Could the Allies have defeated Germany in 1944?

[Patrocles]

folks always hypothesize how germany could have won the war.

How about a thread asking how we could have defeated germany earlier than May 1945?

invade France in 1943?

More lendlease for Russia?

Better effort in N. Africa/Italy?

support of Operation:Market Garden

etc.

please post your opinions

[YankeeDog]

Well, it's very easy to armchair general, but that's what wargaming is all about.

There are a lot of different levels you can look at this strategy on, from Grand Strategy, all the way down to weapons development and local tactical doctrine.

At the moment, I feel most like looking at the Western Allies mid-level, Grand Tactical decisions -- i.e., the desicisions that Ike and Monty were making. That is, assuming the Allies followed the same Grand Strategy, and had more or less the same weapons at their disposal, where were the big missed opportunities?

I think the Allies missed, or failed to take complete advantage of major opportunities in at least the following areas:

1. North Africa: There were some pretty glaring tactical and logistical mistakes by both the Americans and the British, espeically from the TORCH landings to the inital drive into Tunisia. With a bit better planning and exection, I think it's pretty clear the Allies could have cut Rommel off from Tunis, probably preventing the Germans from ever establishing a coherent defensive perimeter and kicking the Germans out of Africa months earlier.

2. Italy: IMHO, biggest grand tactical mistake was probably failing to take full advantage of the landings at Anzio. In hindsight, this operation did catch the Germans completely by surprise, and if the Allies had been more aggressive about expanding the bridgehead in the first hours, they would have put much more pressure on the Germans, and possibly even threatened to cut German forces to the south off completely. Especially if Hitler had gone into one of his 'no retreat' fits, it's quite possible there could have been another mass German surrender in Southern Italy in 1943 -- The Germans certainly weren't going to get out by water given Allied naval dominance!

3. D-Day: Overall, a remarkably effective operation, but I think in hindsight it's clear that the Allies could have siezed a much larger bridgehead in the first couple of days and saved themselves weeks of bocage fighting later on. It certainly would have been a stretch, but actually I think Monty's original goal of taking Caen on D-Day might have been possible.

4. Goodwood, Charnwood etc. in Normandy. Way too much time and resources wasted on poorly planned frontal attacks into ideal defensive territory. Once the Germans built a solid defensive perimeter in the Bocage, it was going to take time and effort to kick them out of there no matter how well planned Allied attacks were, but I think a more better plan of attack and better shepherding of resouces could have broken out of Normandy much earlier than COBRA.

5. Market Garden: Perhaps the biggest missed opportunity. IMHO, while the plan for Market Garden was a bit optimistic in terms of the strength of German resistance and the ability of the Allies to actually execute such a bold plan, it could have succeeded, and ironically would have been more likely to succeed with a more aggressive commander at it's helm like Monty's rival Patton. Whatever the case, there were enough planning and execution failures here that I think the Allies genuinely could have been in Amsterdam on the East bank of the Rhine in the Fall of '44.

6. Battle of the Bulge. I am personally of the opinion that Patton's idea to counterattack behind the German salient, rather than at its base, would have worked, and resulted in even heavier losses to the Germans an and actual net territorial gain for the Allies, rather than just an approximate restoration of the Pre-German attack lines.

With better choices on any 2 or 3 of the above, I think it's likely could have at least been inside Germany by the end of 1944. Of course, a more dramatic success in any of the above operations certainly would have resulted in reaction and from Germany, but given the downward spiral of the German command of the war at the upper levels (basically, the fact that tactical decisions were increasingly being made by a Gefreiter), a bigger Allied success on late 1943 or early 1944 might have actually caused Hitler to do something even more irrational and compromising to the German war effort.

Cheers,

YD

[Liddell-Hart]

It's unlikely that much time could have been knocked off the length of the war, although it is conceivable that either the Anglo Americans or the Russians could have brought it to an end in late '44 or early '45

A successful Market Garden would almost certainly have ended the war a few months earlier, as it would have given a route to Germany and more specifically the Ruhr that bypassed the Siegfried Line.

The Russians almost certainly could and would have beaten Germany earlier had they only realised the state they were in at the time, instead an unfounded fear that a bloody nose was just round the corner led them to be almost over cautious as they swept through Germany. Although in fairness there is a school of thought that had Guderian got his way and the hapless Himmler not been put in charge of Army Group Vistula, the Germans might have managed to hold up the Russian advance long enough to reinforce the front.

[Liddell-Hart]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

Well, it's very easy to armchair general, but that's what wargaming is all about.

