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SPW availability at mid-war, from Kursk OOBs


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How many SPW mounted infantry formations at midwar in the east?

The following is a summary of SPW units in the German OOB at the start of Kursk. I include (at the bottom) mobile units that did not take part but that might have.

North -

9th Army

2nd PD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 2 recon companies, 1 pioneer company 6/17

9th PD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 2 recon companies, 1 pioneer company 6/17

20th PD - part of 1 Pz Gdr battalion 1/17

18th PD - None 0/18

13/69

Gruppe Esebeck (initial reserve, committed behind 9th Army)

4th PD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company 4/18

12th PD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 pioneer company 4/18

10th PGD - none 0/18

8/54

21/123 subtotal AG Center

South - 4th PzA

48 Pz Krps

PD GD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion with extra company, 1 recon company 5/31

3rd PD - part of 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company 2/18

11th PD - part of 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company, 1 pioneer platoon 3/18

10/69

2 SS Pz Krps

1SS - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company, 1 pioneer company 5/29

2SS - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company 4/24

3SS - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company 4/24

13/77

23/146 subtotal 4th PzA

South - AD Kempf

6th PD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company, 1 pioneer company 5/18

7th PD - 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company, 2 pioneer companies 6/18

19th PD - part of 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 pioneer company 2/18

13/54

36/200 subtotal AG South used

57/323 subtotal used

24 Pz Krps, AG South reserve, not used

5SS - none 0/16

17th PD - part of 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company 2/18

23rd PD - part of 1 Pz Gdr battalion, 1 recon company, 1 pioneer company 3/18

5/52

41/252 subtotal AG South

62/375 overall total

The overall total is 1/6 mobile infantry companies. While some Heer panzer divisions had as much as 1/3, the same overall 1/6 was seen on average in most of the attack sectors. Only AD Kempf was appreciably higher, at 1/4.

Also note that the extra weight of the SS and GD formations is greater infantry depth, not a higher portion mounted in SPWs. Together they have 18 out of 108 infantry companies in SPWs, exactly 1/6. What is unusual about these favored formations is simply that 4 divisions have 108 infantry companies, instead of 72 i.e. they are about half again as big as a standard mobile division, overall.

This is only the mobile divisions. Infantry divisions committed to the attack had another 550 infantry type companies. 4 of these were motorized (all pioneer), and 36 had bicycles, leaving 510 entirely on foot.

Overall -

62/925 or 1/15 in SPWs

317/925 or 1/3 in trucks

36/925 or 1/25 on bikes

510/925 or 5/9 on foot

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12 PD was initially part of the exploitation reserve for the northern attack. It was moved closer to the front, anticipating commitment, on 10 July, along with the 36 motorized. On 11 July, Kluge formally released both to Model. A KG from 12 PD advanced that day, to positions just behind 47 Panzer Corps. There was no breakthrough to exploit, and it did not enter combat.

On 12 July, both 12 PD and 36 motorized were ordered north for defensive use, following the Russian counterattacks. 9th Army went over to the defensive. It was as close as a mobile division got to being committed, that wasn't. I include it just as I include the units from 24 Panzer Corps in the south, because it could easily have been committed (indeed, was ordered, but didn't have time to execute before the orders changed).

Its Pz Gdr regiments were 5 and 25. I/25 was equipped with SPWs, the rest were trucked. The pioneer battalion was 32. 3/32 was equipped with SPWs. The recon battalion had 5 companies, one of armored cars (1) and one heavy (5), and 3 recon proper, numbers 2 through 4. None of the recon proper companies were armored.

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mhh stupid me but what is the RL advantage of a SPW above a truck (as I understand in RL SPW were hardly used in assaulting/battlefield conditions, so why bother with the armour if all you want to do is transport people fast from a to b? was it mainly the fact that SPW apparwently have better off road capabilites? Did this matter so much in the "big" picture?) Sorry for asking but it does intrigues me what the idea/reasonong was for this obsession with SPW's

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What obsession with SPWs? The participants, or modern armored infantry people looking back, or wargamers who enjoy hotrodding and don't mind "recon by death" because nobody is actually getting killed?

The extra value of SPWs in the real deal was (1) better off road ability from partial tracks rather than all wheels and (2) some protection against indirect artillery shrapnel, making it easier for them to advance clear to the jump off point, to resupply the men with ammo or evacuate wounded during a barrage, etc.

Recon guys would also scout from them mounted, with the idea of skedaddling if any real opposition was encountered. This is for patrols and screening operations in thin, quiet sectors, or wide open terrain e.g. desert or steppe. They were no doubt better at it than trucks. Along with armored cars, their MGs could try to pin enemy probes at range and then disengage.

Offensively, the ability to move through a barrage could also let the SPW mounted battalions keep up with the tank spearheads better, when the tanks had already crushed the opposition - or it was a gap in the enemy lines and there wasn't any - despite occasional shelling and such. They were less likely to get stripped off the tanks, in other words, by less than full battle line opposition.

These are all nice things to have, but only marginally better than trucks. Trucks or SPWs, either, are better than being on foot because they can get to where they are needed in an operational sense, and keep up with an operational breakthrough if one is achieved.

Actually fighting through an enemy defense was not what they were for. Tanks did that, with arty support and dismounted infantry. Dismounted infantry was especially called on to help when the terrain or enemy tactic was unsuited to tanks, and made use of dismounted infantry's long suits - stealth and use of cover.

E.g. when there are minefields, anti-tank ditchs, streams to cross or bridges to seize, ravines, woods, towns, rocky high ground, or you want to advance quietly at night - then you call on the infantry. SPWs don't help with any of these. Tanks do all the attacking jobs better when those conditions aren't present, and dismounts do all of those jobs better when they are.

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