Kursk

[LynnL53]

I have a number of books about Kursk and a number that include Kursk. The new one from Jean Restyn is really good- many pictures and text--He makes this comment at the end of the book, that from creation in the factory to its use on the front --the average life for a t-34 was 7 days! MY question is while Kursk is my favorite battle-- as the books become newer are we writing history or revising history- The battle of Prokhorovk is now with smaller groups of armor and not the dusty massive engagement it has been portrayed. The Russians do not really win and the Germans really quit and the losses for the Germans were not as bad but were very bad for the Rusians-I realize that the end result is still the Germans did not have any more successful summer attacks and the Russians could and did win in something else than winter - but are we now getting the right of the historical event? Restyn book is still good --I guess there is no real way to completely know--This book as number of pictures of Russian armor being hit and for us and CMBB and almost endless look at this for us to try to recreate--for those who want to

[Hortlund]

If one looks at the combat returns reports for II SS Pz Corps during the battle, a very interesting kill/loss ratio emerges. Have you read Franklin and Zetterlings book on Kursk?

It is a controversial topic though, for some reason I dont really understand, many people want to keep the old image of a German defeat at Kursk. Now when they cant use the combat losses as an argument, they have chosen to include Kursk in some "larger operational plan" masterminded by the Soviets. Therefore the battle at Kursk was a Soviet victory despite the horrible losses because after the battle the Soviets managed to launch several counteroffensives and push the Germans out of the Ukraine...

Anyway as I said, the topic is very controversial still.

[Cpt.Kloss]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

[QB]

It is a controversial topic though, for some reason I dont really understand, many people want to keep the old image of a German defeat at Kursk. QB]

--------------------------

Why defeat?

German attack didn't meet its operational objective - encircling russian armies. It was a terrible loss of valuable assets which destroyed german offensive capabilities. Russians were able to replenish loses quickly, germans not.

Simply...russians could afford that kind of battle.

[Stormhouse]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

If one looks at the combat returns reports for II SS Pz Corps during the battle, a very interesting kill/loss ratio emerges. Have you read Franklin and Zetterlings book on Kursk?

It is a controversial topic though, for some reason I dont really understand, many people want to keep the old image of a German defeat at Kursk. Now when they cant use the combat losses as an argument, they have chosen to include Kursk in some "larger operational plan" masterminded by the Soviets. Therefore the battle at Kursk was a Soviet victory despite the horrible losses because after the battle the Soviets managed to launch several counteroffensives and push the Germans out of the Ukraine...

Anyway as I said, the topic is very controversial still.

This is always funny,

The Germans lost but not really you see.... Your also only looking at II SS panzer division how accurate is that???

I've seen some documentaries about Kursk, yes it’s not the same as reading a book about it but i have also read a number or articles about this battle. If I just read the beginning about the German concentration and preparation before the battle i too would have attacked if I was German. There was really no reason to worry, but if you look at a map and the small dents that the offensives made, it really was a failure. Don’t tell me how far they went in, you might want to look at how much further they had to go to close the circle.

[Kirill S.]

Frankly, the whole eastern front is like the Kursk.

If it wasn't for Stalin giving the orders "not to provoke the germans" and for Zhukov being such an incompetent general we wouldn't have 40 million dead. We would have a communist europe.... but that's another question.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Stormhouse:

The Germans lost but not really you see.... Your also only looking at II SS panzer division how accurate is that???

Im not arguing that the Germans won at Kursk, that would be as pointless as arguing that the Germans (somehow) won ww2.

Interesting question you raise about II SS Panzer (corps) however. I suppose it is because Kursk primarely is known for the tank battle outside Prokhorovka, and the only German unit involved in that one is II SS Panzer Corps.

Another reason why it might be valuable to take a closer look at the results of the southern pincer is because many hold up Kursk as the definitive end to the Blitzkrieg. That the Soviets had managed to contain and control a dedicated blitzkrieg-type offensive. The truth might be more complex than that.

[Silvio Manuel]

That figure of the "avg. life of a T-34 from factory to front to death was 7 days" reminds me of the quote from the History Channel (hopefully it's accurate-!) that the avg. life expectancy of a Soviet Private in the Stalingrad siege was only 24 hours.

[Stormhouse]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Stormhouse:

The Germans lost but not really you see.... Your also only looking at II SS panzer division how accurate is that???

Im not arguing that the Germans won at Kursk, that would be as pointless as arguing that the Germans (somehow) won ww2.

