Who was in charge in the sector of the breakthrough?

[JonS]

Klopper was.

[JasonC]

And the formation? Its weaponry? Etc...

[von Lucke]

The size of the garrison in '42 was about the same as in '41. Gott himself had inspected the defenses under Klopper, and had given his approval to the dispositions --- matter o' fact, Gott had wanted to stay in Tobruk and lead the defense himself, but Ritchie insisted he (Gott) leave to organize the frontier defenses. (Which, given how things turned out, was prolly a good thing).

Probably the biggest difference between the SA defenders of '42 and the Aussies of '41, was the lack of a central command structure to coordinate all the defenders artillery assests into one grand battery (something that had saved the Aussies more than once), or to rapidly coordinate counter-attacks from one sector to the next. I suppose this could be squarely laid on Klopper, since he seems to have taken a strangely passive stance once the attack started --- failing to shift assets where they were needed. But, to be fair, the structure developed in '41 had been set in place by HQ Western Desert Force --- and Morshead had insisted they stay until his defenses were coordinated like a well-oiled machine. The defense in '42 was a last minute affair all around.

Tobruk itself was no longer the fortress it had been in '41: After the first siege, it had been decided that Tobruk was not to be defended (in the event, Churchill suffered a convenient memory loss about that), and most of the mines had been removed from the perimeter for use in the Gazala line; the wire had fallen into disrepair, the anti-tank ditch was broken down in many places, and the field defenses had silted up. The defenders were only given a week to put all this right before Rommel attacked!

201st Guards and the 11th Indian Brigades were prolly equal to the veterans of the Afrika Korps --- but not when out-numbered 6-1, with no CAP, limited AT capability, and inadequate arty support. The green 2nd SA Division probably never had a chance.

The second Auchinleck caved in to Churchill and ordered Ritchie to hold Tobruk, it was over for the poor sods left to hold it. No comfort for them, that the fall of Tobruk pissed off the House of Commons enough to censure Chruchill with a No Confidence vote over his conduct of the war.

[WineCape]

Kingfish,

Yes, it should read 2nd SA Division. Typo in the article - I copied it verbatim - as the accompanying map of Tobruk and perimeter defence shows in fact the 2nd Division as Divisional HQ’s, commanded by Klopper.

The map shows that the Trieste and Ariete Divisions were repelled by the 2nd Cameron Highlanders in the southeast on the morning of the attack, 20 June 1942. But on their left flank, the 2/5 Mahrattas faced the brunt of the 2 DAK Pz. Divisions, the 15 and 21, where the breached occurred. Behind the perimeter and the Mahrattans were the 11 Indian Infantry Bde, flanked on their right by the 1 Forresters, the 201 Gds Brigade (with Bde HQ’s) and the 3rd Coldstream Gds.

It also shows that the western and southern perimeter defended respectively by the 6 SA Bde, the Umvoti Motorised Rifles on their left flank and the 4th SA Bde in the south, further subdivided as “Blake Group”, “Kaffrarian Rifles” and “Beer Group,” the latter anchoring the right flank of the 2 Cameron Highlanders.

Though a more experienced general might have made more progress toward pulling the garrison into shape in time, there was also confusion among the British High Command. For example, Auchinleck realized full well that Rommel was almost certain to stick to his original plan to attack from the southeast. When Ritchie flew into Tobruk on 16 June 1942 to confer with the defenders, he warned Klopper to pay special attention to the western perimeter.

Does the bold above imply that the western perimeter was re-enforced at the cost of the southern/southeastern perimeter where the breach was established by DAK?

[WineCape]

Found on the net this:

June 21st, 1942...Early in the morning, Maj. Gen. Klopper, CO of 2 South African Division in Tobruk, signals Egypt,

"Am sending mobile troops out tonight. Not possible to hold out tomorrow. Mobile troops nearly nought. Enemy captured vehicles. Will resist to last man and round."

8th Army commander Gen. Neil Ritchie signals back,

"Every day and hour of resistance materially assists our cause. I cannot tell tactical situation and must therefore leave you to act on your own judgment regarding capitulation."

