Info on T34 add-on armor

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Besides, T-34s weren't Tigers, they were supposed to be mobile and as a result T-34s risked flank shots etc. more than a slugging tank like the Tiger. So with that mission giving that inherent vulnerability, maybe the Soviets decided it was pointless to waste extra steel on a T-34 front.

Disagree, the whole desgin of the T-34 was based on making it proof against Antitank guns. This was done after the horrific losses of the T-26 and BT tanks in spain vurses the small PaK 37 3,7cm. They went from fast light BT to larger heavier all round protection of the T34. The problem was that the Chassie would not beable to take the uparmouring required to defeat the main line 5cm and 7,5cm guns the Germans began deploying.

Ergo after mucking around with the chassie and various armour mods either through redigin or applique plates they went with a larger turret with a bigger gun as opposed to attempting to meet the original (pre war) desgin goals of having breakthrough tanks that are pretty much imprevious to anti tank guns.

[Bigduke6]

MickyD,

Thanks, I was just fishing for a reference on the Russian-language side, usually one will lead you to more. But if it's just the Germans then no biggie, I can dig around on my own. This is pretty interesting.

Barnstables,

Your argument that the "whole design" of the T-34s was to resist anti-tank guns, I think is flawed.

First, the T-34 was in series production before the T-26 and BT-series tank ever came into contact - well in Russia anyway, with the German 37mm. So, I think it really isn't so easy to argue that the T-34's design came in response to losses in the Barbarossa campaign.

Second, the later versions of the T-34 were increasingly more proof, frontally, against the German 50mm at most combat ranges. Yes I am aware of tungsten and close-range engagements, I am talking generally. But weight increases from the M40 to the M43/Late notwithstanding, the fact remains that by 1942 or so the Soviets had increased the frontal protection of the T-34 so that a 50mm round had to be lucky to penetrate, and the M43 effectively made the 50mm obsolete. Thus, I think it is difficult to accept your arguement the T-34's suspension was unable to handle sufficient armor to defeat 50mm AP. By 1943, it was doing just that.

You and I seem however to agree on the ultimate result of the Soviet attempts to keep their medium tanks on par with the Germans: ultimately the Soviets gave up on trying to make a medium tank resistant to the basic German anti-tank weapon. It made more sense from a resource POV to go for a medium tank capable of killing German medium tanks at most combat ranges, which of course is T-34/85. In other words, when the Soviets were faced with the options of uparmoring, upgunning and maintaining production volume, or designing a whole new tank and losing production volume, they went for guns and volume.

Seems to have worked too. Kind of makes you wonder how smart the Germans were to make Panthers, maybe it would have been better to make a whole lot more MarkIVs. Of course, that assumes unlimited amounts of German steel, which there wasn't.

Finally, I think your understanding and my understanding of what a breakthrough tanks differ. From my POV, the Soviets successfully built a tank specifically designed to be resistant to (practically) all anti-tank weapons of its day - the KV-1. The Soviets ultimately backed off from that "all-around proof" design approach, first by lightening the vehicle to KV-1S to obtain more mobility at the expense of protection, and later by building the Stalin series which was only proof against the 75mm L/48, and then not at all ranges and aspects. Those were vehicles designed as "breakthrough tanks" from the tracks up.

T-34 was different. I for one have never heard of the T-34 being designed as a breakthrough tank, and I've read a bit on the subject. My understanding was the T-34 was designed to be the backbone of the mobile mechanized and tank Corps; and in those formations its role in battle according to doctrine was not breakthrough, but exploitation.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

MickyD,

Barnstables,

Your argument that the "whole design" of the T-34s was to resist anti-tank guns, I think is flawed.

First, the T-34 was in series production before the T-26 and BT-series tank ever came into contact - well in Russia anyway, with the German 37mm. So, I think it really isn't so easy to argue that the T-34's design came in response to losses in the Barbarossa campaign.

Spain, the T-34 was concieved due to experience in Spain.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

MickyD,

T-34 was different. I for one have never heard of the T-34 being designed as a breakthrough tank, and I've read a bit on the subject. My understanding was the T-34 was designed to be the backbone of the mobile mechanized and tank Corps; and in those formations its role in battle according to doctrine was not breakthrough, but exploitation.

Yes breakthrough and explotiation so the armour needed to be proof from all attack angles:front, sides, rear. The Germans post spain went with the PIII setup where front and rear armour are thick and side armour is sligtly lower. PIV reflected a diffrent doctrine where it was envisiged for frontal assult on fixed positions meaning side and rear armour where the same and front armour was thicker.