2. Italy: IMHO, biggest grand tactical mistake was probably failing to take full advantage of the landings at Anzio. In hindsight, this operation did catch the Germans completely by surprise, and if the Allies had been more aggressive about expanding the bridgehead in the first hours, they would have put much more pressure on the Germans, and possibly even threatened to cut German forces to the south off completely. Especially if Hitler had gone into one of his 'no retreat' fits, it's quite possible there could have been another mass German surrender in Southern Italy in 1943 -- The Germans certainly weren't going to get out by water given Allied naval dominance!

5. Market Garden: Perhaps the biggest missed opportunity. IMHO, while the plan for Market Garden was a bit optimistic in terms of the strength of German resistance and the ability of the Allies to actually execute such a bold plan, it could have succeeded, and ironically would have been more likely to succeed with a more aggressive commander at it's helm like Monty's rival Patton. Whatever the case, there were enough planning and execution failures here that I think the Allies genuinely could have been in Amsterdam on the East bank of the Rhine in the Fall of '44.

But surely the plan for Italy was to cut of the German forces?, and Clarke decided to ignore orders and go for the glory of liberating Rome instead.

On Market Garden, I'm not clear what difference Patton commanding would've made to the weather and the completely unplanned for presence of an SS Panzer corps?, which surely are the major reasons for the failure to seize the Arnhem bridge, I'd be interested to read why you think he would have made a difference.

[David I]

There were plans for invading France in '43, thank God we didn't do it. The plan was to land a dozen divisions in Brittany and hold on to the pennisula. Without undisputed control of the air, it could have be a disaster of huge porportions. Read D'Estes' book on the planning for Overlord. It covers the planning for 2 different invasions for '43 and for Overlord. The planning for Overlord changed over time, indeed the way it played out was not the way it was planned.

DavidI

[JonS]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

1. North Africa: There were some pretty glaring tactical and logistical mistakes by both the Americans and the British, espeically from the TORCH landings to the inital drive into Tunisia. With a bit better planning and exection, I think it's pretty clear the Allies could have cut Rommel off from Tunis, probably preventing the Germans from ever establishing a coherent defensive perimeter and kicking the Germans out of Africa months earlier.

Quite possibly, and I don't think the fault here is all with 1st Army. However, a quicker victory would have been staggeringly less complete - because of the delayed Allied victory, the Germans lost as much (more?) in Tunisia as they did at Stalingrad.

2. Italy: IMHO, biggest grand tactical mistake was probably failing to take full advantage of the landings at Anzio. In hindsight, this operation did catch the Germans completely by surprise, and if the Allies had been more aggressive about expanding the bridgehead in the first hours, they would have put much more pressure on the Germans, and possibly even threatened to cut German forces to the south off completely. Especially if Hitler had gone into one of his 'no retreat' fits, it's quite possible there could have been another mass German surrender in Southern Italy in 1943.

Anzio was in 44, not 43. I think the bigger mistake here was in the scale of Anzio, not in the lack of exploitation given the forces involved.

With the forces he had on hand, and against the opposition he initially faced, Lucas could have pushed out further and faster. However, given the quick reaction and violent response of the Germans, a larger, more thinly held perimeter would have been in even more danger than the tight beachhead Lucas actually formed.

OTOH, an initial assault by 3 or 4 divs*, supported by an airborne assault (planned then discarded) should have been able to meet the expectations of the original operation.

BTW, Churchills 'wildcat/whale' comment is based on a gross misunderstanding of the way the beachhead was being resupplied.

3. D-Day: Overall, a remarkably effective operation, but I think in hindsight it's clear that the Allies could have siezed a much larger bridgehead in the first couple of days and saved themselves weeks of bocage fighting later on.

Hmm, 'clear'? Could you expand a bit please. I agree it would have been 'nice', but I'm not sure how it could have been expected of the forces actually involved.

4. Goodwood, Charnwood etc. in Normandy. Way too much time and resources wasted on poorly planned frontal attacks into ideal defensive territory.

Heh. Problem is that, as it turned out, everywhere seemed to be 'ideal defensive terrain'. Villers Bocage in mid June was a missed opportunity, but such things happen.

5. Market Garden: ... there were enough planning and execution failures here ...

yup.

6. Battle of the Bulge. I am personally of the opinion that Patton's idea to counterattack behind the German salient, ...

I agree that Pattons suggested approach would have been more effective, but I fail to see how it wold have gotten the Allies into Germany by 1945, let alone ending the war by 1st Jan.

Be cool

Jon

* possible by delaying the departure of landing craft for England for NEPTUNE. That would have had an effect on Neptune, of course,but that could have been mitigated by following through on the Germany First policy, and diverting landing craft out of the Pacific.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

Villers Bocage in mid June was a missed opportunity, but such things happen.

