Maneuver and Annihilation Battle

[Cuirassier]

Again, thanks to everyone who is helping to keep this thread going.

AdamL,

"If I had to find fault with it as you wish us to do, I would have to say that it seems so thorough and precise as to be designed for a game and not for war. To be fair you note you see it as being under ideal circumstances. But as a warfighting doctrine and not just an account of a specific attack, it probably assumes too much."

I tried to make my description of a German maneuverist attack thorough for several reasons. First of all, a German infantry force and a German mech force will fight differently, so I thought I'd just pick one and describe how it may fight. Secondly, maneuver doctrine won't be applicable in all cases. Infantry can only do it in heavy cover, or poor visibility conditions. Armored forces can do it on any map. Lastly, I thought I should give some specifics, just so who ever may reply to my post could not come up with 'what if' counters, since it would be left so open for them to justify it. Also, JasonC has already outlined the basic maneuver approach in earlier posts, so I thought I'd do something more specific, to prevent needless repetition.

Nonetheless, I feel that my described approach is feasible with vet infantry forces with lots of cover.

"For example, you say the recon screen will leave the enemy "with his eyes gouged out", but I can think of a number of ways that's not true. What are "eyes"? What do you mean, that he is completely out of contact with his parent and you?"

The line "with his eyes gouged out," I actually stole from one of JasonC's earlier posts, along with numerous other things lol. What I meant in saying that though was that it is one of the recon screen's primary tasks to knock out enemy OP's and scouts. In tight terrain, with limited visibility, we both know that one has to have advanced positions on the defence to maintain any situational awareness. Thus, if the recon screen eliminates these, and secures ground that prevents easy repositioning of scouts detached from the MLR, the enemy will have poor intel, and be far less likely to respond effectively to wherever you send your main body.

"Or what about encircling the enemy at the local tactical scale makes him "strangle"? The advantage is that he doesn't get away if your assault element goes in and tries to flush out a trench line, for example. But he doesn't need to be physically surrouneded - having LOS to fire on his escape route is just as good."

I agree that having LOS to interdict escape routes and routes required to shift the defence can be achieved without physical encirclement. For example, HMG-42's can cut up and isolate certain blocks of cover from an overwatch location if you can find a place with decent LOS to do so. However, in tight terrain, this can be difficult to achieve from distant locations, or by units that have not penetrated the enemy defence.

I see such an attack as "strangling" the defence in that, by avoiding strong points, and taking whatever ground the enemy does not occupy, you are effectively hemming in the defence into static positions. Ideally, any shift of serious forces he tries to make will be interdicted slowed, and at least spotted. Also, by having enemy forces occupying areas all around his main positions, and them having little intel as a result, it will be very difficult for the defender to adjust his defence to encounter wherever the attacker's main blow falls.

Anyway, that is how I justify what I said earlier. Thanks for the comments. I'm hoping such criticisms will allow me to better understand the maneuver doctrine, and enable me to work out any kinks in my present interpretation of it.

One last thing. You said, "It's a strange combination of sound principles (local odds edges, use of covered approaches & so on) with maneuverist imperatives (e.g, ranged fire as suppressive only)"

Could you elaborate on this statement please? What makes it strange?

Thanks again.

[civdiv]

Jason,

Sorry not to have responded in so long, I honestly hadn't noticed that this topic was moving along. Reading that essay Cuirassier cited, I am immediately struck by the poor format; it is awefully painful to read. I think it may be an OCR of the actual magazine article, as it seems the citations are mixed right into the article. I'll try and spend some more time decrypting it when I, in fact, have more time. But I will add several points about maneuver warfare as it applies to the USMC which may be or may not be on point in this discussion.

The challenge the Marine Corps faced in the late-80s and early 90s was taking a beach given the evolution of warfare and especially, the evolution of weapon systems. The battleships were gone, or going away. The invention and perfection of the ATGM made landing craft vulnerable. MANPADS made the aging USMC helos (Primarily the CH-46) almost obsolete in an amphibious assault, not to mention the proliferation of Soviet bloc AAA systems and crew served weapons. All of these factor in plus the sophistication of mines (both land and sea) and they made the opposed, DIRECT amphibious invasion a thing of the past.

As America's 911 force of choice the Marine Corps had to find a way to be relevent in carrying out the Commander in Chief's orders. Forward From the Sea came about with an almost 100% adherance to Lind's precepts of Maneuver Warfare. We couldn't fight our way ashore teeth-to-teeth with the enemy. We had to go around/over/behind the enemy. The LCAC was retroactively applied to this new strategy. The CH-53E, able to go deep, was another tool. So was the AAAV and the MV-22 Osprey. The Marine Corps could no longer 'force' itself ashore. But it could use extreme maneuver to get behind/around the enemy, and force the enemy to react to our moves. This extreme ability to manuever (via CH-53E and MV-22s) combined with the ability to hit from over-the-horizon (LCAC and AAAV) led to the continuing relevence of the beach assualt. Amphibious operations could still be conducted, but they were not conducted via brute force, but more with finesse. Seeking the best terrain to force the enemy to react to what you are doing is modern maneuver combat. Seizing Kuwait City in 1991 or Paris in 1944 is not going to force the enemy to stop fighting.

The USMC version of USMC maneuver warfare progressed into the late 1990s, when Krulak wrote about littoral warfare [Opining that 70% of the world's population resides within x miles of the ocean (I don't remember the distance he cited)]. Again, it was partly an adherance to maneuver warfare and partly a way to claim the relevance of the USMC as a seperate arm. Us Marines are always aware that we need a seperate capability and/or mission set to claim a reason for our continuing existance.