Interesting question you raise about II SS Panzer (corps) however. I suppose it is because Kursk primarely is known for the tank battle outside Prokhorovka, and the only German unit involved in that one is II SS Panzer Corps.

Another reason why it might be valuable to take a closer look at the results of the southern pincer is because many hold up Kursk as the definitive end to the Blitzkrieg. That the Soviets had managed to contain and control a dedicated blitzkrieg-type offensive. The truth might be more complex than that.</font>

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Im not arguing that the Germans won at Kursk, that would be as pointless as arguing that the Germans (somehow) won ww2.

Interesting question you raise about II SS Panzer (corps) however. I suppose it is because Kursk primarely is known for the tank battle outside Prokhorovka, and the only German unit involved in that one is II SS Panzer Corps.

Another reason why it might be valuable to take a closer look at the results of the southern pincer is because many hold up Kursk as the definitive end to the Blitzkrieg. That the Soviets had managed to contain and control a dedicated blitzkrieg-type offensive. The truth might be more complex than that.

I'm certain that Zetterling hasn't read Glantz' book on Kursk (though the opposite can't be said - Glantz did look over Zetterling's book before recommending that it be published as part of his series from Frank Cass). As much as some like to point out the differences between Glantz and Zetterling, both books come to similar conclusions. Both books state that there was no single massive tank battle at Prokhorovka (it was actually more of a large number of meeting engagements), both state that Soviet losses at Prokhorovka and elsewhere were large compared to German losses. Glantz states that the key to Soviet victory at Kursk was from the operational level. Namely, that the Germans were continuously denied the ability to consolidate its forces for a concerted push - mostly through the use of incessant counterattacks and the timely use of reserves. Looking at the situation of the southern pincer on 12 July 1943, this becomes acutely obvious. And, though German losses at Kursk were nowhere near the level of Soviet losses, German losses were still substantial, if not heavy.

Finally, a last point Glantz makes wrt the southern pincer. On the day Hitler called off Zitadelle, three unidentified (read: undetected by German intelligence) Soviet rifle armies were deploying NE and E of Prokhorovka along with a tank and mech corps.

Now, it wasn't the smashing Soviet victory that has traditionally been printed in numerous books, but I would not categorize it as a 'near thing' either. When one considers that the northern pincer was stopped cold, and that the southern pincer still had to deal with three fresh rifle armies and a fresh tank and mech corps (all of which were closer to the frontline than 5th Guards Tank Army on 5 July as subunits of Steppe Front), the prospects of any substantial success from von Manstein's pincer were highly unlikely - especially when there usually needs to be two pincers to form an encirclement.

[ January 03, 2003, 01:12 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Grisha:

both state that Soviet losses at Prokhorovka and elsewhere were large compared to German losses.

The key phrase here must be and elsewhere otherwise I cannot get that sentence to match Zetterlings book. Because if you compare the Soviet losses to II SS Pz losses the difference is enormous. Especially for the July 12th battles around Prokhorovka. I dont have the book here right now, but if I remember correctly Zetterlin/Franksson argues that for example LAH lost something like 5-10 tanks on July 12th.

Glantz states that the key to Soviet victory at Kursk was from the operational level. Namely, that the Germans were continuously denied the ability to consolidate its forces for a concerted push - mostly through the use of incessant counterattacks and the timely use of reserves.

Well, I dont really want to dispute Glanz, since many people hold him like the authority figure on eastern front history. BUT having said that, it is my opinion that your answer will depend on the question you ask. If you want to define victory/defeat on the operational level, you will undoubtedly reach that answer. Personally I think that is the wrong level to judge the outcome at Kursk.

Looking at the situation of the southern pincer on 12 July 1943, this becomes acutely obvious. And, though German losses at Kursk were nowhere near the level of Soviet losses, German losses were still substantial, if not heavy.

Finally, a last point Glantz makes wrt the southern pincer. On the day Hitler called off Zitadelle, three unidentified (read: undetected by German intelligence) Soviet rifle armies were deploying NE and E of Prokhorovka along with a tank and mech corps.

Would you agree with this statement:

The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off?

As for the previously unidentified units. Sure, but you also had an SS Pz Corps just SW of Prokhorovka, and by now they had better contact with the units on their flanks. I think it is an interesting question "what would have happened if the offensive had been allowed to continue", but I fear that question can never be answered.

