Effectiveness of Late War Germans (LONGish Post)

[CRSutton]

Well, I know some fanatical units on the East front fought hard, but hundreds of thousands of Germans did surrender and whole fronts and armies fell apart which suggests that not all Germans were fighting to the end.

[Keith]

Getting back to the original subject, I am currently reading a book titled "With our Backs to Berlin" by Tessier. The book is full of first hand accounts of German war veterans during the last months of the war. One interesting fact is that during this period of the war there was such a severe shortage of brass that the Germans were making bullets with steel casings. The problem was that in order to protect the bullets from rust the Germans coated the bullets with laquer, which subsequently caused belts of ammunition to jam in the machine guns after the first burst due to the heat melting the laquer. The weapons would jam so bad that the troops would have to use their entrenching tools to clear the jam. Apparently the MG crews tried to have links of brass ammo available for emergencies. It would be interesting to model this by increasing the percent chance for an MG to jam during this period of the war, although it would obviously put the German player at a disadvantage.

[Spook]

As typical, whenever "nationality" comes up here, many of the viewpoints start getting polarized.

As Andreas can also recall, there was a heated debate earlier about the utility of "primary sources," or veterans' accounts, for WWII historical review. What can be recognized about one veteran's account is that it can be useful to relate experiences that might otherwise be missed in postwar assessments.

(I think one or two posters even labeled Andreas as a "Anglophobe" in those earlier debates. How off-target can one get? )

Now, looking at the recountings of Jary (the "18 Platoon" author), he relates the following key points:

1) From his tactical encounters, his typical experiences was that German infantry would lose "effectiveness" if their MG's were KO'ed. Well, no kidding, given that German squad firepower in an ordinary rifle squad maintained the MG42 as its "base of fire."

2) Jary further relates that getting to the German MG's was a difficult task, given that the Germans he encountered made great efforts for MG concealment. Therefore, HE support from tanks or FOO's (artillery) was very helpful.

3) Infiltration ability was needed for surprise attacks; and also from Jary, it was "easier said than done" to pull off effectively.

Excellent points in all.

Now, when going further to look at Jary's assessment of German "quality," here's where more discernment is needed. First off, remember that Jary's view is only one veteran's account. One. Consider further that the relative "quality" of German divisions in Normandy & afterwards was highly variable. Some were not so good, some were even piss-poor, but others would've likely forced Jary to "reassess" the generalization that "Germans didn't seek close combat." Some FJ units, or veteran panzer troops with more of the automatic small arms per squad, would probably had been more willing to "close." It was very unit-dependent & situation-dependent.

That doesn't invalidate Jary's accounts; he's relating what he experienced. Rather, Jary's account is included in larger correlations of veteran accounts, both British & German, if one is really trying to seek a "trend." I'm sure that some German veterans might have believed, in turn, that British/US troops had little stomach for close battle from his own experiences. (Some East Front vets might've been even more likely to feel this way.) This would then be diametrically opposed to Jary's overall view.

BTW, Andreas, you motivated me enough to look up "Les Plessis Grimault." But it's "Le," not "Les," you git.

[Andreas]

Spook, it is actually le Plessis Grimoult on today's map. Well, for showing me up so badly, I now shan't send you my historical battle based on this action. So there.

You are of course right regarding the validity of Jary's account, and it should also be remembered that 43rd Wessex was one of the best infantry divisions in the 2nd Army. The Germans seemed to regard it as such too, IIRC. Jary must also have been one lucky guy to make it as a platoon commander through the campaign. Any other platoon which may have lost its commanding officer a number of times would probably not have been capable of pulling this action off.

[Sgt Steiner]

Hi Spook et al

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Consider further that the relative "quality" of German divisions in Normandy & afterwards was highly variable. {SNIP} It was very unit-dependent & situation-dependent.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes indeed I agree with this fully, I can think of several instances when German units most certainly did 'stand' with or without MGs or in Close Combat situations those that spring readily to mind are 'remanants of HJ at Falaise (last 50 fought to death as I recall) and the various FJ units oppossing 21st Army during Rhine crossings in 1945 again many noted as fighting to very last. There are numerous others. And we can quote similar instances for all armies in WWII.