(Disclamier: I am not sure the next paragraph is really relevent to the discussion, but I think it provides some background.). Between the first gulf war and Afghanistan both the USMC and the US Army went through a period of change. Based on the heavy, mech battles the USMC experienced in the First Gulf War the M-1 Abrams was brought into the force structure (Stop, I know this was done during the First Gulf War), and the USMC grew heavier. The USMC insisted on keeping their artillery towed to claim an 'expeditionary capability' as they could be ferried by helo. M1 platoons became a regular part of their Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), always deployed afloat in peacetime or during wartime. Meanwhile the Army sought to become lighter and started to design the Stryker Bde concept, to be more expeditionary. So basically the USMC was seeking relevance on the traditional battlefield while the Army wanted to become more relevent in the realm of 'Small Wars'.

In 2001 there was a need to create an initial foothold in Afghanistan for the influx of US Forces. Despite years of a more 'expeditionary' focus on the part of the US Army they were unable to accomplish the mission of obtaining an initial foothold in southern Afghanistan. This was a HUGE source of embarassment to them and I wish I still had the emails involved. The USMC did a deep strike to establish Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino near Kandahar. This occurance caused much consternation in the US Army camp because the Army proved unable to accomplish this initial seizure of land, and the Marine had to be called in. Their embarassment was partly (But inadequetly) assuaged by the fact that a couple companies of Rangers led the way in by jumping into the area. They took 30% casualties from the jump alone but it made them feel better. The Marines then established FOB Rhino.

Maneuver warfare, at least as it to applies to current event really ends there. Iraq was an example of m,aneuver warfare as the US sought to cut off the head, ie; Baghdad. They succeeded, and for a couple of weeks they had peace. And then the insurgency started, big suprise there.

[JasonC]

Cuirassier - 3 points, tiny, little, and big.

Tiny point - I'd usually have the company HQ group right up with the screen and quite light, lighter than you describe. I'd rarely consider attaching an FO, for example. Occasionally a single AFV, mostly to destroy enemy counter-recon screen light armor. You really don't want one T-26 stopping the whole thing.

But basically the recon wave is really a thin line, which expects to be checked wherever it hits a full position.

Little point - on force selection, some armor or mobile support is thematic. I realize you are talking about northern woods. But unless it is a continuous blanket of trees, such support is still possible. A 251/2 as fire support, for example. Or one 75L24 tank back with the main body.

Big point - Basically you have the execution mechanics right, but the main theme is missing. It is all supposed to start with a guess about what the enemy is going to do, anticipating and outthinking him. In the case of the AI that still happens - it means exploiting its predictability in some way. So yeah there should be flags. Even if you ignore them, the enemy might not.

The fundamental idea of the whole approach is that whatever is predicted well ahead of time is weak, and creates opportunities for surprise. If you go in entirely reactive, just waiting for the screen to find you things and steering through them, you won't be the three moves ahead you need to be. Think, pull the enemy off the left side with the recon screen's threat to the rightmost flag, then main body comes in with a left hook. Or anything similar.

Perfect maneuver play should feel like you are commanding both sides. Meaning, so inside the enemy decision "tree" that you know what he will do in response to what you make him see. The only unpredictable things he should have available are dumb moves you didn't see coming.

In a careful attrition attack, the mechanics are the essential - getting each of them right, making "sound" moves that get plenty out of each bit of your force, whatever the enemy tries. But in a maneuver attack, the essential is the anticipation game, and the mechanics of implementation are quite secondary. So, to apply to a particular case, the starting point needs to be what you expect the enemy to be doing and how you are going to make him dance, to get him into a position you then exploit.

[JasonC]

civdiv - I understand the history. I don't sympathesize with it very much. I think it is shallow military analysis driven by budgeting battles and branch rivalry. Competition is famously a beautiful thing that makes us strive, and it is obvious admirable that Marines look for way to be relevant and get themselves into the fight.

I have no worries that Marines will ever fail in that particular task (lol). But really, if one examines the level of thought described in your last post, and compares it to a sober attrition analysis of Iraq II, one can see how we got here and what (at least some of) the problem is.

We spent half the 1990s redesigning major portions of the force to be air deployable anywhere in the world on 48 hours notice in things as light as C-130s, wary enough of manpads and ATGMs that we think force on force will be highly dangerous. Then we fight a war lasting 5 years against a hard scrabble militia with AKs and RPGs, whose most effective weapon is basically a remotely detonated mine.

We are in hummers because they had to be rapidly deployable, but had years to get anything at all to the theater. So 10,000 M113s sit in national guard depots and sergeants hunt around for scrap metal to bolt onto the sides of flatbed trucks and SUVs. But those are well enough known and don't amount to real attrition analysis. Let's do some, OK?

Attrition analysis is ice cold. If you don't have the stomach for it, you don't have the stomach for real war either.

The population of Iraq was around 24 million (now more like 27). Fit males of military age, order 5 million. Portion of the prewar population that directly benefited from the regime we were to oust, approximately one quarter. This sets the maximum pool of enemy manpower we might have to contend with at 1.25 million.

What mobilization rate will they achieve? This is clearly the single most important question for the overall scale of the war. It is driven by political factors and by morale, secondarily by perceived chances of success, the last in turn depending on perceived US will and on casualties suffered.