There was also the Caumont gap, a truly heartbreaking missed opportunity. But you are right. The history of war is in part a history of missed opportunities.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

1. North Africa: There were some pretty glaring tactical and logistical mistakes by both the Americans and the British, espeically from the TORCH landings to the inital drive into Tunisia. With a bit better planning and exection, I think it's pretty clear the Allies could have cut Rommel off from Tunis, probably preventing the Germans from ever establishing a coherent defensive perimeter and kicking the Germans out of Africa months earlier.

Apart from the very good point that Jon makes that delaying victory in NA meant that more Axis arms and men got lost, there is another consideration. North Africa is where the Allies really went to school on how to fight a modern war. The British 8th. Army had been at it for a while and had worked some of it out, but the Americans were green in nearly every sense of the word. The more time they spent in NA, the better prepared they were to meet the Axis in Europe. In Operation Husky, they turned in a fine performance.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

Villers Bocage in mid June was a missed opportunity, but such things happen.

There was also the Caumont gap, a truly heartbreaking missed opportunity. But you are right. The history of war is in part a history of missed opportunities.</font>

[Shosties]

How about these two counterfactuals put together?

1) Earlier closing of the Falaise Gap. (But just how much more complete a victory would this have been? The ramifications?)

2) Horrocks cuts off the line of retreat of the 15th Army prior to Market Garden. I'm recalling Horrocks saying after the war that in hindsight this missed opportunity was his greatest blunder.

I think (2) would have been of greater impact. That could have made Mardet Garden much easier to pull off and made a clearance of the Scheldt to make Antwerp usable unnecessary (and Antwerp would have been vital to fully exploiting a sucessful Market Garden).

[SKELLEN]

I don't know if this has been mentioned before but, why wasn't the Atomic bomb used on Germany? Surely this could have helped shorten the war as well as save numerous Allied lives.

This may have been considered by the Allies but obviously they decided otherwise, but why and for what reason?

[Sergei]

Not only that, but since USA has nucular weapons then why didn't Lincoln use the A-bomb in the US Civil War? Was it because the cotton crops could've been harmed?

[Sergei]

How to beat Germany in 1944:

1) Soviets and the Vatican form a personal union after Stalin marries the Pope

2) Hell freezes over, consequently so does most of Europe

3) The Allies gather all the vodka, whiskey and rum that they can find (let's just say that's a lot), and use that to bribe Finns to do the dirty work

4) Drunken Finn hooligans ski across the frozen Baltic Sea to German coast and work their way to Berlin, beating the living crapola outta the Krauts on the way

5) Victory!

[Shosties]

*clears throat*

VE Day was 8 May, 1945.

The plutonium implosion bomb principle was tested 16 July 1945. A bit late, no?

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Trinity.html

I don't recall when they first had enough metallic U-235 to make one gun-type bomb. But I doubt it was even in April '45.

As it was, LeMay was asked to curb his firebombing campaign in order to leave some cities intact to drop the atom bombs on. When you think about that, the minor role the bomb played in the greater scheme of the war really sinks in. Of course, it was of great importance for everything afterwards.

[Pzman]

Originally posted by Sergei:

How to beat Germany in 1944:

1) Soviets and the Vatican form a personal union after Stalin marries the Pope

2) Hell freezes over, consequently so does most of Europe

3) The Allies gather all the vodka, whiskey and rum that they can find (let's just say that's a lot), and use that to bribe Finns to do the dirty work

4) Drunken Finn hooligans ski across the frozen Baltic Sea to German coast and work their way to Berlin, beating the living crapola outta the Krauts on the way

5) Victory!

Darn urberFinns. Their gamey tatics would have won the war in 1941 if they had joined the Allies.

[kenfedoroff]

There are some interesting stories in "An Army at Dawn" by Rick Atkinson, of the logistical nightmare of providing, accounting and shipping everything to North Africa across the ocean from the States. The tonnage required to sustain just one division in the field was incredible.

Makes you wonder how it ever got done at all.

For what it's worth,

Ken

[YankeeDog]

Don't really have time for a really compete reply at the moment, but in brief:

1. North Africa: Point well taken that, ironically, the Allied failure to take advantage of earlier opportunity resulted in a larger commitment by the Germans. Also definitely true that the US Army especially needed practice before taking on bigger foes. Then again, if the Allies has swiftly kicked the Axis out of NA in 1942, it's interesting to speculate what the effects would have been on overall Axis strategy. . . one wonders if the Germans wouldn't have put a much higher priority on defending Italy, for one.

