Calling All You Tactical Grogs...

[Andreas]

Another way the Red Army dealt with dug-in positions was by developing a deep loving for direct fire artillery assets. No self-respecting assault group would go into the attack without at least a few 45mm AT guns and 76.2mm regimental guns. When protection and speed of movement of these became an issue, Soviet engineers would put really big guns or howitzers into really well armoured vehicles - always a winner on the battlefield.

So if you were a Landser unfortunate enough to man a fire-point in a breakthrough sector in summer 1944, and somehow were spared in the aerial or artillery bombardment, chances were that within 15 minutes or so a 122mm round would knock on your door from a short distance - followed by a couple of sturdy fellows with submachine guns.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Tero:

The Finnish army had massed its reserves at Tali-Ihantala during the 10 day rear guard action.

That's not exactly true. Finns were about to mass their reserves at Ihantala area, but only weakened 18th Division and 3rd Brigade dealt with Soviet 21st Army until 25 June at this focal point.

Originally posted by Tero:

EDIT 2: According to Soviet sources there never was a Kotka-Kouvola operation. in his siege of Leningrad book Glanz however indicates the Red Army intention was to "push inland" but the attack was "rebuffed".

According to the wardiary of Soviet 21st Army, Stalin ordered 21 June the commander of the Leningrad Front, Marshal Govorov, to continue with the offensive, and reach Imatra, Lappenranta and Virojoki by 26th-28th June. Then towns of Kotka and Kouvola should be captured (hence the name Kotka-Kouvola operation). After that and with the help of the 59th Army, Helsinki should be "liberated".

[Keke]

Originally posted by Tero:

The only real difference is the brunt of the Iasi-Kischinjow was directed at two AK and the first day saw the near destruction of two divisions while the Viipuri Offensive was directed at the Western half of the Isthmus (IIRC one AK) and the Valkeasaari cambit shattered but not annihilated only elements one Finnish division. By the end the Iasi-Kischinjow operation was the end of AG South Ukraine while the Finnish army survived the Viborg-Petrozavodsk operation relatively intact.

One big difference is that whereas Finnish High Command was ready to withdraw and delay as soon as it was necessary, German Army had to deal with idiotic "stand fast" -orders, against which the Soviet Army had perfected itself.

[Mouse]

Originally posted by Andreas:

BTW - the reason I only saw this now is that those are not really tactical questions, they are operational. When someone says 'tactical' on this board I think of questions along the lines of 'How do I use the SU-76 against the King Tiger?' (answer: very carefully).

Oh that one's simple... use the SU-76 to drive as far and as fast as possible in the other direction, while being careful to maintain cover between you and the KT.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Keke:

That's not exactly true. Finns were about to mass their reserves at Ihantala area, but only weakened 18th Division and 3rd Brigade dealt with Soviet 21st Army until 25 June at this focal point.

Sorry about the inaccuracy.

Anyway, the reserves were being massed in the bay of Viipuri/Tali-Ihantala/Vuosalmi area as per original battle plan set down already when the the defences collapsed at Valkeasaari.

According to the wardiary of Soviet 21st Army, Stalin ordered 21 June the commander of the Leningrad Front, Marshal Govorov, to continue with the offensive, and reach Imatra, Lappenranta and Virojoki by 26th-28th June. Then towns of Kotka and Kouvola should be captured (hence the name Kotka-Kouvola operation). After that and with the help of the 59th Army, Helsinki should be "liberated".

That bit of info was not present in Soviet histography.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Keke:

One big difference is that whereas Finnish High Command was ready to withdraw and delay as soon as it was necessary, German Army had to deal with idiotic "stand fast" -orders, against which the Soviet Army had perfected itself.

True. It does seem like the Red Army 1944-style attacks were less effective when the defenders were willing/able to move around.

[Florian Gross]

JasonC is.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Russians' main problems are to direct their preplanned barrage sensibly despite limited intel,

IRL the intel the Red Army gathered on the opposing defensive positions before this kind of prepared, deliberate offensive was very, VERY extensive, exhaustive and above all extremely accurate. At times they even built mock ups of the positions and rehearsed attack against them to get the timing etc right.

