Assaulting anti-Tank/Infantry guns

[malfuriouspete]

Hey all,

I'm trying out one of B&T scenarios, Opening Moments I think the name was...dealing with the start of the Kursk Offensive, operation citadel july 1943

Playing as the Germans and the Russians have a hell of a lot of hidden anti-tank guns, which also seem to be pretty effective against my infantry too

Trying to find some effective ways of attacking these positions without suffering to many losses? Any tips like how should I approach them or what formations to use?

This battle, I have 8 Tiger Tanks at my disposal and they very well seem to be impenetrable and their guns can take out just about anything at range. Also have 5 Panzer III's and 10 IV's.. and a side opinion, which is the better tank to use? Pz IIIs or IVs? IIIs seem to have better frontal armor while the IVs have a more powerful gun

[JasonC]

Guns are killed by mortars. But not all scenario designers get this and give you want you'd actually have.

The combined arms drill is supposed to be, some kind of scouting force goes first, draws fire, overwatch then engages each weapon that opens and silences it, before the scouts risk themselves further. Overwatch against guns means either AFVs they cannot harm, or mortars they cannot even see, or FOs.

Of these, on map mortars are the most economical and the preferred solution. That is why the Germans have 2 in every infantry type company, plus as many again at battalion level, and then 2-3 of those companies for every company of actual tanks.

In a moving fight, the best version is the SPW 251/2, carefully kept in full defilade. A single one can KO a full battery of ATGs before it runs dry. At TOE a standard German panzer division had 12 (half in the armored Panzergrenadiers, and half in the armored recon).

Tigers will also serve. The only things they have to worry about are 57mm ATGs (rare), a few SUs they can usually kill first easily, and the short range threats - AT mines, tank hunters, pioneers. The solution to the last set is simply not to drive them too aggressively into the defensive zone, but instead hold them back in overwatch, sending their lines of sight and their shells, not the tank itself.

That leaves the issue of who to have scout. Infantry works in close terrain and deals with such short run threats. But in open steppe, it will be stopped by stealthy ranged fire from hidden MGs, mortars, FOs, and snipers. Which will slow them to a literal crawl. They can still help, and force such things to open up, but they won't succeed on their own.

Leaving lesser armor the scouting role. The key is to use something thick enough that it takes a full sized gun to hurt it. Halftracks or thin armored cars can be killed by ATRs or light AA that will not reveal itself doing so, at long enough range. So instead use your lesser tanks. The Panzer IIIs are ideal for it, of the types you mention.

But don't risk a mass of them. Instead, send infantry along intended axes of advance, with one count 'em one Panzer III, and lots of overwatch (Tigers, mortars, FOs). If MGs stop the infantry, drive the Panzer III close enough to get a full ID not a sound contact - aggressively. If the MGs shut up, halt the Panzer III and bring up the infantry. If they don't, blow them up. If the defenders reveal a gun to hit the Panzer III, reply with the Tigers and mortars - after repositioning if necessary to get LOS - and finish off that gun. Then repeat, another Panzer forward.

Trade through the guns this way. It takes time, and sometimes to accelerate it you have to run some risks.

As for the IVs, they are vulnerable to 76mm fire at long range through their turret front. But have good firepower and fast turrets, themselves. Their best initial use is hanging back on the flanks of the Tigers, preferably in pairs at least, to kill any T-34s that get too frisky. As the enemy gun defense cracks, you can get more aggressive with them, and bring them up to the overwatch line.

If you run out of IIIs to send forward, though, I'd send a Tiger (keeping 50m from cover if possible, and with infantry trying to keep up) rather than a IV - too many things can kill a IV from too many angles and ranges etc.

I hope this helps.

[malfuriouspete]

hey, thanks for all that advice, I'll certainly try to implement it the next time I play it

in that scenario, I do have some SPW 251/2's, the mortor ones but couldn't figure out exactly how to use them effectively. I've found that most of the russian guns on this map may have lines of sight up to 1000m and many many supporting troops hidden in woods around the guns so it makes for quite a challenge.