Klopper signals:

"Situation shambles. Terrible casualties would result. Am doing the worst. Petrol destroyed."

Ritchie:

"Whole of 8th Army has watched with admiration your gallant fight. You are an example to us all and I know South Africa will be proud of you. God bless you and may fortune favour your efforts wherever you be."

In a last effort, gallant attempts are made to destroy stores stockpiled in Tobruk. Troops smash petrol drums and let fluid soak into the sand until the gasoline rots their boots and the fumes overcome them. Men hurl armored cars over cliffs into the sea.

At 5 a.m., Rommel drives into town: "Practically every building of the dismal place was either flat or little more than a heap of rubble, mostly the result of our siege of 1941. Next I drove off along the Coast Road to the west. The staff of 32 British Army Tank Brigade offered to surrender, which brought us 30 serviceable tanks. Vehicles stood inflames on either side of the Via Balbia. Wherever one looked there was chaos and destruction."

At 6:30 a.m., Klopper sends out parlementaires under a white flag to offer to surrender. As a white flag goes up over 6 Brigade HQ, the South African MPs give a moan that is a combination of anguish and misery.

At 9:40 a.m., Rommel meets Klopper, who announces the capitulation. Rommel tells Klopper to follow him in his own car back to Tobruk, driving past Afrika Korps vehicles and thousands of South African and British PoWs. At the Hotel Tobruk (still miraculously standing) the two generals work out the surrender.

Rommel tells Klopper to make himself and his officers responsible for order among the PoWs, and organize their maintenance from captured stores. However, as Rommel is angry at the South African efforts to destroy the fuel, he won't let the PoWs change their clothes until his tanks have left Tobruk.

Klopper sends out officers to tell his scattered positions to give up. The 2/7th Gurkha Rifles and 2nd Cameron Highlanders are among the last to surrender, doing so around dusk.

Small parties make their way to safety. Maj. Sainthill of the Coldstream Guards leads 387 men to Allied lines. But 33,000 men face PoW cages, 19,000 Britons, 9,000 white South Africans,

the rest Indian and African native.

Rommel also captures 2,000 tons of petrol, 5,000 more of provisions, abundant quantities of ammunition (including German and Italian types), and almost 2,000 serviceable vehicles. He also gains an important (if damaged) port, and a water-filtration plant. These supplies are enough to fuel Rommel's continued drive to Egypt.

The 8th Army has been outgeneralled, outmaneuvered, and outfought. Its tired veterans and brash newcomers have failed to learn tactical lessons. British tank officers still make cavalry-

style charges while German tanks concentrate and wait behind an artillery screen until the coup de grace.

The Afrika Korps raid the British supply dumps, spurning their "Alte Mann" -- Italian sausage, labelled A.M. -- in favor of British beer, South African pineapples, Australian bully beef, Irish potatoes, and American cigarettes. German troops swap out their worn clothing with superior British khaki.

Rommel reports laconically, "Fortress Tobruk has

capitulated. All units will reassemble and prepare for further advances." His German casualties since May 26 are 3,360, about 15 percent of the Afrika Korps' strength. Italian losses are somewhat less. However, the Afrika Korps has lost 300 officers, a drain on its leadership cadre.

[ October 19, 2003, 07:46 AM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[von Lucke]

Ritchie's supposed cautioning to "pay special attention to the western perimeter" seems belied by the dispositions of the defenders: The most experienced Commonwealth units were deployed to the SE (where the main attack fell), while the least experienced (2nd SA) were deployed to the west. Seems like somebody (Gott?) was expecting Rommel to repeat his 1941 attack plan.

There's also this communique from Ritchie to Auchinleck (0100 hrs, 20 June):

"There have been no signs today of any effort except with small recce detachments to press eastwards towards the frontier. I feel that having removed our air threat from Gambut group of aerodromes he is likely to turn his main attention on Tobruk..."

The Germans would begin the assault at 0520.

As for the Mahratta battalion facing the full brunt of the 15th / 21st Panzer alone, it should be mentioned that previous to that, they had also been pounded for almost 3 straight hours by every gun and aircraft that the Axis forces could muster. Any wonder they didn't put up much of a fight?

