How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?

[Dandelion]

Goodnight Darci, wherever you are.

Sic

Dandelion

[Randal]

Why are you always writing about Hitler? It was not Hitler who attached Russia 1941. If it would have been only Hitler, then even one single russian tank would have been enough to stop him!

[Dandelion]

Actually I was writing about Darci, she works at the Atlantis Rising company. Of course, she also never attached Russia. As far as I know that is. But I never knew much of anything.

[Randal]

Oh, I was thinkin this page had something to do with "How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa? "

[Corvidae]

Kingfish

You know me too well,,

I'll ask her to bring a friend for you,

Cheers

[Son of Hamchuck]

JasonC,

We seem to have deviated a bit from the original question, which was "How could Germany have defeated the SU during Barbarossa?" Well I think it's been pretty well established that they would not have been able to defeat (as in force capitulation ) the SU during Barbarossa ( the blitzkreig period of June-Nov or 1941 ), even with an early total war commitment. This hinges in my view, on the Russians at some point during the initial period adopt a trading space for time strategy, in the face of a recognizably and markedly superior force both qualitatively and possibly even numericly( in the operational areas at least), and using their strategic depth to the utmost. This would be somewhat similar to the strategy they eventually adopted during Napoleon's invasion. Utilizing "scorched earth" methods as they retreated, would leave the Germans little to "inherit". It would take years to develop anything beyond a rudimentary infrastrucure.

Moving along to the post-blitzkrieg period, you actually made a very salient analogy for my point by mentioning China. China didn't have to defeat the Japanese, they had the Americans ( and the rest of the Allies ), for that. All China ( and Russia ) had to do was at a minimum survive, and wait for the cavalry. Anything beyond that would be gravy. The totalitarian regimes of Germany and Japan sowed the seeds for their own destruction in large part because they allowed for only for total victory ( and virtual slavery or death for the defeated ). Because they couldn't declare victory and go home( or even be relatively beneign rulers ), they' ensured that the subjegated populaces could never be anything but hostile to them, and that any resisting troops in the field were for the most part better off fighting to the death.

If you remove atomic weapons in 1945 (or soon thereafter) from the above scenario, then the war drags on for some time. Germany dominates Europe, at least until Japan is defeated, and the Allies can focus entirely on retaking the continent from all directions. The war lasts maybe another 3-5 years beyond 1945. It would be total victory or total defeat, aside from the Allies foresworn commitment to defeat the Axis, they could never allow Germany to aquire weapons of mass destruction. Germany was going down whatever the outcome from Barbarossa. The only good news for Germany ( if they succeeding in occupying European Russia), would be that the American's would be shoulder to shoulder with the Russians when they hit Berlin. That's my thesis.

FFKD

[Black Jack Pershing II]

FFKD-

What is this new Soviet Union going to live off? How much food production is there from the Urals to the Pacific?

The Red Army would not be consolidating toward their supply lines, they would be retreating away from them.

If you want to talk historical hypotheticals, I would envision a different cold war, with the US and East Asia (and maybe England, depending on who develops the A-bomb first) on one side and Europe on the other.

[John Kettler]

Gunzel for Kanzler,

A Hitler to Tavistock Institute connection, eh? That's a new one to me, but I am aware of Tavistock's involvement with rock and roll.

frenchfried_krautdog,

There's this tiny little (okay, huge and glaring) problem with your argument. Why? It's a documented fact that on at least two separate occasions the Russians attempted to begin peace treaty negotiations with the Germans. In one case, during the battle of Moscow, Stalin came within an ace of abandoning the city. In fact, his personal telegrapher was already on the special train waiting for him to arrive. The telegrapher was interviewed on a History Channel program, which also presented the documents from an earlier effort.

Regards,

John Kettler

[chiavarm]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Why? It's a documented fact that on at least two separate occasions the Russians attempted to begin peace treaty negotiations with the Germans. In one case, during the battle of Moscow, Stalin came within an ace of abandoning the city. In fact, his personal telegrapher was already on the special train waiting for him to arrive. The telegrapher was interviewed on a History Channel program, which also presented the documents from an earlier effort.

Regards,

John Kettler

"Peace Negotiations" have been used in an attempt stall successful offensives and this could have been the case.

It would be interesting to know what preparations Stalin was doing while offering peace.

