Maneuver and Annihilation Battle

[Mick_Oz]

This is a most interesting and useful thread. Congrats to the OP, Jason and the other contributors. I've been away from these forums for quite awhile (after ROW V, RL got very busy) and am heartened to see that the quality of discussion hasn't diminished. One question: how far behind the recon screen advance would normally be appropriate for the main body?

Secondly, if anyone is up for a CMBB pbem (QB or otherwise), drop me a line at mick_hv@optusnet.com.au

[Cuirassier]

"how far behind the recon screen advance would normally be appropriate for the main body?"

I would say it depends on the terrain. In tight terrain (woods etc), I think the main body could probably travel safely 50-100m behind the recon screen. In terrain with less cover, I think between 200-300m would be appropriate.

[Cuirassier]

I have another question for JasonC: With the recon screen, should the full squads on line being the leading elements, or will there be some halfsquads ahead of them to trigger ambushes?

[Urban Shocker]

An example of maneuver tactics:

A wealthy old lady decides to go on a photo safari in Africa, taking her faithful aged poodle named Cuddles, along for the company.

One day the poodle starts chasing butterflies and before long, Cuddles discovers that he's lost.. Wandering about, he notices a leopard heading rapidly in his direction with the intention of having lunch.

The old poodle thinks, "Oh, oh! I'm in deep doo-doo now!" Noticing some bones on the ground close by, he immediately settles down to chew on the bones with his back to the approaching cat. Just as the leopard is about to leap the old poodle exclaims loudly, "Boy, that was one delicious leopard! I wonder if there are any more around here?"

Hearing this, the young leopard halts his attack in mid-strike, a look of terror comes over him and he slinks away into the trees. "Whew!", says the leopard, "That was close! That old poodle nearly had me!"

Meanwhile, a monkey who had been watching the whole scene from a nearby tree, figures he can put this knowledge to good use and trade it for

protection from the leopard. So off he goes, but the old poodle sees him heading after the leopard with great speed, and figures that something must be up. The monkey soon catches up with the leopard, spills the beans and strikes a deal for himself with the leopard.

The young leopard is furious at being made a fool of and says, "Here, monkey, hop on my back and see what's going to happen to that conniving

canine!

Now, the old poodle sees the leopard coming with the monkey on his back and thinks, "What am I going to do now?", but instead of running, the dog sits down with his back to his attackers, pretending he hasn't seen them yet, and just when they get close enough to hear, the old poodle says.

"Where's that darn monkey? I sent him off an hour ago to bring me another leopard!"

The ultimate of maneuver tactics: A bloodless victory by attacking the mind of the enemy.

[JasonC]

Cuirassier - on half squad scouts, no, usually they would not be used. Don't want to telegraph the line is coming and they don't create enough of a threat. Occasionally it makes sense for terrain reasons, though.

E.g. a 100m wide clearing has to be crossed by a full platoon on my left, during a line-wave advance. I will detach one half squad and send it across first, at "run", then cross the rest at "run" the following minute if he makes it. Expecting the pause to be made up by the dash, restoring on-line alignment with the platoon next to the right.

The principle, though, is you are trading security for speed. A careful attrition-ee attack picks its way forward by comparison. Half squad first, find out what is there, select the perfect counter from your combined arms bag of tricks, remove or exchange off for minimum cost - all that is an entirely different idea and not what a recon screen is trying to do in these attacks. It is too slow. It doesn't create an immediate threat of penetrating deep into the enemy position wherever it is weak.

What limits ambush losses anyway? Only a portion of the line will strike any single enemy position. The enemy typically won't be aligned perfectly with the approaching wavefront, particularly if you picked the route well or have already made your way partially around one flank.

Where the enemy does clobber the recon line, you can in principle fix it inward from both edges, send a main body element over it. But it is more thematic to flat ignore the stronger point (or just suppress by ranged fire, arty or a heavy weapons group set up opposite e.g.) and push harder in the places that weren't strong, instead.