Once the Germans began to exploit their breakthrough, von Mellenthin (Panzer Battles) indicates the German surprise at the weakness of the SA artillery response --- and an even greater surprise at the piece-meal counter-attacks by 32nd Tank Bde and 201st Guards Bde.

Like I mentioned before, a more centralized command that had the defenders working as a unit, instead of individual brigades, was what was required.

[ October 16, 2003, 12:49 PM: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

[JasonC]

So, in answer to my question, it was an Indian battalion that folded, and its Indian brigade backstop failed as well. The headline "role of the SAs" was that they held a sector of the perimeter that wasn't attacked, were not engaged as a result, and watched the line crumble to their left, and then were taken in the rear.

As for why arty was elsewhere, obviously the Italian attack from the southeast, stopped, was considered the main effort. Contrary to the original posting, there was 1 break in not 2. The first attempt just "soaked off" arty and reserves and command attention. The second hit not SAs but Indians and broke through.

Here is another site's description of the breakthrough fighting itself, and what was actually faced, in what order -

The combined weight of the artillery and bombing was terrific, and as we soon realized, had a crushing effect on the morale of the Mahratta battalion in that sector," writes Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthin...By 6:30 a.m., the 2/5th Mahrattas have collapsed at Strong Point 69. At 7:45, 10

strongpoints have fallen, and tanks can cross the anti-tank ditch. ***The defenders cannot fire out of the Italian-built concrete shelters, and can only huddle under the bombing***.

By 8:30, 21st Panzers tanks are into the bridgehead (notice - not leading), joined by 15th Panzer soon after...The 2nd Camerons and Gurkhas counterattack, but it's not enough.

At 11 a.m., the Germans are at the inner minefield, where they meet Matilda tanks with heavy armor and tiny 2-lbr. (40 mm) guns. The Germans open fire, and the British crews abandon their tanks and flee.

At noon, 21st Panzer runs into 30 25-lbr. guns drawn up in defense in a wide fan. The panzers slow down, reload with high explosives, and attack, shelling the guns until each crew is dead

or wounded. By 12:30, the gunline is chased away.

Analysis - no vehicles are across the anti tank ditch ahead of the position until 8:30. The Indian infantry under bombardment did not really defend at all. They went into their shelters and remained there. The German difficulty was probably from obstacles and arty mostly. It was enough to slow them down for hours. Meanwhile the Italians are hitting the SE.

The backstop formations of the Indian brigade attempt to plug the gap, but they are infantry going into an artillery cauldron against tanks. It nevertheless takes the Germans 2 1/2 hours to get from the AT ditch to the inner minefield. Obstacles are again the likely hold up.

The Allied AT line of defense is not up in the infantry zone but behind it. Heavy tanks are supposed to contest passage of the last belt of mines. It is baldly stated that the British crews abandoned their vehicles, but it is not really explained why.

Hail fire is the likely explanation. There cannot have been many Matildas there. Each was probably hammered by a formation 1-2 echelons larger. An hour passes here, but the engagement was probably much faster than that. The balance of the time - mines.

Once through the minefield and the tanks, they still face a gun line - the artillery regiment in the area. This one is said to last half an hour. No mention is made of German indirect arty or air helping. Tanks duel field pieces and win, probably by ganging up on portions at a time, at range.

Conspicuously absent is anything remotely like combined arms. There is no report of encountering heavy artillery fire in the infantry zone, or of coordination between the reserve line of tanks and the gun line faced fully an hour later.

The obvious basis of the defensive scheme was obstacle belts. It was believed tanks could not negotiate these without extensive help from dismounted engineers. Given the extreme time it all took - as a tactical matter, mind - that was probably true. An anti-infantry defense combined with the obstacles was supposed to stop any attack. Shoot the engineers, the tanks won't get through the mines.