I agree with Spook that Jarys thoughts are exactly that - his - but still an important a source of info.

Jarys point that if MG 'nests' became too hard to deal with he 'resorted' to bringing up HE support direct or indirect is very interesting and I would suspect was standard operating procedure for both British and US forces in NW Europe ?

Cheers

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Spook, it is actually le Plessis Grimoult on today's map. Well, for showing me up so badly, I now shan't send you my historical battle based on this action. So there.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Funny that you should mention. Recently, I've done an extensive "retooling" of "Crown of Thorns" which I got earlier from your Kessel site. When done, I'm sending back to you & the original author for review or perhaps another revision cycle.

[Skipper]

From russian perspective, from late 1943 combat qualities of german infantry started to decline noticeably. This is not to say that it was poor, but to many it seemed considerably worse than in 1941-42. It is a commonly held view in many memoirs.

Interpretation of this factoid is this. German superiority was based on superior officer/NCO corps, that was trained in implementing the modern tactical doctrines better than anybody else at the time. The theory was well known, but it was germans who practiced it harder than anyone else when the war started.

These were the guys who made initial successes of 1939-42 possible. And at the same time these were the guys who died a lot in combat. So, by 1943 german army was not better trained than their soviet counterparts (both were conscripts and reservists with actual combat experience anywhere from green to veteran, and few professional soldiers with "proper military education" among them).

Besides, from late 1942 more and more germans realised that Fuhrer's is a lost cause. Which played a role in combat efficiency, too - less initiative, less aggressiveness.

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by RMC:

Ok, so the German infantry was ****e, their tanks couldn't hit anything, they waited too long to go to full war production and they were all around bad guys. How did they last so long with all those good guys arrayed against them? It can't be all Monty's fault now can it?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Anyone who underestimates the fighting power of the German soldier is out on a very long limb indeed. I don't think anybody here is in a hurry to try that one on.

But that is not to say that there weren't glaring deficiencies in the German military machine and it is not to say that there weren't mistakes at every level at one time or another. Most of all, it is not to claim that every German soldier was a ten foot tall god of war. This subtlety seems to get lost on certain 14 year olds.

Michael

[Roksovkiy]

By June 1944 and onwards, the allies were predominantly fighting the dregs of the German army. The personal accounts sound a lot like they were based on fighting volksturm units and dare I say it ‘biased’ on a hatred of the Nazis.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

By June 1944 and onwards, the allies were predominantly fighting the dregs of the German army. The personal accounts sound a lot like they were based on fighting volksturm units and dare I say it ‘biased’ on a hatred of the Nazis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's a pretty sweeping generalization, but in many cases true - by Allies I presume you include the Russians as well. Nonetheless, certain units were still putting up a tough fight - KG Chill, for example, at Hoogerheide/Woensdrecht. Andreas, I think the Black Watch at Woensdrecht qualify for one of your awards - one rifle company was reduced from 90 men to 4, as the regiment had to attack over 1300 yards of open beet fields. A Calgary Highlander officer later commented that you couldn't walk over the railroad embankment without stepping on Black Watch bodies.

Certainly German units in 1944 were a mixed bag - the cream of the Wehrmacht and SS had been buried, mostly in Russia - but all of the allies - Russia, USA, Britain, Canada, NZ, SA, etc., were sometimes faced with above average troops, and other examples can be found for all of these.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

By June 1944 and onwards, the allies were predominantly fighting the dregs of the German army. The personal accounts sound a lot like they were based on fighting volksturm units and dare I say it ‘biased’ on a hatred of the Nazis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You should pick up a history book and also learn reading English, not just typing it. What is wrong with a bias against Nazis BTW?

12th SS the 'dregs' of the German army? Panzerlehr? 1st SS LAH? Numerous Heer infantry divisions of earlier waves? The Fallschirmjaeger units? Yeah right. Get a book and start reading.

For the record, 43rd Wessex, in which Jary must have been an officer, fought 12th SS at Maltot/Hill 112, achieved the Vernon Seine crossing, later fought at Arnhem and on the island against German paras, and fought beyond the Rhine. They did fight all sorts of German units.

[RMC]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Anyone who underestimates the fighting power of the German soldier is out on a very long limb indeed. I don't think anybody here is in a hurry to try that one on.