The goal isn't minimal own-side losses or setting up cheap kills of the most exposed enemy positions. It is getting deep lots of places the enemy would rather not have you around, and in the process blinding him over much of the map.

In a paper-scissors-rock sense, what you are countering and best suited to clobber, are thin outposts, enemy half squad scouts, LMG teams, the odd TH or ATR or sniper. Even a few delaying HMGs meant to carry the ranged fight. You want to just sweep through all that stuff at speed, taking control of any locations not occupied by full platoons or more.

Think square meters secured divided by time spent, that is the success metric being aimed at. Not enemy KOed divided by men lost.

[JasonC]

U.S. - and the typical outcome of purist no fighting maneuverism, the bluffer is lunch.

Attrition tactics will beat that approach hands down, simply because they aim at "laying your ship alongside the enemy". Not trying to avoid all losses (don't think it is possible), so long as plenty are inflicted. And largely ignores the enemy plan. (Think Grant bulling ahead in the Wilderness campaign).

What can get fooled by such mind games, though, is an enemy who himself is trying to anticipate enemy plans and change whatever he does to counter this or that. Two perfectionist maneuverists playing paper scissors rock, in other words.

[JasonC]

On distances behind the screen for the main body, in CM Cuirassier's figures are about right for infantry. The lesser one only in full woods, though, and the right distance is heavily terrain dependent.

The principle is to be able to arrive behind any open spot the line finds in a couple of minutes, not giving the enemy a chance to react and "shut the door" with reserves. But you also want to stay far enough back that he doesn't see where the main body decides to go, if the recon screen kills his outposts in that area.

With both, you want to create the impression that a strong fist is about to land everywhere along the recon line. The defender won't be able to defend every place sufficiently. The actual blow only lands in one spot, but if the defender stays thin to cover all, it won't be enough, and if he concentrates in one spot, he has to guess exactly which one without good info to go on.

To create that effect, clearly you can't let his full battle line at A defeat the recon screen, wait and see nothing behind it, and reposition as a reserve behind B, before you've followed up in the real attack spot B or C.

Open makes for a longer "trailing distance" to avoid being spotted, and tanks can stay farther back because they can cover the ground more rapidly (and without being delayed by one MG). If you have dead ground routes, you can stay closer.

[JasonC]

Dook - thanks for the correction on my classical illiteracy. The amendment is friendly...

[Cuirassier]

Thanks for the replies JasonC. I have played most of my CM games with an attritionist style, and am now just realizing how attritionist my mindset is.

Yesterday I was doing some searches on google looking for sites regarding German tactical doctrine of both world wars. The best document I found was a US handbook written in 1945 I believe discussing German tactical methods. You have probably read it before, but here it is in any case:Lonesentry

I've read all of the CM relevant sections. Basically, it describes the basic methods of the German maneuver attack. From what I got out of it, you send troops forward on line (actually attacking certain vital points of the defense) hoping to drive wedges into it at various points, while disguising where the main attack will fall.

The main body is then launched through, arranged in depth and typically in waves, and looks to completely penetrate the defense. The frist wave continues into the open areas and can cut off retreats I'm assuming (since one can't drive into the operational rear of the enemy to destroy his artillery parks on the CM scale) The second wave in depth completes the breakthrough and rolls up the enemy position on both newly created flanks, engaging each position in sequence. Strong reserves are necessary for the breakthrough force to repel counterattacks and to have enough momentum to breakthrough and roll up the position.

Heavy weapons are generally located on the flanks of the breakthrough force and helps launch them through the position while suppressing flanking fire, delaying reserves etc. Some heavy weapons are decentralized do deal with unexpected threats during the breakthrough.

What do you think of the accuracy of this document JasonC, and its applicability to CM? What counters can be used against this approach? What must be achieved for it to be successful?

[Cuirassier]

Bump

[Cuirassier]

Bump again for JasonC or anyone else interested.

