Leibstandarte Division and Schweppenburg

[Jeff Duquette]

Interesting interpretation. I can see now that your not simply pulling stuff out of your ass . Perhaps we can simply agree to disagree for the time being.

[lassner.1]

Jeff,

Just for the record, I think that Russell would agree in large measure with FB.

Not that I'm trying to draw fire.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Atlas:

Apache,

You may say what you will about Rommel post-Afrika Corp, but the man was a genius on the coast of North Africa - on par with Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Rommel's march through Northern France was as equally impressive.

They certainly were on par, Lee and Rommel. Both began to believe their own press clippings, thought they were invincible, and wasted away possible victory on poor gambles.

[Jeff Duquette]

lassner.1

I think I get where FB is coming from now, and I vaguely recall reading Reynold's account of the debacle on Hill 195 and Totalize in "Steel Inferno"...but it's been awhile since I read SI. Than again Reynold's was a palmmy bastard with an obvious axe to grind with his poor Canadian Allies

Why not send Russell an email and see if he would drop by our discussion and throw a neutral third party opinion into this thread. I reckon it would make an interesting read.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Rommel22:

I think the absolute reason why the Tide turned in N africa was the result of the suplly sitution.

A supply situtation worsened by Rommel driving for the canal against the orders of higher command.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I think I get where FB is coming from now, and I vaguely recall reading Reynold's account of the debacle on Hill 195 and Totalize in "Steel Inferno"...but it's been awhile since I read SI. Than again Reynold's was a palmmy bastard with an obvious axe to grind with his poor Canadian Allies

Col. Stacey, in the official 'History of the Canadian Army 1939-1945' a work which is certainly not labouring under the reputation of slighting the Canadian contribution to the war, has a good account of the debacle IIRC. According to this, Worthington never knew he was on Hill 140. All the arty support was called for the grid coordinates of Hill 195. He died from a mortar round before somebody could point out his mistake, following a lot of his men.

The main contribution of this wasteful adventure was to spread a bit of panic in 12th SS HQ - maneuverists should love it...

This, and some of the other goings-on in 21st AG show that there were incapable men in positions they should never have achieved. I am sure the US had their share of CO failures as well.

My criticism of the Commonwealth performance, and I believe Babra's as well, extended to these COs, and not the poor sods who had to die or suffer otherwise due to their ineptness.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

Just so it's perfectly clear: Commonwealth troops weren't bad; their opponents were just better at the task of making war.

How where they "better" at "making war", a war that they lost?

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-20-2001).]

[Forever Babra]

Who is Russell?

[Jeff Duquette]

Russell is Lessner's bud that did the desertation on unit quaility in Normandy...man don't you read other folks posts

[Guest machineman]

I thought this might apply here somewhat. Also ties in a bit to the discussion on relative combat efficiency of the Soviets vs the west:

Stephen E. Ambrose has even written:

Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin relied on overwhelming numbers, and to some extent American-supplied equipment,to fight the Wehrmacht. The British and Americans were going to have to rely on their soldiers outfighting Nazi soldiers, because the numbers of troops on the opposing sides were roughly equal.

This is entirely wrong. When Operation Cobra was launched, the Germans had brought to Normandy about 410,000 men in divisions and non-divisional combat units. If this is multiplied by 1.19 [Zetterling's factor for adding service and support manpower outside German divisions and non-div units] we arrive at approximately 490,000 soldiers.

However, until 23 July, casualties amounted to 116,863, while only 10,078 replacements had arrived. This means that no more than 380,000 soldiers remained in Normandy or supported the fighting in Normandy. On 25 July there were 812,000 US soldiers and 640,000 British in Normandy. This means that the Allies had a 3.8:1 superiority in manpower. This was better than the superiority enjoyed by the Red Army on the Eastern Front. On 1 June 1944 the Soviets pitted 7.25 million men against 2.62 million Germans.

