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Maneuver and Annihilation Battle


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JasonC,

"There is a VASSAL for it and I have a hard copy, if anyone is interested in trying their hand at it."

As I continue to study the German and Soviet doctrines, I am becoming much more interested in the operational aspects of the war. But pardon my ignorance JasonC, I have practically no experience with operational wargames and don't know what VASSAL is. Still, I think I would be interested.

Also, could you direct me to some accurate operational histories concerning German forces on the Eastern front? I don't know where to start looking. I wouldn't mind to see Soviet operational histories as well. If you can't think of any thats fine too.

AdamL,

I will let you know what I think of the book as soon as I can, though that will probably be a while from now. I have also ordered Glantz's book that discusses the tactics and roles of forward detachments.

While I've been waiting for my books I've been combing through the internet trying to scrape up whatever I can concerning Soviet operational theory and doctrine. I find the subject very interesting. If anyone is interested in sharing insight on the subject, and comparing it to German methods, feel free to do so. Perhaps in a later post I'll write down some things I've noticed and learned, though my only resource so far has been the internet.

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The Russian idea that operations will be needed in sequence because each can only be expected to make limited gains, is a bit of attritionist realism that is conspicuously missing from German views about decisive breakthrough. In practice, the Germans strung together operational scale offensives, but they rarely planned on them and were always expecting each one to be the last needed.

The Russian understanding of that need arose from analysis of the failure of WW I era offensives, notably the Brusilov offensive in 1916 and the late war German offensives in the west in 1918. Unlike the western allies, they did not see the problem as one of achieving breakthrough, because they had seen full scale breakthrough achieved, even with WW I technology and methods. But they noticed those did not win the war.

The result was a much more cautious attitude in strategic planning and the highest level of operations. They always had a huge second echelon by German standards. They considered it perfectly normal to have a whole string of armies in reserve, and to plan on committing them to a whole string of offensives staggered through time. The Germans were rarely rich enough for that, but moreover would have regarded it as something of a waste of combat power, a sin against the principle of concentration at the decisive point.

There were other practical differences in organization. The Germans privileged the division level far more, and typically had very few assets above that level. Occasionally they would pool artillery higher, generally for fire allocation, but often using divisional assets. Modest bits of armor (some Pz Jgr, StuG, the heavies e.g.) were free floating but in practice assigned to this or that division for a full operation.

In contrast, the Russians privileged the army level. Far more of the specialist forces were placed there, and allocated by the army commander. That could make for some distance and slower adaptation, but it also made for much greater concentration of particular weapon types in particular areas. It was less a uniform TOE mix, in other words, because up to half the real combat power might be the "top-off" stuff assigned by army.

The Germans also placed a much greater emphasis on flanking movements tactically, while the Russians were not shy about straight ahead, frontal attacks. On defense, the Germans relied on instant counterattack at all scales, while the Russians were marginally more inclined to a static defense, augmented by shifts of reserves.

It is true the Russians did indulge in premature counterattacks, but usually as more centralized and rather grandious affairs meant to win back the initiative (not too successfully it must be said). A typical case would be a second echelon formation given a full attack order 1-3 days after a German attack. These were much more successful when delivered with full preparation (weeks typically) somewhere else along the front, well clear of German attack concentrations.

Both sides placed high - I would say excessive - emphasis on ground control and not giving an inch, when defending. The Germans were more comfortable adopting non-linear defenses in which only fire or counterattack covered some sectors. Russians fought that way as hold outs sometimes, but not deliberately - they had been burned enough in pocket fights in 1941 that they generally tried to maintain a continuous line thereafter. And preferably 2 or 3 of them.

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  • 2 weeks later...

I've been reading Glantz's book "The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver," and some essays of his I have found on the internet. I am still waiting for my book "Soviet Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle."

Nonetheless, from what I've read of Glantz so far, I'm quite impressed with the amount of detail and insight he provides in his writings.

I have some questions for the grogs regarding his one essay found here.

Basically, Operation August Storm was the culmination of Soviet war experience and theory and the maturation of their doctrine. In an extremely short period of time, the Soviets virtually annihilated their Japanese opponents via deep operations. During this operation, the Soviets showed excellent combined arms coordination, flexibility and creativity. They also employed surprise well and their use of foreward detachments is notable.

At least this is how Glantz puts it. So what I am wondering is this: was the Soviet success in Manchuria a result of an excellent doctrine that was fully matured and commanders could use it to the fullest, or was it a result of of an ill-equipped Japanese army not close to TOE that was poorly handled in the field?

I look forward to the replies.

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The Russians had learned modern mobile operations in the hardest possible school, not to perfection but to solid professional competence. And they were equipped for it on a massive scale. The Japanese had been chasing barely armed Chinese peasants for over a decade without ever facing a real opponent, and were barely armed to WW I infantry fighting standards. It was a deterministic smash.

Glantz studies it anyway because it was viewed as a kind of set piece for what central Europe might look like - perhaps with the addition, "if we weren't careful". Meaning, at least, the Russians were expected to attack in something like that fashion. Clearly, NATO would have been far better prepared to receive them than the Japanese occupation army was.

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