[Joachim]

You usually don't get the attacker odds for this type of attack in CM - except with an extremely wide frontage where the attacker can overwhelm the defender in a small part of the front. Most likely works only if the defender defends the whole line and does defend way ahead of the flags.

Gruß

Joachim

[Cuirassier]

Joachim,

I think I have come to similar conclusions as you. I've played numerous scenarios of varying sizes against the AI trying the 'penetration of weak points' doctrine described in the pamphlet. When looking at the maps of these scenarios, it is difficult to see how one could isolate the defenders and walk over them in the small time frames usually given. Also, achieving a penetration seems of little use since it just leaves your flanks vulnerable (mainly a problem with armor), and you can't exploit it by driving into the enemy's operational rear.

I'm guessing these tactics are only really applicable in the specific circumstances as you describe (covered routes for surprise, lots of space to maneuver, thin linear line ahead of flags giving a penetration an actual objective to achieve, battalion to regimental sized force with ample reserves etc).

[civdiv]

To All;

Attritionist versus manueverist beliefs. I am just now reading Doughty's "The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940". What is your opinion on what Germany should have done, post-Poland /Norway/Denmark. They went forward against France with the expectation that they could conquer the country in a month. This they succeeded at. Basically, at what point should they have gone to the attritionist strategy? Attrition would not have worked against France (IMHO). That is playing right into France's hands. So when (given Germany in WWII) should attritionist doctrine be used? When in Russia? After the initial drive on Moscow?

Given, as hindsight is 20/20, pursuing offensive action against the USSR was carried out too far. Given, their strategy in France ended up being flawed.

Also, what is your read on how things would have been different in the USSR if they had acted better towards the Russians who initially greated them as liberators. Actually, let me distill this further and give you three scenarios, or any combination of the three;

1. They convert to a war economy when they should have.

2. They treat the citizens of occupied Russia as a liberated people?

3. They had adopted an attritionist approach at the proper time in the USSR and post-D-Day, or in N Africa?

What combination of the three above would lead to either stalemate, or a German victory? What does an extra year of the Nazi regime mean?

I know you can 'what if' stuff to death but I am really curious what you all think.

[Cuirassier]

civdiv,

There is already a very long thread discussing whether or not Germany could have won WWII somewhere on the CMBB forum (which I began incidentally), if you're interested.

"They went forward against France with the expectation that they could conquer the country in a month. This they succeeded at. Basically, at what point should they have gone to the attritionist strategy?"

Well, as history proves, Germany didn't need to rely on production or numbers to knock out Poland and then France. Spaces were small enough and terrain friendly enough (plus the lack of knowledge of either nation on how to counter concentrated tank penetrations) enabled Germany to rapidly break through enemy frontlines and encircle and destroy their enemies in detail, earning them very lopsided victories.

Against France, I don't see why an attrition strategy would fail. In fact, half of German doctrine was attrition based really, since they focused on destroying their enemy's army. They just had trouble accepting that attrition also applied to them.

Either way against France, if they adopted an attrition strategy, they still could have used Manstein's maneuver approach, while also ramping up production. The campaign thus would have ended the same whether production was ramped up or not, as the Germans proved they could destroy France quickly. However, the ramping up of production would have been a good fall back plan if the Meuse crossing was halted or if the planned counterattacks had been successful (eg. De Gaulle's attempt).

Remember though, an attritionist attack doesn't mean one has to conduct slow, costly frontal assaults or something. Strategic attrition is primarly based around production capabilities and manpower reserves. A attrionist strategy may still use operational maneuver as a force multiplier to gain favorable kill/loss ratios.

Also, from what I know, Germany was a much more powerful state at the beginning of WWII than they were at the beginning of WWI, in terms of manpower, production capabilities, etc. France, in comparison, had declined in strength. Thus, even if the west front in WWII had become another positional trench war as in WWI, Germany could still come out victorious, even with Britain against them on French soil. Falkenhayn at Verdun nearly bled the French to death in 1916 using an attritionist approach. As the relative strength between Germany and France had increased in the former's favor during World War 2 when compared to WWI, it is likely that the Germans, if they had decided to ramp up production, could still have bled France to death.