Now, it wasn't the smashing Soviet victory that has traditionally been printed in numerous books, but I would not categorize it as a 'near thing' either. When one considers that the northern pincer was stopped cold, and that the southern pincer still had to deal with three fresh rifle armies and a fresh tank and mech corps (all of which were closer to the frontline than 5th Guards Tank Army on 5 July as subunits of Steppe Front), the prospects of any substantial success from von Manstein's pincer were highly unlikely - especially when there usually needs to be two pincers to form an encirclement.

As I said, I agree that the Kursk offensive failed. It was a strategic offensive that failed due to the inability of the northern pincer to meet any of its objectives. The offensive was cancelled due to strategic considerations (Sicily). But the advance on the southern pincer was never stopped by enemy resistance, therefore I think it is wrong to hold up Kursk as an example on how the blitzkrieg failed. Frankly, I dont think Kursk has anything to do with Bitzkrieg at all, since there is no German attempt att "blitzing" or how you want to put it. Manstein knew he could not blitz those defenses, instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS.

[ January 03, 2003, 05:43 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Ant]

If I just read the beginning about the German concentration and preparation before the battle i too would have attacked if I was German. There was really no reason to worry.

There was plenty reason to worry, and If the Germans had seriously invested in any kind of intelligence regarding the Russian defences at Kursk they would have realised this. One of the major failings of Germany during WW2, and especially on the eastern front, was their hopeless intelligence.

Manstein knew he could not blitz those defenses,

Isn't hindsight a wonderfull thing

instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS.

Similar to the slow and steady advance of the british troops over the battlefield of the Somme, otherwise known as simply walking into destruction.

[ January 03, 2003, 05:50 AM: Message edited by: Ant ]

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

If you want to define victory/defeat on the operational level, you will undoubtedly reach that answer. Personally I think that is the wrong level to judge the outcome at Kursk.

How so? Looking at the tactical battle in the southern pincer is a nice way of salvaging some glory for the germans, but the operational and strategic consequences of Kursk are ultimatly more important. The soviets managed to turn tactical defeat into operational victory, and the Kursk battle was followed by the first of a series of soviet offensives that would end with the capture of Berlin.

Quite the opposite of the aims of the german offensive, hence you can classify it as a failure.

Would you agree with this statement:

The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off?

No, the tip of the southern pincer was precariously thin, still facing major opposition and without hope for real success. To make the advance inopportune is the same as halting it.

[Hortlund]

instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS.

Similar to the slow and steady advance of the british troops over the battlefield of the Somme, otherwise known as simply walking into destruction.

No, not similar at all. If you want to make a comparrisson with the Somme battles, you would have british troops advancing well past the German defensive lines every day inflicting something like 7-1 casualties on the Germans in the process.

I suggest you take a look at the combat losses for II SS during Zitadelle. And (try to) compare them to the (still classified) Soviet losses.

[ January 03, 2003, 06:05 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Ant]

I suggest you take a look at the combat losses for II SS during Zitadelle. And (try to) compare them to the (still classified) Soviet losses.

True enough, but as has been said many times: The Soviets could afford those losses, the Germans couldn't, so to get involved in a slugging match at Kursk was a futile mistake for Germany

[Hortlund]

Do you know the reason behind the Kursk offensive? It was not "lets surround the Soviets at Kursk and then march on to Moscow" the offensive had a completely different motivation. The Germans (I never know whether to say "Hitler" or "the Germans"...I think Im going to go with "the Germans") wanted to encircle the Soviets at Kursk and destroy them for two reasons.

1) Shorten and stabilize the front,

2) Remove large portion of Soviet attack capability.

Both these measures are defensive in nature. The Germans knew that the Allies were coming in the west, and that soon troops would have to be shifted from the east to the west. Meanwhile, the front had stabilized after Stalingrad, and thanks to IISS at Kharkov, the situation was not really as desperate in the south as it might have been. In the summer of 43, everything was pretty much balanced...even. If Kursk had succeded, the Germans would have a quiet autumn and maybe even winter on the eastern front, this period could be spent fortifying the lines ala AG Center did in 42 (and they would later defeat Zhukovs offensive outside Moscow thanks to these preparations), a strategic reserve could be built up, and preparations could be made to meet the allies in the west.

The alternative would be to defend the front as it looked in spring of 43. Taking a look at the relative numbers and the nature of the frontline, it is quite clear that any such attempt would simply lead to numerous situations compareable to the crisis at/after Stalingrad. But more importantly, that would mean surrendering the initiative to the Soviets.