KV was a failuer and a diffrent desgin doctrine thick armour ment to be imprevious in stright slabs. Automotive performance was terrible so armour was removed in reaction to frontline reports that the KV was too slow and tended to get left behind. It did not make much diffrence as by 1943 and the advent of the new lower armour KV 1S the Germans were using the long 5cm and long 7,5cm guns as the main anti tankweapons. (leading to the calls that resulted in the IS series tanks). T34 was to do both breakthrough and explotiation ergo needed speed, so to make it imprevious to antitank weapons without having to use tons of armour they went with High hardness armour that was sloped, which is what they did with the BT series tanks earlier execpt the T-34 had much thicker armour than the BT tanks.

[Guest Mike]

The intial prototype that became the T34 only had 20mm or armour (the A-20), sloped as the T34's - this was increased to 30mm in hte A-32, but it was noted that the tank could support more weight, so 45mm was adopted, and it remained that on the T34.

It was tested against 45mm gunfire, even though the tank itself carried a 76mm gun.

BT-5 and T-26 tanks in Spain had been rendered completely ineffective by Natinoalist 37mm anti-tankguns whenever these were present, so the 37mm threat was well known.

The T34 prototypes WERE actually designed as "breakthrough" tanks - but to do so by virtue of speed rather than heavy armour - they were to replace the BT series of fast tanks, and the T50 was to replace the T26 infantry tank. as we all know now the T50 didn't eventuate, and the T34 filled both roles rather handily.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Seems to have worked too. Kind of makes you wonder how smart the Germans were to make Panthers, maybe it would have been better to make a whole lot more MarkIVs. Of course, that assumes unlimited amounts of German steel, which there wasn't.

No I don't think so, PIV required 2000 manhours to manufacture as did the Panther. July 5th 1944 cost comparision Panther 117,100 Riech marks PIV: 103,462 Riech Marks. Not including weapons or radios. Tiger: 250,800 Riech Marks. Panther production rampped up much faster than T-34 production on a year by year basis. cost effectivness is not with the PIV.

And it only seems to have worked because German Tank production was eaten up fighting the Western allies post Normandy, bulge southern france ect. Note that the only time rebuilt PZ divisions were sent east again were for the failed Operation spring offensives in Hungery. The exchange ratio of tanks/industrlised war was not on the Soviet side.

[ November 21, 2006, 04:06 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

MickyD,

Second, the later versions of the T-34 were increasingly more proof, frontally, against the German 50mm at most combat ranges. Yes I am aware of tungsten and close-range engagements, I am talking generally. But weight increases from the M40 to the M43/Late notwithstanding, the fact remains that by 1942 or so the Soviets had increased the frontal protection of the T-34 so that a 50mm round had to be lucky to penetrate, and the M43 effectively made the 50mm obsolete. Thus, I think it is difficult to accept your arguement the T-34's suspension was unable to handle sufficient armor to defeat 50mm AP. By 1943, it was doing just that.

No the T34 chassie was not able to handle the uparmoring which is why they moved away form all round armour protection to upgrading the turret (esp the front as 5cm L/60 guns could defeat the turret armour at normal 1000m ranges). or applique armour on the front hull only. Plus the failed experiments in redesgined T-34M's. T-34 was desgined for and pretty much proof vurses the main anti tank weapons during the opening of barbarossa. It could not handle being uparmoured all around to be proof vurses either the PaK38 nor PaK40

As you point out your self the amount of armour needed to protect vurses the new German guns had the IS armour configuration similar to Panther's. Not at all like the armour configurations of the KV, tiger or equal all round protection of the T-34.

Soviet studies and figures have about 30% of T-34 losses in 1943 due to 5cm holes in them, the year when 5cm guns were no longer the main Anti-tank weapon. compare this to figures of less than 5% with the 3,7cm 1941 the main anti tank weapon of infantry and Panzer Div's.

[ November 21, 2006, 04:30 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

here are the pictures from Zaloga's "T-34 in action" which i mentioned earlier.

[Count D'Ten]

Originally posted by Bastables:

cost effectivness is not with the PIV.

And it only seems to have worked because German Tank production was eaten up fighting the Western allies post Normandy, bulge southern france ect. Note that the only time rebuilt PZ divisions were sent east again were for the failed Operation spring offensives in Hungery. The exchange ratio of tanks/industrlised war was not on the Soviet side.