Finally, the German's were much more proficient than the allies at the tactical level during the first years of the war. Even if they made operational blunders during the attack on France, it is likely they would have still achieved decent kill/loss ratios because of this discrepancy in tactical capabilities.

"Given, their strategy in France ended up being flawed."

Not sure how you determined this. The campaign in France was as flawless as one can expect in war.

"So when (given Germany in WWII) should attritionist doctrine be used? When in Russia? After the initial drive on Moscow?"

Well, by invading Poland, the Germans (at least Hitler) should have been aware they were starting a World War. When a nation is going to be fighting a World War, it is wise to use every resource you have. Really, the Germans should have started ramping up production and thinking about mobilizing the country when they invaded Poland. Luckily for them, there were no setbacks in Poland or France, allowing them to win cheaply without having to use much of their resources. To there disadvantage however, these cheap victories made them overconfident, and they thought they could defeat anyone within a month.

The first time the Germans were really confronted with a battle of attrition (where they weren't achieving quick, lopsided victories)was during the Battle of Britain. Germany started with a larger airforce than the British, but they drew all their combat power from stockpiles of planes already made. They weren't producing even remotely enough planes to replace the losses sustained over Britain. The British however ramped up their production and produced as many Spitfires and Hurricanes as they could, and staved off defeat beacause of it.

Germany would have easily achieved air superiority over Britain if they had increased the production of their own aircraft, using a flow of planes and pilots to gradually defeat Britain, instead of relying on a fixed stockpile.

This was another oppurtunity for the Germans to realize that not all battles would be easy and cheap in the war, and that they should mobilize their economy. Instead they gave up on the aerial campaign over Britain, and ignored the important lessons to be learned from it.

Despite this, the war wasn't lost. It was lost when Germany invaded the Soviet Union without mobilizing the economy. Up to this point, their risks and gambles didn't have adverse consequences. However, invading Russia without a mobilized economy was a stupid gamble that ended in disaster: German losing the war. The Germans should have mobilized before the invasion, knowing they were fighting a power of equal strength, with great manpower reserves, production capabilities, and vast space that could be traded for time.

Instead, they mobilized after the defeat in Stalingrad, and never really came close to matching allied production numbers until 1944. By then, it was obviously too late.

"Also, what is your read on how things would have been different in the USSR if they had acted better towards the Russians who initially greated them as liberators. Actually, let me distill this further and give you three scenarios, or any combination of the three;

1. They convert to a war economy when they should have.

2. They treat the citizens of occupied Russia as a liberated people?

3. They had adopted an attritionist approach at the proper time in the USSR and post-D-Day, or in N Africa?

What combination of the three above would lead to either stalemate, or a German victory? What does an extra year of the Nazi regime mean?"

When a country is invaded, and the invaders act nicely to the population (though invading in the first place isn't a very nice thing to do) it is unlikely that the population of the country being invaded will just wave the white flag without a fight. It is a maneuverists dream that a nation can be counquered by instructing invasion forces to be "friendly" and act as liberators. All national populations have some sense of pride and duty to their country, and will normally defend it when faced with destruction.

In any case, the concept of Germans acting as liberators during the invasion of the Soviet Union was an impossibility considering Nazi policy regarding Bolsheviks.

So basically, if the Germans mobilize their economy before invading Russia, and the US stays out of the war long enough, they could indeed have won. However, they failed to do this, and predictably lost.

[PFMM]

So, instead of selling an easy quick war with little discomfort to the supporting populace, you will now tell me how they will accept a long hard war with great personnal sacrifice.

Meanwhile, all the other countries are going to idly sit on their hands while you visibly gear up for world domination.

I think not.

[Cuirassier]

"So, instead of selling an easy quick war with little discomfort to the supporting populace, you will now tell me how they will accept a long hard war with great personnal sacrifice."

