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What if Poland had defeated the Blitz?


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Originally posted by Bigduke6:

I remember the main arguements well enough. They were:

1. The Czechs had right fine weapons.

Besides the tanks and artillery the Czechs had excellent small arms and at that time the Czech MG was the best in the world.

2. The Czechs from a morale and warfighting point of view were not pushovers.

Nationalism was alive and well in Czechoslovakia. (Mass public physical health exercises, youth camps, patriotic songs, media promoting the national ideal, etc.) Also militarism was pretty big there, after all it was the exploits of the Czech Legion in 1918-20 that pretty much put the idea of a Czech nation on the international map.

So, the arguement goes, the individual soldiers the Czechs would have put into the field would not have been particlarly better or worse than the Germans'.

3. The Werhmacht 1938 was nothing close to Wehrmacht 1939.

The arguement here is that the German military was tooling up, training, expanding, and in a general state of flux. Vehicles were in short supply, and something like 2/3 of the German tanks that invaded Poland, either hadn't been manufactured or were being operated by the Czech army.

So the Germans had neither the equipment nor the training to conduct a Blitzkrieg against Czechoslovakia. True the thinkers had a plan to make that possible, but the plan wasn't close to implemented by 1938. So if the German 1938 army had fought the Czechs, it would have been primarily infantry not mechanized warfare, and so the Czechs could have held out.

4. Czechoslovakia's border terrain is really defensible.

Thanks for all that BigDuke6, that makes it clear enough and you've also helped me to confirm my understanding of the issues involved there and then. (Especially in terms of thinking about the German level of military preparedness and amounts of production etc.) smile.gif

FROM ABOVE: 'Nationalism was alive and well in Czechoslovakia. (Mass public physical health exercises, youth camps, patriotic songs, media promoting the national ideal, etc.)' I had no idea that there was a Czech Nationlistic Youth Group! tongue.gif

From a few things that I've come across regarding both the morale and the performance of Czechs during WWI this makes sense. Apparently they started fighting the war fairly lacklusteredly especially against their fallow Slavs for Austro-Hungaria. However they became quite willing to fight for the Hapsberg Empire, at least before it became ruled by just the Crown alone, when Italy entered the war against the Central Powers. They also fought better under their own leadership because they were to inquisative/intelligent and asked too many questions for their Austrian handlers. (Reminds me of the troubles that the colonials gave their thick headed podgy British (almost always English) controllers. ;)

BTW the smallarms and MGs that the Czechoslovak Army had in 1938-9 are carried by the Rumanians in CMBB, that's their rifles, LMGs & HMGs were all of Czech design and manufacture.

I can qualify your points about the maintenance and brake down issues for the Germans to the extent that they had had the previous experience of these problems in Austria earlier in 1938. AFAIK they still had only some unresolved matters crop up in October 1938 requiring only minor improvements at the most. However, IIRC and AIUI there were not any major concerns during March 1939, at least from what I've read. (Mainly Guderian and one of his biggest military historian fans Kenneth Macksey.)

Cheers Paul, :eek:

Regards,

Saul.

[ September 09, 2005, 11:07 AM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

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Mind you roqf77 I can say what I please about the Anglo-Saxon race because I am part Anglo-Saxon myself. redface.gif

Because of where that part comes from I really ought to barrick for the Cobblers, but the last time I checked they were bloody still in Division 4. BTW I like to say that I go for Arsenal, but stress that I am really more of a Tottemham kind of persons, if you know what I mean! ;)

(I was young and I liked the cannon, what can I say!) :rolleyes:

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Actually I'm a Rugby Union bloke myself, and that's in a State where Rugby practically isn't even in the Sports section! (Melbourne is the birth place of Aussie Rules Football.) The nature and quality of WWI Generals are interesting subjects but yeah I agree outside this thread except for individuals in relevant specific instances. ;)

No offense taken, don't know why you thought that I might have, but I was just making it clear that I didn't intend any to others myself either.

[ September 09, 2005, 07:30 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

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Originally posted by Bigduke6:

There's a famous story about the top Czech general begging Benes for orders to fight the Germans even after the British sold the Czechs down the river, but Benes nixed the idea as disastrous for the Czech nation.