The conservative case is that all of them will be willing to fight. We can't make it otherwise by any single action, so it is the prudent basis of planning. But we also pull every possible lever to reduce the mobilization ratio.

What are those levers? Political end state, first and foremost. Irrevocable regime change and adamant establishment of the new political order. A clear relationship between the outcome from the groups who oppose the new order and how many of them choose to fight - strong, meaningful, negative correlation. As in, if a lot of you fight, you and yours will be ashes in a matter of days. If few of you fight, you will be safe and well off.

Maybe expert "play" on the mobilization ratio can keep it to a factor of 10%. To expect more is unrealistic panglossian optimism. 20% would still have to be counted a great success, while figures more like 50-100% are to be feared and prepared for, but avoided if possible by the methods described above.

Next, estimate the achievable exchange ratios for possible own side forces based on past experience and differences in tactics, training, and equipment. I look at Pacific wars by the capital rich US vs. lower tech enemies this century, and I see 10 to 1 is achievable. 20 to 1 is possible but not to be counted on. 5 to 1 is possible, counting wounded. Aim for 10 and plan for 5 as a worst case.

Iraqi allies can be counted on to share some of the fighting. With less of a quality edge, they cannot be expected to achieve such exchange ratios. If they get 2 to 1 it must be counted a great success, and 1 to 1 has to be planned for as possible.

What portion of own casualties will be KIA rather than WIA? Typical 20th century outcomes as 1 in 4 to 1 in 5. Excellent medical care has driven that as low as 1 in 7 in recent US wars, with full medivac abilities and the like. It is possible even more can be achieved, maybe 1 in 10, but 1 in 7 is as much as should be counted on.

So, the war can be expected to require inflicting 125,000 casualties on the enemy, up to 5-10 times that number if high portions choose to fight. If US forces did all of that, at best we must expect 12,500 US casualties (including wounded, most of them in fact), and 5-10 times that possible. To avoid the higher figures, we rely on standing up Iraqi forces if the war goes long. Perhaps they can should a third of it, perhaps half - it is unrealistic to expect a higher portion, when they have to pay 5-10 times as much blood to achieve the same results. They cannot be expected to consider it a bargain.

OK, assume Iraqi help takes a third. What about other allies? 10% of the rest maybe, 25% of the non-Iraqi portion at the outside (and only with definite prior political signs of it etc). That means 60% of the attrition will have to be inflicted by US forces. Minimum.

Therefore, before a shot is fired, we can deduce that the absolute best case is 7500 US casualties including 1100 dead, with 15000 and 2200 far more likely (assuming a low 20% achieved mobilization rate for the enemy). And if the enemy seriously chooses to fight (50% mobilization ratio and up), it is entirely within his power to raise those totals by a factor of 5.

How long in time? This will be driven by op-tempo. If the enemy choose the rate at which he spends his forces, he can drag out his sustainable losses over a longer period of time, at the cost of keeping the loss rate low for us, as well.

The enemy is eminently defeatable. To defeat him, it will be sufficient to inflict a million causalties, and he may give up well before that. The more clearly he sees that we will inflict those million casaulties without a qualm and as fast as we can, if he chooses to fight seriously, the less likely he is to actually do so. But in the end, how much he bleeds is up to him.

But to do it, one must plan at the outset to inflict such losses, and be ready willing and able to sustain up to 10,000 KIA.

That realistic analysis of the likely nature of the war was readily available the day it started. All that is necessary is an attrition frame. It is avoided as an analysis because it seems unpleasant or pessimistic, or might seem to argue for avoiding things NCAs want to accomplish. When a few bright boys with pocket protectors and some gung ho snake eaters promise to do it all for a tenth or a twentieth of that and to be home by Christmas with everybody cheering, it sounds awful good to the politicos.

Problem is, it isn't true.

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[civdiv]

Jason,

Very valid points but you really took the topic and morphed it. You can't do maneuver warfare in a COIN operation. But I disagree with you when you say;

When a few bright boys with pocket protectors and some gung ho snake eaters promise to do it all for a tenth or a twentieth of that and to be home by Christmas with everybody cheering, it sounds awful good to the politicos.

Nothing like that ever happened. The military fought tooth and nail against the administration, and Rumsfeld to keep this war from ever starting. And then warned the troop levels were too low. Don't hang this thing on the military. Sure, the latter has made mistakes, but the administration and the State Dept are responsible for this mess. Bush, who didn't even know there was a difference between Shias and Sunnis until Feb 2003 (While watching the Super Bowl) is responsible. That complete idiot Bremer brought all his completely unqualified neocon Ivy League 'whiz kids' along and they hid in the green zone for 18 months planning in a complete vacuum, while repeatedly ignoring the military. They had meetings that Abizaid and Casey weren't allowed to attend but some Yale punk who had never had a job could. They got rid of the Iraqi Army and Police, declared no Baathe party officials could be employed, and then w/o even telling the military before-hand, shut down Sadr's newspaper against prior objections from the military. And the pompousity of him and the rest of the CPA alienated both military and Iraqi government alike. He treating the Iraqis like colinized natives. Forget what they want, we are going to teach them to be Americans.

Hmmm, get rid of the only real functioning security apparatus. Check.

Alienate the Sunnis. Check.

Alienate the Shias. Check.

Alienate the Iraqi Government. Check.

Then Bremer hands the burning baby to the military and heads home to do a speaking tour at $50,000 a pop. Yeah, definately the military's fault.

We fought a war we didn't want to fight.