But that is not to say that there weren't glaring deficiencies in the German military machine and it is not to say that there weren't mistakes at every level at one time or another. Most of all, it is not to claim that every German soldier was a ten foot tall god of war. This subtlety seems to get lost on certain 14 year olds.

Michael<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course there were glaring deficiencies in the german military machine, I just tend to see them more in the realm of logistics and organization than anything else.

I was just posting an outburst in a vain attempt to highlight the recent series of posts we've had. As each area is viewed in turn there seems plenty of room for debunking myths of German ability until we find that the allies had parity or superiority in most areas in addition to their logistical strength and then one is left wondering why the war lasted as long as it did.

The comments from the british officer are interesting and I don't mean to dismiss them out of hand, but if I accord my grandfather's own remarks about the Germans with the same respect as granted these then the Germans couldn't fight worth beans at night and allied units should get a spotting bonus based on stinky leather load-bearing gear and cheese.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Andreas, I think the Black Watch at Woensdrecht qualify for one of your awards - one rifle company was reduced from 90 men to 4, as the regiment had to attack over 1300 yards of open beet fields. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That would be a repeat award to add to the earlier one for attack on Rocquancourt, where the 'dregs' of the German army annihilated the battalion.

[Michael Dorosh]

Now, now, Andreas, let's be fair. The German Army did have a lot of dregs in it by 1944 - so-called "elite" units and panzer/paratroops aside (let's not forget GD either)

So when was the German Army at its peak?

Summer 1941? Does France and Poland really count as "combat experience"?

Summer 1942? How many veteran soldiers died or were invalided out during the first terrible winter in Russia?

1943? How many veteran soldiers were buried already?

Generalizations are really kind of silly - unit for unit is the way to look at them.

I mean, the Brits also had 59th Staffordshire Div, right? All the armies were a mixed bag. Even 5th Canadian Armoured had the stuffing knocked out of it during its first real fight on the Arielli in early 1944.

[Spook]

Actually, Andreas, it's interesting how you relate about the 43rd Division being one of the better UK outfits. Not to debate it, but I would've presumed, in earlier times, that more "veteranized" units like the 7th Armored, & 50th/51st Infantry Divisions would've been more consistent performers.

It's a tricky thing to broach, but for those in the "know" regarding UK division histories of the NW Europe campaigns, which really seemed to be the "better" divisions on a regular basis? And which seemed to perform under expectations?

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Not to debate it, but I would've presumed, in earlier times, that more "veteranized" units like the 7th Armored, & 50th/51st Infantry Divisions would've been more consistent performers.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I was under the impression these divs were the most INCONSISTENT - they were strung out and fought poorly early in Normandy - because they were over-used.

Easier to convince a newby that he's bulletproof than a veteran...

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Actually, Andreas, it's interesting how you relate about the 43rd Division being one of the better UK outfits. Not to debate it, but I would've presumed, in earlier times, that more "veteranized" units like the 7th Armored, & 50th/51st Infantry Divisions would've been more consistent performers.

It's a tricky thing to broach, but for those in the "know" regarding UK division histories of the NW Europe campaigns, which really seemed to be the "better" divisions on a regular basis? And which seemed to perform under expectations?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Michael, and RMC - it is a question of accepting variability. A statement like that by Mr. Runonsentence about the great Germans is equally ludicrous as one saying that by June 1944 there were only the dregs left. The reality (as always) is much more muddy. Some units were excellent, and on an ordinary day could outfight the best the Allies could throw at them. A lot of units were crap. Some units were indifferent, just your Ho-Hum lot of soldiers.

Spook - actually, both the 7th and the 51st had very serious problems in Normandy. The usual explanation is that they were not used to this kind of fighting, and they were of the opinion that they had 'done their bit. Divisions like 11th Armoured and 43rd performed better because they had trained in England for two-three years, and had not seen what HE or an 88 penetration can do to the human body.