I hadn't heard that one before 6 could you elaborate upon this or post the story in greater detail when you find your paper (if or when you do so) thanks, that'd be great. :cool:
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probably not saying too much that already hasnt been said. The problem for the Poles was they tried to defend the borders where their head was in the proverbial meat grinder. They were enveloped while the luftwaffe quickly gained air superiority and wrecked havoc in their rear. Had the Poles pulled back to more defensible positions, the could have prevented the outright disasters that historically occurred. The French and British, as timid as they were to attack, may have siezed the opportunity to surge forward into the undefended west while the poles fought a delaying action. The war could have been over almost before it began. Just my 2 cents.

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The west was not "undefended". There were 30 German divisions there. Yes, two thirds of them were second line, but the same is true of the French force. French mobilization took 2 weeks and involved dividing active divisions into three formations filled out with reservists to the extent one regiment, two, and all but a cadre. When completed they could field 85 divisions, a third of them close to first line. But the war in Poland was decided in well under the time it took the French to mobilize.

The ones fighting the "delaying action" would have been the Germans. As they had 98 divisions total, the French edge would have been entirely temporary. The French would have needed a plan capable of penetrating 30 German divisions and conquering Germany on a time scale of a week or two, with a vanishing edge in the second half of the effort even if it succeeded (and pulled some forces off the Poles, at best).

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Originally posted by JasonC:

The west was not "undefended". There were 30 German divisions there. Yes, two thirds of them were second line, but the same is true of the French force.

I'm not entirely sure, but I find it hard to believe the French could assemble a big enough force in anything less than 3-4 weeks. I mean, in numbers alone, they had an army of some capability, but those forces were deployed in various places. Grouping them together, even after mobilization was complete, would not have been so simple.

My guess is they would have been hard-pressed to come up with 50 divisions for an invasion of Germany.

Also, on the subject of Czechoslovakia, I see it being a sitting duck. Look at a political map of Europe in 1938. Germany has no need of blazing a trail of glory through the mountains. The border gave more than enough routes of access. They could have cut the country in half in a day or two (three at the absolute most) and simply ground up what was left at their leisure. The Czechs, unlike the Poles, could not expect help from any greater powers.

Cheers

Paul

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Um, in re Czechs and greater powers, the whole scandal of Munich consists in Britain forcing France to give them up. The French had mutual defense treaties with the Czechs and the Poles. It was a system; if any of them were attacked all were to respond together. Britain had not formally signed on (though France certainly counted on her) and used that to scupper it. If Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland had all mobilized and fought together, the Germans would not have had an easy time of it.

On French mobilization speed, the rear echelon third of their 85 division force would not have been terribly useful fast, but it would be formed into units of mobilized reservists, and in a couple of weeks. Mobilization speed was a critical factor in WW I and before it in the second half of the 19th century, and the French were not slack about it. It is mostly a matter of having reserves of men who have already done short compulsory service, and railway planning to muster them all quickly.

What is true is the reservists are not active duty military personnel, as to the level of their individual readiness, their training, etc. The third line formations had only officer cadres from the active army. The rest were all reservists, and realistically they needed some time to train together to get back into military shape. The second line had one regiment per division of active forces, plus more extensive cadres. The active part could provide additional NCOs etc. They had some combat ability immediately, able to rotate formations etc.

So the French could have put a superior force on the German border, but portions of their force were really meant as relievers in an envisioned battle of attrition, expected to have time to train while others fought, then to relieve them for a spell, to train in quieter sectors etc. They did not have anything like a plan to conquer Germany in 2-4 weeks, through a force of 30 divisions. And without it, by the time their reserve formations made their numbers felt, the Germans would have large forces back from Poland.

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In my point of view the biggest mistake made by polish government in 1939 was refuse to join axis. Hitler wanted poles as ally to cover his back from USSR during war in west. Till spring 1939 Germans tried many times to invite Poles but polish minister Beck played balanced game and by the end finished with destruction of all country.

Poland cooperated with heers in Czechoslovakia as well as on political grounds.

If Poland had joined axis the USSR and western democracies would have been destroyed swiftly. Polish cavalry units proved not only once their superior power over russian units (take a look war in 1920). Polish cavalry was also strong enough to fight panzer divisions. on 1st of September 1939 4th German panzer division run on Wolynska Cavalry Brigade and after one day of struggle polish units pull back in order leaving Germans with 70 burning tanks on fields of Mokra.

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Point of order sturmowik Poland did not co-operate with the German Armee in Czechoslovakia, she rather stupidly IMHO seized a small Polish inhabited mining area for the industrial value of possessing it rather than trying to attempt to keep afloat Czechoslovakia as an ally on her Southwestern flank.