When faced with a long war, though one that can be won through total war, or a quick, cheap attempt that will inevitably result with a their own destruction, any population will likely choose the former. Goebbels successfully rallied the German population in 1942 after Stalingrad and the German population carried out the concept of Total War. The allied nations did it throughout the war. To say its impossible is ignoring historical fact.

"Meanwhile, all the other countries are going to idly sit on their hands while you visibly gear up for world domination."

Umm. When Germany invaded Poland and the western flank of Germany was horribly exposed, France and Britain sat on their hands and did nothing. When France feared invasion, Belgium thought neutrality would save them and did nothing. Denmark did nothing. Norway did nothing. When France was overrun and Britain was hanging alone, the US did not intervene with force until they were themselves attacked. When Germany was making threatening moves in the east, Stalin ignored it. To me, that seems like substantial proof that these things do happen, whether you choose to ignore them or not.

[PFMM]

It's one matter to convince people when everyone is set against you because of your own actions and you are all stuck in the same **** together. It's completely different when all you original goals have been achieved almost bloodlesly.

And the Phoney war illustrates this well. The Germans gain both another easy victory and fool the Russians which then convinces them this will be the status quo. The Allies are unable to persecute a war because noone believes them that the Germans are a real threat.

In point of fact it was the Allies who came in for some stick over their conduct. The Germans mounted a successfull propaganda campaign that displayed the Allies as aggressors against the peace loving Germans (which was true in part as raids were being conducted ny the Allies on German military sites).

[Cuirassier]

"It's one matter to convince people when everyone is set against you because of your own actions and you are all stuck in the same **** together."

Agreed.

"It's completely different when all you original goals have been achieved almost bloodlesly."

I disagree. I don't see why it has to be any different. In a regime such as Nazi Germany, if the government can successfully convince a population that a war will be bloodless for them, then why can't they convince the population that the war will be long and arduous. Again, if the German government had given their population two options-either fight a longer "Total War", but with a good chance of victory, or a short wreckless war that will result in the destruction of their state-any sane indivivual will pursue the former.

"And the Phoney war illustrates this well. The Germans gain both another easy victory and fool the Russians which then convinces them this will be the status quo. The Allies are unable to persecute a war because noone believes them that the Germans are a real threat."

I disagree. Just because the campaign in Poland and France were cheap victories, the German leadership should have readily realized during the Battle of Britain, and when considering an invasion of the Soviet Union, that their entire country's resources would be needed for the war. The Germans gambled however thinking the entire war would be cheap, and lost as a result. Thus, the Germans didn't fail to mobilize because their population was lazy and wouldn't accept the concept of 'Total War,' despite however disasterous the consequences may be. They failed to mobilize because the German leadership was overconfident and foolish, wrongly thinking that the war would be short and cheap. History proves it was neither cheap nor short.

And to say that the allies didn't consider the Germans to be a real threat is complete folly. If anything, the allies sat on their hands because they saw Germany as a very dangerous agressor, and thus didn't want to do anything that might cause the war to escalate, even if it meant ignoring their defensive pact with Poland. WWI experiences were still very fresh in the minds of the allied leadership, and they wrongly assumed that sitting passively would make the situation go away. It didn't.

"In point of fact it was the Allies who came in for some stick over their conduct. The Germans mounted a successfull propaganda campaign that displayed the Allies as aggressors against the peace loving Germans (which was true in part as raids were being conducted ny the Allies on German military sites)."

Not sure what your point is with this statement.

Nonetheless, this thread was orignially intended to discuss German maneuver doctrine at the tactical level and how it can be employed or imitated in CM. This thread's purpose is *not* here to discuss the 'what ifs' of WWII and the decisions made by Allied and German leadership in the war.

If you want to discuss those things, please start a new topic.

[civdiv]

Cuirassier (and others),

Thanks for your replies. One point I needed to clarify; when I said Germany's plan in France failed I meant post D-Day, sorry for my lack of clarity.