2. Anzio: Yes, sorry. Very early 1944, not 1943. But I think one of the problems defending the Anzio beachhead was that is was so shallow. Certainly, more ground could have been taken in the first days after the landing by the Allies when the Germans were really off guard. This would have given the Allies room to establish a defense in depth, forced the Germans to also commit more forces to simply holding the containment circle around the bridgehead, and also relieved the actual beach landings from much of the artillery harrasment, making it easier to efficiently land more forces. While an absolute cut-off of Southern Axis forces might not have been possible without help from Hitler (by his ordering German forces in the South to stay there after it was tactically wise), I believe a more successful landing and exploitation would have been a net gain for the Allies.

3. D-Day: Not really enough time to really address this fully, but for starters it boggles my mind that no one in the Allied command even recognized the potential problem bocage presented for an attacking force. I would not that there are areas of England that have terrain very similar to the Normandy bocage, and would have been ideal training grounds for Allied forces preparing for D-Day. I also believe that, while the plannings for the actual landings was very good, not enough thought was given as to how to actually get organized units moving inland on D-Day. As a result, it didn't happen.

4. Goodwood, Charnwoood, etc.: Briefly, if you don't have what it takes to do the job, then wait unit you have it. To my mind Goodwood and Charnwood were mostly wastes of good troops and valuable resources. I think Monty's whole keeping pressure in the Germans argument is a load of hogwash. Better of waiting until a more complete operation could be mounted.

5. Market Garden: This is a topic worthy of a book. For starters, I would agree that the missed opportunity to cut off the German 15th Army just before MG was a big one. I would also add that it is simply remarkable to me that, for example, the Ox and Bucks Company of the famous Pegasus Bridge operation on D-Day was not pulled out of the line ASAP and reserved for another important task (such as siezing one the ends of the Arnhem bridges over the Rhine), and instead largely squandered as a line infantry company.

6. No, Patton's proposed counterattack at the Bulge certainly couldn't have ended the war by Jan 1, 1945. Maybe by March or April, but not January. In conjunction with another more successful operation, though, one wonders. . .

Cheers,

YD

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

I assume you're talking about 1USInfDivs failure to exploit the same gap before 2PzDiv turned up, yeah?

Right. That is, I'd have to look up whether it was the 2nd. Pz. Div., but it was either the 1st. or 29th. on the Allied side, probably the former.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

2. Anzio: Yes, sorry. Very early 1944, not 1943. But I think one of the problems defending the Anzio beachhead was that is was so shallow. Certainly, more ground could have been taken in the first days after the landing by the Allies when the Germans were really off guard. This would have given the Allies room to establish a defense in depth, forced the Germans to also commit more forces to simply holding the containment circle around the bridgehead, and also relieved the actual beach landings from much of the artillery harrasment, making it easier to efficiently land more forces. While an absolute cut-off of Southern Axis forces might not have been possible without help from Hitler (by his ordering German forces in the South to stay there after it was tactically wise), I believe a more successful landing and exploitation would have been a net gain for the Allies.

Certainly a greater depth of the lodgement area would have been preferable for all the reasons you mention and one or two more. But as previously stated, a larger perimeter would have required more troops, which would have required more supplies, which would have required more shipping, and so on. The only place the shipping, especially amphibious shipping, could come from, would have been the Pacific, and King had effectively scuttled that option.

BTW, it wasn't in Italy that Hitler was giving his give no ground orders. In fact, he was prepared to withdraw all the way to the Brenner Pass after the fall of Sicily. It was Kesselring who convinced him that the penninsula was defendable.

3. D-Day: Not really enough time to really address this fully, but for starters it boggles my mind that no one in the Allied command even recognized the potential problem bocage presented for an attacking force. I would not that there are areas of England that have terrain very similar to the Normandy bocage, and would have been ideal training grounds for Allied forces preparing for D-Day. I also believe that, while the plannings for the actual landings was very good, not enough thought was given as to how to actually get organized units moving inland on D-Day. As a result, it didn't happen.

Yep. The lack of thought for bocage is inexplicable to me, except that it shows how worried the Allied commanders were about even getting across the beach. That seems to have been getting all their concentrated attention. Exception being the deployment of the American airborne divisions to expedite an early capture of Cherbourgh.

4. Goodwood, Charnwoood, etc.: Briefly, if you don't have what it takes to do the job, then wait unit you have it. To my mind Goodwood and Charnwood were mostly wastes of good troops and valuable resources. I think Monty's whole keeping pressure in the Germans argument is a load of hogwash. Better of waiting until a more complete operation could be mounted.