They also dug assault trenched towards the enemy positions (as close as 70m from the first barbed wire obstacles) so the line of departure would be closer to the enemy defensive installations and the defenders could be surprised while still keeping their heads down after the barrage.

[Shosties]

JasonC, what would be appropriate dimensions for a map upon which this hypothetical, but archtypical, battle would take place?

Any feel for the width of zones dividing up the map and the number of flags that should be placed? Or would an exit objective for the Russians be best?

Also, what sort of terrain would the front tend to go static on and from which a major attack would be mounted? (Obviously this would vary with time and zone)

I'll take a crack at whipping this up in the scenario editor. It would be great for the purpose of learning how to create effective fireplans with the copious, but inflexible, Soviet artillery. It should also offer quite a challenge to the German defender. And it should definately have that "genuine East Front suck" feel to it.

[Shosties]

More relevent JasonC wisdom can be found here.

[JasonC]

1000-1500m wide for those force sizes. Up to 3 km deep. To depict a strong, concentrated attack use 1 km wide by 2 km deep.

The Russians should have an adequate depth for their set up zone, not a 200m strip with limited cover as the QB generator typically gives. They must, after all, deploy 20 platoons of infantry, 14 on map guns or mortars, and 18 MG teams. At a minimum they should have 400m of depth, with decent cover. 500-600m might be more comfortable.

The Germans should be allowed outposts at least as close as 200m from the foremost Russian positions, with 100m more realistic (not necessarily game effective) as an allowed set up area. Obviously their obstacles can start that far forward, as well.

Their forward line of real positions could be 200-400m behind the outpost limit. So the first km of board depth will only show the Russian set up zone, a thin no man's land, outpost line, and gap between that and the real German positions. Behind that the Germans would be expected to have layered strongpoints. At this scale, you are only seeing the forward company and its heavy weapons, so 2 layers deep should be enough.

Objectives should not start until the half way mark or a little beyond, corresponding to the first line of main German positions. Meaning 1km to 1.2 km from the Russian edge. Those should only be small flags. More small or perhaps 1-2 large flags could be used at the second line or about 1.5-1.6 km from the Russian edge. You can add additional large flags near the back of the map, on prominent terrain features if there are any there. The overall points available from flags should probably be between 900 and 1800.

As for the comment that the Russians would have perfect intel about the defending positions, not really. Yes, they would know more than CM Qbs tell you about enemy set up zones. But the defenders would have dugouts and cellars that are more resistant to shell fire than trenches are in CM, and might or might not be up manning the positions the Russians had IDed.

Similarly, the obstacles the Russians could face - and the trench systems - could be arbitrarily stronger than what I gave, which is meant for CM balance purposes. Real defense systems had miles of trenches in multiple lines with communications between them, occasionally tunnels from deep dugouts to firing positions or bunkers, continuous belts of wire miles long and sometimes multilayered, sometimes extensive minefields hundreds of meters deep, water obstacles, etc. Naturally the attackers picked their shots to avoid the worst of these things.

[86smopuim]

What about ruskiue versus built up town typical forces?

[Keke]

After rereading the source it seems that the 2km^2 deployment area of the 30th GRC was more like a forming up point, since it later states that the actual breakthrough area of the first 5 Bns (followed by the other 13 of 2 regiments) were actually 4km wide, backed by 778 pieces of artillery, almost 200 direct fire guns (tanks included) and heavy air support. Btw, the lines of 2 heavily depleted Finnish Bns opposing the Corps were shattered after only one hour of battle.

[ July 21, 2003, 09:59 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Andreas]

Keke, in that case that seems a low density to me for a 1944 operation. Are you sure they really attacked on a 4km front with the five BNs? Sometimes they would designate an actual main sector within the wider breakthrough sector. It also sounds as if a lot of forces were kept in the back. This could mean that they were less than clear about what faced them, and hoped to be able to reinforce success quickly.

That the two Finnish battalions were shattered in just an hour is hardly surprising. Standing in the way of the Soviet juggernaut must have been devastating. Poor sods.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Keke, in that case that seems a low density to me for a 1944 operation. Are you sure they really attacked on a 4km front with the five BNs?