Very interesting, but I'm not sure I follow. Combat losses, for example, are only part of the total cost. (Have you ever driven a British sports car?) We'd need to know whether PIV's were more reliable in the field on the one hand -- and compare the real tank attrition on the Eastern and Western fronts on the other, factoring in that even simple mechanical or logistic breakdowns are lost to a rapidly retreating army. Great post however, given me lot to think about.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Count D'Ten:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

cost effectivness is not with the PIV.

And it only seems to have worked because German Tank production was eaten up fighting the Western allies post Normandy, bulge southern france ect. Note that the only time rebuilt PZ divisions were sent east again were for the failed Operation spring offensives in Hungery. The exchange ratio of tanks/industrlised war was not on the Soviet side.

Very interesting, but I'm not sure I follow. Combat losses, for example, are only part of the total cost. (Have you ever driven a British sports car?) We'd need to know whether PIV's were more reliable in the field on the one hand -- and compare the real tank attrition on the Eastern and Western fronts on the other, factoring in that even simple mechanical or logistic breakdowns are lost to a rapidly retreating army. Great post however, given me lot to think about. </font>

[undead reindeer cavalry]

browsed thru Zaloga's "T-34/76 medium tank 1941-1945" but it didn't contain additional info. however "Soviet tanks in combat 1941-1945" had this picture:

[Bigduke6]

Ok, I did a little digging.

First, here's a 1945 list of what was manufactured where:

Cheliabinsk Kirovsky ChTZ – IS and ISU

Gorkiy No 112 “Krasnoe Sormogo”* – T-34/85

Gorkiy GAZ – SU-76M and BA-64

Lenigrad Kirovskiy Factory – IS

Mytishchin # 40 – Su-76M

Nizhniy Tagil # 183 – T-34/85

Omsk, # 174 – T-34/85

Sverdlovsk, Uralmash – Su-100

*Note Zladoga translates this as "Sormovo". Although phonetically this is correct by standard transliteration rules this is incorrect. No matter, Zladoga is generally an excellent source.

Trivia: Gorky 112 first installed the AT chicken wire we’ve seen on T-34/76, yes that's 76, in 1944. However, the pictures that we’ve all seen of the stripey tanks in Berlin with the faust screens are from 1st Guards Tank Army, which improvised the screens across the force prior to the assault on the Seelow height. The picture’s we’ve seen of IS and T-34/85 with the screens are elements of 36th Guards Tank Brigade.

I didn't know that, I thought it would be interesting to some of you. Remember, if it had chicken wire on the turret, it was attacking Berlin and it belonged to Zhukov.

http://www.smallafv.nn.ru/gallery/Warlock_t34.html

Some general T-34 tidbits.

T-34 turrets were cast, but the plates were machined, and so more resilient. This is why the turret got thickened faster than the hull.

Low engine, suspension, track, and transmission life was not poor engineering but a conscious decision to maximize production by using cheaper components subject to earlier failure. The M40 T-34 on average was expected to operate 2.5 – 5 times longer than a T-34/85, depending on the subassembly one is talking about.

Thus Barnstables, the T-34 was most certainly not a Jaguar. It was rather more like a Hertz rental car: use it, abuse it, and then throw it away.

http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2-34

Here is where I hit paydirt on the armor plate question -

Tank T-34 in the Great Patriotic War, Igor Shmelev, Tekhnika and Vooruzhenie No 11-12, 1998)

Smelev writes:

“…There were also attempts to strengthen the armored defense of the hull of the T-34. At the very beginning of the war the design bureau of Factory number 183 received a proposal to increase the thickness of the bow armor and the turret to 60mm, and to prepare two improved vehicles by August 1931. It was proposed that as of 1 January 1942 the STZ (Stalingrad) would shift to the manufacture of these vehicles.

In surrounded Leningrad technicians (also)attempted to increase with layered armor the hulls and turrets of already existing tanks with plates of up to 15mm thickness.

In 1942 factory number 112 manufactured an unknown number of vehicles with welded on additional plates on the upper frontal hull. By this means, the armor thickness at this point was increased to 75mm. However, this was nonetheless merely palliatives.”

http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/T34/Shmelev2.html

So there you have it. The plates were pretty much a temporary expedient produced by a couple of factories, to different standards, at STZ and GTZ 112. The STZ plate was 15mm more or less, and the GTZ plate was something like 35mm.

The production appears to have taken place from some point in 1942, to the point in late 1943 where both these two factories began retooling for T-34/85. It is not clear whether these two factories were making ALL of their T-34s with thickened fronts, or only some, but the circumstance evidence is overwhelming that it was some, not all.