[Son of Hamchuck]

BJPII,

It would be a hard life certainly, but could it be worse than Leningrad was for nearly three years? Also, it wouldn't be a given that they would be pushed back all the way to the Urals ( though they're base of production would have to be there ). The western Allies would probably have forgone an invasion of the European continent, in favor of smashing Japan first, and opening up supply lines thru China, and Russia's eastern ports. Supply thru the middle east although difficult, would have been possible. As it was, the Russian lost the Ukraine anyway ( a major source of their food supply ).

Regarding hypotheticals ( well this whole thread is just that ), I have a hard time envisioning the Allies just surrendering all of Europe to the Nazi, just because the Germans occupied European Russia. Can you perhaps explain why they would do that? Also knowing that England would be in mortal danger from German V weapons carrying at some point WMD, and eventually the US would be in range as well ( In fact the Germans had a heavy bomber prototype that could reach the US ). They were dealing with a mad man, and knew full well the consequenses of not stopping him and his followers.

John Kettler,

I'm aware of the peace feelers, but not the details of them( share them with us if you do). My hasty inclination would be that they were an attempt to stall for time. The Russian knew they were in trouble, and also knew they were not in a position at that time to retake the lost territory. If they could keep the Germans locked in place via an armistice, they would allow themselves time to rebuild their forces for an eventual attempt at retaking the lost areas. They also knew the Germans were fighting the clock by embarking on a two front war.

As for Stalin nearly abandoning Moscow, so what if he had? A prestige loss, sure. But it certainly wasn't going to change things signifigantly one way or another, as the factories and other important parts had already been evacuated.

[Son of Hamchuck]

Just a followup on the peace feelers. As should be obvious ANY agreement between Stalin and Hitler would have been totally worthless.

[Corvidae]

the thread has degenerated into humour

Hitler could not have invaded the SU,

He was lazy and out of shape ,, so he sent the army to do it for him,

end of topic

[Cuirassier]

I haven't posted on this thread since I started it a long time ago. This does not mean that I am not interested, but that the topics being discussed were basically 'over my head' since day one. I have been reading all of the replies however.

BTW, Corvidae, those Russian Troops are a tad overcrowded. I think German HE might make a mess of them...

[JasonC]

f-k - the difference is, the Russians *were* the "cavalry"...

Somebody had to actually pay the blood price to defeat the German army on the ground. They paid it, it is not clear anybody else was even up to it. Only the US is even close in all the required suits, and (thankfully) we never had to. (We faced more than half their force for all of a month when they were already deadly weak, and even that was no picnic).

[Son of Hamchuck]

JasonC,

I would agree with you in the context of what *actually* happened the Russian's were the "cavalry". They did ( most ) of the dirty work against the Germans, while the US did ( most ) of the dirty work against the Japanese. We were discussing hypotheticals about what might happen if the Russian's had to face a fully mobilized,total war effort from the German's from day one of the invasion. And conceding that very real possiblility that they would have lost signifigantly more territory than they actually did, with the accompaning impact on their supply,recruiting, and manufacturing capabilities.

The Germans weren't "supermen", and Blitzkreig wasn't concieved for a protracted large theater conflict. They had their share of superior weapons, but didn't/couldn't produce enough of them, and wasted effort on too many designs. Their tactics were very good, as was their operational abilities. Logisticly they were average.

In reality, they were extremely lucky to have defeated France. Imagine what would have happened if the French had advanced even a token force into the Ardennes, and made an effort to bomb the c**p out of the armored spearheads before they hit the Meuse. The Germans faced abysmal generalship in France, and decapitated generalship in Russia initially. They had a good run of luck, but couldn't overcome the odds against them.

I didn't quite get the comment about facing half their force for a month. Were you referring to the Battle of the Bulge? If so, then your right it was no picnic, but if you ever needed a demostration of the grit of the American fighting man, that was it.

FFKD

[Physim]

In paying the blood price Russia had more to lose than the US in fighting Germany. I think people will aways fight harder for there own homeland than that of others, hence it is not surprising the russians fought more desperately. I think the grit of US soldiers was better represented in the Pacific.

[Corvidae]

Cuirassier

Its ok,, I'll just recruit a million replacements next month,

[JasonC]

f=k - yes I was referring to the period mid Decemeber to mid January 1944-5, which means the Bulge and Alsace counterattacks. At that time, around half the German force remaining - and around 60% of the armor - was in the west, for the only time in the war. Most of the time the Russians faced 2-3 times the force the western allies did, although the portion facing the west rose over time. And of course the Russians faced them for 4 times as long. Overall, they dealt with about 10 times as much German fighting power as the western allies did.