But I disagree with some of your points. The Ukranians welcomed the German as liberators. They hated Moscow and Stalingrad and Communism. It wasn't an act when they welcomed the Germans.

Second, Germany come a hair from winning the Battle of Britain, their intel failed them. The Royal Air Force was on it's last legs when the Germans switched from targeting airfields and the aircraft industry and switched to terror raids. But I will agree they had the wrong type of Air Force to fight the Battle of Britain in that they had aircraft more suited for tactical and operational use rather than on a strategic effort. Light and medium bombers exclusively, short range fighters, etc.

Next, claiming that the Battle of France in 1940 was an attritionist strategy is debatable. Surrounding a large portion of the French Army is a classic manueverist approach. Manueverists tend to concentrate on terrain rather than on the enemy's army in their strategy. But they are still seeking to destroy the enemy and their will to fight through either destroying the enemy militarily, or through the capture of political targets which will cause the enemy to stop fighting. In France in 1940 the Germans sought the enemy flank and rear while luring the French forward into Belgium. Surrounding a significant portion of the enemy army to destroy it is not attritionist, it is maneuverist. Attrition warfare means forcing the enemy to attack against bad odds with small and short counterattacks to cut off, cut up, enemy penetrations, and attacking only when you have a clear advantage, or when the enemy has a bottleneck or something behind him. Manuever warfare is surfaces and gaps and attempts to get your forces through, behind, around the enemy to destroy his rear area and force him into rash and unprepared attacks and unfavorable odds. It is also the tempo of your operations forcing your enemy to react to a situation that is continually changing, and acting on increasingly old information. The name for it is the OODA loop; Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, or called, I believe; Boyle's loop (I think that's the guys name). You observe the enemy situation. You position yourself to act, and then decide your actions. Then you act. If his OODA loop is bigger then yours, then the enemy is reacting to what you WERE doing, rather than what you ARE doing.

[Cuirassier]

"But I disagree with some of your points. The Ukranians welcomed the German as liberators. They hated Moscow and Stalingrad and Communism. It wasn't an act when they welcomed the Germans."

It is true that that some portions of the Soviet Union disliked Stalin's regime, saw the German's as liberators and actually aided the Nazi's when possible (eg the Ukraine, Latvia, etc) However, even if a greater percentage of the populations of these respective nations rallied to the German side, it would have made little difference.

"Second, Germany come a hair from winning the Battle of Britain, their intel failed them. The Royal Air Force was on it's last legs when the Germans switched from targeting airfields and the aircraft industry and switched to terror raids. But I will agree they had the wrong type of Air Force to fight the Battle of Britain in that they had aircraft more suited for tactical and operational use rather than on a strategic effort. Light and medium bombers exclusively, short range fighters, etc."

The battle was a very close run fight. It is true that the Luftwaffe suffered from poor intel and stupid decisions made by Goering. Nonetheless, in war, plans cannot be expected to fuction as intended. When mentioning the Battle of Britain in my last post, I was trying to convey that it was a gamble to fight a battle of attrition with a fixed stockpile of equipment rather than a flow, which makes good your losses. More importantly, this should have been a sign for the German leadership that mistakes (intel etc) can happen, and that an attrition strategy reduces much risk in war. It provides a good fall back in case the quick and cheap victory fails.

"Next, claiming that the Battle of France in 1940 was an attritionist strategy is debatable."

Our differences in opinion lies in the fact that you are speaking of the operational level of the campaign, while I was talking about the strategic level. The campaign in France was an attrition strategy (though not completely as it wasn't an example of 'Total War')because the German army sought to destroy the French and British forces. It was not primarly focused on terrain objectives. Yes, when Guderian broke out across the Meuse, he picked the channel coasts, seeing that location as important. But he did not send his Panzergruppe their because the coast had any strategic value of its own. He drove there because the allied army in the north could then be fenced in and defeated in detail, which was promply done.