If we start trying to figure out what percentage of these uparmored T-34s was in the fleet, for starters we need to remember the Battle of Stalingrad took place during this time frame, and so output at STZ suffered a bit.

During this time, January 1942 - August 1943 roughly, these two factories were in any case two of four factories producing T-34s; the others being Omsk and Nizhniy Tagil. There is no evidence Omsk and Nizhniy Tagil ever having produced uparmored T-34s.

(Weren’t T-34s also made in Leningrad at some point? Any one know off hand?)

It is impossible to say what percentage of the fleet was “thickened front”, of either type, during the period the “thick front” T-34s were produced.

Photographic evidence suggests less than one in ten vehicles fielded from say Feb 42 through September 43. That’s my estimate not Shmelev’s.

Still, it would be nice to have a tank like that in CMBB, seeing as such vehicles clearly were fielded. If the Germans can have Tigers, which AKAIK were way less than one in ten of the German fleet, in fairness the Soviets ought to have the beefed-up T-34s. They don't, of course.

I will add that Shmelev is one of the top Russian-language experts on Soviet armored vehicles accessible by the Internet. A good deal of the Russian Battlefield site goes straight back to Smelev’s site.

For example, here

http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/T34/inbattle/

is a link to an actual 1942 operating manual for the T-34 tank. I suggest reading it, unfortunately there is no translation that I know of.

[ November 22, 2006, 09:09 AM: Message edited by: Bigduke6 ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Some general T-34 tidbits.

T-34 turrets were cast, but the plates were machined, and so more resilient. This is why the turret got thickened faster than the hull.

Low engine, suspension, track, and transmission life was not poor engineering but a conscious decision to maximize production by using cheaper components subject to earlier failure. The M40 T-34 on average was expected to operate 2.5 – 5 times longer than a T-34/85, depending on the subassembly one is talking about.

You seem to be restating arguments I've put forward but in a slightly diffrent way.

You: Uparmoured the turret because it was cast and weaker vurses high hardness RHA armour.

Me: Uparmoured turret because it was a weak point vurses German anti tank weapons.

You: T-34 was built to shody standreds as a concious desision to increase war prodection.

Me: T34 built to awful standreds and accepted by the Army/state to increase war production. Leads on to the fact that up armouring and or up gunning placed increased strain on a chassie that had issues moving 200 km in 1940-41 and moving 100km in 1942.

This also ignores that the V-2 diesel engine that drove the T-34's and KV's was limited to a mean service life of 800km in 1942 yet would consume it's oil supply in about 145-150km.

So no T34's are not reliable hertz cars who's only danger to their mechanical lives is poor driving: They (t-34) will break down at realitily short intervals independent of how much "abuse" they've been given. The choice of expendable T-34 is not with the "user." They were "expendable" thrown away becasue usually they would be shot or burned resulting in a total loss before their short mechanical life could be brought to it's conclusion.

[Bigduke6]

Barnstables,

Not shoddy standards. Targeted standards. There is such a thing as over-engineering. No one makes toilet paper that will remain absorbent under a monsoon. No one makes a food package that resists the elements longer than the shelf life of the food inside. To do so, would be a waste of resources.

If tanks are routinely lost in combat at 50 - 100 kilometers on the road clock, what is the point of expending the resources of building them to run for 500 kilometers? They only need to run until the front stops moving, then you overhaul them. Typically that was 250 kilometers or so.

If you have a source demonstrating T-34s couldn't manage 250 kilometers, I'd love to see it. From what I've read, Soviet tankers considered the vehicle rugged and reliable.

Did you take a look at the T-34 user's manual?

[Inola]

As I just read from posts of Svirin (famous historian of WW2 in Russia), T-34 with additional plates were prodused in 1942. Additional plates were put on tanks with non-diesel engine (M-17) to prevent them from fire after being shot.

[Melnibone]

FYI

Last post on page is interesting.

"According to a report by the Scientific Institute for Armored Equipment (NIBT) to Ya. N. Fedorenko, the chief of the Red Army’s Auto-Armored Directorate, the average distance a T-34 travelled before requiring overhaul (capital repairs) did not exceed 200 kilometers."

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

Not shoddy standards. Targeted standards. There is such a thing as over-engineering. No one makes toilet paper that will remain absorbent under a monsoon. No one makes a food package that resists the elements longer than the shelf life of the food inside. To do so, would be a waste of resources.