From:

http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/001126.shtml

[Guest machineman]

Aha, this is what I was looking for:

http://www.wargamer.com/articles/death_battle_group/wrthfrc1.asp

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Russell is Lessner's bud that did the desertation on unit quaility in Normandy...man don't you read other folks posts

Sorry -- momentary lapse. I just got a new job today

[Jeff Duquette]

Congrats...work however can often be over rated Money on the other hand can be a good thing to have on occasion.

[Forever Babra]

Excellent read, machineman. Thanks. That account indicates the Poles did try to intervene, but abandoned the attempt after the loss of 22 tanks.

Another thing which struck me was why Worthington Force, involved in the very point of a offensive, did not have air recognition signals deployed BEFORE being strafed by RAF Typhoons. It just strikes me as another example of unprofessionalism, though in this case it could likely be chalked up to inexperience.

A well written AAR. Thanks again.

[Jeff Duquette]

Great Article machineman...unfortunately the ending would seem to imply that the article has a Canadian Origin (kidding)

Lt.-Col. Worthington had shown great daring and dash in his night advance through the German 89th Infantry positions. A combination of factors ultimately led to the destruction of his battle group. Most notably was the error in direction, but loss of communication and the fact that this was their first battle also contributed to their eventual misfortune. The 4th Canadian Armoured Division was often criticized for a lack of offensive drive during the push to Falaise. The experience of Worthington Force illustrates the perils that can befall those who are tasked with missions that ultimately prove too daring in nature.

[Forever Babra]

Why a unit untrained in using the Oboe navigation system was sent on a night route with compasses baffles me. I believe Worthington would have been quite in the right to disregard his orders and approach the problem his own way.

Anyway, I'm sure the Germans suffered their share of similar balls-ups.

[Simon Fox]

The experience of Worthington Force illustrates the perils that can befall those who are tasked with missions that ultimately prove too daring in nature.

It was good to read that article again but it is easy to view it as a complete debacle. The critical word missing from the conclusion is "inexperience". I wouldn't view the entire thing as a debacle either. Questions I would ask are:

-What were the German casualties in this battle? The Canadian casualties are heavy but they were hardly 'wiped out'.

-What effect did concentration of powerful German forces against this force have in releiving pressure on other Allied units? The Germans clearly saw this as a considerable threat.

Worthington Force penetrated the German MLR(a loose description I know) with relative ease and deployed in a relatively good defensive position and fought a defensive battle (the ideal type for an inexperienced force) against the inevitable German counterattack inflicting considerable casualties on the Germans (apparently). As far as I can see whether they were on 195 or 140 is fairly irrelevant in that context, though considering the care taken in pathfinding during Totalize generally it is very perplexing. The only critical element missing from the mix is artillery support. I suspect that things would have been a fair bit different if they had it. There are plenty of battles in Normandy where Commonwealth infantry forces of similar size were fairly isolated and with little or no armour support smashed German combined arms counterattacks if they had good artillery support.

The 2nd Canadian Army was made up of predominantly inexperienced units but the initial stages of Totalize employing largely experienced units were a generally a brilliant success and followed a similar pattern. The difference was good pathfinding and leaders and staffs experienced in fighting a battle. There is always a weeding out process, it is inevitable, it happened to all armies, accentuated by small prewar armies and the need for rapid expansion. It is best if this weeding out is occurrs outside the context of critical offensive operations

------------------

"Stand to your glasses steady,

This world is a world of lies,

Here's a toast to the dead already,

And here's to the next man to die."

-hymn of the "Double Reds"

[Forever Babra]

I would consider the loss of nearly 100 tanks (47 BCR, 22 Polish, 26 GGFG), an unspecified number of other armoured vehicles, and the quantity of killed, wounded and captured among the infantry, for an objective which was never an objective, was not on the line of advance, and had no value, a debacle.

And it was because of a mistake, and a very avoidable mistake. Other units were trained in night navigation -- the BCR were not, yet they were asked to lead because they were fresh.