The strategic reasoning behind the Kursk offensive was sound. It all depended on that successful offensive though. When the offensive failed, the front crumbled. It did not collapse however, but the Germans were steadily pushed back.

[Ant]

I agree that the Germans were stuck between a rock and a hard place. All of your comments are very valid, but the trouble is that the Soviets knew all that too, and so fortified the salient to an incredible degree. There was pretty much no chance of a German victory at Kursk. They were effectively forced to fight a straight battle of attrition against an army that was better able and prepared to handle such an encounter. It was a (roughly) similar situation to Montgomery's plan to defeat Rommel at El-Alamein, just lure him into a face to face slugging match and beat him with numbers.

[Leit]

What is the point of the discussion?

Germans wants mobile war? They lost under Stalingrad, lost strategicly, they get 100% mobile war after Kursk and lost it in to years.

Germans could execute their tactic under unprepared enemy (june 1941 year) and conscripts (autumn 1941- ~ autmn 1942 year). Regular russian forses give them good lessons because germans don't want to die and for russians this wasn't a problem, but expirience was somth about the same after 1943 year may be.

About waffen SS on russian front. Somthing about 25% of all waffen SS on russian front was formed form inhabitants of an occupied territory. This was cannon meat wich elite left to protect hopeless positions when it was necessary to retreat. Ofcourse elite get no losses in the situation. German statistic never includes this boys to german loses and their loses were about 100% as traitors. Remember the point.

[ January 03, 2003, 07:06 AM: Message edited by: Leit ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

How so? Looking at the tactical battle in the southern pincer is a nice way of salvaging some glory for the germans, but the operational and strategic consequences of Kursk are ultimatly more important. The soviets managed to turn tactical defeat into operational victory, and the Kursk battle was followed by the first of a series of soviet offensives that would end with the capture of Berlin.

So now Kursk is the first step on the road to Berlin? You know, I am always fascinated by people who want to draw conclusions like that. Personally I find them a bit far fetched. As I said, if you want to lable Kursk a failed German operation, then go ahead, but it is wrong to lable it as such, just as it would be wrong to lable Fall Blau a successful German operation (it was a strategic offensive). Kursk was a strategic offensive, nothing else. It doesnt really matter whether you want to call it strategic or operational though, Germany still lost the war...right.

While I agree that you might say that the Soviets suffered a tactical defeat against II SS Pz, I do not agree to the conclusion that Kursk was somehow all a part of a successful Soviet offensive operation.

As you say, Zitadelle was followed by a series of successful Soviet operations. That is not the same thing to say as "zitadelle was the first step in a successful soviet operation". You are attributing insights and capabilities to the Soviets that they did not have.

Zitadelle failed for one reason; it was called off. There are two reasons why it was called off, the inability of the northern pincer to gain ground, and the allied landings in Italy.

Quite the opposite of the aims of the german offensive, hence you can classify it as a failure.

Have you ever heard me argue that Zitadelle was a German success?

Would you agree with this statement:

The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off?

No, the tip of the southern pincer was precariously thin, still facing major opposition and without hope for real success. To make the advance inopportune is the same as halting it.

Are you a politician by any chance?

Let me ask you this then: Was the southern pincer (or rather II SS Pz) still advancing when the offensive was called off?

And as I said, the hypotethical "what if" questions are interesting, but at the end of the day they are just that...hypothetical what if discussions. You have no possible way of knowing what would have happened on that southern pincer if the offensive had been allowed to continue. If you want we can go into a long discussion about our various hypothesis about what would have happened, but I object to statements such as "without hope for real success". Military history is filled with examples of units achieving their objectives despite horrible odds stacked against them.

[Cpt.Kloss]

And one more thing about loses. Many russian tanks considered destroyed were quickly repaired and even knocked out again during same battle, resulting in "double count" by german crews.

[Leit]

"Zitadelle failed for one reason; it was called off. There are two reasons why it was called off, the inability of the northern pincer to gain ground, and the allied landings in Italy."

It was called because luck of progress and large losses. German staff understand that their reserves exhausted and russians still had large number of fresh divisions. Continuation of offensive would mean changing of a parity of forces with dangerous way. Moust russian loses during Kursk was after russian offensive starts.

[ January 03, 2003, 08:01 AM: Message edited by: Leit ]

[Pascal DI FOLCO]

Zitadelle never attained even one fourth of its objective, it can hardly be called a success ...