This apparently failed because (1) the preliminary bombardment drove the local defenders into fortifications that were not designed as fighting positions - the infamous Italian "blockhouses" - but only as shelters. Then (2) arty did not fill the gap by counter-massing at the breach, probably because the breach was thought to be elsewhere - the Italian-Brit sector. I'll bet the Brit units up front were better at grabbing control of the guns than the Indians, too. (3) Infantry reserves were sent, but faced superior odds and combined arms, without anything but obstacles to help them. They bought the defenders 2 1/2 hours, but it would appear nothing substantial was done with that time. (4) Tanks and a gun front were not coordinated as responses, and the whole AT portion of the defense was an afterthought. It is likely nobody thought they could get through the mines.

A darn sight more involved than "wow, Stukas scream down, whole DAK on a front of 600 yards, trembling SAs smashed" yada yada. That is a journalist level account that does not know elements smaller than divisions or personalities other than whole side commanders exist.

[WineCape]

Ritchie's supposed cautioning to "pay special attention to the western perimeter" seems belied by the dispositions of the defenders: The most experienced Commonwealth units were deployed to the SE (where the main attack fell), while the least experienced (2nd SA) were deployed to the west. Seems like somebody (Gott?) was expecting Rommel to repeat his 1941 attack plan.

Yes, I agree.

Looking at the map and troop positions of Tobruk in June 1942 one cannot come to any other conclusion. In all, not a strong argument/analysis put forward by Brigadier Young in this instance, as pointed out earlier by Michael Dorosh above.

The Tobruk garrison was reported to have 35,000 troops. Roughly how big was the DAK attacking force that concentrated on the SE perimeter?

[JasonC]

von Luck wrote above "After the first siege, it had been decided that Tobruk was not to be defended and most of the mines had been removed from the perimeter for use in the Gazala line; the wire had fallen into disrepair, the anti-tank ditch was broken down in many places, and the field defenses had silted up. The defenders were only given a week to put all this right"

Considering that an analysis of the times and fights in the actual break in reveals an obstacle based defense, (i.e. anti-infantry directed at the engineers, with AT only deep in the rear), I think this is much more likely the real cause of the difference from the previous year, than any imagined difference between Aussies and SAs. It still took the Germans hours to get through the obstacle belts - probably because dummy or thinned minefields remained. But the coherence of the defense scheme had been broken, reduced to bluff.

[WineCape]

A darn sight more involved than "wow, Stukas scream down, whole DAK on a front of 600 yards, trembling SAs smashed" yada yada. That is a journalist level account that does not know elements smaller than divisions or personalities other than whole side commanders exist.

Oh I agree Jason. Thanks for the material. Being South African, but knowing little about the circumstances under which Klopper capitulated a lost cause anyway, any insight is helpful than just a mere overglossing/dismissing of the South Africans combat role in the fall of Tobruk.

Even in South African military circles - and elsewhere - Klopper did not escape severe critiscm, which seems quite unfair given (limited) material reviewed so far.

[ October 17, 2003, 11:26 AM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by WineCape:

The Tobruk garrison was reported to have 35,000 troops. Roughly how big was the DAK attacking force that concentrated on the SE perimeter?

At the time of surrender, there were 19,000 British, 10,500 SA, and 2500 Indian. 32,000.

As for the Axis, I don't have an exact OOB, but I do know the divisional dispositions: The Italian Sabratha, Trento, and Brescia Divisions were screening the defenders, respectively, on the west, south, and east perimeters. It was the Trieste, Ariete, 15th Pz, and 21st Pz Divisions that took an active part in the breakthrough.

At this point (1942), the Italian armored divisions consisted of a tank regiment, a motorized infantry regiment, and an artillery regiment, + engineer, AA, recon companies, etc.; say around 8500 men, full strength. The German Panzer divisions were aranged in similar fashion. Say, 35,000 men, all together then. But then, you have to take into account that the Axis forces had been fighting almost non-stop for over a month, so subtract 20%. Say about 28,000.

28,000 men in four divisions (plus the entirety of the 8th Fliegerkorps, and a corps worth of arty) focused on one Brigade of around 2800. You can force a pretty big hole that way.