This being a steppe map, I always had my vehicles bogging and probably lost around 10 halftracks, a some tanks this way.

I've played through this battle once, lost 2 PzIIIs, 6 Pz IVs, and none of my tigers. The russians had a lot of T-34s waiting for me over a hill but the tigers basically took everything out. Most of my halftracks were destroyed by the guns though..

[JasonC]

Any infantry HQ unit can spot for any on map mortar, including SPW 251/2s. There will be a red command line from the 'track to the HQ if you are in command distance, just like there would be for an infantry unit. Naturally HQs with +2 command bonuses have the longest reach, and ones with +2 combat can improve accuracy etc.

Then the 'track needs to be stationary, ready to fire. The HQ needs to have a clear line of sight to the intended target location. It is best if you can see the actual target unit, but you can also "area fire" at a map location (if, e.g., the gun is known to be barely out of LOS). Now give the 'track a fire order - the targeting line will "stick" and should be yellow. All such indirect fire will continue until cancelled, and won't pay attention to target movements if any, so update the order at the end of the turn.

The effectiveness varies with the range, target cover, and tree cover near the target. Under 400 meters the accuracy is best. At 1000 meters, it will be poor, but the shot can be taken. Targets in trees are considerably more vulnerable, because some portion (a quarter to a third of those that land in woods) of the mortar rounds will hit the treetops, and "airburst". Ground cover helps the defender though, and trenches are fairly hard at long range. Also not effective against buildings, but you don't find guns in those.

As for how to drive lighter armor on a big map, the answer is obviously "carefully". Yes it is easy to lose lots of them (I have). Dead ground is the safest, and low tends to mean dead to more of the map, so when it doubt, stay low. Also use "shadows" from houses or blocks of trees sufficiently deep (2 full tiles of woods lengthwise, e.g.). Only advance as far as you need to, to spot what you intend to shoot at. In the case of SPW 251/2s, you want their spotter HQs in cover looking, and the 'track behind them but behind some obstacle (e.g. right behind a house, or one of the sharper slopes).

The most common single mistake in these situations is to drive forward just because you can, there don't seem to be enemy ahead yet, or you can't see something to fire on that instant. Don't send the vehicle when you can send scouts and shells. If you can't see any enemy or anyplace more unspotted ones are likely to be lurking, then it is OK to advance. You don't need more enemy seeing you than you can shoot at once, right?

I hope this helps.

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[JasonC]

When they want to get through a gun front quickly and it is thin enough, they just overload the 4 or so defending guns per kilometer with 50 attacking tanks, take their lumps, and break in. If on the other hand they run into 24 guns where they expected 4, however, that will result in a Bad Day . If they are expecting too many, they drop artillery on them and hit elsewhere.

Good attacks do prior battlefield recon, sometimes e.g. infiltrating a whole battalion (leg) before the tanks go in. In that case, they are picking locations that seemed weak from a higher view and are expecting the lesser concentration figures. But also, good shared tactical intel makes it easier to apply brick by brick methods in CM.

In practice, the break-in part was rarely the problem. It usually went well, a few cases of very poor armor - artillery cooperation excepted. But once into the enemy defensive zone, the fight continues with arriving reserves, tactical intel drops, artillery is outranged. Mistakes get easier to make. And yes, often the attacker tries to make up for it by running risks and making haste, hoping to beat the enemy reaction reserves to the back of their own defensive zone.

They practically never do, though. Sometimes they meet and beat those reserves, and can continue. More often, the farther they stuck their neck out, the harder they get stopped. Full breakthroughs only happened either early in the war, against enemies who didn't know how to stop it all, or after operational reserves of the enemy had been exhausted.