If tanks are routinely lost in combat at 50 - 100 kilometers on the road clock, what is the point of expending the resources of building them to run for 500 kilometers? They only need to run until the front stops moving, then you overhaul them. Typically that was 250 kilometers or so.

If you have a source demonstrating T-34s couldn't manage 250 kilometers, I'd love to see it. From what I've read, Soviet tankers considered the vehicle rugged and reliable.

Did you take a look at the T-34 user's manual?

Cribbed from TDI

According to a report by the Scientific Institute for Armored Equipment (NIBT) to Ya. N. Fedorenko, the chief of the Red Army’s Auto-Armored Directorate, the average distance a T-34 traveled before requiring overhaul (capital repairs) did not exceed 200 kilometers.

Targeted? You mean building T-34's in reevacuated factories with unskilled recently concripted women and teenage laboureres having no previous skills in tank manufacturers is targted? You mean constant fretting and worrying by Soviet engieeners in rasing the mechanical reliablity of shoddy Drivetrains underpreforming engines was targeted? Losing entire year tank production lots to combat in spaces of 3 months was targted?

At this time the T-34 was mechanicaily desgined to have a running life before overhaul of 1000km. That was the target of the desgin it failed this. Never achived this till 1944 where it was able to reach a mean distance of 1800km in the T-34-85 (similar to equvilent year Panther Units). The State/Army accepted any T-34 no matter how poorly built becasue the situation was dire and they needed any tank not through some calculation that you only need operational manouver of about 4-5 days.

[ November 23, 2006, 12:36 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Bastables:

........ Losing entire year tank production lots to combat in spaces of 3 months was targted?.........

Love to see the figures for a years production of any tank lost in 3 months.........I think your source is wrong.

Whatever the Soviet practise was one thing stands out.....IT WORKED!

[Bastables]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

........ Losing entire year tank production lots to combat in spaces of 3 months was targted?.........

Love to see the figures for a years production of any tank lost in 3 months.........I think your source is wrong.

Whatever the Soviet practise was one thing stands out.....IT WORKED! </font>

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Try opening year of Barbarossa.

So you are talking about pre-war peacetime production! Obviously you have the production figures/years for the 21,000 light tanks in Soviet service on 22/06/41? Can you post them?

Using the same sleight of hand we could show that in 1941 the heavy tank stock was destroyed twice and the medium tank force destroyed 2.5 times

[Bastables]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

Try opening year of Barbarossa.

So you are talking about pre-war peacetime production! Obviously you have the production figures/years for the 21,000 light tanks in Soviet service on 22/06/41? Can you post them?

Using the same sleight of hand we could show that in 1941 the heavy tank stock was destroyed twice and the medium tank force destroyed 2.5 times </font>

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Production of AFV 1941 and only 1941: 6590 (1996 Harrison: pg180).

Or 5,600 light,medium and heavy tanks produced in 1941.

(Krivosheev)

What about tank/SP production in 1942, 28,000.

1943, 27,000.

1944, 35,000

1945, 13,5OO (to May 1945)

Losses in 1941-45 20,000/15,000/23,500/23,700/13,700.

looks like 1945 is the only year that the tank park went backwards as they had a net loss of 200 tanks that year.The Soviets still had 25,000 tanks and 10,000 SP guns in May 1945.

[Guest Mike]

I'm confused - soviet tank losses in 1941 were pretty much all it's pre-war production - is this point in question?

If not then what's the slight of hand? it's a pretty simple statement of fact - an accumulation of production from (more or less) peaceful years got hammered.

there's nothing unusual in this as far as I can see - that's what happens to stockpiles - they get used up...some faster than otehrs.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

[ I'm confused - soviet tank losses in 1941 were pretty much all it's pre-war production - is this point in question?

The 'confusion' is I was assuming wartime production not the slower peacetime production. That is all.

[Bigduke6]

Barnstables,

Before I get going on the technical side, I challenge you to produce documented instances of even a marginally significant number Soviet women forcibly conscripted to work on a T-34 assembly line, and so producing shoddy products. I say you invented that.

I say the overwhelming attitude of all workers in Soviet war factories was, essentially: We are making the tools so our soldiers can kick the German murderers out of our country. I say this made perfect sense, since the best status a Soviet citizen could have under the German occupation was slave with no rights.

Cetainly the Soviets treated some portions of its own population that way, most obviously the Tartars and Chechens. Ethnic minorities like that did not work in arms factories generally, and specifically in critical arms factories like one of the four T-34 plants.

Put up or shut up.