[ October 18, 2003, 07:34 PM: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

[Determinant]

Originally posted by WineCape:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />A darn sight more involved than "wow, Stukas scream down, whole DAK on a front of 600 yards, trembling SAs smashed" yada yada. That is a journalist level account that does not know elements smaller than divisions or personalities other than whole side commanders exist.

Oh I agree Jason. Thanks for the material. Being South African, but knowing little about the circumstances under which Klopper capitulated a lost cause anyway, any insight is helpful than just a mere overglossing/dismissing of the South Africans combat role in the fall of Tobruk.

Even in South African military circles - and elsewhere - Klopper did not escape severe critiscm, which seems quite unfair given (limited) material reviewed so far. </font>

[Patrocles]

Originally posted by JonS:

Parachutists? For real?

BTW, thanks for that WC.

I was thinking the same thing when I read the archive posted by Winecape!

[WineCape]

Jason + von Lucke (obliged for the responses/info so far),

Is there any mention of paratroopers in General von Mellenthin's book - Panzer Battles - being dropped within the Tobruk perimeter when Rommel launched his assault?

[ October 18, 2003, 06:29 PM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by WineCape:

Is there any mention of paratroopers in General von Mellenthin's book - Panzer Battles - being dropped within the Tobruk perimeter when Rommel launched his assault?

Actually, this is the first I'd heard of it.

AFAIK, in June of '42, all the Axis paras in the Med were sitting in Italy preparing to invade Malta come July. It wasn't until Op Herkules was called off, that the Folgore Division and Ramcke's FJ Brigade were deployed to Libya --- mid-July to August --- a month after Tobruk.

But that's not to say some Axis commandoes couldn't have air-dropped into Tobruk in an attempt to secure the fuel dumps there.

The Italians actually had a paratrooper school in Tripoli, and at the start of the war in North Africa had two battalions of Colonial Paratroopers formed up --- only to loose them in rear-guard actions in '40 and '41.

[Andreas]

The Germans had special forces from the Brandenburger Division operating in the med. This does sound like the stuff they would have been trained for. Quick googling found nothing on it though.

It could also just be confusion, sounds from the report above that there was enough confusion to go round for mistaking a forward detachment suddenly appearing for paras.

[JasonC]

Deter. said "if an attacker concentrated his force on a particular point then he would eventually break through"

Defenders have a number of ways of defeating local concentration. Coordinated counterattack is the most expensive and least commonly available of them. The main thing is to bring to bear something that exploits the narrowness of the attack. At a small enough scale just interlocking fire zones do that, because you can kill everything in one narrow area and still be subject to fire trying to advance through that area. Area effect items also do this very well.

So the number one response is counter-massing artillery fire. Mines are another - you can mass all the men you wanted if they have to drive through a minefield. You will just hit more mines and still be stopped. Against tanks in particular, another useful measure is the gun front, with any decent towed AT weapon just trucked in behind the obviously intended break through sector, lined up and waiting. Last, you can send modest reaction reserves - the "one back" portion of infantry formations, all tanks nearby held off the line - to the threatened sector.

The first thing to notice is that the earlier main attack - the Italians - failed. Despite the air support and the narrow front. Probably in part because the attackers were Italians (and so was their armor) - certainly. Probably also because the typical means, like artillery countermassing, were used against that prong.

How had the Aussies done so much better the year before? Was it command, wielding all forces into one unit? Concentrated counterattack? Or did they just have 100,000 more mines to sit behind, picking off any pioneers trying to clear lanes through them, than the place had a year later?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

It was the Trieste, Ariete, 15th Pz, and 21st Pz Divisions that took an active part in the breakthrough.

Where was the 90th. Lt. at this time? And wasn't the Trento around too? Were they screening the frontier? I admit I've forgotten.

Michael

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Where was the 90th. Lt. at this time? And wasn't the Trento around too? Were they screening the frontier? I admit I've forgotten.

Michael

The 90th was about 60 miles east, at Bardia, faking-out the British as to Rommel's intentions.

The Trento Division was at Tobruk, besieging the 4th South African Bde --- from a safe distance, south of the defenses.