We fought it in a way we didn't want to fight.

We fought it with fewer troops than we wanted to fight it with.

We fought it without a post-invasion plan, something we had desperately asked for.

And we had absolutely no input into the rebuilding of the country, despite having vast and recent experience in rebuilding countries (Somolia, Balkans, Germany, Japan, etc.).

When the rebuilding failed, we got handed the baby and fault for the failure.

And this is the same military that finally forced Bush to take nukes off the table for attacking Iran. Bush thinks nukes are just another weapon. Yeah, so is phosgene.

[ February 14, 2007, 06:05 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

[JasonC]

Sorry, that's CYA spin and it is bilge water.

Several very senior officers signed off on every scrap of it, said the forces were enough etc.

The same people who spent the 90s dismantling the heavy army and calling everyone involved with it dinosaurs, to grab more than their share of funding and all the promotions, happily rode to power telling the NCAs what they wanted to hear, and sold maneuverism as a way to do twice everything with half the resources. Short term, they even delivered a fair amount of it, to their lasting credit. But the strategic wrapper was trashed in the process.

Pols didn't lose the war, officers didn't win it. Isn't lost today, the politics are.

But you are right that it is a distraction and my intention was not to broaden the discussion into a generalized ideological watering contest over Iraq. Only to point out that the attrition frame of reference naturally *expects* long and messy wars and knows how to win them anyway. While on present evidence, the maneuverists flat *do not know what to do* if their shot to the brain leaves the enemy still fighting, as brainlessly as you please.

[Cuirassier]

JasonC,

"Tiny point - I'd usually have the company HQ group right up with the screen and quite light, lighter than you describe. I'd rarely consider attaching an FO, for example. Occasionally a single AFV, mostly to destroy enemy counter-recon screen light armor. You really don't want one T-26 stopping the whole thing"

I can see why one would want the screen light. It means less forces exposed, more forces available for the main body, and the fast screen not slowed down by mortars, FO's etc. However, I came across the idea for a heavier screen when reading some of Fionn's AAR's at CMHQ. He advocated having FO's travelling with leading elements to provide immediate fire support.

"Little point - on force selection, some armor or mobile support is thematic. I realize you are talking about northern woods. But unless it is a continuous blanket of trees, such support is still possible. A 251/2 as fire support, for example. Or one 75L24 tank back with the main body."

Point taken. Before I was just thinking of pure infantry forces or tank heavy forces. Not a mix.

"Big point - Basically you have the execution mechanics right, but the main theme is missing. It is all supposed to start with a guess about what the enemy is going to do, anticipating and outthinking him. In the case of the AI that still happens - it means exploiting its predictability in some way. So yeah there should be flags. Even if you ignore them, the enemy might not."

As you've pointed out, this is where I become most confused regarding maneuverism. You say a maneuverist should anticipate largely how the whole battle will play out before it happens. They should, through very intensive planning, devise a way of manipulating and surprising the enemy force in such a way that it ensures victory. So success or failure really hinges on the plan itself, and its execution.

OTOH, after reading Fionn's AAR's, and some notes on Moltke the eldar and Clausewitz, there seems to be a slightly differing view, at least that is how I see it. Basically, this view is that, no matter how much you plan, you cannot be assured what an enemy will do or fail to do. Thus you should develop the battle, 'think on your feet,' and react appropriately. To me, the whole idea seems to revolve around flexibility and good judgement.

Nonetheless, considering both POV's, it becomes obvious that a mix of both worlds would be best. A good plan provides direction, while flexibility allows one to adapt in case things do not go according to plan, which often happens.

I will respond to AdamL's comments in a later post.

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[Cuirassier]

"I know, I'm familiar with the doctrine. But what makes you think your enemy is going blind in any meaningful way in the average CM scenario, simply because his point teams get clobbered?"

For the average CM scenario, I would agree. In conditions of low visibility however (heavy woods, town, fog, night etc), the recon screen is very capable of blinding an enemy force by neutralizing his advanced positions before the main body travels one of several possible routes of advance. In conditions such as this, the enemy OP's will not know what route the main body will travel, since they are dead.

Thus, the defense should not know where the main attack is occuring until it has already contacted his main positions. By this point it should be too late (unless the enemy just guessed correctly and concentrated in the right spot, despite having no prior intel to act on). Either way, if the recon screen does its job, the defense will either have to just guess where the main blow will fall, or defend everywhere, and risk being defeated in detail. Of course, this is assuming that the defence cannot be fully intergrated because of the low visibilty conditions.

"If the recon screen eliminates the enemy OP's in tight terrain, you do no more than announce your intention to begin a skirmish and probably an attack. He then readies his forces for defense (if they were not already) and sends new teams forward to take a look."

I don't think this is necessarily true, if the recon screen is handled correctly, and the terrain conditions are favorable. The recon screen *should* be able to eliminate enemy OP's over quite a large front, as it is generally a company on line.

If tight terrain or limited visibility prevents easy integration of a defence, then it is possible for an attackers main body to concentrate an assault behind a small portion of the recon screen, without all the defenders being able to help each other out. Thus, by knocking out OP's across the frontage (or a large enough portion of it), the attacker is signalling that he is preparing an attack, but the attack could fall anywhere behind the screen. If the defender does not have adequate intel, he can only guess where this location may be.

Also, the new teams a defence sends forward to scout or replace the OP's already lost will have a difficult time fighting their way through a recon screen. It could be a costly way for a defence to gather intel.