In the first stage of Totalize, the tanks were formed up so close together that one officer was literally able to walk the entire length of the two-mile force, walking over 1000 tanks and armoured vehicles, without ever touching the ground. The dust from this force made navigation impossible, but it was accomplished because they used Oboe (a radio beacon developed by the RAF for night bombing) and coast defence lights aimed at the clouds to produce artificial moonlight. That was on August 7th. A day later, another armoured force was sent into the night without any navigational aids at all, with the result that they lost 100% of their tank strength to enemy action.

When dawn came and Worthington Force reported themselves on the objective, did any of the officers present pull out a compass and take a bearing? That's SOP, and if even one of them had, their artillery wouldn't have landed four miles away. Why weren't the air recognition panels deployed? Why, even after survivors had straggled in, weren't the Poles able to advise of Worthington Force's location? Language trouble? The whole operation reeks of amateurism.

I hate to harp on the dead though. I mention that one incident as just an example. There are others.

[TheDesertFox]

I thought some of you might find this an interesting read in the context of Worthington Force, Hill 140 and Operation Totalize Phase II.

BTW: Hill 140 was the Phase II Objective of 1st Polish Armoured Division which suffered badly during Totalize. They lost 26 tanks in a few minutes on 8th August alone and 66 tanks in total during Totalize.

Snippet from AMENDMENT TO REPORT NO. 169 HISTORICAL SECTION CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS by (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,

Director Historical Section. 3 July 47

74. To carry out the Corps Commander's intention, Brigadier Booth ordered

the B.C.R. - Alq R. group "to advance to pt 195 and to reach objective by

first light". (W.D., H.Q. 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 9 Aug 44). The attempt to carry

out these orders produced a most costly action. Having got far off its axis

during the advance the combined force was almost annihilated.

75. The column moved off from near Gaumesnil a little after 0200 hours,

brushed aside enemy resistance at Cintheaux and engaged between Hautmesnil and

Cauvicourt on the way down. Pushing on to Bretteville-le-Rabet, our troops

were fired on from the woods north of the town. As "Halpenny Force" of Lake

Sup R. (Mot) and C.G.G. was just arriving in the area, the question arose

whether it would not be better to wait until Bretteville was cleared before

going any further. The commanding officer, Lt-Col D.G. Worthington of B.C.R.,

decided that the force must drive on in the hope of achieving surprise.

(W.Ds., 28 Cdn Armd Regt and Alq R., 9 Aug 44)

76. 28 Cdn Armd Regt led off, firing as it went. As the tanks got deeper

into hostile country, they soon discovered how effectively the German

positions had been camouflaged and the diarist describes how haystacks were apt to explode and bullets ricochet off haymounds. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt,

9 Aug 44). One company and one squadron had apparently been left behind to

deal with enemy resistance encountered en route, and this company ("D" Coy) is

reported as in action at a cross-roads (118510) about 2000 yards north-east of

Bretteville-le-Rabet. The remainder of the force fought on past Estrées-la-Campagne

to the high ground to the south and east. Enemy opposition around

Bretteville-le-Rabet was probably responsible for the decision to move by the

east of that village "and flank well out to the left to get around the

resistance" (ibid). The leading tanks obviously strayed from their course

(W.D. 28 Cdn Armd Regt remarks "The light was very poor this early in the

morning", and later "High ground was sighted, and we headed for it"). This

high ground on which they established themselves was described by many

different references. It was certainly, however, the wooded area in the

centre of the triangle between Estrées-la-Campagne, Soignolles and Rouvres,

some 6500 yards north-east of their objective and on the wrong side of the

Falaise road [This location is referred to by the diary of 28 Cdn Armd Regt as

Hill 143, at M.R. 144490; the History of 10 Cdn Inf Bde as Point 82, 8000

yards east of Point 195; and by Major Monk, in an eye-witness account appended

to the diary of Alq R. as Hill 140 which is at M.R. 135478, while the diary of Alq R. says M.R. 143490. Examination of the ground by Colonel C.P. Stacey on