A maneuver strategy would not seek this effect, and would instead go for the 'shot in the brain', by capturing Paris, for example.

At the operational level, as you describe, the campaign was indeed maneuverist. Manstein's feint through Belgium and thrust through the Ardennes took advantage of maneuver as a force multiplier, to better the exchange ratio between German and allied forces in the former's favor.

However, the maneuver in itself wasn't decisive. The destruction of the enemy as a result of the force multipliers the maneuvers provided is what was decisive. Thus, at the strategic level, the campaign in France was attritionist. At the operational level, it was a maneuver approach.

[civdiv]

Manuever warfare IS at the operational and tactical level. Knocking France out of the war is neither Manuever or Attritionist. What, invading Spain to get behind France would be Manuever Warfare at the Strategic Level?

When you talk about Maneuver Warfare or Attritionism you are talking at the tactical and operational level. Or you are talking about a strategy. But a strategy is not Strategic just because the words sound the same. You could argue that conquering France to have a base to attack England or to keep them off the continent was strategic, but the invasion of France is at the operational level. If it was ONLY Germany and France fighting you could attempt to call it strategic. But as the field is the entire world, in the context of 1940, France was operational. Fall Gelb was an operation, and thus it was operational in nature. And it was maneuver warfare. The goal was to flank the French and the Brits, drive to the channel and cut them off. They weren't fighting to kill the other army as their immediate goal. Their immediate goal is terrain and positioning, and they fought only those forces that were trying to prevent them from accomplishing their intent.

France in 1940 was the classic example of maneuver warfare on the German side versus the use of attritionist methodology by France. And in that I am not saying it shows manuever warfare is superior, it was just superior on this day.

[ February 03, 2007, 09:50 AM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

[JasonC]

civdiv is illustrating nicely the eternal confusion that is the maneuverist mind, in which anything that seems maneuver-ee and works is maneuver, and anything that seems maneuver-ee and fails is a departure from maneuver doctrine.

To avoid the confusion, add more labels and distinguish the propositions.

JFC Fuller maneuver is meant to win a war without having to defeat the whole enemy fielded army, by substituting a "shot to the brain" for "hacking at the limbs". The target is the political control structure, and below and on the way to that, the army command structure.

If Fuller breaks through at Sedan in 1940, he drives to Paris, not the channel.

If Fuller has reached Smolensk in 1941, he drives straight ahead for Moscow, not a right hook for Kiev.

If you go to the channel instead of Paris, yes you are employing maneuver as a means. But as a means to what? As a means to destroying the enemy army in the field, by trapping a piece of it in Belgium, and then directly attacking that piece.

You could instead want to ignore the army, make it irrelevant, drive straight to Paris. Or, after dislocating HQs, contain the part split off from the rest but not attack it. It is out of position, isn't it? So in the most purest of maneuverist terms, it is already irrelevant, supposedly.

Now, what maneuverists actually do in argument, is praise the channel rather than Paris, because it worked, and damn Kiev rather than Moscow, because it supposedly didn't.

In reality, of course, both decisions were sound, Kiev no less than the channel. In both cases, it was purely rational to target the fielded forces of the enemy - Fuller's "limbs" - and hack them to pieces. This may be called maneuver-ee because it contains the word "pieces", which suggests spatial division, which suggests maneuver. But after all, it is not the enemy's decision loop or C3 one is hacking to pieces, but his army.

I call this "annihilation battle" as the continue *aim* being sought by maneuver. It is an operational use of maneuver, but it seeks the overall decision not by "shot to the brain" but by chopping off limbs, which means changing the odds. There is a strategic wrapper, unstated by driving the specific goals selected, which says "kill the enemy army to achieve victory".

And that is a *strategic* choice. It is not a necessary choice. A strategy may aim at an enemy's political processes or at his leaderhip or at his sustainability economically or at his diplomatic position or at his understanding or confusion, or his morale or political will, or his physical means of communication and coordination.