"If at any time his line comes under attack from your main body, it is *communication* and not his recon screen that will inform him of this. His reserves will be able to meet your attack to the degree that they are aware of it. It does not matter that the screen OP's are gone - they are meant to provide early warning, force you to deploy early (and be exposed to fire), and so forth. They are not the only way the enemy has access to information."

It is true that the defender will know when the main attack is underway, once his main positions are engaged with weapons and numbers of troops that exceed what would be found in a recon screen. It is also true that OP's provide early warning.

However, assuming favorable terrain, if the OP's are knocked out before getting a glimpse of the main body, the defence will not be aware where the attack will actually fall. Once his main positions are engaged on a selected frontage, he will know where the main body is attacking, but by then it should be too late, and the defence should suffer irrevocable damage as a result.

"Right, although *pursuit* can accomplish this too, without prior encirclement being needed at all. You also have fire options that don't need LOS - mortars, artillery."

Agreed. What method should be used is dependent on the situation, whether it is infiltration, interdicting overwatch, or pursuit by fire.

"Doesn't matter that they're static if they are strong. If he has an entrenched platoon on key terrain, what does he care if you want to take the places he is "not". For he is "not" there probably for pretty good reason."

Static positions are very strong if they are all integrated into an effective, supportive set up (everyone has LOS to everyone else). A maneuver attack against such a defence is impossible. However, in suitable conditions, where many of few situations are possible against each position, in sequence, a static defence would be quite weak, as it cannot adapt well. This is especially true if the recon screen is successfull in isolating enemy positions, preventing easy shifting of forces and hinders reserve movements.

I also think seizing empty terrain features to be valuable in certain cases. While such features, particularly in the rear of the defencem, may not have value to him, they may have value to the recon screen to be used as places to cut up retreats, prevent easy reinforcement, observe, etc.

"Basic idea "prevent enemy from putting reserves in action, or shifting strength to meet your strength" is fine. But it is a broader idea than the means to accomplish it (in your case, occupying empty spots all around his main positions. - hopefully not KZs.)"

Agreed. Artillery can be used, HMG's, armor, among other methods. An attacker does have various options to achieve this.

"BTW, the primary point of the security screen for the defender is often just to counter the attacker from getting cheap exchanges with his probes. The attacker wants to lead with small elements (assault teams) from each of his platoons and likewise with whatever first echelon screening forces are present. You know the why of that. So the defender seeks to negate that as much as possible by biting off the attacker probes in a skirmish phase or during the first echelons of determined attack. It is not usually as eyes, although every unit plays that role, that aggressive screening is sought by defenders."

This is a very valid point you bring up. A fast moving recon screen will definately suffer heavy casualties for little gain if a defender employs a strong, aggressive screen himself, particularly if it uses the 'ambush and fall-back drill.'

I think a more attrition based approach would be a better counter to this defence. Basically, probe very carefully ahead, and slowly, while most of the attacking force overwatches. This would mean a slow, predictable heavy front that has lots of firepower readily available. Countering such a defence would warrant a separate thread all on its own I think.

[kawaiku]

Maybe you all should collaborate and write a book on this subject of all CM players with CMBB(with pics of course) 'cuz there is sooo much info in almost every single post I haven't even gotten past the first page

[RockinHarry]

Originally posted by Cuirassier:

Another question: What are some good books that outline or discuss German tactical doctrine either during WWI or WWII (preferably company to regimental scale)? Where could I purchase them?

Thanks.

Most likely not available in english language, but I find Guderian/Munzel´s "Panzer Marsch!" (Panzer march) and Eike Middeldorf´s "Taktik im Russlandfeldzug" (tactics in the russian campaign) of great value. Both are post war (1956) publications and deal mainly with the wartime experiences, application of the military regulations/tactics, their successes-failures and adaptions. Guderians book focuses mainly on tank arm matters (incl. combined arms) while Middeldorfs book takes a wider approach and compares all german vs. russian army combat arms and application of combat tactics.

There´s also some very useful tactics books from german wartime authors publishing during and shortly before WW2, in example there´s the Greiner/Degener series of books dealing mainly with infantry bataillon and regimental tactics. There´s numerous other authors, too many to mention since most of their publications would be only available in german language and not easy to find usually. I find most this stuff either on local used stuff markets or ebay.

Interesting to know is that many of the US wartime publications about german tactics is direct translations of german field regulations or tactics/training manuals of the time. "The german squad in combat" (german original is KÜHLWEIN´s "Die Gruppe im Gefecht") is one example, or US publications who include large parts of the german "Truppenführung" tactical doctrine manual (HDV 300/1), comparable to US field service regulation FM 100-5. Most of the US translated stuff is available from the net for free (MHI, CARL ect.) Also it can be savely assumed that all military stuff published by german authors and official authorities was aqquired before and during WW2 and that it can either be found in archives and/or micro films in the US somewhere.