As for not supermen, sure I agree (the thesis is, command muff...) But they still managed to inflict about 5 times the losses on Russians as they took from them, despite losing overall. It was not strategic brilliance, though they had surprise in 1941 and the Russians performed quite poorly that year. It wasn't brilliant operational "play" - the Russians outplayed them in pure "big chess", maneuver terms, from 1942 on. As anyone who can read a map and goes through the whole campaign can verify for themselves. It wasn't primarily technology or weapon systems - they nearly won in Pz IIIs and lost in Tigers and Panthers, against T-34s in both cases.

They were just tactical tigers, small "t". They used the right weapon for each job, had professional officers, disciplined noncoms, etc. Everybody experienced it and had to find their own counters. (US leaned on logistical superiority and firepower arms - arty and air. Russians leaned on scale, operations that put a unit an echelon larger up against each German. Etc).

As a result, taking down even the vanilla infantry corps was always expensive. Their biggest tactical weakness was throwing away their armor using it too aggressively, which made it a lot easier to deal with them afterward, than they would have been had they retained it for "linebacker" uses. But they were tough enough even with such weaknesses, thank you very much (lol).

As for France, I think the early French and Brits were so totally outclassed in the above terms, that no they didn't just get lucky. In fact, looking over the campaign I've always been struck by how overdetermined it is. It is not like the Germans lose anywhere, and need the Sedan breakthrough. Yes it is the instrument of the win, but even the secondary attacks romp. The French light mech fought reasonably well, that is about the most one can charitably say.

[Physim]

The French and the Brits had no counter for the blitzkrieg tactic, they had prepared for war like it was fought in WW1, once the static defences were flanked they were gone. As you rightly say the russians were helped by scale, this meant the initial blitz had to last longer. It stretched the German supply lines and gave the Russians time to prepare for a counter. I also think splitting the German offensive into 3 groups was a mistake, they should have concentrated on the South and held the oil fields this would have strangled Russian industry, Moscow and Leningrad were political and prestige targets not strategic ones and too many resources were wated on them.

[JasonC]

What's "the blitzkrieg tactic"? Hint - there isn't one.

[John Kettler]

Here's some independent confirmation of just how bad things got. The Soviet government evacuated Moscow

and went to Kubyischev (sp?). Stalin nearly left himself, then changed his mind, stayed and ordered the NKVD into action. Andreas should find this valuable to his investigations. It's in the first paragraph below the header about a Major Declassification Effort.

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no2/article12.html

This 1996 book review of Walter Dunn's KURSK: Hitler's Gamble specifically mentions that shortly before Kursk (spring of 43) the German government summarily rejected Soviet peace feelers made in Stockholm, Sweden. It's in the fifth paragraph.

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/reviewsw2.htm

Note 49 here has a significant discussion of sources on Soviet peace feelers to Germany.

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/ad/ad_v3_1/stc01.html

This analysis of Kursk devotes (about halfway down) two paragraphs to discussing the Soviet peace feelers to Germany, starting at "The diplomatic initiatives..."

http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~epf/1997/padilla.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[ February 17, 2006, 10:28 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Son of Hamchuck]

JasonC,

It would stand to reason that the Russians would face 2-3(or whatever) times the Germans the western allies would, they had an immensely larger front to fight on.

The Ardennes offensive was not a particulary good test case one way or another, because of the nature of the terrain, and the poor road network. It was a doomed offensive from the start, even if the weather had remained favorable, and had fuel supplies been adequate. It was really just a testament to the American GI as much as anything. Of course massive amounts of artillery didn't hurt either.

The Russians taking a high body count ratio reflects no particular great credit on the Germans. The Russians put little stock in conserving manpower, witness the human wave assaults ( ala the banzai charge ), so high losses were to be expected. When the tide turned, and the Russians became more adept in their tactics the ratio dropped. The Germans simply couldn't afford to be wasteful with their infantry ( not that Hitler particularly cared ).