All sorts of possible targets might be selected, and nowhere is it written in stone that the target of the whole strategy must and shall be the defeat of the field army of the enemy.

The Germans consistently maintained a focus on defeat of the field army of the enemy. This was a choice. It was a continuity in strategy with previous military traditions, going back to Napoleon (and to Frederick the Great, for that matter, who he looked to himself).

It is *not* the choice advocated by armor theorists like Fuller, nor by modern maneuver theoriests like Leonard Wood. Some German commanders in WW II were inconsistent on the point in their writings or advocacy, or changed in hindsight, or tried to have it both ways. In actual practice, they sought to destroy the enemy field army.

Next level - although the Germans chose as their target the enemy field army, which means they relied on an eventual military odds state (of their army intact and the enemy's destroyed) to achieve victory and decision, they did *not* conistently seek to move global odds in their favor by every possible means. Notably, they skimped on production and avoiding going to "total war" until late.

A completely consistent ideal attritionist would both target the fielded forces of the enemy and move every possible stone to greater better global odds, and to keep them moving in his favor.

A completely consistent ideal maneuverist - Wood may stand for the type, Fuller is close - would target the enemy command structure and not care too much about overall odds. Since he would think victory readily achievable without them.

All, at the strategic level. Either may employ maneuver at the operational scale to get better exchange ratios (the former) or get at the enemy command structure (the latter), etc.

The Germans were neither, completely, at the strategic level. They targeted the enemy field force but did not mobilize the economy.

It was an innovation in German and general military practice to not focus on odds on the mobilization question. It was consistent with a long tradition (much of it frankly attritionist) to target the enemy field force.

They also relied on operational successes and tactical skills throughout, of course. Especially to justify the lack of full mobilization (as unneeded, unpromising, etc).

The reason the title of the thread says what it does, is to split off this German mix of maneuver operations still focused on annihilation battle, from the Fuller-esque or modernist versions that sought or seek decision without having to destroy the enemy field force directly.

I explain this mix as arising from seeing maneuver-esque effects as temporary, as *fleeting* advantages, that need to be "cashed" for the "harder currency" of global odds. A million eliminated Russians at Kiev is the cash value of a mispositioned and reeling Russian defense in 1941. Half the French army and the BEF cut off and reduced in Belgium is the cash value of a broken front at Sedan.

Whereas, if you just drive for Paris you risk the advantage evaporating as the French reposition themselves. If you just drive for Moscow those million Russians are still there to stop you. And if you get there, the government just moves and the army continues to fight.

Now, anyone may disagree with those decisions by the Germans. But what you can't do is claim they were shots at the brain. They were hacking at the limbs.

[civdiv]

JasonC;

You bring up some very valid points, but your definitions are a bit off. Fall Gelb was maneuver warfare, period, by the definition of US and NATO military doctrine. Lind defined exactly what Maneuver warfare is in his book of the same name. The target in manuever warfare is not always a political target, it is anything that if destroyed/captured etc would cause the enemy to stop fighting. In actual maneuver warfare the goal is the enemy's 'critical mass'. In France this was surrounding the enemy and forcing him to surrender.

Maneuver warfare is not defined by Fuller, it is defined by Lind and his proteges. The military acadamia, military leaders and the practitioners of the art define what maneuver warfare is. I have been classicly trained by the military in maneuver warfare, and you simply aren't correct. It started with Lind, and then moved on to 'Forward From the Sea'. Maneuever warfare doesn't aim always for a political target, it aims for what will make the enemy stop fighting, or it aims for the political or military goal that the military has been assigned. It then uses maneuver warfare to succeed. Kuwait is another good example. No political target within the military realm. Threaten the Iraqi LOCs, push from the south with the Marines, and he drives back to Iraq.

So while Boyd and Lind and Hooker and dozens others DO have their roots back in Fuller and arguably Sun Tsu, and others, that doesn't mean the latter define what maneuver warfare is today.

[ February 04, 2007, 04:56 AM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

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