9 Aug 46 (the precise second anniversary of the action) indicates that this

last position (about one-and-a-half miles east of Estrées) is accurate. Many

of the B.C.R. tanks (perhaps 15 to 20 - trees and undergrowth made precise

count difficult) still remained on the spot, shot through-and-through by the

enemy guns. See Report No. 157]. The text of the War Diary of H.Q. 4 Cdn

Armd Bde states that there was no communication with 28 Cdn Armd Regt after

0624 hours, but this is disproved by the operations log attached to the Diary

(Appx 5). At the time just mentioned the unit reported itself at 105498 (just

south-east of Bretteville-le-Rabet). At 0643 hours it was reported "Objective LESS 1800 metres... forming up now to reach objective"; and at 0655 hours the

following message from 28 Cdn Armd Regt was entered in the log:

Objective 0650 hours. No evidence of enemy occupation - but recent

signs. Few lorries destroyed, slit trenches and tools about. We are

holding until our friends come fwd to consolidate.

At 0755 hours the unit gave its position as recorded in the log as 0964. This

location (close to Caen) makes no sense, but clearly should read 0946, the

summit of Point 195. There can thus be no doubt that the unit's headquarters

actually believed that it was on the objective. By 0800 hours the troops were

dug in on the hill and came under "traffic 88-mm fire from North and North-east"

which knocked out several tanks. (W.D., Alq R., 9 Aug 44). From the

main positions "B" Squadron was sent forward to secure high ground in front.

Under supporting fire from one troop, a second cleared the position indicated,

when suddenly tanks began to flare up, and not one from either troop (it would

appear from the war diary) was able to return. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt,

9 Aug 44)

77. Meanwhile, No. 2 Troop of "B" Squadron had "advanced on centre line

decided on in 'B' Sqn 'O' Group" and had got as far as Hill 151 south-west of

Bretteville-le-Rabet. The "O" Group referred to was held near Estrées, and

the line of advance was presumably south-west from there. Here it was fired

on by two anti-tank guns. These were knocked out and groups of enemy infantry

were encountered too frightened to fight on. The isolated troop then fell

back and joined another squadron ("A", the detached one) near Estrées-la-Campagne,

where a German tank reported to be a Tiger had been cornered and

driven into the village. While our tanks were killing it, four of them were

knocked out, and the rest, except two which pushed on towards the main force, were pinned down and unable to move from their position. They succeeded in

destroying another Tiger, but were themselves eventually knocked out. The two

tanks which reached the main body made the dismal report that hostile armour

and anti-tank guns had completely cut off the approaches, and that no further

reinforcements from the original battle group could get through. (W.D.,

28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44) [There seems little doubt that No. 2 Troop of “B”

Sqn took the line of advance intended for the whole regiment, but that the

main body in some way strayed from this line and went east instead of south-west].

78. Throughout the morning continuous fire swept the position. Tanks were

being hit, bursting into flames, and exploding their ammunition.

Lt-Col Worthington, whose tank was one of the first hit, eventually

concentrated all the serviceable armour in "the south-west corner" (W.D.,

Alq R., 9 Aug 44) and continued the fight. During the battle the defenders

wee assisted greatly by Typhoons which supported them with rocket and cannon.

Casualties included Lt-Col Hay of Alq R. badly wounded in the leg.

Fortunately a daring attempt to evacuate wounded succeeded in breaking through

the encircling enemy. On the way out one of the vehicles carrying the wounded

was hit by an 88-mm shell, but at 1040 hours the rest got back to 10 Cdn Inf

Bde. Numerous small counter-attacks were launched from all sides during the

day, and at noon Lt-Col Worthington, commander of the dwindling garrison on

the hill, took stock of his resources. He found that there were about eight

tanks left undamaged from the 60 that had started the advance. Tank crews had

suffered heavily in both killed and wounded, and there were eight dead and 25

wounded from the infantry (ibid). About 1500 hours the shelling and mortaring

increased in intensity. The Germans then counter-attacked with infantry and

tanks, but were held off by the aid of rocket-firing Typhoons. Now that the

infantry were well entrenched, Lt-Col Worthington ordered all tanks that could still run to make a dash for it, using fire and movement to effect their

escape. Acting on this order, the remaining eight tanks got out safely.