That is what my source (Niilo Lappalainen: Ihantala kesti) tells me. It seems that both 45th GRD and 46th GRD had their own 2 km sectors, a lake (Leitimonjärvi) between them. After the breakthrough, 45th GRD managed to advance 3 km, and its attached tanks 8 km, before a counterattack of Finnish Jäger Brigade pushed it back almost to its starting positions. 46th GRD did better since it managed to advance almost 5 km before its advance stalled. 286th and 168th RD of the 110th RC had followed 46th GRD through the gap it had made.

Originally posted by Andreas:

Sometimes they would designate an actual main sector within the wider breakthrough sector. It also sounds as if a lot of forces were kept in the back. This could mean that they were less than clear about what faced them, and hoped to be able to reinforce success quickly.

Note that 2 divisions of 110th RC were send to the more succesful route of 46th GD.

[Andreas]

Ah okay - that is beginning to make sense to me now (doesn't mean much ) - the breakthrough area was separated by a lake, it would make sense to keep a strong force back, instead of committing them early, and risking them ending up on the wrong side of the lake.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Ah okay - that is beginning to make sense to me now (doesn't mean much ) - the breakthrough area was separated by a lake, it would make sense to keep a strong force back, instead of committing them early, and risking them ending up on the wrong side of the lake.

Here's some maps to get you oriented:

http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Kartat/cwdata/4406-07Tali-IhantalanTaistelu.html

http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Kartat/cwdata/4406-07Tali-IhantalanTaistelunAlku25-26.6.html

http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Kartat/cwdata/4406-07KannasIhantalanTykist%F6keskitys.html

from http://karjala.dyndns.org/metsapirtti/artikkelit/penttiahtiainen/jankajaak/janka05.htm

This last two places JR12 (jaeger/infantry regiment 12) AT assets on the map and the tanks KO'd in JR12 sector.

RK means 76,2mm regiment cannon, the 45 and 75 are selfexplanatory, PS kauhu means pzschreck and psnyrkkimiehiä means men armed with pzfausts.

[ July 22, 2003, 04:43 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

[Keke]

Originally posted by Tero:

Here's some maps to get you oriented:

The second one shows the offensive that started 25th June. 30th GRC is on the right, Leitimonjärvi (in the picture Leitimoj) dividing its offensive.

Edit: For reference reasons it should be mentioned that the city of Viipuri (Vyborg) is just SW of the map area.

[ July 22, 2003, 04:44 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Andreas]

Great link, and very interesting stuff. Thanks for that.

Looks like a nightmare area to attack through.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Looks like a nightmare area to attack through.

It's Finnish terrain, what did you expect?

[Wunsche]

Gentlemen,

I am ready to take a good sound whipping from the Soviets, trying to defend with the September 1943 forces that JasonC recommends early on in this thread. My problem is that I am having a tough time finding a good 1.5km x 3km map. Anyone have a decent one or know where I can get one? Thanks for your help.

Yann

[ August 25, 2003, 09:16 PM: Message edited by: Wunsche ]

[Ogre]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB] A typical Russian prep barrage would ...

I was going to chime in on the barrage moving into "interdiction" mode after pounding the known positions to stop/slow down any enemy reinforcements from entering the assualted area, but hell Jason, you've got that all covered in great detail. Nice info!

[Keke]

Bumping this old thread, since I found a nice map online showing the Soviet breakthrough 6/25 before the Finnish counterattacks. If I had a scanner I could post 5 maps like this about the Tali-Ihantala battle.

[Other Means]

Wunsche:

Gentlemen,

I am ready to take a good sound whipping from the Soviets, trying to defend with the September 1943 forces that JasonC recommends early on in this thread. My problem is that I am having a tough time finding a good 1.5km x 3km map. Anyone have a decent one or know where I can get one? Thanks for your help.

Yann

i'll take the other side of that if you like .

[Sergei]

Hey Wunsche, I've got a good 2,8 km times 2,8 km map from just south of Ihantala. You'll just have to set the deployment zones to north-south axis. If you're interested, I can send it to you.