IMHO at Kursk's time Germany had already lost the war, Hitler and OKW desperately trying to replay Blitzkrieg successes -that were just no more ossible- wasted their army in bloody offensives such as Kursk or later Ardennes.

Obviously it could only go bad...

As far as alternative history go, note that without these waste and stupidities like Hitler's "Standfast" order the war could have lasted for some months more, so won't have ended before A-bomb was discovered, and then Europe could have been nuked :eek:

So we can thank Hitler as well as Stalin to have been the bloody mad dictators they were, maybe ...

[Kingfish]

Kursk - day by day accounts

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Leit:

About waffen SS on russian front. Somthing about 25% of all waffen SS on russian front was formed form inhabitants of an occupied territory. This was cannon meat wich elite left to protect hopeless positions when it was necessary to retreat. Ofcourse elite get no losses in the situation. German statistic never includes this boys to german loses and their loses were about 100% as traitors. Remember the point.

But the point is flawed.

I'll just say this about your statement on Waffen SS. Maybe the 25% figure is correct, Im not sure. But from reading your post one gets the impression that the Waffen SS divisions had a core of Germans and a number of "expendable" voulonteers. That is wrong. The "classical" Waffen SS divsions, LAH, DR, T (and later H, F and HJ) had a vast majority of Germans, with some individual men coming from other western european nations. Then there were Western european divisions, primarely Wiking and later Nordland, Nederland, Charlemange and Wallonien these divisions had men from scandinavia and Benelux mostly. Then you had the other divisions like for example 14, 15, 19, 20, 29, 30, these divisions were specifically manned with people from the east. 29 and 30 with Russians, 15 and 19 latvians, 14th Ukranians etc. I suppose if you add all the numbers of foreign volounteers together, and then calculate how many were from the east, that 25% figure might be accurate, but as I said, the way you present it is misleading. And these divisions that I mentioned now were used as "normal" divsions, not some cannon fodder.

While the whermacht made plentiful use of hiwis from the east, I dont think that even them put the hiwis in the front line. I know it happened, but I dont think it happened on the scale you are suggesting.

[ January 03, 2003, 08:26 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

So now Kursk is the first step on the road to Berlin?

It is, in a very real way. The germans lost the strategic initiative there. And they created the preconditions for the russian offensives.

You know, I am always fascinated by people who want to draw conclusions like that. Personally I find them a bit far fetched.

Still that is how it happened.

While I agree that you might say that the Soviets suffered a tactical defeat against II SS Pz, I do not agree to the conclusion that Kursk was somehow all a part of a successful Soviet offensive operation.

I never said it was, but it created the preconditions for the ensuing operations.

As you say, Zitadelle was followed by a series of successful Soviet operations. That is not the same thing to say as "zitadelle was the first step in a successful soviet operation". You are attributing insights and capabilities to the Soviets that they did not have.

As far as attributes and insights go, the soviets made a consious decision to allow the germans to attack in the hope that they would spend themselves, and allow the soviets to use the aftermath of the german offensive as the starting point for theirs. That happened at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk and I would therefore say that all three are soviet successes, high losses and german near breaching of the defense notwithstanding.

Zitadelle failed for one reason; it was called off.

That's just not right. The fact that it was called of was an admission of failure, not the cause.

There are two reasons why it was called off, the inability of the northern pincer to gain ground, and the allied landings in Italy.

Do you really think that if the offensive was still viable it would have been called off?

The northern pincer ground to a halt, the southern pincewr penetrated only on a very narrow axis, pinching off the entire saillant had become unrealistic, and the units were thus better used elsewhere.

Would you agree with this statement:

The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off? </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />No, the tip of the southern pincer was precariously thin, still facing major opposition and without hope for real success. To make the advance inopportune is the same as halting it.

Are you a politician by any chance? </font>

[Leit]

Leutnant Hortlund

250 000 only Ukrain inhabitants serve in Waffen SS as solgers. Moust of them was used to guard prisoner's camps and against partisans but when nessary save german lives. This formations was used to slow down Red Army advance but without any antitank wepon (and few Machne guns) was a little tread.

Some formations continue fight on cleared theritory. Even after war some bands was there. Be shure all of them assistinated, only few of them march now on independece days of their republicks.

There was less (in pearcents to all population) number in Belorussia, more in Latvia and Estonia.

[ January 03, 2003, 10:12 AM: Message edited by: Leit ]