That being so, it would have made much more sense to grind through said reserves as carefully as possible, with little attention to immediate haste and plenty to exchange efficiency. But they didn't. Wasn't doctrine, didn't fit the high hopes always brought to the table, etc. Everyone generally thought too highly of the initiative and not highly enough of conservation of own side force.

Which is why the war was a train wreck, and not an operating room...

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[John Kettler]

JasonC,

There are ways to put ATGs inside houses in CM. Though probably not doable in a QB, they could be placed that way in a scenario.

Regards,

John Kettler

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Adam1:

Was anyone doing it efficiently? Or at least writing about alternatives to contemporary theories? Also, do you think much of this has been absorbed since?

Finns had some initial problems in adjusting to changed Soviet tactics in defensive battles of summer 1944.

traditionally Soviets had just pressed forward as far as possible until they were stopped by Finns. typically Finns had no problems in stopping & eliminating these kinds of attacks.

in summer 1944, instead of just pressing forward, the Soviets would stop their advance after initial success and form "hedgehog" defenses (all around or at least 180 degree defence, infantry forming the outer edge with tanks supporting on the inner layer or further back). once Finns launched their expected counterattack/assault, and once the Soviets had defeated it (at that point Finnish infantry had no special AT weaponry like panzerfausts, not to mention having tank support, so they had little chances of being succesful with hasty counterassaults), the Soviet units would resume their advance.

EDIT: i realize that the described Soviet tactic had little to do with overcoming AT-guns, but it did show attitude that favored attrition over haste (even if that attitude soon died out once their general offensive stalled).

[ April 11, 2008, 07:17 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[Conscript Bagger]

Originally posted by JasonC:

That being so, it would have made much more sense to grind through said reserves as carefully as possible, with little attention to immediate haste and plenty to exchange efficiency. But they didn't. Wasn't doctrine, didn't fit the high hopes always brought to the table, etc. Everyone generally thought too highly of the initiative and not highly enough of conservation of own side force.

So operationally, they fought the same way we play CM?

[JasonC]

Usually people only got serious about attrition efficiency after being forced onto the defensive. Then the field grade types were more serious about it than the top echelons, who generally confused past successes with their own daring in ordering attacks and the initiative always working etc.

Sometimes the Germans in Russia got excellent attrition efficiency out of their opponents being boneheads, without particularly focusing on it as a matter of doctrine. Even while attacking I mean. They were undoubtedly better at sending the right arm for the job tactically. Not always (or even, usually) with close real time coordination between two or all three arms, but just sending tanks where tanks works but infantry when it likely wouldn't, exploiting terrain or night to get around a blockage, etc.

The western allies aimed at attrition efficiency of a somewhat different sort by leaning on HE arms as a crutch against tactical ineptitude, and that worked to a degree. In money or capital terms it might be as inefficient as you please, but they sent bombs or shells instead of bodies and traded money for blood. Money wasn't scarce.

Rather than involving pinpoint use of the perfect weapon against the weapon it best countered, in close real time cooperation, though, this was more often a matter of inundating a wide area with a sea of HE. Which was inefficient when they tried to do it all at once to get momentary annhiliation, to support breakthrough dreams - which was way too often the aim. But if sustained over a long enough period - a month or so sufficed - it would bleed defenders white, at little own-side cost. That was about as close as they got to a deliberate focus on exchange efficiency dictating operations.

They were better about it at sea, actually. The war against U-boats was conducted in the most scientific and attritionist manner - it was the showcase use of operations research to direct resources to where they gave the most bang for the buck, in sunk subs and ships safely through.

Intel and tech helped in that too, but fundamentally it was won by OR, which rapidly zeroed in on the right mix of tactics - radar equipped long range aircraft search, carrier escorts forcing u-boats to stay submerged near convoys they were attempting to hunt, escorted convoys, and hunter-killer groups of a few surface escorts chasing down subs after their attacks, successful or not.