[Aacooper]

"Effectiveness" is always a fun topic because everyone has an opinion, and there's no good way to quantify it yet (sorry fans of DuPuy). Just looking at the CMBO timeline, I believe the Germans peaked in Normandy and trailed off until the end. The US got better and better past Normandy. The Commonwealth troops peaked at Operation Veritable (Reichswald battle in Feb 45). My opinions of the advantages and disadvantages of each:

German Advantages:

- Warrior mentality/tradition - while little Tommy or Joe were working on "if the fast train leaves the station at 2:00pm, what time does it pass the slow train which left at 1:30pm?", little Fritz was working on "if bombers leave Berlin at 9:00am, what time do they drop bombs on Warsaw?" If you think I'm joking, read "Black March".

- More experienced NCO's and small-unit commanders - There's no better training than the real thing, and a division built from the core of survivors of the Eastern Front has a pool of combat-hardened leaders.

- MG42's and Panthers - much better than the Allied equivalents.

- Delaying action abilities - the Germans were able to fight surperb delaying actions. Look at Italy or the second half of the Ardennes for examples. A few troops can hold up many when the attacker has only a few choices in their line of advance. You won't win a war that way, but you will make it longer.

- Professionalism and thoroughness - The Germans were very professional and almost always conducted their doctrinally required counterattacks. Of course, that was a disadvantage when the attacker was ready, but many times it caused a lot of trouble.

German disadvantages:

- Willingness to surrender to the UK/US- Zetterling, who comes down squarely in the "Germans are great fighters" camp, points out that the percentage of German casualties in the West from MIA's are much greater than in the East - ~50% vs. ~13%. The reason is the high surrender rate. It's odd he uses that figure to buttress his argument. Anyway, the US Army Green Books show the US Army took more German prisoners than suffered casualties in each campaign except for the Ardennes. Fact is, many German soldiers did not fight to the death.

- Poor training - The German soldiers of 44/45 were thrown into battle with very little training. Sometimes Luftwaffe ground crews were reassigned to the infantry without any training. Even the elite divisions in the Ardennes had many raw recruits. This factor was less disastrous than it might have been because of all the veterans around, plus the fact that defensive missions are easier.

- Replacement system not up to the task - The German replacement system tried to keep soldiers fighting with others from their region. The use of a replacement battalion also meant replacements were trained and ready. Unfortunately, the combat tempo in 44/45 meant that replacement battalions were committed to the front line early in the fighting. As a result, divisions got burned out and were incorporated into other divisions or withdrawn from the line. It's a great system if casualties are lower and if your nation has adequate manpower, but it couldn't cope with the situation.

British advantages:

Regimental affiliations - The regimental system led to a lot of esprit de corps.

Infantry courage - Although all soldiers of all nations fought hard at times, the British soldiers had a special abilility for taking high casualties or staying in place when they shouldn't have.

British disadvantages:

- No doctrine - Apparently, doctrine was regarded as unnecessary, and the British Army had no doctrine. As a result, there was a tendancy to muddle through. This disadvantage was more pronounced in the armor, because it was the combat arm most in need of an effective method of fighting. The US and German doctrine was similar (read "When The Odds Were Even" for an analysis).

- Manpower shortages - The well-known manpower shortages constrained British aggressiveness (more on that) and caused operational difficulties.

- Army group command - Yes, I believe Monty was a disadvantage. He was simply too slow and cautious, which meant opportunities were lost. Modern warfare requires seizing the initiative and keeping it. Alexander, for example, knew this, and the battle for the Gothic Line reflects it (even if the battle did not succeed). Even Monty's famous gamble would have been less of a gamble if a) the German 15th Army had been cut off, and the British paused for a shorter time getting ready for the operation, and c) the lead units had been pushed harder to reach Arnhem.

- Combined arms - British combined arms warfare did not reach its peak until Operation Veritable. Before then, you have many examples in Normandy of armor going it alone. Even in Italy, unsupported armor attacked a portion of the Gothic Line, and got slaughtered.

US advantages:

- Training time - Each division got two years of training before reaching Europe. Granted, some units were better trained than others, and the training schedule had some disruptions, but Generals Marshall and McNair have to be congratulated for making the US Army from a small professional army to a large, successful draftee army in a short time.

- Flexibility - The US Army got better as the war came along, and that's because they weren't afraid to try new things and improve. There was a lot of learning on the job.

- Artillery - The flexibility and quantity made a big difference. With it, battalions could survive on isolated hilltops (outside Mortain), and impromptu defenses could be hard as rock (Krinkelt/Rocherath). Also true for the British as well.