Here´s a list of original german stuff I collected during past 2 years (sorry, all german!):

Publishers:

OW-Offene Worte Verlag

M&S - Mittler & Sohn Verlag

Barbara Verlag

Mars Verlag

Format: Title, author, publisher, year.

official german training regulations:

D 102 Die Infanterie im Stellungskrieg, 1940

H.Dv. 73, Schießvorschrift sMG, 1937

H.Dv. 100, Krankenträgerordnung, 1934

H.Dv. 111/2 Teil2 Schießvorschrift für Infanteriegeschütze, 1939

H.Dv. 125/3a Fernmeldetechnik im Heere, Heft 3a, Funktechnik, 1939

H.Dv. 125/2 Fernmeldetechnik im Heere, Heft 2, Fernsprechtechnik, 1939

H.Dv. 130/2a, A.V.I, 1942

H.Dv. 130/2b, A.V.I, 1936

H.Dv. 130/3a, A.V.I, Maschinengewehr-Kp., 1936

H.Dv. 130/4a, A.V.I, Infanteriegeschütz-Kp., 1937 + 1941

H.Dv. 130/5, A.V.I, Die Panzerabwehrkompanie, 1938

H.Dv. 130/9, A.V.I, Führung und Kampf der Infanterie, Das Inf.-Btl, 1940

H.Dv. 130/11, A.V.I, Feldbefestigung der Infanterie, 1940

H.Dv. 200/2g, A.V.A, Ausbildung Batterie lFH18, 1937

H.Dv. 200/4, A.V.A, Bespannte Batterie, 1934

H.Dv. 200/6, Teil 1 A.V.A, Schießvorschrift, 1943

H.Dv. 240, Schiessvorschrift für leichte Waffen, 1937

H.Dv. 299/3, A.V.K, Die Radfahrerschwadron, 1937

H.Dv. 300 Truppenführung Teil 1

H.Dv. 316 Pionierdienst aller Waffen, 1935

H.Dv. 316 Pionierdienst aller Waffen Ergänzungsheft, 1941

H.Dv. 319/1, Behelfsmäßiges Bauen im Kriege, 1941

H.Dv. 487 Teil 2, Führung und Gefecht verbundener Waffen, 1923

H.Dv. stands for "Heeres Druck Vorschrift" = army printed regulation (technical, service, training ect.)

A.V.I means "Ausbildungs Vorschrift Infanterie" = Training regulation for the infantry

A.V.A means "Ausbildungs Vorschrift Artillerie" = Training regulation for the artillery

A.V.K means "Ausbildungs Vorschrift Kavallerie" = Training regulation for the cavalry

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Freely available (unclassified and in selected bookstores ect.) stuff of the period:

Technisches Hilfsbuch für Funker, OW, 1942

Der Kompaniechef, Ellenbeck, 1940

Offizierthemen, Gesterding/M&S, 1943

Das Wesen der soldat. Erziehung, Altrichter/Stalling, 1935

Die Rekruten-Ausbildung (Infanterie), Queckbörner/M&S, 1940

Der Dienst in der Kompanie, Stock/M&S, 1937

Kompanie-Ausbildung im Feldheer, Busol/M&S, 1942

Der Kompanietrupp, Wilhelm Strutz, OW 1936

Die (neue) Gruppe, Zimmermann/OW, ~1930-34

Die Gruppe der Schützenkompanie zu 12 Gruppen, Zimmermann/OW, 1941

Soldatenfibel, OW, ~1930-34

Gefechtsfibel, OW, 1937

Taktikfibel, Witzleben/OW, ~1934

Kriegsspielfibel, OW, ~1935

Pionierfibel, OW, ~1935

Kavalleriefibel, ~1935

Nachrichten Fibel, OW, ~1935

Geländefibel, Jordan, OW 1940/41

Leichter Granatwerfer Wa 38/39, 1940

Artilleristisches Merkheft, Barbara, 1941

Artilleristische Schiessaufgaben, Barbara, 1940

Praktische Ballistik für den Artilleristen, Schmidt/M&S, 1943

Taschenbuch für den Artilleristen, Rheinmetall-Borsig, 1942

Handbuch für den Flakartilleristen (Der Kanonier) 8,8 und 2cm Flak, Neuman/OW, 1941

Artilleristischer Ratgeber auf dem Gefechtsfeld, Kruse/Barbara, 1940

Das verstärkte Bataillon, K.W.Uebe, M&S, 1942

Die M.G.-Kompanie, Hofmann/M&S, 1939

Der Feuerkampf des s. M.G., Froböse/M&S, 1940

Das Kommandobuch, Die Schützenkompanie Teil1, Mars/Siwinna, 1941

Soldaten-Wörterbuch Deutsch-Russisch, 1941

Taschenbuch für den Winterkrieg, 1942

Das Nachtgefecht, Boltze/M&S, 1936

Kleine Lagen und ihre Durchführung, Bones/M&S, 1942

Taktisches Handbuch f.d. Truppenführer und seine Gehilfen, Cochenhausen/M&S, 1936

Die Planübung, Mahlman/M&S, 1942

Grundaufgaben für die Gefechtsausbildung im Inf.-Batl., Haymann, Gustav Kühn Verlag 1942

Die Maschinenwaffen im Rahmen der Taktik, Däniker, M&S 1942

Taktik im Rahmen des verstärkten Infanterie Battailons, Greiner-Degener/OW, 1940

Krisen im Gefecht, Greiner-Degener/OW, 1936

Gefechtsführung und Kampftechnik, Greiner-Degener/M&S, 1937

Kampftechnik, Greiner/M&S, 1941

Aufgabenstellung und Übungsleitung, Greiner-Degener/M&S, 1938

Felddienst-ABC für den Schützen, Kühlwein/M&S, 1935

Die Gruppe im Gefecht, Kühlwein/M&S, 1934

Schützenzug und Kompanie im Gefecht, Kühlwein/M&S, 1934

Panzerkampfwagen-Buch, Kaufmann/OW, 1941

Gefechtsausbildung der Panzergrenadiere, Helmut von Wehren, OW 1944

Das Panzerjägerbuch, Major Ritter Edler von Peter, OW 1939

Geschütz- und Zugaufgaben der Panzerabwehrkompanie, Hohmann, M&S 1939

Geländebeschreibung und Geländebeurteilung, Denckler Verlag, 1940

Richtig Entfernungschätzen, Denckler Verlag, 1940

Das militärische Geländezeichnen im Aufklärungsdienst, Distler/Selbstverlag, 1924