(W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44)

79. It was now accepted by those of our garrison who still survived that

they were not on their objective, but it was decided to hold on as long as

possible in the hope that the officer who had taken the convoy of wounded back

to Brigade would be able to arrange some assistance. At 1700 hours the

defenders on the hill were encouraged and excited by the prospects of help,

when they saw friendly tanks coming towards them from the direction of

Soignolles. But this new hope was soon abandoned, for not knowing the plight

of the troops on the high ground ahead, and hard-pressed because of their own

casualties, the Poles turned around and went back to safer ground. (W.D., Alq

R., 9 Aug 44). A little after 1800 hours another strong counter-attack was

put in from the south-east by a force estimated at two infantry companies and

supported by a vicious concentration of mortar fire, which added further

casualties and burnt up one of the four disabled tanks which could still fire.

The besieging infantry were held off, but a mixed force of Tiger and Panther

tanks was able to come within 200 yards and fire across our positions. At

this time a mortar bomb killed Lt-Col Worthington as he was evacuating the wounded to the slight cover of a hedgerow. This gallant stand, against

increasing and hopeless odds, came to an end at dusk. At some time between

2100 and 2230 hours the remnants of the two infantry companies, together with

12 or 14 unhorsed tank-men, made their way down the slope through the

wheatfields and succeeded in reaching the Polish lines at Renémesnil. (W.Ds.,

28 Cdn Armd Regt and Alq R., 9 Aug 44) 80. In this isolated and heroic episode the B.C.R. on its first day in

action lost five officers killed, including the Commanding Officer, five officers missing and four officers wounded; while 33 other ranks were reported

missing and 78 wounded. Forty-seven tanks were lost during the day. (W.D.,

28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44). Of the two companies of Alq R. which had helped

so valiantly to hold the mistaken hill only three officers and 79 other ranks

were fit for duty. Known casualties were 12 dead and 46 wounded. (W.D.,

Alq R., 11 Aug 44)

cheers

Helge

------------------

Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate!

- The DesertFox -

Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net

WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

I wouldn't view the entire thing as a debacle either. Questions I would ask are:

-What were the German casualties in this battle? The Canadian casualties are heavy but they were hardly 'wiped out'.

-What effect did concentration of powerful German forces against this force have in releiving pressure on other Allied units? The Germans clearly saw this as a considerable threat.

Simon, no offense intended - if you apply these questions, you can make look the experience of 1st Airborne at Arnhem look good. The Germans clearly saw it as a thread and took heavy casualties, the drop relieved pressure on the XXX Corps and the US airborne divisions, the division was hardly wiped out, about 25% of them made it back.

Armies don't just saunter through the countryside looking for a fight like a bunch of rednecks in a pickup truck on a Saturday night in Alabama. Worthington's force was assembled and tasked with Hill 195 for a purpose. It failed to achieve it. In failing to achieve it, it took serious casualties. It also failed to achieve any gains whatsoever around Hill 140. The bumbling of Worthington (i.e. not knowing where he was) made it impossible to rescue the situation through arty.

I think the questions to ask are:

- Why was Hill 195 important, and what effect did not taking it have on future operations?

- Would a position on Hill 140 have been tenable (it may have been under overwatch from Hill 195) even if it could have been achieved?

- Were the casualties incurred to cause German casualties and spread confusion amongst them worth it?

Evaluating operations by using the yardstick you proposed would throw a whole new light on the Somme, Ypres, Gallipolli and any number of failed battles you care to mention. In all of these cases the defender took serious casualties and was feeling threatened.

Worthington failed with fatal consequences for him and many of his men. Compare his performance to that of Major Curry of the same division in St. Lambert-sur-Dives only nine days later.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

The whole operation reeks of amateurism.