- Combined arms - The Germans had kampfgruppe, but the US task forces had something the Germans didn't -- airpower. The US managed to tie in the air like no other combatant.

US Disadvantages:

- Inexperience - This was most felt in the NCO and lieutenant areas, where unsuited small-unit leaders sometimes led to poor results. Normandy has the most dramatic examples of inexperience, though authors who extrapolate the US soldier's ability to fight based on Normandy aren't seeing the whole picture.

- Replacement system - The Repple Depples were great for keeping a division in the line, but the individual men weren't necessarily ready for combat.

I could say more, but I've got to go to work!

[M Hofbauer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aacooper:

- MG42's and Panthers - much better than the Allied equivalents.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

oh how very wrong you are! apparently you have been misled to this very wrong impression by playing CM, because BTS despiccably failed to model the ground-breaking, incredible "scourge of the german army" tripod-Bren, and CMBO lacks the funnies and therefore doesn't show how pairs of Churchills carrying fascines successfully took on whole companies of Panthers for breakfast.

[Tero]

How does the peace time conscription affect the effectivness of an army during the time of war ? (Yes, the old professional vs conscript army angle )

I have recently taken a closer look at these "national modifier" related things and this has been a recurring pattern.

The armies who relied on peace time consciption had a broader base from which to draw materiel rapidly. These armies had a standing army which was made out of cadre officers and both cadre and conscript NCO's. The rank and file of the troops received uniform basic training which was (or was not as the case may be) periodically updated in refresher training.

On the other hand the armies which relied on a standing army comprised of cadre professional soldiers in all levels was not as agile to broaden its base. It was also susceptible to bloodletting early on that left it in turmoil if the losses were critical. That was because the influx of new recruits was utterly untrained and could not be brought to service standing with a brief (or in times of crisis no) refresher training.

What makes this interesting is the fact that both western Allies fall into the latter cathegory. And both had to use quantitative superiority in men, vehicles and weight of fire to overcome the supposedly more proficient but less lavishly equipped enemy.

The Red Army had shot itself in the head just prior to the start of the war and its peacetime conscript training had been directed more on the ideological training than military training so they had the worst of both worlds going for them.

From what I have read the British career military personel seems to have thought the influx of volunteers (or called up men) at the time of war was cramping their style (for the lack of a better term). This negative attidude towards conscription is apparent even in relatively recent studies made by civilian researchers.

The British army lost a sizable portion of its trained peace time manpower early on in large numbers all around the globe. They were simply written off in Europe (Norway, France) and Far East and also in the Mediterranean area in spectacular sweeps.

The British made things worse for themselves with the abysmally poor (read non-existent) training for ordinary infantry and to some extent the armoured force. They had to compensate for these deficiencies by making the infanrty support element better.

Apparently there was nothing wrong with the troop morale. They were just not prepared for combat because they had received no or minimal training. Most of the tactical and doctrinal training was given to the NCO's and officers.

How was it for the Americans ? They too lost a sizable portion of their manpower trained during peace time in the cataclysmic losses in 1941.

Was there any scorn or apprehention in the US professional military circles towards the non-professionals being called up that would have affected the training cycle, training methods and tactical and doctrinal thinking ?

The TD doctrine with is notion that "regular" tanks (manned by the less trained bulk of the crews) should leave the enemy armour for the highly trained TD arm would point this way.

When looking at the Germans the VG has always been belittled. But was their supposed ineffectivness due to the lack of training or was it attributable to something else (like poor or fragile morale) ?

These formations were comprised of young boys and old men. But since the early 1930's there had been various government schemes that were nothing more than military training in disguise. That would mean that they all were for all intents and purposes troops who had undergone basic training similar to the regular conscipts. The quality of the troops inside a unit was uneven. They were out of shape and untested in combat (do WWI veterans apply ?). They had also been subjected for years to the demoralizing effects of the Allied bombing campaign more than the frontline troops (who had suffered reverses but they were not helpless bystanders).

[Andreas]

Tero - you do know that the UK had the Territorial Army, which was something like the National Guard then? So the trained manpower was much larger than the professional army. Many of the very well-performing units in 21st AG were old territorials.