Gelände ABC, Thümmel/M&S, 1942

Gelände und Kartenkunde, Baumgart/M&S, 1939

Taktische Zeichen des Heeres, Graefe, 1938

Panzer Marsch!, Guderian-Munzel, 1956

Taktik im Russlandfeldzug, Middeldorf/M&S, 1957

Prices ranged between 5 to 30 Euro with most of them somewhere in the middle (10-20). All are in readable condition. There´s yet quite rare FM/TM and field service regulations that are not easy to aqquire, unless you have the right amount of cash at hand. Most of the rare stuff is from the Panzertruppen and prices my go up to 50-100 Euro or more. For an overview about german field service and training regulations check this site: http://www.superborg.de/

Have questions about the content of one or the other listed book, let me know!

[JasonC]

Sure you can remain flexible and adapt. But if all you do is waltz in planless and react, you are not going to be 3 steps ahead of the enemy and it is a delusion to think you can be faster than him.

The whole idea is to achieve surprise effects by being faster than the enemy to adapt to changed conditions of fighting - positional, informational, plan to plan interaction ones.

You are supposed to develop an initiative, meaning get the enemy to react to your moves, while you are making 2-3 others he has not yet prepared adequate reactions to, catching him in deployments adapted for conditions that have already disappeared.

In practice, there is no way to develop such an initiative without "jumping the gun" on the mutual information war. If you wait for certainty you will *always* be too slow.

The whole skill of the thing consists in guessing correctly with limited intel, and doing so as fast as possible, as many times as necessary. With each guess translated into an actual "move" - a set of new dispositions creating a previously unrevealed threat, to which the enemy cannot be expected to have adapted (yet).

If instead you just go in "flexible but uncommitted", all that happens is you have no particular plan and create no particular threat. The enemy doesn't need to be in dispositions X, so the fact that he is in Y have no impact. There is nothing to exploit.

The point of forcing a plan to start with is to create a single right answer than the enemy must find, or suffer. Then you can adapt all you like based on whether you think he has adapted correctly - which is just a reiteration of the same move and counter relationship.

Compare the unplanned, OK? I send in broad front recon. It finds that the enemy is weak on his left and strongest on his center-right. It also finds this out at the exact same time it tells the enemy I know it. After his strong center right has shot the recon screen to rags on the center right, what is he going to do? He doesn't have to be a rocket scientist - he reduces the winning positions to a screen and siphons off the balance there to his reserve, while his previous reserve forms a refused left, hinged off the winning position.

So what have I gained if I send my main body at his discovered left only at that point? Nothing. I have no tempo, I have no intel advantage. My moves are predictable consequences of the recon battle results. Being predictable and coming well after those results, they will be anticipated and nobody will be out of position to meet them.

If on the other hand I committed to a heavy left before the recon screen hit, I am following it instantly when my prior guess proves to have been right. The main body is through before his strong right has even won its easier fight with the recon screen.

If on the other hand I guessed wrong, then I find myself wrong footed in the following sense - my recon screen is checked with the main body right behind it, but gets ahead someplace else. I refrain from reinforcing failure and I am forced to change the plan in mid stride. I cannot be expected to be as fast as when I guessed right. But I can be just as fast as I would have been had I not guessed at all - the main body side steps during the recon screen's loss to the strong position.

There is no substitute for guessing right ahead of time, with limited intel, in terms of the speed it can deliver. Staying flexible just means you have to admit when the plan was wrong and fall back on an "unguessed" attack. But there is no reason to start there. Doing so will throw away your best single shot at the initiative and an opponent caught out of position.

As I put it earlier, do something unexpected, and then do three other things hard while the enemy is still adapting to the first. That's the idea. It is how one gets ahead in the adapt and reorient cycle. You can't count on being faster if you wait for information and certainty and take no risks.

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[Cuirassier]

JasonC,

You cleared up my confusion over how the fundamental ideas of maneuver doctrine work. I guess you had already explained it in your first posts, but it went sort of over my head. So thanks for responses.

AdamL,

Thanks for the post. I think it is somewhat difficult to debate the mechanics of a maneuver attack when how any attack should be conducted is largely dependent on the specific situation. I think most things and POV's we have exchanged or advocated in our posts have relevance. Really, it is difficult to argue which principles may be better or worse, when there is no specific situation to apply the principles to.

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[civdiv]

Jason,

The long and short of it is that the military succeeded in their mission, and the State Dept failed in their mission. Franks warned the administration that toppling Saddam was easier than insuring the peace. He agreed there were sufficient troops to topple Saddam but he wanted more troops due, in large, to occupy the country post-invasion. Rumsfeld dictated the troops levels, and State took responsibility for rebuilding. The military toppled Saddam, State didn't rebuild the country. Shoot, the training of Iraqi police and para-militaries was a very low priority (dollar-wise) in the CPA's arithmetic. They didn't initially even envision a real Iraqi army but only a lightly armed paramilitary very reminiscent of South Korea in 1950. Remember, we had several months of relative calm after the fall of Baghdad. AQ in Iraq was a no-brainer, but the Sunni insurgency was a direct result of the CPA's misguided policies, post-Saddam.