See, there were lots of ideas about what might work - just beef up convoy escorts, search for the u-boats in open ocean with surface groups, interdict them as they left their bases, hit them with bombs in their sub pens, sail in big convoys or in faster ones, etc etc. Every idea had an advocate and all could point to some reasoning or past success or both. But none really knew what the critical steps were for the u-boats themselves.

It turns out the u-boats biggest weakness was their low submerged speed, which meant their chances of ever spotting convoys let alone catching them or setting up well coordinated group attacks, to overwhelm their escorts, depended critically on the boats spending most of their sortie time running at 15-20 knots on the surface, not 5 knots underwater. Planes forced them to dive. Once slowed, they were vulnerable to HK groups if and only if there was a decent, recent spotting report already, and they had been submerged the whole time since (if they could get "up" again soon, the area they could reach was too big to find them).

This was all found in statistical analysis of u-boat sinkings etc. These combined tactics drove the typical exchange rate from one u-boat sinks 10-20 merchant ships over its life, to 2 u-boats lost for every merchant ship sunk - and the production ratio between them would do the rest.

That is pretty far afield from the original question, I understand. But it is an example of systematic focus on attrition efficiency and what it was capable of delivering.

Examples of sides on defense that learned to focus on exchange efficiency - well, the Germans in Russia to a degree, but the top never really "got" it. As a result, whenever they gathered a large enough reserve they'd throw it away in a grandious counterattack attempt.

The Americans on defense against German armor, when it attacked, sort of stumbled into it. I think to be honest the driving cause was simply fear of the Germans and their press inflated virtuousity - this led the Americans to renounce the initiative when attacked by German armor, and in some panic to focus on wearing them out, numerically speaking. With artillery stripping doing some of it, TD doctrine some more etc.

Mac and island hopping were an operational form of it in the Pacific. But the US still spent a lot of blood digging Japanese infantry out of a lot of cave forts on the islands they did land on. Used a lot of HE for it, with mixed results as we've discussed.

After the war, there are 3 conspicuous examples of such thinking later, that I'd call sound or successful. Ridgway in Korea in the still-mobile portion of the fight against the Chinese, didn't care a straw for the initiative, or for ground controlled for that matter, and was exclusively focused on killing as many Chinese as possible, as cheaply as possible.

It worked impressively, especially given the numerical disparity in forces. Capital - firepower arms - did a lot of it, but so did his focus. He found the Chinese' weakest suit, logistics and their ability to sustain forces after an advance. So he'd let them come on and overextend themselves, then hit back hard in chosen places, and then fade again when the Chinese built up anew.

He saw they were short reach punchers, in other words, very dangerous if you stood stock still in front of them and tried to hold every inch of ground, much less so if they had to punch while on their "forward" foot. It saved South Korea IMO. Mac would have lost it.

In the later cold war, US army planners for central front fighting adopted a consciously attritionist and defensive focus, willing to trade ground for time and for loss efficiency, not willing to trade own side forces for any initiative etc. This wasn't tested, but would in my opinion have worked beautifully.

The wild card at the time, that they didn't have a good handle on, was whether the air force would win and play its assigned role in this. The hindsight evidence is that it would have - the US tech lead and pilot training lead was good enough. And with air superiority and smart weapons, backpeddling and smashing tanks with laser-like focus, would have stopped the Warsaw Pact cold. Fundamentally this was an armored cav doctrine, and it was informed by deep reading about the Germans in Russia, and clear thinking about the firepower revolution smart weapons brought about.

More recently, the air force has effectively had such an attritionist focus. It thinks in target sets and capability dismantling, not in terms of initiatives and decision loops and maneuvers. They can talk that talk to army and marine types breed on maneuverism, but at bottom it is deeply firepower-centric thinking. And combined-arms procedural dismantling.

What do I mean? I mean stealths and missiles get the mission of shutting off the radar net before the rest are turned loose, then it is airfields, then it is SAM suppression, then it is high value C3I. All meant to take away the equivalent of the AT network and let the tanks (planes) roam free. It is done carefully with the best asset for each job - they don't try to overwhelm a SAM battery with close air support missions by F-16s e.g. They take their time, establish early that time is on their side, seek an assymmetry of near impunity for own-side forces and a positive net loss rate to the enemy, etc.