While generally I would agree with you, I think the particular case of Normandy is something of an exception. It was of paramount importance to keep the Germans' attention fixed on the eastern part of the lodgement along with their armor. In order to do that, the Allies had to make it look like that's where their primary effort was going to fall. Also, you have to take into account that one reason those operations look as bad as they do is due to just plain bad luck. A couple of luckier rolls of the dice and we'd be saying other things about them and about Monty.

5. Market Garden: This is a topic worthy of a book. For starters, I would agree that the missed opportunity to cut off the German 15th Army just before MG was a big one.

Trapping 15th. Armee and clearing the banks of the Scheldt should have been absolute first priorities for 21st. Army Group. It was Eisenhower's failing not to have made that perfectly and firmly clear. Without Antwerp in operation, the Allied offensive practically grinds to a halt.

6. No, Patton's proposed counterattack at the Bulge certainly couldn't have ended the war by Jan 1, 1945. Maybe by March or April, but not January. In conjunction with another more successful operation, though, one wonders. . .

It would have made things a lot easier for the Allied armies.

Michael

[Splinty]

5. Market Garden: This is a topic worthy of a book. For starters, I would agree that the missed opportunity to cut off the German 15th Army just before MG was a big one.

Whether Patton had commanded MG or Monty had, I think MG would have had a much better chance of success if the reports of German armor at Arnhem had been believed and planned for, and if Col. Frost had working radios.

[i.i.koshkin]

The allies in the West were at the very end of their supply tether after the breakout in 1944. The only way (militarily) you can end the war earlier is by bringing the port of Antwerp into service, thus allowing further operations.

[Andrew H.]

There's always the interesting question (which has received a lot of scholarly attention starting in the 50's) of whether it would have made more sense to switch the position of the US and CW armies. That is, the US lands to the east, the CW to the west. The advantage of this would be that the US, with more manpower overall, would be closer to the Ruhr, and closer to Germany. It's a *similar* path to market garden, only on a much broader front and with the entire US army.

[Zitadelle]

I would also argue that a victory in 1944 would not have been possible for either the Western allies or Red Army primarily for the reason expressed in other postings- logistics.

With only time for a couple quick arguments-

By Summer/Early Fall 1944 the Western allies were at the limit of their logistical lines, and supply was becoming difficult. They would not had the capability of bringing sufficient supplies, manpower, nor equipment into battle and being able to maintain a strong offensive.

At the same time, the German supply lines were definitely shorter on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. Additionally, the German armed forces was still a sizable force on both fronts.

On the Eastern Front, the Russians were also experiencing problems with logistics and wearing down units. Operation Bagration made extensive advances, but at the end of that advance the Russian units were worn down dramatically, and the supply lines had been overextended. The Russians would not be able to resume extensive offensive operations along the central front until the beginning of 1945 (although the Southern Fronts were very actively as documented by Erickson).

In summary, neither allied force would have had the capability for victory due to logisitcal limitations.

One more argument- the Italian Front. I would argue that the Italian Front would not have had a dramatic affect on the outcome of the war after D-Day (sorry CMAK fans...). The Italian Front became a sideshow with D-Day- primarily based upon allied strategic concentration and a realization of the difficulty of fighting in Italy.

Moreover, earlier victories on the boot would not have resulted in successes that would have lead to an emphasis of that front. In the event Anzio would have succeeded, the Allies would probably have trapped more troops and advanced up the boot sooner. However, complete victory in Italy would not have shortened the war. Once Italy was taken, the next two options would have been difficult for taking Germany. The Allies would have either had to advance over the Alps which would not have worked, or proceed into Southern France through a terrain bottleneck of the Med and Southern Alps. I would argue that Italy was to become a deadend front.

[Leopard_2]

I think the best chance of ending the war 1944 would have been the Stauffenberg group being successful...

[MG TOW]

Dieppe. A good indication that an allied invasion would need alot of preparation to succeed. First blunder, Montbatten yanks naval support, Churchill doesn't want to risk his Belfast cruiser. So they have air support right. Well that got scaled back. Now enter Monty. Monty says " well if you aint got naval support, or air support for a seaborne invasion, then you gotta land everything in one single wave...tanks and all!"

Thats great Monty, but if you land everything in a single wave forget about aborting the mission, because there's nobody left to abort. Thus sealed the fate of a Canadian Brigade and a handful of Commandos and Rangers in august of 42. so no, the allies were not ready for an invasion for a long time to come.

As for shortening the war later on, yeah, Bradley could have bypassed the Hurtgeon forest altogether, this bought the time needed for the German's to launch their Bulge offensive. The Hurtgeon was a waste of resources and time. And played into the German's hands.