OTOH, in terms of Polish geo-political reasoning behind her deployments for September 1939 I would like to point three things out.

Firstly, obviously based upon an under-estimation of the actual strength and capabilities of the Wehrmacht by the Polish Officers and other fereigners as well they actually thought that they could have fought relatively reasonably well enough against the Germans bearing in mind their own performance against the Soviet Russians in the early 1920's and especially considering that everybody thought that the Wehrmacht was still less ready for War than they actually were. Don't forget that the German Army was only supposed to have consisted of 100 000 men and had other restrictions until Hitler announced that Germay was officially unilateraly renouncing the Versaillies Treaty in 1936 IIRC. Just how well and fast they managed in the Polish Campainge came as a supprised pretty much to everyone like how well the Arab States come & hit back against Isreal during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 after their defeat in the Six Day War of 1967 and more recently how effective the US Army did during the early Blitzkiegeques phase of the invasion of Iraq which allowed them to pull back from exposing themselves so much on the North Korean border.

Secondly the Poles expected to be able to hold out for a longer period of time which would have given the French the time to draw the Germans increasing away to the West for the Campaigne to bog down into the Winter, hopefully, given their record against the Russians and deluding themselves about their own military capability.

Thirdly on in a more geo-political illusion some of the Poles at the top mistakingly believed that Hitler was only intent upon siezing the disputed Corridor and the port of Danzig and other German populated border areas such as South-eastern Pomerania and Upper Selisia. Therefore they had reasoned upon massing their Armed forced forward and in the Corridor with the expectation of mainly having to make enough of a contest in these areas in order to assist their expected aid by greater French intervention according to the above second consideration. So in this sense according to their estimation their deployments were correctly devoted to attempting to respond to the strategic situation but totally wrong for that which they actually were facing.

[ September 24, 2005, 12:06 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

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Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:

Just how well and fast they managed in the Polish Campainge came as a supprised pretty much to everyone like how well the Arab States come & hit back against Isreal during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 after their defeat in the Six Day War of 1967 and more recently how effective the US Army did during the early Blitzkiegeques phase of the invasion of Iraq which allowed them to pull back from exposing themselves so much on the North Korean border.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Could you explain a bit further?

Cheers

Paul

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I agree that seizing of Cieszyn and adjacent area was stupid only in terms of rejecting of any further cooperation with Germans. Fatal political move. Also UK is to blame because of giving guarantee without chance of help for Poles. That is what insured Poland to stand against Germans. (by the way Poland did the same stupid thing now in Iraq - supporting USA).

And I stress again the biggest mistake was side on which polish fought.

Yes USSR could join war earlier, but the army showed its capability in front of weak but highly motivated Finish troops. Same story could have happed in Poland.

I disagree about underestimation of German troops by polish intelligence. Strength and deployment were known for HQ and chance of total loose of were taken into consideration long before catastrophe. What Zalgiris is writing is what was said by polish propaganda and that is total different story nice picked up by communists after war and their allies from west.

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Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:

Just how well and fast they managed in the Polish Campainge came as a supprised pretty much to everyone like how well the Arab States come & hit back against Isreal during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 after their defeat in the Six Day War of 1967 and more recently how effective the US Army did during the early Blitzkiegeques phase of the invasion of Iraq which allowed them to pull back from exposing themselves so much on the North Korean border.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Could you explain a bit further?</font>
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I've read from quite a few sources, admittedly mostly in brief passages, but consistent enough, that basically share this view.
can you give some examples?

little Poznan based Army intended to march the 60 miles on to Berlin!
?????????

This "little" Poznan army consists 14th, 17 th, 25 th & 26 th Infantry Divisions and two cavalry brigades (Wielkopolska i Podolska) plus own planes and panzer troops. Also never heard about rush towards Berlin (smells like propaganda also), Army Poznan and remains of army Pomorze were falling back on Warsaw were challenged by German 8th Army, which tried to bar retreat (retreat towards Berlin?).In Such situation General Kutrzeba decided to lunch attack on left flank of advancing Germans troops. The result was hard fought "Battle of the Bzura". The Polish troops succeeded in capturing bridges across Buzra river and hit & drove back German 30th inf division. There was vicious fighting around Lowicz and Sochaczew before Poles pull back caught from the flank by Army group North diverted from Warsaw direction on Hitlers order.

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