I hadn't heard of Lt. Col Worthington before I read Michael Reynolds excellent Steel Inferno. I have no idea what he did before then, how long he'd been in Normandy, and what actions he'd been involved after landing. I don't know what physical and mental demands had been placed on him in the days and weeks beforehand. I doubt anyone else here does. For that reason I think people should be careful with the "why didn't he..?" reasoning.

We can debate this from the comfort of our homes and offices, benefiting from the comforts of home life, and certainly not being subject to the terrors of combat and impending death. Lt. Col Worthington wasn't out on a route march. His force was engaged along it's route by KG Waldmuller, and, it seems, they headed for high ground, becoming disorientated along the way. But we will never know what was in Worthington's mind, however, as he didn't survive the battle.

------------------

"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Forever Babra]

I really (really) hate the old "comfort of our chairs" argument. It's no argument at all, as I've already pointed out.

However, just to prove that nothing is as simple as it seems, here's an article from Legion Magazine. Pay special attention to the lecture Simonds gave his senior officers on July 30th, a week before Totalize. Eerie stuff.

http://www.wlu.ca/~wwwmsds/341copptotalize.htm

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

I don't know what physical and mental demands had been placed on him in the days and weeks beforehand. I doubt anyone else here does. For that reason I think people should be careful with the "why didn't he..?" reasoning.

If you don't feel up to the job of leading hundreds of men and a lot of tanks to take an important objective, just say so, and I am sure you'll be found a nice desk job. If you don't, it is the job of your superior to notice it and give you the job at a desk anyway. That way good men won't get killed.

To reiterate - compare Worthington's performance with that of Major Curry, and you see the two extremes of junior leadership in the Canadian army. It is not fair to only judge it by either one or the other, but the fact that Worthington was given this job speaks volumes about the judgement of his superiors.

Was there not a Canadian CO at a very high level that was generally held to be incompetent, but he could not be removed because it was felt necessary not to offend the tender sensibilities of the Canadians?

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Simon Fox]

Andreas,

It seems you misinterpreted my points which were of degrees rather than absolutes. Certainly I was not trying to throw a positive light on the whole episode, just trying to point out that there were far worse debacles. I definitely did not intend to evaluate the operation by the yardstick of those questions alone. Your questions and others are equally valid.

It seems to me that things often go awry, the measure of competence is how one deals with the situation. It appears that Worthington's force strayed into the axis of advance of the Polish division. It suprises me that they were unable to exploit that fact, though clearly they tried. The armour losses are so high because they were using tanks to do an infantry job. The same may well apply to the Poles, at the time the Commonwealth armoured divisions had the force mix all wrong.

Armies don't just saunter through the countryside looking for a fight like a bunch of rednecks in a pickup truck on a Saturday night in Alabama.

Hehe, well actually it is a classic tactic employed by the Commonwealth infantry divisions at Alamein which works really well against hidebound Germans. Attack at night, get on the objective (which is of little significance in itself), consolidate before dawn, smash the inevitable Axis counterattack. That Rommel, sooooo predictable .

It is not fair to only judge it by either one or the other, but the fact that Worthington was given this job speaks volumes about the judgement of his superiors.

Though I don't know the specifics of Worthingtons backround, I think you are being a little harsh there, sometimes there is no way of knowing. One of the positive aspects of the self-depreciating British attitude was that often they would acknowledge that they were "not up to it". Suprisingly in accounts this is generally seen as positive whereas the idiots who keep plugging away are derided

------------------

"Stand to your glasses steady,

This world is a world of lies,

Here's a toast to the dead already,

And here's to the next man to die."

-hymn of the "Double Reds"

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

We can debate this from the comfort of our homes and offices, benefiting from the comforts of home life, and certainly not being subject to the terrors of combat and impending death.

Oh, I certainly hope so! I freely concede that any army depending on me for battlefield leadership would be in a very sorry state indeed!

Michael