On the technical side, yeah well, needing capital overhaul, and actually failing as a result of not having capital overhaul, are two different things.

It was from what I can tell routine after about a month of offensive operations in a typical tank army for the tank fleet to "require" capital overhaul front to back. They all had travelled more than, say, 250 kilometers in substantially off-road conditions.

Did that stop offensive operations? Did the entire tank fleet suddenly grind to a halt? Did the Germans, just about ever, recover ground captured by a major Soviet offensive operation?

Of course there are exceptions, but the general answer to all of the above is an emphatic "no". In fact, once the Soviets got on their game, say late '42 early '43, a Soviet tank-heavy offensive was almost inevitably a successful thing at least to a distance of 150 - 200 kilometers, sometimes 250 - 300 kilometers. In spite of all the tanks needing overhaul in the latter stages of the offensive.

I would say the T-34 did the job it was designed for. There is an important distinction here - there is a big difference between what the engineers design for, and the operational planners design for. The T-34 fit the needs of Soviet operational technique, and that was sufficient. So what if the vehicle design specs weren't met.

If any one sees a problem with that logic, then that person needs to answer the question: How much more effective would the Red Army have been, if its T-34 fleet had a practical operational radius of (say) 1,000 kilometers, and not 200 - 250 kilometers?

The first question I would ask is: How far could the Red Army operate from its railheads?

I would add there are plenty of anecdotal reports of T-34/76 that made it all the way to Berlin and Prague, so assuming a T-34 would inevitably fall apart into a useless pile of scrap metal at kilometer 251 is counterfactual.

As an aside, one needs to be careful with drawing conclusions from raw statistics. Although it is true T-34/85 throughout its service life was more reliable than the earlier marks, there are some facts that logically argue against that happening, particularly the overloaded front end, and new model teething problems, the vehicles overall greater complexity, and the maintenance system's lack of experience with the new vehicle.

In some ways, the fact T-34/85 turned out to be more "reliable" than earlier marks of the tank doesn't make any sense.

But of course, there are also good reasons T-34/85 has a better maintenance record than the earlier marks: an additional crewman, and more of them operated on a better road net. But even more important was, obviously, by the time T-34/85 was fielded, the Soviets were advancing. Ground they captured they practically never lost, therefore,

a busted T-34/85 eventually got fixed. Prior to Autumn '43 busted T-34/76 frequently got captured by the advancing Germans.

Things like that affect maintenance numbers. I would argue this is a big reason why the Soviets managed to push the practical operational range of their vehicles past the 1,000 km. point by late 1944: Sooner or later, by that time in the war, the Germans always lost the battlefield, and they lost it catastrophically enough so that removal or even destruction of captured T-34s was not possible.

Even more important, I think, was the increasing professionlism in the Red Army as the war wore on. Even green crews sent to units as early as Autumn '42 were without exception fully-trained. Crews thrown into battle June 41 - 42 inclusive often were half-trained, and there are instances of conscripted factory workers driving their tanks right off the assembly line into battle. (Katiukov).

By mid-'43 the Soviet tank force was a thoroughly veteran force, after all even though the Germans were KOing Soviet tanks wholesale Soviet tankers were mostly surviving along with their combat experience.

By early '45 it is arguable - not an incontrovertible fact, but at least arguable - that the Red Army operated the most experienced mechanized units the world has ever seen. Formations like the 1-3 Guards Tank Armies had been in continuous and generally successful large-scale combat for close to three years against the premier European army of the 20th century - the German Wehrmacht.

It is of course true the German panzer formations had more experience as per the time line, but as the arguement goes by the later stages of the war resource problems forced the Germans to lower the standards of their panzer force, and as time wore on, the lower the standards went.

It is nice Cold War rhetoric to argue the Soviet mechanized forces was just a faceless flood of Asian men and machines. For those interested in an alternate point of view, I suggest reading the memoirs of Katukov, Rotmistrov, Konev, Rokkosovsky etc. These guys were pros, and by the end of the war they commanded throroughly professional mechanized forces.

The point to this little tangental rah-rah advertisement for the Red Army, of course, is that the backbone of this force at the apex of its efficiency was the T-34/85. Even a terrible tank - which the T-34/85 was not - operated by pros will function a lot longer than a great tank operated by untrained idiots.

Along those same lines, I wonder how it is possible to characterize the Soviet Union as an agrarian nation, when literacy was in the 70 -80 per cent range, at the war's beginning they fielded the T-34 and KV-1, and the country was AFAIK the second largest producer of steel in the world.