The military wanted to use about 400,000 troops for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Rumsfeld vetoed that and defined the actual troop strengths used. And the actual numbers used was about 30,000 less than actually planned for since the 4th ID couldn't get in-country. Again, that was a gaff by State as they just started steaming the 4th ID to Turkey assuming the Turks would let them in. This 'assumption' w/o prior coordination was an insult to the Turks who blocked their entrance through Turkey, and the 4th ID had to turn around and steam back to the Persian Gulf.

The Sunni insurgency AND the Shia death-squads/Iranian Qods Force supported insurgents were a direct result of the CPA and State. There is a reason Bush recently declared 'open season' on the Iranians meddling in Iraq. It was due to the fact that previously Iranian agents were 'out-of-season', and that wasn't the military's call.

Your criticism of the military 'going light' holds no water. What is more effective in a COIN situation, a HMMWV or an M1? A HMMWV w/ Level II is just as protected as an M113. So the M113 can move better cross country, so what? The M113 issue is just a distractor, nothing more and nothing less. In most cases the M113 is still road bound and it tears up the road because it is tracked, and it provides LESS protection than a Level II armored HMMWV. Why? Because it is heavier. A HMMWV has more 'give' to an IED as it is lighter while the heavier M113 is more likely to allow an IED to affect the armor as it is heavier. The M113 is also less maneuverable, bigger, and louder, and as mentioned, it tears up the road.

There is a reason that the Isrealis chose to ride on top of their M113s during both the 1973 war and the Invasion of Beruit in 1983. It was because they tended to die if they were inside the vehicle when it was hit by an RPG. Have you ever seen an M113 that was hit by an RPG? Because of the aluminum armor they tended to be pentrated and to burn down to a puddle of aluminum. The M113 is no panacea for the current COIN going on in Iraq.

A Level II armored HMMWV is armored to withstand a Soviet 7.62 at zero range. A Marine LAV is armored to withstand a Soviet 7.62 at zero range. A M113 is armored to withstand a Soviet 7.62 at zero range. Cross country mobility (And the M113's mobility is little better than that of a HMMWV.) means little in a COIN situation. And there is little to no difference between transporting up-armored HMMWVs and M113s; it has little to with weight and deals more with volume.

And this is a good example of Iraqi insurgent adaptation. They progressed from simple AT mines that killed HMMWVs to double or triple stack mines. They have since moved on to multiple 122 or 152 rounds, enhanced by natural gas tanks, and on to EFPs, the latter that can penetrate Bradleys, and in some instances, Abrams. The M113 is just as susceptible to IEDs and mines as the up-armored HMMWVs. And it sacrifices visibility and survivability, and it places more personnel in danger at one time (As 10 guys could be in a M113 while only 5 could be in a HMMWV.).

[ February 21, 2007, 08:19 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

[z-warfare]

Speaking of puddles of aluminum i was always suprised military vehicles can be made of magnesium alloys... i remember that stuff on fire in science class...

[JasonC]

civdiv - more CYA and blame-game bilgewater. Soldiers win, losers whine and point fingers.

[civdiv]

Originally posted by JasonC:

civdiv - more CYA and blame-game bilgewater. Soldiers win, losers whine and point fingers.

Sorry Jason, the military did what they set out to do; namely, topple Saddam. They succeeded at the invasion and they are winning the insurgency (Based on your own argument). With approximately 50,000 insurgents killed, captured, or 'hors de combat', they are winning the fight. But it will take years to win the whole thing. State had the rebuilding and their failure led to the insurgency. And insurgency, the actual cause of it, is not a military issue, it is a foreign policy issue. State had that and fumbled. You can't have iron-fisted control over a country the size of France with some 160,000 troops (To include coalition troops plus gun toting contractors).

The military's mission was to topple Saddam. They succeeded.

State's mission was to rebuild the country. They failed.

The insurgency came about due to State's failure. The military is winning the COIN despite having too few numbers.

The military told the NCA that they needed more troops to occupy Iraq and they were ignored.

In the end the military says 'yes sir' when given an order. We don't make foreign policy, we just carry it out. If the policy is flawed it is not our fault. Somolia is a good example. The military succeeded at every mission given it. And it was mistakes made by State and the UN that led to the calamity.

Jason, if you send a platoon of National Guard into China with orders to take over the country and they fail, it isn't the military's fault. No one ever told Rumsfeld and/or Bush/Powell whatever that the plan was good. On the contrary the military fought them tooth-and-nail but in the end they were ordered to obey, and they said 'yes sir'.

[Cuirassier]

Well, I've decided to add some more to this thread. Over the past couple days I've been searching the internet looking for information about the Russian pre-war doctrine (1936), as I understand it was maneuver based as well. I also want to compare it with German ideas.

I've been having difficulty finding information on the subject however. Could someone point me in the right direction where to look for information on pre-war Soviet doctrine? Or if anyone has good knowledge of it could they please post what they know, and compare it with German doctrine?

Also, was the Soviet pre-war doctrine mostly just concerned with operational concepts (eg deep battle, successive operations) or was it largely concerned with tactical concepts as well?

If any of my questions seem confusing, I can try to elaborate. Thanks in advance.

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[Cuirassier]

Thanks for the title AdamL. I've placed an order on Amazon for the book and should get it in a couple weeks.