Which is why they win the active parts of the nation's wars, frankly, while the maneuverist ground types with their theories of razzle and dazzle mostly mop up, and then get to fight deeply attritionist protracted wars they aren't doctrinally prepared for. Because the maneuverist furstest with da mostest knockdown part of the fight has already been won, small thanks to them, by the attritionist boys in blue.

Has the real tactical lesson been seen, absorbed, and applied? No not really. Some arms at some times have seen it, and been ready to apply it (armored cav doctrine cold war period e.g.). But mostly, men have backed into it because other factors, or tech or institutional interest or traditional methods or enemy mistakes or weaknesses, and resulting opportunities, have drawn a few to working solutions. While lots of others haven't seen it or would violently disagree, and are committed to objectively stupider courses of action.

One man's (strong) opinions...

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[JasonC]

Operational factors generally dominate tactical ones, period. Strategic factors generally dominate operational ones. There are exceptions but they are exceptions, and they generally are a matter of a large edge one level down outweighing a small edge the other way a level up.

But it seems to me your question or phrasing contains a conceptual "bug" - equally competent and well equipped opponents don't (at least, typically) have large tactical multipliers between them. A greater competence that produces no multipliers at any level isn't a competence, it is a conceit.

If serious differences in efficiencies exist at some scale and they aren't explained by tech differences, then they reflect competence differences of one kind or another. Of course you can have better or worse odds, and different stances (in an era of offense or defense dominance due to tech e.g.), but those are not differences in efficiencies.

There is undoubtedly some tendency for commanders to ignore readily gain-able advantages at some scales because they don't think they will matter in the grand scheme of things. Often they do anyway because fights are closer and harder than planned. And nearly always the attitude is criminal to the men involved. But it a rough and callous way, it may sometimes be true enough.

What doesn't happen is idiotic tactical courses are actually necessary to some operational scheme that outweighs their deficiencies because of its brilliance. You can keep the operational scheme and correct the tactics, and it will make the higher level scheme more likely to succeed, not less.

It is true there is an error in the other direction, that sometimes a side or commander will believe that good tactics are all he needs, and that everything else will take care of itself. Then you can wind up backing into a hopeless strategy (e.g. one that can't achieve decision), or string together barren operations that individual achieve little. The higher levels are simply manipulating more powerful forces.

But maybe you had a particular point in mind different from any of the above. If I tie it back to the original topic, the question might be something like, aren't dumb tactics sometimes useful at the operational scale? I deny it, smarter ones used for the same operational ends will dominate them. Nothing is really gained by being deliberately dumber at the bottom level. It is just easier. Men wind up there because they are lazy and because they are "empirics" (I tried A, something good happened, keep doing A until it fails. Then do A some more for 3 more years as the sky collapses).

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[decimated550]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

JasonC,

There are ways to put ATGs inside houses in CM. Though probably not doable in a QB, they could be placed that way in a scenario.

Regards,

John Kettler

John - I found out how to do that - i'm building a pretty cool factory area scenario, and the germs will be at a disadvantage numerically againt the attacking soviets, and i wondered how to emplace guns that would not be picked off in the few non-built up squares (trees, etc). And i tried it and it worked - guns are now sitting in rubble and factories!

[decimated550]

As for infantry advancing against guns, i just played and won a a small scenario. My infantry company , after taking heavy losses and losing their only tank, then overtook a pak 75, a 150mm, and a smaller infantry gun, all with infantry support. (of course, being their leader, i get some of the credit too).

Some ways i did it, and generally speaking:

- area fire with overwatch units

- area fire with advancing units

- simultaneous attacks from divergent angles. Guns take a long time to rotate; this is the best way to pin the crews.