AFAIK the VG divisions were not old men and boys but the result of a call-up of previously exempt units, who had a very short training cycle?

Both of which makes quite a few of your points incorrect.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Tero - you do know that the UK had the Territorial Army, which was something like the National Guard then? So the trained manpower was much larger than the professional army. Many of the very well-performing units in 21st AG were old territorials.

AFAIK the VG divisions were not old men and boys but the result of a call-up of previously exempt units, who had a very short training cycle?

Both of which makes quite a few of your points incorrect.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Canadian Army had a lot of Militia in it, too, and Militia formed the core of the overseas Army.

Yet it is doubtful that many Militia troops received anything like useful training before 1939, and when you go from a 50,000 man Army (Militia included) to 500,000, your experienced troops have a little less impact.

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Spook - actually, both the 7th and the 51st had very serious problems in Normandy. The usual explanation is that they were not used to this kind of fighting, and they were of the opinion that they had 'done their bit. Divisions like 11th Armoured and 43rd performed better because they had trained in England for two-three years, and had not seen what HE or an 88 penetration can do to the human body.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Point taken about the "done their bit" factor, although I'm uncertain as to how much of an effect that was specifically to the 50th Division on D-Day, or for the noted divisions after the Normandy campaigns.

What Aacooper has posted as a follow-up, however, approaches closer to my point. While units like the 43rd & 11th Armored trained for multiple years, they hadn't any prior combat experience on a divisional scale. That can allow that units like the 43rd are more willing to "stand & take fire" because they are not "old lags" like the 50th & 51st. But that doesn't quite answer as to what relative combat proficiencies the newer units had in Normandy, in terms of combined operations, artillery usage, specialized tactics, operational command, etc. Further, on the US side, the "veteran" units certainly seemed to do better in Normandy, at least having a better handle on combined arms. The 9th Division, with prior experience in NA & Sicily, gave one of the better Normandy performances, dismantling 77th Division in the Cherbourg drive and repulsing Panzer Lehr near St. Lo a few weeks later.

My prior reading of UK units in Normandy, over the years, was really only "source-skimming," and as such, was often contradictory in relating which were the "effective" ones on an objective basis. For example, you've related how the Germans especially feared the 43rd Division. I've seen one source relate how a special fear was attached to the 49th "Polar Bears" (prior assignment was the Iceland guard) which the Germans were alleged to nickname as the "Butcher Bears." Or perhaps this was overstated. Another example relates how the 15th "Scottish" Division had a special "pibroch" about it, although its performance in Epsom doesn't seem overly outstanding.

Further, given the 43rd's losses at Hill 112, that would've been enough to shear off the "youthful spirit" you've inferred earlier, although the combat experience of the survivors could have proved enough to compensate.

I guess the "safe" path would be to allow that each UK division had its unique abilities. But on a removed objective scale, if one was trying to design a WWII game that had to weigh operational effectivenesses of these divisions against each other, then I'm still uncertain as to how these divisions would "rate" against each other through the progression of the NW European campaigns.

Granted, perhaps not an easy query to answer.

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aacooper:

British disadvantages:

- No doctrine - Apparently, doctrine was regarded as unnecessary, and the British Army had no doctrine. As a result, there was a tendancy to muddle through. This disadvantage was more pronounced in the armor, because it was the combat arm most in need of an effective method of fighting. The US and German doctrine was similar (read "When The Odds Were Even" for an analysis).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting claim. On what basis do you make it?

I'm not familar with the work you cite but from my understanding, the British definitly had a "doctrine" and it was a continuation of the tradition which stretched back to at least the turn of the century (as did the German).

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Another example relates how the 15th "Scottish" Division had a special "pibroch" about it, although its performance in Epsom doesn't seem overly outstanding.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is the second time I've seen "pibroch" in this manner. (Actually the first time, it was used to refer to "skill with bagpipes")

I had always thought that "pibroch" was an alternate spelling of "piobaireachd", which means Big Music in Gaelic and is a class of bagpipe music.

Is this a case of an American not knowing what the term means (my first impression years ago), or is this actually a legitimate use of the word - like someone saying "brogue" to refer to an Irish accent instead of his shoe?

[ 10-17-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]