I never said the Germans were brilliant strategists, far from it. As I pointed out earlier, they were quite deficient in that area. In the realm of operations, however, they were generally excellent. Their ability to concieve and execute was unmatched by the Russians until Kursk. In fact they dictated the tempo of the conflict up until that time. Even the Russian breakthru operation at Stalingrad ( Uranus ), was as dependant on surprise due to the lack of good( any? ) intel on the part of the Germans, as anything. For the most part up until July 1943, the Russian knew the Germans were coming, they just couldn't stop them( of course the weather could ). I don't count the attempt to take Stalingrad, because of the nature of the battle which had the Germans deprived of their strengths while playing into the Russians, and was simply a meatgrinder.

The German weapons were generally good to excellent, and they were able to get as much out of them as anyone could, thru doctrine and thru modifications of the basic designs. That the Pz-III could remain a mainstay as long as it did, is a testament to that. The improved tanks came too late( and in too few numbers ) to have a chance to make a difference in the outcome.

As you pointed out, a major German strength was it's organization at the lower levels of command. Also the ability to improvise, coordinate all-arms teams, and exercise independant initiative were of a high order. In fact the real strength of the German capabilites, was not the technical quality of the weapons systems, but rather their coordinated use as part of combined all-arms teams.

The Russian typical unit designations were often times higher in name only, than the Germans. For example, a Russian armored corps would be the rough eqivilant of a full strength panzer division( of course how often were they at full strength?).

As for the Germans throwing away their armor by being overly agressive, that was the mentality of Blitzkreig. It's hard to have it both ways. If your overly conservative, you can miss opportunities. Sometimes they were so weak on infantry support, that they had no choice but to chance it. When things were going well, that aggessiveness was generally rewarded. It's hard to break what's ingrained in your training, and took them time to adjust to being on a permanent defensive posture.

Sure the German's could have still beaten the French without Sedan ( a "near miracle" in Guderians words ), but it wouldn't have been a romp. And no, the Allies were not "totally outclassed". When it came to organization of armor units, the Germans were better. In combined arms coordination, superior. Weapons systems both qualtitatively and quantitatively, slightly inferior. Give the French a general staff equal to the German's, and they'd have no worse than a draw. The French fought well at Sedan, until the rumor mill and the unceasing pressure broke them ( these were the 2nd line troops ). Prioux's calvary corp inflicted heavy losses on Hoeppner's panzer corps, before retiring on orders. The counter attack at Arras put a real scare in the German high command . Pretty much everywhere there was a straight up battle, the Allies gave a good accounting of themselves. Without the breakthru at Sedan, the Allies have a chance to retreat in relatively good order behind sucessive river lines, to bring up reserves in intelligently instead of piecemeal, and avoid the chaos that jammed the roads in the rear areas. With Dunkirk not needed, the British stay, so Britains home defence fighter force gets commited to the battle. There's more, but the point is they last on the field a lot longer than six weeks. Even if eventually victorious, Hitlers' timetable would have been seriously out of wack, made worse by the Wermacht taking a much higher loss of men and machines. So instead of being ready to invade Russia in 1941, the Russians strike first in middle of 1942 with another year of T-34 production under their belts and a rebuilt officer corps.

FFKD

[Son of Hamchuck]

Physim,

The static defences ( Maginot Line ) were flanked because the portion of the Ardennes forest adjacent to them was left essentially uncovered.

There was no option but to advance across a broad front in Russia, anything else would have invited a flank attack on the extended supply lines.

FFKD

[Son of Hamchuck]

John Kettler,

Some interesting info, on the CIA website anyway. A few points.

Look at the time of year, even a short delay of a few weeks for "peace talks" would have put them right in middle of worst winter in memory. Advantage Russians.

Even if this was more than a stall for time on Stalins part, any "peace" wouldn't have been worth more than a brief respite to either side. They were NOT going to co-exist peaceably. Not before the invasion, and certainly not after one side carved a nice chunk out of the other.

Stalin made similar feelers as late as middle of 1943. What better way to light a fire under the Western Allies to initiate a second front, then to subtly threaten to cut a deal with Hitler. The guy was crazy like a fox.

Information coming out of the former SU has to always be taken with at least a little skeptism, until thouroughly corroborated. There are just too many skeletons in closets,and axes to grind, to do anything else.

FFKD

[Physim]

Originally posted by JasonC:

What's "the blitzkrieg tactic"? Hint - there isn't one.

I would suggest the use of armour to move quickly across enemy flanks and cause encirclement is a tactic.