- Get the business over with in a hurry, though with a sound plan. Real life commanders and units have well-rehearsed reactions for many contingencies.

- Long-range exchanges while you ponder moves will fail. A poor unit can still do well in an advantage situation (i.e. dug in, or ambush) but only a good unit can overcome an overmatch such as men versus guns.

- Do it in at least company strength, so that your company commander following behind can rally units and take over when platoon HQ units get wiped out.

- Targetted fire may not work, as the unit will lose sight and stop firing.

- You'll probably lose more than half the time, as infantry was never made to take guns in the open. It seldom worked in the US Civil War, and won't in the XX Century.

[ April 12, 2008, 07:52 PM: Message edited by: decimated550 ]

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[JasonC]

I just deny that proper combined arms tactics are slower in any material sense. Dead units aren't zippy. Reckless break-in tactics (just overmatch the guns) are OK only if you know for a fact that the defending gun density is low. If you are just gambling about that, you will "blow out" soon enough when you hit the real PAK front.

As for using area fire at deduced enemy positions, that's fine, there is nothing in it that contradicts attritionist combined arms. It can be more efficient if it reduces fire taken by getting kills earlier. Fire plan artillery does it all the time. Sending shells before most of the bodies is thematic throughout.

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[JasonC]

Guns blazing is emphatically attritionist thinking, it is the driving in part that is optional.

When you try to race the defense to the back side of his own defensive zone, you are simply guaranteed to lose that race. Period. It simply never works. Predicating the success or failure of your operational plan on something that will not happen, that you only hope for, it dumb all the way down.

Even in 1941 it didn't work. The Russian reserves met the German spearheads behind the front line. The mech corps sent for it just evaporated on contact, that is the only thing that allowed it to appear successful. The front line guys were meanwhile given idiotic orders to stand stock still, never backpeddle, counterattack every instant, etc, because the higher ups diagnosed "morale failure" as the cause. These were defender own goals and not a result of any soundness of principle on the attacking side. And they still, as mentioned, didn't beat the defending reserves to the back side of the defensive zone, they just defeated them as they ran into them, largely because CSS was non existent and the whole Russian mech arm therefore combat ineffective.

That is the only time it came close to happening. Every other occasion, rushing at the breakthrough zone just resulted in meeting the reserves and having to fight through them, not in getting through before they arrived. When there weren't any reserves to speak of in the whole region, it worked fine, but so would more deliberate breakthrough methods.

Look at the time scales. Front scale reserves readily "pancake" to the point of attack within 48 hours. On a scale of a week, you can bring up a reserve army group, or shift whole armies laterally, from the flank positions in the line. On a scale of 2 weeks, the Germans sometimes met a threat with an entire panzer corps from another *theater*.

You aren't going to break through because the defender can't get there. You might if he doesn't have enough to send, or to enough places, or you beat what he does send the get through anyway. Getting through without fighting his full strength because you are so recklessly fast, simply never happens.

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[JasonC]

I report the order as unreasonable and attack in the reasonable and deliberate manner. No framed certificate from a higher up excuses needless loss of a subordinate's life.

As for attack methods, they vary, they are a toolkit, not one size fits all. They don't have a speedometer, time is not their control variable, they are not picked by command push but by opportunity pull. The method is chosen to meet the type of defense, the ground, and own side advantages.

Sometimes you stonk with artillery, sometimes you infiltrate infantry by night, sometimes you set up killer overwatch and advance scouts, sometimes you go around, etc. The idea is to pick one the enemy is least ready for. "Let's all go over the top shouting "huzzah" and pretend that is faster", isn't used because it doesn't work, and higher ups too clueless to know that are kept out of the loop if necessary.

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[JasonC]

Slow is smooth and smooth is fast. Haste is dead and dead is stopped. I utterly deny the claim, all the way down. Rushing is always stupid. Tactical opportunity pull decides the pace, not a rear echelon you know what -er with a bug up his tail.